Loading profile…
Loading profile…
Book
Antonio R. Damasio · 1994
Damasio's title is an accusation: Descartes was wrong to split the thinking thing from the feeling body. From patients who lost emotion and with it the ability to decide well, Damasio built the case that feeling is not the opponent of reason but one of its instruments — the body tagging options with value before deliberation begins.
Sequence ladder
Narrative Intelligence sources live outside the figurative image sequence ladder. Adaptive placement applies to image sequences, not this reading library.
What this book knows
The mind-body split is a mistake: somatic markers — gut-level emotional signals from the body — are not noise against reason but the very thing that makes sound decision possible.
Illuminates
Editor’s framing
This is the origin of the somatic-marker hypothesis and the ground of Vela's attention to the body in emotion and in writing — the felt sense that arrives before the reasoned account and shapes it. It sits on the body-first side of the field's central divide, in tension with the constructionist account. Read it for the inversion of a four-hundred-year-old picture: that a person stripped of feeling does not become more rational, but less able to live.
Read alongside · the magazine
Feeling as input to reason — the somatic case for writing from the body.
Read alongside · the emotions
One of the felt states Damasio reattaches to judgment rather than ruling out of it.
Scholars: Antonio Damasio
0 published passages · book excerpt · research analysis
Reader resonance signals for text sources are not wired to this view yet.