Confusion

Passages

Every passage tagged with this emotion in the Vela corpus. Search the body text, narrow by source or register, click through to a book’s profile to see how the passage sits with the rest of the work.

Page 111 of 112 · 20 per page

• From Boys & Sex (2020)

  I admit, I sometimes struggle to understand a new generation’s approach to gender. Does it challenge or reinforce convention when we consider certain attitudes, qualities, ways of presenting to be “masculine” or “feminine” regardless of a person’s anatomy? Must a boy in a skirt be seen as possibly gay or female? Must a girl with a crew cut and baggy jeans be thought of as mannish? Also, while some nonnormative young people try to explode the binary by identifying as fluid, others, like Devon or Hutch, identify firmly and fully as male. Nor did that identification predict sexuality. Hutch, for one, enjoyed vaginal penetration and felt most sexually attracted to what he referred to as “people with penises,” though more romantically toward those with vulvas. It’s confusing, but then, maybe that’s the point. “When you have a shift, even a small shift in the lived experience of gender around trans bodies, there’s a domino effect on heteronormativity,” pointed out Jack Halberstam, a professor of English and gender studies at Columbia University who writes about female masculinity and trans issues. “So if a woman flirts with someone she finds out later is a trans man, it might inadvertently change her understanding of what it means to be a man whom she finds attractive. And that creates the potential for more positive, surprising, pleasurable interactions between people.” As with Zane, Devon felt a previously unimaginable level of support from friends, family, and community. Even his grandmother took his transition in stride. They could, and would, accept him as a boy—but, unsurprisingly, no one talked about what that meant in bed. How do you find pleasure in the body with which you’ve been so at odds, and specifically from the parts that may be fundamental to that disaffection? “I didn’t feel hopeless about it,” Devon said. “But I didn’t have a very high level of confidence that I would ever enjoy sex for myself.” Then, midway through college, he met Mia. The first time they were naked together, she looked at Devon, really took him in, and clearly appreciated what she saw. “I thought, God, that is a beautiful man!” she told him later. When Devon said he didn’t want to be touched, Mia said, “That’s okay, I don’t have to touch you. But I’m going to make you want me to.” And she did. Their relationship has not been a fairy tale: it has been turbulent, inconsistent, sometimes tense. But sexually, it has made Devon feel whole. “I have felt like she welcomed me into my own body,” he said. “She’s so reverent about it and that is so healing for me. She says, ‘I love your parts, I love doing what I do to you, and you are male to me.’ Through that, I’ve learned to feel that way as well. She’s taught me that just because my body isn’t classically male, that doesn’t mean that I’m not male.”

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  Again. The higher the intellect the more it knows;—either a greater number of things, or at least more about the same things. Now the divine intellect surpasses every created intellect: and consequently it knows more things than any created intellect. Yet it knows not things except through knowing its own essence, as we proved in the First Book. Therefore more things are knowable in the divine essence, than any created intellect can see therein. Besides. The measure of a power is according to what it can do. Consequently to know all that a power can do is the same as to comprehend that power. But, since the divine power is infinite, no created intellect can comprehend it any more than it can comprehend its essence, as we proved above. Neither, therefore, can a created intellect know all that the divine power can do. Yet all the things that the divine power can do are knowable in the divine essence, because God knows them all, and not otherwise than in His essence. Therefore a created intellect by seeing the divine essence, does not see all that can be seen in the divine substance.

• From The Distancing-Embracing model of the enjoyment of negative emotions in art reception (2017)

  [arWM] Silvia, P. J. (2012) Human emotions and aesthetic experience: An overview of empirical aesthetics. In:Aesthetic science: Connecting minds, brains, and experience, ed. A. Shimamura & S. E. Palmer, pp. 250–75. Oxford University Press. [MN] Silvia, P. J. & Brown, E. M. (2007) Anger, disgust, and the negative aesthetic emo- tions: Expanding an appraisal model of aesthetic experience.Psychology of Aesthetics, Creativity, and the Arts1(2):100–106. [EST] Silvia, P. J., Fayn, K., Nusbaum, E. C. & Beaty, R. E. (2015) Openness to experience and awe in response to nature and music: Personality and profound aesthetic experiences.Psychology of Aesthetics, Creativity, and the Arts9(4):376–84. Available at:http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/aca0000028. [KF, aWM] Silvia, P. J. & Nusbaum, E. C. (2011) On personality and piloerection: Individual differences in aesthetic chills and other unusual aesthetic experiences.Psy- chology of Aesthetics, Creativity, and the Arts5(3):208–14. [KF] Singer, T. & Lamm, C. (2009) The social neuroscience of empathy.Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences1156(1):81–96. Available at:http://dx.doi.org/10. 1111/j.1749-6632.2009.04418.x. [GG, aWM] Singer, T., Seymour, B., O’Doherty, J., Kaube, H., Dolan, R. J. & Frith, C. D. (2004) Empathy for pain involves the affective but not sensory components of pain. Science303(5661):1157–62. Available at:http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science. 1093535. [aWM] Skulsky, H. (1980) On being moved byfiction.Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criti- cism39(1):5–14. Available at:http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/429914. [aWM] Slater, M. D. (2002) Entertainment education and the persuasive impact of narra- tives. In:Narrative impact: Social and cognitive foundations, ed. M. C. Green, J. J. Strange & T. C. Brock. pp. 157–81. Erlbaum. [MCG] Sloman, S. A. & Lagnado, D. (2015) Causality in thought.Annual Review of Psy- chology66:223–47. [NR] Smidt, K. E. & Suvak, M. K. (2015) A brief, but nuanced, review of emotional granularity and emotion differentiation research.Current Opinion in Psychol- ogy3:48–51. Available at:http://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2015.02.007. [NFB, rWM] References/Menninghaus et al.: The Distancing-Embracing model of the enjoyment of negative emotions in art reception 60 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES, 40 (2017) https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X17000309 Published online by Cambridge University Press

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  2364. He shows by induction that change takes place only between the above-mentioned limits; for the limits of change admit of four possible combinations: first, when both limits are affirmative or positive terms, as when something is said to be changed from white to black, and this change he describes as one from subject to subject; second, when both limits are negative terms, as when something is said to be changed from not-white to not-black, or in his words, from non-subject to non-subject; third, when the starting point from which change begins is a positive term and the terminus to which it proceeds is a negative one, as when a thing is said to be changed from white to not-white, or as he says, from subject to non-subject; fourth, when the starting point of change is a negative term and the terminus to which it proceeds is a positive one, as when a thing is said to be changed from not-white to white, or as he says, from a non-subject to a subject. He explains the meaning of the term subject which he had used, as what is signified by an affirmative or positive term. 2365. Now one of these four combinations is useless; for there is no change from a non-subject to a non-subject, because two negative terms, such as not-white and not-black, are neither contraries nor contradictories since they are not opposites; for they can be affirmed truly of the same subject because there are many things which are neither white nor black. Hence, since change is between opposites, as is proved in Book I of the Physics, it follows that there is no change from a non-subject to a non-subject. Therefore there must be three kinds of change, two of which relate to contradiction and the other to contrariety. 2366. The change (1009). Then he shows what these three changes are; and in regard to this he does three things. First, he shows that generation and destruction are two of these. Second (1010:C 2368), he shows that neither of these is motion ( “ If non-being ” ). Third (1011:C 2375), he draws his conclusion as to which change is called motion ( “ And since every ” ). He accordingly says, first (1009), that of the three changes mentioned above, that which is from a non-subject to a subject, or between contradictory terms, is called generation. And this is twofold; for there is change either from non-being in an unqualified sense to being in an unqualified sense (generation in an unqualified sense), and this occurs when a movable subject is changed substantially; or there is change from non-being to being, not in an unqualified sense but in a qualified one, for example, change from not-white to white (generation in a qualified sense).

• From Deceptions and Myths of the Bible (1975)

  Once free, an aspect of that intelligence that creates cosmic forms, creates biologic forms to complete its purpose, namely, the development of qualities. These forms through experience with the quantitative (environment) develop an intelligence of their own, moral, rational, and so forth. Here we have another name for intelligence: we call it consciousness—funded experience. As this is something added, we call it epigenetic consciousness to distinguish it from the genetic. This is the work of Evolution, the sequel to Involution, and here science calls the biologic intelligence genetic, but it has never carried the idea to its logical conclusion, namely, that the biologic and the cosmologic must be of like nature. Yet there are not two Creators, one for the cosmic the other for the biologic. To this cosmic genetic we may attribute all the creative wisdom we have attributed to religion’s God, with this difference: it is neither moral nor self-conscious. This alone explains the earthquake and volcano, the hurricane and flood. These are not conscious “acts of God,” but only planetary functionalism. They are energy acting without consciousness; biologic forms are energy controlled by consciousness. There are, in fact, just two principles in the entire universe, consciousness and energy, and they are inextricably bound together throughout the entire creative process. Without energy, consciousness can do nothing, and energy without consciousness will do nothing constructive. It is of these two then that we must learn. From all this we see that the mystery of life is man-made, not God-made. When an ignorant priesthood introduced the supernatural into a perfectly natural universe, it threw confusion into the human mind. The result was a myriad warring religions and philosophies all trying like the blind men with the elephant, to explain the whole by something felt (emotional) instead of seen (mental). Only in our theory can these warring elements be harmonized, and the paradox posed by religion—divine source and savage nature—be resolved. Energy (Source)Silence! coeval with eternity, Thou wert ere Nature’s self began to be: ‘Twas one vast Nothing all, and all Slept fast in thee.1 ALEXANDER POPE For the creation of a thing so vast as a world, Creative Intelligence must have a vast amount of matter. The second question then is: Where did this matter come from? Though scoffed at but a few years ago, it is now known that matter is but “congealed energy.” This implies a congealing process and a prephysical source of matter, something like that of the nonphysical electron. Dr. I. Langmuir called this source the quantel , a significant term and we shall use it. A more familiar name, however, is etheric energy. But is this the ultimate source of matter? May it not be but one of the many vibratory rates of energy? It is. We are all familiar with the many vibratory rates of the electromagnetic spectrum, but this spectrum itself is but a section of the total cosmic spectrum; it is, in fact, the lowest part of it.

• From History of the Christian Church: The Complete Set of Eight Volumes (1858)

  It is a solemn warning against the antinomian and licentious tendencies which revealed themselves between A.D. 60 and 70. Origen remarks that it is "of few lines, but rich in words of heavenly wisdom." The style is fresh and vigorous. The Epistle of Jude belongs likewise to the Eusebian Antilegomena, and has signs of post-apostolic origin, yet may have been written by Jude, who was not one of the Twelve, though closely connected with apostolic circles. A forger would hardly have written under the name of a "brother of James" rather than a brother of Christ or an apostle. The time and place of composition are unknown. The Tübingen critics put it down to the reign of Trajan; Renan, on the contrary, as far back as 54, wrongly supposing it to have been intended, together with the Epistle of James, as a counter-manifesto against Paul’s doctrine of free grace. But Paul condemned antinomianism as severely as James and Jude (comp. Rom. 6, and in fact all his Epistles). It is safest to say, with Bleek, that it was written shortly before the destruction of Jerusalem, which is not alluded to (comp. Jude 14, 15). The Epistles of John. Comp. §§ 40–43, 83 and 84. The First Epistle of John betrays throughout, in thought and style, the author of the fourth Gospel. It is a postscript to it, or a practical application of the lessons of the life of Christ to the wants of the church at the close of the first century. It is a circular letter of the venerable apostle to his beloved children in Asia Minor, exhorting them to a holy life of faith and love in Christ, and earnestly warning them against the Gnostic "antichrists," already existing or to come, who deny the mystery of the incarnation, sunder religion from morality, and run into Antinomian practices. The Second and Third Epistles of John are, like the Epistle of Paul to Philemon, short private letters, one to a Christian woman by the name of Cyria, the other to one Gains, probably an officer of a congregation in Asia Minor. They belong to the seven Antilegomena, and have been ascribed by some to the "Presbyter John," a contemporary of the apostle, though of disputed existence. But the second Epistle resembles the first, almost to verbal repetition,1131 and such repetition well agrees with the familiar tradition of Jerome concerning the apostle of love, ever exhorting the congregation, in his advanced age, to love one another.

• From History of the Christian Church: The Complete Set of Eight Volumes (1858)

  Then the church historian Eusebius, in the name of the middle party, proposed an ancient Palestinian Confession, which was very similar to the Nicene, and acknowledged the divine nature of Christ in general biblical terms, but avoided the term in question, oJmoouvsio" consubstantialis, of the same essence. The emperor had already seen and approved this confession, and even the Arian minority were ready to accept it. But this last circumstance itself was very suspicious to the extreme right. They wished a creed which no Arian could honestly subscribe, and especially insisted on inserting the expression homo-ousios, which the Arians hated and declared to be unscriptural, Sabellian, and materialistic.1328 The emperor saw clearly that the Eusebian formula would not pass; and, as he had at heart, for the sake of peace, the most nearly unanimous decision which was possible, he gave his voice for the disputed word. Then Hosius of Cordova appeared and announced that a confession was prepared which would now be read by the deacon (afterwards bishop) Hermogenes of Caesarea, the secretary of the synod. It is in substance the well-known Nicene creed with some additions and omissions of which we are to speak below. It is somewhat abrupt; the council not caring to do more than meet the immediate exigency. The direct concern was only to establish the doctrine of the true deity of the Son. The deity of the Holy Spirit, though inevitably involved, did not then come up as a subject of special discussion, and therefore the synod contented itself on this point with the sentence: "And (we believe) in the Holy Ghost."1329 The council of Constantinople enlarged the last article concerning the Holy Ghost. To the positive part of the Nicene confession is added a condemnation of the Arian heresy, which dropped out of the formula afterwards received. Almost all the bishops subscribed the creed, Hosius at the head, and next him the two Roman presbyters in the name of their bishop. This is the first instance of such signing of a document in the Christian church. Eusebius of Caesarea also signed his name after a day’s deliberation, and vindicated this act in a letter to his diocese. Eusebius of Nicomedia and Theognis of Nicaea subscribed the creed without the condemnatory formula, and for this they were deposed and for a time banished, but finally consented to all the decrees of the council. The Arian historian Philostorgius, who however deserves little credit,1330 accuses them of insincerity in having substituted, by the advice of the emperor, for oJmo-ouvsio" (of the same essence) the semi-Arian word oJmoi-ouvsio" (of like essence). Only two Egyptian bishops, Theonas and Secundus, persistently refused to sign, and were banished with Arius to Illyria. The books of Arius were burned and his followers branded as enemies of Christianity.1331 This is the first example of the civil punishment of heresy; and it is the beginning of a long succession of civil persecutions for all departures from the Catholic faith.

• From History of the Christian Church: The Complete Set of Eight Volumes (1858)

  *Theophile Roller (Protest.): Les Catacombes de Rome. Histoire de l’art et des croyances religieuses pendant les premiers siècles du Christianisme. Paris, 1879–1881, 2 vols. fol, 720 pages text and 100 excellent plates en hétiogravure, and many illustrations and inscriptions. The author resided several years at Naples and Rome as Reformed pastor. M. Armellini (R.C.): Le Catacombe Romane descritte. Roma, 1880 (A popular extract from De Rossi, 437 pages). By the same the more important work: Il Cimiterio di S. Agnese sulla via Nomentana. Rom. 1880. Dean Stanley: The Roman Catacombs, in his "Christian Institutions." Lond. and N. York, 1881 (pp. 272–295). Victor Schultze (Lutheran): Archaeologische Studien ueber altchristliche Monumente. Mit 26 Holzschnitten. Wien, 1880; Die Katakomben. Die altchristlichen Grabstätten. Ihre Geschichte und ihre Monumente (with 52 illustrations). Leipzig, 1882 (342 pages); Die Katakomben von San Gennaro dei Poveri in Neapel. Jena, 1877. Also the pamphlet: Der theolog. Ertrag der Katakombenforschung. Leipz. 1882 (30 pages). The last pamphlet is against Harnack’s review, who charged Schultze with overrating the gain of the catacomb-investigations (see the "Theol. Literaturzeitung," 1882.) Bishop W. J. Kip: The Catacombs of Rome as illustrating the Church of the First Three Centuries. N. York, 1853, 6th ed., 1887(212pages). K. Rönneke: Rom’s christliche Katakomben. Leipzig, 1886. Comp. also Edmund Venables in Smith and Cheetham, I. 294–317; Heinrich Merz in Herzog, VII. 559–568; Theod. Mommsen on the Roman Catac. in "The Contemp. Review." vol. XVII. 160–175 (April to July, 1871); the relevant articles in the Archaeol. Dicts. of Martigny and Kraus, and the Archaeology of Bennett (1888). III. Christian Inscriptions in the catacombs and other old monuments. *Commendatore J. B. de Rossi: Inscriptiones Christiana Urbis Romae septimo seculo antiquiores. Romae, 1861 (XXIII. and 619 pages). Another vol. is expected. The chief work in this department. Many inscriptions also in his Roma Sott. and "Bulletino." Edward Le Blant: Inscriptions chrétiennes de la Gaule anterieures au VIIIme siècle. Paris, 1856 and 1865, 2 vols. By the same: Manuel d’Epigraphie chrétienne. Paris, 1869. John McCaul: Christian Epitaphs of the First Six Centuries. Toronto, 1869. Greek and Latin, especially from Rome. F. Becker: Die Inschriften der römischen Cömeterien. Leipzig, 1878. *J. Spencer Northcote (R.C. Canon of Birmingham): Epitaphs of the Catacombs or Christian Inscriptions in Rome during the First Four Centuries. Lond., 1878 (196 pages). G. T. Stokes on Greek and Latin Christian Inscriptions; two articles in the "Contemporary Review" for 1880 and 1881. V. Schultze discusses the Inscriptions in the fifth section of his work Die Katakomben (1882), pp. 235–274, and gives the literature. The Corpus Inscriptionum Graecarum by Böckh, and Kirchhoff, and the Corpus Inscriptionium Lat, edited for the Berlin Academy by, Th. Mommsen and others, 1863 sqq. (not yet completed), contain also Christian Inscriptions. Prof. E. Hübner has added those of Spain (1871) and Britain (1873). G. Petrie has collected the Christian Inscriptions in the Irish language, ed. by Stokes. Dublin, 1870 sqq. Comp. the art. "Inscriptions," in Smith and Cheetham, I. 841.

• From The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion (1967)

  Mutatis mutandis , the process of mystification extends to the roles clustered in the institutions in question. In other words, the representation implied in every role is mysteriously endowed with the power to represent suprahuman realities. Thus the husband faithfully channeling his lust in the direction of his lawful spouse not only represents in this reiterated action all other faithful husbands, all other complementary roles (including those of faithful wives) and the institution of marriage as a whole, but he now also represents the prototypical action of connubial sexuality as willed by the gods and, finally, represents the gods themselves. Similarly, the king’s executioner, who faithfully chops off the head of the lawfully condemned malefactor, not only represents the institutions of kingship, law, and morality as established in his society, but he represents the divine justice that is posited as underlying these. Once more, the terror of suprahuman mysteries overshadows the concrete, empirical terrors of these proceedings. It is very important to recall in this connection that roles are not only external patterns of conduct, but are internalized within the consciousness of their performers and constitute an essential element of these individuals’ subjective identities. The religious mystification of internalized roles further alienates these, in terms of the duplication of consciousness discussed before, but it also facilitates a further process of falsification that may be described as bad faith ( 23 ). One way of defining bad faith is to say that it replaces choice with fictitious necessities. In other words, the individual, who in fact has a choice between different courses of action, posits one of these courses as necessary. The particular case of bad faith that interests us here is the one where the individual, faced with the choice of acting or not acting within a certain role “program,” denies this choice on the basis of his identification with the role in question. For example, the faithful husband may tell himself that he has “no choice” but to “program” his sexual activity in accordance with his marital role, suppressing any lustful alternatives as “impossibilities.” Under conditions of successful socialization, they may then be “impossible” in fact—the husband may be impotent if he attempts them. Or again, the faithful executioner may tell himself that he has “no choice” but to follow the “program” of head-chopping, suppressing both the emotional and moral inhibitions (compassion and scruples, say) to this course of action, which he posits as inexorable necessity for himself qua executioner. A different way of saying this is to say that bad faith is that form of false consciousness in which the dialectic between the socialized self and the self in its totality is lost to consciousness ( 24 ). As we have seen before, alienation and false consciousness always entail a severance, in consciousness, of the dialectical relationship between man and his products, that is, a denial of the fundamental socio-cultural dialectic. This dialectic, however, is internalized in socialization.

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  Whether the completion of the Divine works ought to be ascribed to the seventh day?Objection 1: It would seem that the completion of the Divine works ought not to be ascribed to the seventh day. For all things that are done in this world belong to the Divine works. But the consummation of the world will be at the end of the world (Mat. 13:39,40). Moreover, the time of Christ’s Incarnation is a time of completion, wherefore it is called “the time of fulness [*Vulg.: ‘the fulness of time’]” (Gal. 4:4). And Christ Himself, at the moment of His death, cried out, “It is consummated” (Jn. 19:30). Hence the completion of the Divine works does not belong to the seventh day. Objection 2: Further, the completion of a work is an act in itself. But we do not read that God acted at all on the seventh day, but rather that He rested from all His work. Therefore the completion of the works does not belong to the seventh day. Objection 3: Further, nothing is said to be complete to which many things are added, unless they are merely superfluous, for a thing is called perfect to which nothing is wanting that it ought to possess. But many things were made after the seventh day, as the production of many individual beings, and even of certain new species that are frequently appearing, especially in the case of animals generated from putrefaction. Also, God creates daily new souls. Again, the work of the Incarnation was a new work, of which it is said (Jer. 31:22): “The Lord hath created a new thing upon the earth.” Miracles also are new works, of which it is said (Eccles. 36:6): “Renew thy signs, and work new miracles.” Moreover, all things will be made new when the Saints are glorified, according to Apoc. 21:5: “And He that sat on the throne said: Behold I make all things new.” Therefore the completion of the Divine works ought not to be attributed to the seventh day. On the contrary, It is said (Gn. 2:2): “On the seventh day God ended His work which He had made.”

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  Reply to Objection 2: Judgment, as it were, concludes and terminates counsel. Now counsel is terminated, first, by the judgment of reason; secondly, by the acceptation of the appetite: whence the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 3) says that, “having formed a judgment by counsel, we desire in accordance with that counsel.” And in this sense choice itself is a judgment from which free-will takes its name. Reply to Objection 3: This comparison which is implied in the choice belongs to the preceding counsel, which is an act of reason. For though the appetite does not make comparisons, yet forasmuch as it is moved by the apprehensive power which does compare, it has some likeness of comparison by choosing one in preference to another. Whether free-will is a power distinct from the will?Objection 1: It would seem that free-will is a power distinct from the will. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that {thelesis} is one thing and {boulesis} another. But {thelesis} is the will, while {boulesis} seems to be the free-will, because {boulesis}, according to him, is will as concerning an object by way of comparison between two things. Therefore it seems that free-will is a distinct power from the will. Objection 2: Further, powers are known by their acts. But choice, which is the act of free-will, is distinct from the act of willing, because “the act of the will regards the end, whereas choice regards the means to the end” (Ethic. iii, 2). Therefore free-will is a distinct power from the will. Objection 3: Further, the will is the intellectual appetite. But in the intellect there are two powers—the active and the passive. Therefore, also on the part of the intellectual appetite, there must be another power besides the will. And this, seemingly, can only be free-will. Therefore free-will is a distinct power from the will. On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 14) free-will is nothing else than the will.

• From The John Dominic Crossan Essential Set (Jesus; The Birth of Christianity; The Power of Parable; The Greatest Prayer) (2004)

  But those passing references are unintelligible without some story at least similar to that in the Cross Gospel source of the Gospel of Peter . Finally, recall, from above, that Van Voorst said Recognitions 1.33–71 had “a strong connection with the primitive church” (1989:180) and that Jones said its “author stood in some sort of direct genetic relationship to earliest Jewish Christianity” (1995:165). The more that source in Recognitions 1.33–71 is connected to the earliest Christian Jewish community in Jerusalem, the more that story in the Cross Gospel is pushed back to that same situation. Scriptural Memory The issue of scriptural background becomes more debatable in views like those of Koester and J. D. Crossan, who … dismiss any rooting of the passion in Christian memory. Koester [1980a:127] states with assurance that in the beginning there was only belief that Jesus’ passion and resurrection happened according to the Scriptures so that “the very first narratives of Jesus’ suffering and death would not have made any attempt to remember what actually happened.” Crossan [1988:405] goes even further: “It seems to me most likely that those closest to Jesus knew almost nothing about the details of the event. They knew only that Jesus had been crucified, outside Jerusalem, at the time of Passover, and probably through some conjunction of imperial and sacerdotal authority.” He does not explain why he thinks this “most likely,” granted the well-founded tradition that those closest to Jesus had followed him for a long time, day and night. Did they suddenly lose all interest, not even taking the trouble to inquire about what must have been the most traumatic moment of their lives? Raymond E. Brown, The Death of the Messiah , pp. 15–16 I conclude this chapter by asking about a more basic and important issue than sources: that of origins. The most fundamental debate about the passion-resurrection story is not about the problem of sources (or how our versions relate to one another) but about the problem of origins (or how that story was first created). The problem is not about the brute facts of Jesus’ crucifixion outside Jerusalem around Passover but about the specific details of that consecutive story, blow by blow and word for word, hour by hour and day by day. There are two major disjunctive options that I summarize as prophecy historicized versus history remembered. Those twin options were given respectively in the epigraphs from Helmut Koester and Raymond Brown at the start of this Part X. They are continued in the epigraph just above. What is at issue in this debate? RECORDING HISTORY Brown’s position, which I summarize as history remembered , seems at first sight both obvious and commonsensical. Jesus’ companions knew or found out what happened to him, and such historical information formed the basic passion story from the very beginning. Allusions to biblical precedents were illustrative or probative for that story, but not determinative or constitutive of its content.

• From Survival of the Prettiest: The Science of Beauty (1999)

  84. genes and happiness: D. Lykken and A. Tellegen, “Happiness is a stochastic phenomenon,” Psychological Science, 7, 1996, 186–189. 85. “happier people tend to perceive themselves”: Diener, Wolsic, and Fujita, p. 120. 86. less faithful, seek a divorce: M. Dermer and D. L. Thiel, “When beauty may fail,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 31, 1975, 1168–1176. 87. “propitious physiognomies”: Michel de Montaigne, “On physiognomy.” In Michel de Montaigne, Essays. Trans. J. M. Cohen (New York: Penguin, 1958), p. 338. 88. beauty and integrity: A. H. Eagly, R. D. Ashmore, M. G. Makhijani, and L. C. Longo, “What is beautiful is good, but … : A meta-analytic review of research on the physical attractiveness stereotype,” Psychological Bulletin, 110, 1991, 109–128. CHAPTER 4. COVER ME 1. seeing “derived from touching”: Sigmund Freud, Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality. Trans. James Strachey (New York: Basic Books, 1962), p. 22. 2. gloves … like “steamrollered silk arms”: Kennedy Fraser, Scenes from the Fashionable World (New York: Knopf, 1987), p. 73. 3. Flawless skin: Desmond Morris, The Human Zoo (New York: Dell, 1969). 4. Skin may be: W. Montagna, The Structure and Function of Skin (New York: Academic Press, 1962). A. Montague, Touching: The Human Significance of the Skin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971). M. Lappe, The Body’s Edge: Our Cultural Obsession with Skin (New York: Henry Holt, 1996). 5. nothing quite like skin gone bad: William Ian Miller, The Anatomy of Disgust (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997), pp. 52–53. 6. Ruskin never consummated: I thank Stan Sclaroff for relating the Ruskin anecdote to me. See also P. Rose, Parallel Lives: Five Victorian Marriages (New York: Vintage, 1984), p. 56. 7. “coprophilic pleasure”: S. Freud, 1962, p. 21, note 1. 8. “The naked ape”: Desmond Morris, The Naked Ape: A Zoologist’s Study of the Human Animal (New York: McGraw Hill, 1967). 9. denuding took place: Marvin Harris, Our Kind: Who We Are, Where We Came From, Where We Are Going (New York: HarperPerennial, 1989). 10. Alek Wek: See Elle, November 1997, and A. Samuels, “Black beauty’s new face: African model has impact on the runway,” Newsweek, November 24, 1997, p. 68. 11. grooming and primates: Franz de Waal, Chimpanzee Politics: Power and Sex among Apes (London: Cape, 1982); Azalea: Franz de Waal, Good Natured: The Origins of Right and Wrong in Humans and Other Animals (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996). 12. maternal grooming: S. R. Butler, M. R. Suskind, and S. M. Schanberg, “Maternal behavior as a regulator of polyamine biosynthesis in brain and heart of the rat pup,” Science, 199, 1978, 445–447. S. M. Schanberg and T. M. Field, “Sensory deprivation stress and supplemental stimulation in the rat pup and preterm human neonate,” Child Development, 58, 1987, 1431–1447.

• From The Second Sex (1949)

  This accounts for the importance the young man gives to love’s apprenticeship;19 we have seen how Stendhal and Malraux marvel at the miracle that “I myself am another.” But Gusdorf is wrong to write “and in the same way man represents for the woman an indispensable intermediary of herself to herself,” because today her situation is not the same; man is revealed in the guise of another, but he remains himself, and his new face is integrated into the whole of his personality. It would only be the same for woman if she also existed essentially for-herself; this would imply that she possessed an economic independence, that she projected herself toward her own ends and surpassed herself without intermediary toward the group. Thus equal loves are possible, such as the one Malraux describes between Kyo and May. It can even happen that the woman plays the virile and dominating role like Mme de Warens with Rousseau, Léa with Chéri. But in most cases, the woman knows herself only as other: her for-others merges with her very being; love is not for her an intermediary between self and self, because she does not find herself in her subjective existence; she remains engulfed in this loving woman that man has not only revealed but also created; her salvation depends on this despotic freedom that formed her and can destroy her in an instant. She spends her life trembling in fear of the one who holds her destiny in his hands without completely realizing it and without completely wanting it; she is in danger in an other, an anguished and powerless witness of her own destiny. Tyrant and executioner in spite of himself, this other wears the face of the enemy in spite of her and himself: instead of the sought-after union, the woman in love experiences the bitterest of solitudes; instead of complicity, struggle and often hate. Love, for the woman, is a supreme attempt to overcome the dependence to which she is condemned by assuming it; but even consented to, dependence can only be lived in fear and servility. Men have rivaled each other proclaiming that love is a woman’s supreme accomplishment. “A woman who loves like a woman becomes a more perfect woman,” says Nietzsche; and Balzac: “In the higher order, man’s life is glory, woman’s is love. Woman is equal to man only in making her life a perpetual offering, as his is perpetual action.” But there again is a cruel mystification since what she offers, he cares not at all to accept. Man does not need the unconditional devotion he demands, nor the idolatrous love that flatters his vanity; he only accepts them on the condition that he does not satisfy the demands these attitudes reciprocally imply. He preaches to the woman about giving: and her gifts exasperate him; she finds herself disconcerted by her useless gifts, disconcerted by her vain existence. The day when it will be possible for the woman to love in her strength and not in her weakness, not to escape from herself but to find herself, not out of resignation but to affirm herself, love will become for her as for man the source of life and not a mortal danger. For the time being, love epitomizes in its most moving form the curse that weighs on woman trapped in the feminine universe, the mutilated woman, incapable of being self-sufficient. Innumerable martyrs to love attest to the injustice of a destiny that offers them as ultimate salvation a sterile hell.

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  Reply to Objection 2: Genus is taken from matter, as is stated in Metaph. viii, 2; and in accidents the subject takes the place of matter. Now it has been said above that pleasure and sorrow are generically contrary to one another. Consequently in every sorrow the subject has a disposition contrary to the disposition of the subject of pleasure: because in every pleasure the appetite is viewed as accepting what it possesses, and in every sorrow, as avoiding it. And therefore on the part of the subject every pleasure is a remedy for any kind of sorrow, and every sorrow is a hindrance of all manner of pleasure: but chiefly when pleasure is opposed to sorrow specifically. Wherefore the Reply to the Third Objection is evident. Or we may say that, although not every sorrow is specifically contrary to every pleasure, yet they are contrary to one another in regard to their effects: since one has the effect of strengthening the animal nature, while the other results in a kind of discomfort. Whether there is any sorrow contrary to the pleasure of contemplation?Objection 1: It would seem that there is a sorrow that is contrary to the pleasure of contemplation. For the Apostle says (2 Cor. 7:10): “The sorrow that is according to God, worketh penance steadfast unto salvation.” Now to look at God belongs to the higher reason, whose act is to give itself to contemplation, according to Augustine (De Trin. xii, 3,4). Therefore there is a sorrow contrary to the pleasure of contemplation. Objection 2: Further, contrary things have contrary effects. If therefore the contemplation of one contrary gives pleasure, the other contrary will give sorrow: and so there will be a sorrow contrary to the pleasure of contemplation. Objection 3: Further, as the object of pleasure is good, so the object of sorrow is evil. But contemplation can be an evil: since the Philosopher says (Metaph. xii, 9) that “it is unfitting to think of certain things.” Therefore sorrow can be contrary to the pleasure of contemplation. Objection 4: Further, any work, so far as it is unhindered, can be a cause of pleasure, as stated in Ethic. vii, 12,13; x, 4. But the work of contemplation can be hindered in many ways, either so as to destroy it altogether, or as to make it difficult. Therefore in contemplation there can be a sorrow contrary to the pleasure. Objection 5: Further, affliction of the flesh is a cause of sorrow. But, as it is written (Eccles. 12:12) “much study is an affliction of the flesh.” Therefore contemplation admits of sorrow contrary to its pleasure. On the contrary, It is written (Wis. 8:16): “Her,” i.e. wisdom’s, “conversation hath no bitterness nor her company any tediousness; but joy and gladness.” Now the conversation and company of wisdom are found in contemplation. Therefore there is no sorrow contrary to the pleasure of contemplation.

• From History of the Christian Church: The Complete Set of Eight Volumes (1858)

  To be just, we must recognize the sectarian imperfections of Bible versions, arising partly from defective knowledge, partly from ingrained prejudices. A translation is an interpretation. Absolute reproduction is impossible in any work.471 A Jew will give a version of the Old Testament differing from that of a Christian, because they look upon it in a different light,—the one with his face turned backward, the other with his face turned forward. A Jew cannot understand the Old Testament till he becomes a Christian, and sees in it a prophecy and type of Christianity. No synagogue would use a Christian version, nor any church a Jewish version. So also the New Testament is rendered differently by scholars of the Greek, Latin, and Protestant churches. And even where they agree in words, there is a difference in the pervading spirit. They move, as it were, in a different atmosphere. A Roman Catholic version must be closely conformed to the Latin Vulgate, which the Council of Trent puts on an equal footing with the original text.472 A Protestant version is bound only by the original text, and breathes an air of freedom from traditional restraint. The Roman Church will never use Luther’s Version or King James’s Version, and could not do so without endangering her creed; nor will German Protestants use Emser’s and Eck’s Versions, or English Protestants the Douay Version. The Romanist must become evangelical before he can fully apprehend the free spirit of the gospel as revealed in the New Testament. There is, however, a gradual progress in translation, which goes hand in hand with the progress of the understanding of the Bible. Jerome’s Vulgate is an advance upon the Itala, both in accuracy and Latinity; the Protestant Versions of the sixteenth century are an advance upon the Vulgate, in spirit and in idiomatic reproduction; the revisions of the nineteenth century are an advance upon the versions of the sixteenth, in philological and historical accuracy and consistency. A future generation will make a still nearer approach to the original text in its purity and integrity. If the Holy Spirit of God shall raise the Church to a higher plane of faith and love, and melt the antagonisms of human creeds into the one creed of Christ, then, and not before then, may we expect perfect versions of the oracles of God. NOTES. the official revision of the luther-bible, and the anglo- american revision of the authorized english bible. An official revision of Luther’s version was inaugurated, after long previous agitation and discussion, by the "Eisenach German Evangelical Church Conference," in 1863, and published under the title: Die Bibel oder die ganze Heilige Schrift des Alten und Neuen Testaments nach der deutschen Uebersetzung D. Martin Luthers. Halle (Buchhandlung des Waisenhauses), 1883. It is called the Probebibel. The revised New Testament had been published several years before, and is printed by Dr. O. von Gebhardt together with the Greek text, in his Novum Testamentum Graece et Germanice, Leipzig, 1881.

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  Reply to Objection 2: Evil, as evil, does not move the will, but in so far as it is thought to be good. Yet it comes of their wickedness that they esteem that which is evil as though it were good. Hence their will is evil. Reply to Objection 3: The habits of civic virtue do not remain in the separated soul, because those virtues perfect us only in the civic life which will not remain after this life. Even though they remained, they would never come into action, being enchained, as it were, by the obstinacy of the mind. Whether the damned repent of the evil they have done?Objection 1: It would seem that the damned never repent of the evil they have done. For Bernard says on the Canticle [*Cf. De Consideratione v, 12; De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio ix] that “the damned ever consent to the evil they have done.” Therefore they never repent of the sins they have committed. Objection 2: Further, to wish one had not sinned is a good will. But the damned will never have a good will. Therefore the damned will never wish they had not sinned: and thus the same conclusion follows as above. Objection 3: Further, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii), “death is to man what their fall was to the angels.” But the angel’s will is irrevocable after his fall, so that he cannot withdraw from the choice whereby he previously sinned [*Cf. [5161]FP, Q[64], A[2]]. Therefore the damned also cannot repent of the sins committed by them. Objection 4: Further, the wickedness of the damned in hell will be greater than that of sinners in the world. Now in this world some sinners repent not of the sins they have committed, either through blindness of mind, as heretics, or through obstinacy, as those “who are glad when they have done evil, and rejoice in most wicked things” (Prov. 2:14). Therefore, etc. On the contrary, It is said of the damned (Wis. 5:3): “Repenting within themselves [Vulg.: ‘Saying within themselves, repenting’].” Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 4) that “the wicked are full of repentance; for afterwards they are sorry for that in which previously they took pleasure.” Therefore the damned, being most wicked, repent all the more. I answer that, A person may repent of sin in two ways: in one way directly, in another way indirectly. He repents of a sin directly who hates sin as such: and he repents indirectly who hates it on account of something connected with it, for instance punishment or something of that kind. Accordingly the wicked will not repent of their sins directly, because consent in the malice of sin will remain in them; but they will repent indirectly, inasmuch as they will suffer from the punishment inflicted on them for sin. Reply to Objection 1: The damned will wickedness, but shun punishment: and thus indirectly they repent of wickedness committed.

• From Why Is Sex Fun? The Evolution of Human Sexuality (1997)

  Title : Why Is Sex Fun? (Science Masters) Author: Diamond, Jared WHY IS SEX FUN? WHY IS SEX FUN?The Evolution of Human Sexuality JARED DIAMOND [image file=image_rsrc1P2.jpg] [image file=image_rsrc1P3.jpg] A Member of the Perseus Books Group The Science Masters Series is a global publishing venture consisting of original science books written by leading scientists and published by a worldwide team of twenty-six publishers assembled by John Brockman. The series was conceived by Anthony Cheetham of Orion Publishers and John Brockman of Brockman Inc., a New York literary agency, and developed in coordination with Basic Books. ·············· The Science Masters name and marks are owned by and licensed to the publisher by Brockman Inc. ·············· Copyright © 1997 by Jared Diamond. Published by Basic Books, A Member of the Perseus Books Group. ·············· All rights reserved. No part of this book may be used in any manner whatsoever without written permission except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles and reviews. For information, address Basic Books, 387 Park Avenue South, New York, NY 10016-8810. ·············· Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Diamond, Jared M. Why is sex fun? : the evolution of human sexuality / by Jared Diamond. — 1st ed. p. cm. Includes index. ISBN-10 0-465-03127-7 (cloth) ISBN-13 978-0-465-03127-6 (cloth) ISBN-10 0-465-03126-9 (paper) ISBN-13 978-0-465-03126-9 (paper) 1. Sex. 2. Sex customs. I. Title. HQ21.D48 1997306.7—DC2196-44065CIPEBC 06 07 08 09 27 26 25 24 23 22 21 20 19 To Marie, My best friend, coparent, lover, and wife CONTENTSPreface 1The Animal with the Weirdest Sex Life 2The Battle of the Sexes 3Why Don’t Men Breast-feed Their Babies? The Non-Evolution of Male Lactation 4Wrong Time for Love: The Evolution of Recreational Sex 5What Are Men Good For? The Evolution of Men’s Roles 6Making More by Making Less: The Evolution of Female Menopause 7Truth in Advertising: The Evolution of Body Signals Further Reading Index PREFACE The subject of sex preoccupies us. It’s the source of our most intense pleasures. Often it’s also the cause of misery, much of which arises from built-in conflicts between the evolved roles of women and men. This book is a speculative account of how human sexuality came to be the way it now is. Most of us don’t realize how unusual human sexual practices are, compared to those of all other living animals. Scientists infer that the sex life of even our recent apelike ancestors was very different from ours today. Some distinctive evolutionary forces must have operated on our ancestors to make us different. What were those forces, and what really is so bizarre about us? Understanding how our sexuality evolved is fascinating not only in its own right but also in order to understand our other distinctively human features. Those features include our culture, speech, parent-child relations, and mastery of complex tools. While paleontologists usually attribute the evolution of these features to our attainment of large brains and upright posture, I argue that our bizarre sexuality was equally essential for their evolution.

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  Reply to Objection 1: We can grant, without distinction, that the Son has the same power as the Father; but we cannot grant that the Son has the power “generandi” [of begetting] thus taking “generandi” as the gerund of the active verb, so that the sense would be that the Son has the “power to beget.” Just as, although Father and Son have the same being, it does not follow that the Son is the Father, by reason of the notional term added. But if the word “generandi” [of being begotten] is taken as the gerundive of the passive verb, the power “generandi” is in the Son—that is, the power of being begotten. The same is to be said if it be taken as the gerundive of an impersonal verb, so that the sense be “the power of generation”—that is, a power by which it is generated by some person. Reply to Objection 2: Augustine does not mean to say by those words that the Son could beget a Son: but that if He did not, it was not because He could not, as we shall see later on ([352]Q[42], A[6], ad 3). Reply to Objection 3: Divine perfection and the total absence of matter in God require that there cannot be several Sons in God, as we have explained. Wherefore that there are not several Sons is not due to any lack of begetting power in the Father. OF EQUALITY AND LIKENESS AMONG THE DIVINE PERSONS (SIX ARTICLES)We now have to consider the persons as compared to one another: firstly, with regard to equality and likeness; secondly, with regard to mission. Concerning the first there are six points of inquiry. (1) Whether there is equality among the divine persons? (2) Whether the person who proceeds is equal to the one from Whom He proceeds in eternity? (3) Whether there is any order among the divine persons? (4) Whether the divine persons are equal in greatness? (5) Whether the one divine person is in another? (6) Whether they are equal in power? Whether there is equality in God?Objection 1: It would seem that equality is not becoming to the divine persons. For equality is in relation to things which are one in quantity as the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text 20). But in the divine persons there is no quantity, neither continuous intrinsic quantity, which we call size, nor continuous extrinsic quantity, which we call place and time. Nor can there be equality by reason of discrete quantity, because two persons are more than one. Therefore equality is not becoming to the divine persons. Objection 2: Further, the divine persons are of one essence, as we have said ([353]Q[39], A[2]). Now essence is signified by way of form. But agreement in form makes things to be alike, not to be equal. Therefore, we may speak of likeness in the divine persons, but not of equality.

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  HILARY. (de Trin.) Heretics, among their other impieties, misinterpret these words of our Lord’s, and say, that if His Father is their Father, His God their God, He cannot be God Himself. But though He remained in the form of God, He took upon Him the form of a servant; and Christ says this in the form of a servant to men. And we cannot doubt that in so far as He is man, the Father is His Father in the same sense in which He is of other men, and God His God in like manner. Indeed He begins with saying, Go to My brethren. But God can only have brethren according to the flesh; the Only-Begotten God, being Only-Begotten, is without brethren. AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxxi) He does not say, Our Father, but, My Father and your Father: Mine therefore and yours in a different sense; Mine by nature, yours by grace. Nor does He say, Our God, but, My God—under Him I am man—and your God; between you and Him I am Mediator. AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Evang. iii. xxiv. 69) She then went away from the sepulchre, i. e. from that part of the garden before the rock which had been hollowed out, and with her the other women. But these, according to Mark, were seized with trembling and amazement, and said nothing to any man: Mary Magdalene came and told the disciples that she had seen the Lord, and that He had spoken these things unto her. GREGORY. (Hom. xxv.) So the sin of mankind is buried in the very place whence it came forth. For whereas in Paradise the woman gave the man the deadly fruit, a woman from the sepulchre announced life to men; a woman delivers the message of Him who raises us from the dead, as a woman had delivered the words of the serpent who slew us. AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Evang. iii. 25) While she was going with the other women, according to Matthew, Jesus met them, saying, All hail. (Matt 28:9) So we gather that there were two visions of Angels; and that our Lord too was seen twice, once when Mary took Him for the gardener, and again, when He met them by the way, and by this repeating His presence confirmed their faith. And so Mary Magdalen came and told the disciples, not alone, but with the other women whom Luke mentions. BEDE. Mystically, Mary, which name signifies, mistress, enlightened, enlightener, star of the sea, stands for the Church, which is also Magdalen, i. e. towered, (Magdalen being Greek for tower,) as we read in the Psalms, Thou hast been a strong tower for me. (Ps. 61:3) In that she announced Christ’s resurrection to the disciples, all, especially those to whom the office of preaching is committed, are admonished to be zealous in setting forth to others whatever is revealed from above.