Confusion

Passages

Every passage tagged with this emotion in the Vela corpus. Search the body text, narrow by source or register, click through to a book’s profile to see how the passage sits with the rest of the work.

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• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  Reply to Objection 2: A man should by no means give evidence on matters secretly committed to him in confession, because he knows such things, not as man but as God’s minister: and the sacrament is more binding than any human precept. But as regards matters committed to man in some other way under secrecy, we must make a distinction. Sometimes they are of such a nature that one is bound to make them known as soon as they come to our knowledge, for instance if they conduce to the spiritual or corporal corruption of the community, or to some grave personal injury, in short any like matter that a man is bound to make known either by giving evidence or by denouncing it. Against such a duty a man cannot be obliged to act on the plea that the matter is committed to him under secrecy, for he would break the faith he owes to another. On the other hand sometimes they are such as one is not bound to make known, so that one may be under obligation not to do so on account of their being committed to one under secrecy. In such a case one is by no means bound to make them known, even if the superior should command; because to keep faith is of natural right, and a man cannot be commanded to do what is contrary to natural right. Reply to Objection 3: It is unbecoming for ministers of the altar to slay a man or to cooperate in his slaying, as stated above ([2938]Q[64], A[4]); hence according to the order of justice they cannot be compelled to give evidence when a man is on trial for his life. Whether the evidence of two or three persons suffices?Objection 1: It would seem that the evidence of two or three persons is not sufficient. For judgment requires certitude. Now certitude of the truth is not obtained by the assertions of two or three witnesses, for we read that Naboth was unjustly condemned on the evidence of two witnesses (3 Kings 21). Therefore the evidence of two or three witnesses does not suffice. Objection 2: Further, in order for evidence to be credible it must agree. But frequently the evidence of two or three disagrees in some point. Therefore it is of no use for proving the truth in court. Objection 3: Further, it is laid down (Decret. II, qu. iv, can. Praesul.): “A bishop shall not be condemned save on the evidence of seventy-two witnesses; nor a cardinal priest of the Roman Church, unless there be sixty-four witnesses. Nor a cardinal deacon of the Roman Church, unless there be twenty-seven witnesses; nor a subdeacon, an acolyte, an exorcist, a reader or a doorkeeper without seven witnesses.” Now the sin of one who is of higher dignity is more grievous, and consequently should be treated more severely. Therefore neither is the evidence of two or three witnesses sufficient for the condemnation of other persons.

• From The Beautiful Room Is Empty (1988)

  FIRST VINTAGE INTERNATIONAL EDITION, OCTOBER 1994 Copyright © 1988 by Edmund White Penguin Random House values and supports copyright. Copyright fuels creativity, encourages diverse voices, promotes free speech, and creates a vibrant culture. Thank you for buying an authorized edition of this book and for complying with copyright laws by not reproducing, scanning, or distributing any part of it in any form without permission. You are supporting writers and allowing Penguin Random House to continue to publish books for every reader. Please note that no part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner for the purpose of training artificial intelligence technologies or systems. Published by Vintage Books, a division of Penguin Random House LLC, 1745 Broadway, New York, NY 10019. Originally Published in hardcover in the United States by Alfred A. Knopf, a division of Penguin Random House LLC, New York, in 1988. The Library of Congress has cataloged the Knopf edition as follows: White, Edmund, [ date ] The beautiful room is empty. I. Title. PS3573.H463B43 1988 813’.54 87-40495 ISBN 0-394-56444-8 Vintage International Trade Paperback ISBN 9780679755401 eBook ISBN 9780307764461 Author photograph copyright © Jerry Bauer penguinrandomhouse.com | vintagebooks.com The authorized representative in the EU for product safety and compliance is Penguin Random House Ireland, Morrison Chambers, 32 Nassau Street, Dublin DO2 YH68, Ireland, https://eu-contact.penguin.ie . rh_3.1_153700938_c0_r2 Contents Books by Edmund White About the Author Dedication Epigraph Chapter One Chapter Two Chapter Three Chapter Four Chapter Five Chapter Six Chapter Seven Chapter Eight Chapter Nine Chapter Ten Also by Edmund White _153700938_ To Stanley Redfern “Ah! Do you have to be sensual to be human?” “Certainly, Madame. Pity is in the guts, just as tenderness is on the skin.” Anatole France, The Red Lily Sometimes I have the feeling that we’re in one room with two opposite doors and each of us holds the handle of one door, one of us flicks an eyelash and the other is already behind his door, and now the first one has but to utter a word and immediately the second one has closed his door behind him and can no longer be seen. He’s sure to open the door again for it’s a room which perhaps one cannot leave. If only the first one were not precisely like the second, if he were calm, if he would only pretend not to look at the other, if he would slowly set the room in order as though it were a room like any other; but instead he does exactly the same as the other at his door, sometimes even both are behind the doors and the beautiful room is empty. Franz Kafka, in a letter to Milena Jesenská

• From Adam, Eve, and the Serpent (1988)

  Augustine came to see his own will, then, divided and consequently impotent: “Myself I willed it, and myself I nilled it: it was I myself. I neither willed entirely, nor nilled entirely. Therefore I was in conflict with myself, and … was distracted by my own self.”39 How did he account for such conflict? Augustine insists that, since he suffered much of this “against my own will, … I was not, therefore, the cause of it, but the ‘sin that dwells in me’: from the punishment of that more voluntary sin, because I was a son of Adam.”40 In his earlier writings, as Edward Cranz points out, Augustine expresses views on human freedom and self-government that virtually echo those of his predecessors, such as Chrysostom.41 But in the fourteenth chapter of The City of God Augustine seems intent on proving that, even if Adam once had free will, he himself had never received it. Even in his account of Adam’s case Augustine betrays his own ambivalence or, indeed, outright hostility toward the possibility of human freedom. What earlier apologists had celebrated as God’s greatest gift to humankind—free will, liberty, autonomy, self-government—Augustine characterizes in surprisingly negative terms. Adam had received freedom as his birthright, but nonetheless, as Augustine tells it, the first man “conceived a desire for freedom,”42 and his desire became, in Augustine’s eyes, the root of sin, betraying nothing less than contempt for God. The desire to master one’s will, far from expressing what Origen, Clement, and Chrysostom consider the true nature of rational beings, becomes for Augustine the great and fatal temptation: “The fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil is personal control over one’s own will” (proprium voluntatis arbitrium).43 Augustine cannot resist reading that desire for self-government as total, obstinate perversity: “The soul, then, delighting in its own freedom to do wickedness, and scorning to serve God … willfully deserted its higher master.”44 Seduced by this desire for autonomy, Adam entered into a “life of cruel and wretched slavery instead of the freedom for which he had conceived a desire.”45 Uncomfortably aware of a contradiction in his argument, Augustine explains that obedience, not autonomy, should have been Adam’s true glory, “since man has been naturally so created that it is advantageous for him to be submissive, but disastrous for him to follow his own will, and not the will of his creator.”46 Admitting that “it does, indeed, seem something of a paradox,”47 Augustine resorts to paradoxical language to describe how God “sought to impress upon this creature, for whom free slavery [libera servitus] was expedient, that he was the Lord.”48 Augustine insists, however, that whatever the constraints upon Adam’s freedom, the first man was more free than any of his progeny, for only the story of Adam’s misuse of free will can account for the contradictions he discovered within himself, his own will caught in perpetual conflict, “much of which I suffered against my own will, rather than did by my will.”49

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  Objection 2: Further, the sin of simony consists in giving the corporal for the spiritual, and it is to be utterly avoided. Therefore one ought not to give alms in order to receive a spiritual effect. Objection 3: Further, to multiply the cause is to multiply the effect. If therefore corporal almsdeeds cause a spiritual effect, the greater the alms, the greater the spiritual profit, which is contrary to what we read (Lk. 21:3) of the widow who cast two brass mites into the treasury, and in Our Lord’s own words “cast in more than . . . all.” Therefore bodily almsdeeds have no spiritual effect. On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 17:18): “The alms of a man . . . shall preserve the grace of a man as the apple of the eye.” I answer that, Corporal almsdeeds may be considered in three ways. First, with regard to their substance, and in this way they have merely a corporal effect, inasmuch as they supply our neighbor’s corporal needs. Secondly, they may be considered with regard to their cause, in so far as a man gives a corporal alms out of love for God and his neighbor, and in this respect they bring forth a spiritual fruit, according to Ecclus. 29:13, 14: “Lose thy money for thy brother . . . place thy treasure in the commandments of the Most High, and it shall bring thee more profit than gold.” Thirdly, with regard to the effect, and in this way again, they have a spiritual fruit, inasmuch as our neighbor, who is succored by a corporal alms, is moved to pray for his benefactor; wherefore the above text goes on (Ecclus. 29:15): “Shut up alms in the heart of the poor, and it shall obtain help for thee from all evil.” Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers corporal almsdeeds as to their substance. Reply to Objection 2: He who gives an alms does rot intend to buy a spiritual thing with a corporal thing, for he knows that spiritual things infinitely surpass corporal things, but he intends to merit a spiritual fruit through the love of charity. Reply to Objection 3: The widow who gave less in quantity, gave more in proportion; and thus we gather that the fervor of her charity, whence corporal almsdeeds derive their spiritual efficacy, was greater. Whether almsgiving is a matter of precept?Objection 1: It would seem that almsgiving is not a matter of precept. For the counsels are distinct from the precepts. Now almsgiving is a matter of counsel, according to Dan. 4:24: “Let my counsel be acceptable to the King; [Vulg.: ‘to thee, and’] redeem thou thy sins with alms.” Therefore almsgiving is not a matter of precept. Objection 2: Further, it is lawful for everyone to use and to keep what is his own. Yet by keeping it he will not give alms. Therefore it is lawful not to give alms: and consequently almsgiving is not a matter of precept.

• From Going Clear (2013)

  42 “Once upon a time”: The Philosopher: The Rediscovery of the Human Soul , the Ron magazines, 1996, pp. 11–12. 43 “I have high hopes”: Miller, Bare-Faced Messiah , p. 81. 44 Hubbard explained to his agent: Ibid., p. 79. Gerald Armstrong testified that Hubbard “stated that seven people originally read it and a couple of them jumped out of windows and another two went insane.” Church of Scientology California v. Gerald Armstrong . 45 The last time he showed Excalibur: Forrest Ackerman interview, “Secret Lives—L. Ron Hubbard,” Channel 4, UK, 1997. 46 “worthless”: Hubbard letter to Russell Hays, Oct. 20, 1938. (Also quoted and mistakenly dated as Dec. 31, 1937, in Letters and Journals: Literary Correspondence , the Ron magazines, 1997, pp. 59–61.) 47 “a tall, large man”: Asimov, I. Asimov , p. 72. 48 “A deviant figure of”: Amis, New Maps of Hell , p. 84. 49 Fanzines and sci-fi clubs: I was aided in this insight by Steven Weinberg, who recalled for me the science-fiction club at Bronx High, which he attended in the 1940s; he and his classmate Sheldon Glashow, who was also in the club, went on to share the Nobel Prize in Physics in 1979. 50 “Science fiction, particularly”: Hubbard, introduction to Battlefield Earth , p. xix. 51 “I had, myself, somewhat”: Ibid., p. xvi. 52 “In his late twenties”: L. Sprague de Camp, “El-Ron of the City of Brass,” from “Literary Swordsmen and Sorcerers,” Fantastic , August 1975. 53 “Because of her coldness”: “The Admissions of L. Ron Hubbard,” www.gerryarmstrong.org/50grand/writings/ars/ars-2000-03-11.html . The church disputes the authenticity of this document, claiming that it is a forgery. 54 “I loved her and she me”: Ibid. 55 Polly had discovered: Russell Miller interview with Robert MacDonald Ford, “The Bare-Faced Messiah Interviews,” Sept. 1, 1986, www.cs.cmu.edu/~dst/Library/Shelf/miller/interviews/robford.htm . 56 “two-fold, one to win”: Miller, Bare-Faced Messiah , p. 89. 57 While he was stranded: Ibid., pp. 90–91. 58 “Throughout all this”: Church of Scientology International, “1939–1944, Explorer and Master Mariner,” 2005, www.hubbard.org/pg007.html [inactive]. 59 he failed the entrance examination: Miller, Bare-Faced Messiah , pp. 45–46. 60 “I do not have the time”: Hubbard request to US Marine Corps, July 18, 1931. 61 “a well-known writer”: Warren G. Magnuson letter to “The President,” April 8, 1941; L. Ron Hubbard military records, National Personnel Records Center. 62 “one of the most brilliant men”: Miller, Bare-Faced Messiah , p. 93. 63 Hubbard said that he: Thomas Moulton testimony, Church of Scientology California v. Gerald Armstrong . “I never saw the scars,” Moulton admitted. For a comprehensive list of the contradictions in Hubbard’s various war accounts, see Document A in Chris Owen, “Ron the ‘War Hero,’ ” July 1999, www.cs.cmu.edu/~dst/Cowen/warhero/battle.htm . 64 “first U.S. returned casualty”: Hubbard, “A Brief Biography of L. Ron Hubbard,” brochure for the First Australian Congress of the Hubbard Association of Scientologists International, Nov. 7–8, 1959. 65 “By assuming unauthorized authority”: L. D. Causey to Commandant, Twelfth Naval District, Feb. 14, 1942.

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  It is therefore evident that God cannot make Himself not to be, or not to be good or happy: because He necessarily wills Himself to be, and to be good and happy, as we proved in the First Book. Again, it was shown above that God cannot will anything evil. Therefore it is evident that God cannot sin. Likewise it was proved above that God’s will cannot be changeable: and consequently it cannot make that which is willed by Him, not to be fulfilled. It must however be observed that He is said to be unable to do this in a different sense from that in which He is said to be unable to do the things mentioned before. Because God is simply unable either to will or to make the foregoing. Whereas God can do or will these, if we consider His power or will absolutely, but not if we presuppose Him to will the opposite: for the divine will, in respect of creatures, has no necessity, except on a supposition, as we proved in the First Book. Hence all these statements, God cannot do the contrary of what He has decreed to do, and any like sayings are to be understood in the composite sense: for thus they imply a supposition of the divine will with regard to the opposite. But if they be understood in the divided sense, they are false, because they refer to God’s power and will absolutely. And as God acts by will, so also does He act by intellect and knowledge, as we have proved. Hence He cannot do what He has foreseen that He will not do, or omit to do what He has foreseen that He will do, for the same reason that He cannot do what He wills not to do, or omit to do what He wills. Also, each assertion is conceded and denied in the same sense, namely that He be said to be unable to do these things, not indeed absolutely, but on a certain condition or supposition. CHAPTER XXVI THAT THE DIVINE INTELLECT IS NOT CONFINED TO CERTAIN DETERMINED EFFECTSFORASMUCH as it has been proved that the divine power is not limited to certain determined effects, and this because He acts not by a necessity of His nature, but by His intellect and will; lest some one perhaps should think that His intellect or knowledge can only reach to certain effects, and that consequently He acts by a necessity of His knowledge, although not by a necessity of His nature: it remains to be shown that His knowledge or intellect is not confined to any limits in its effects.

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  Objection 3: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 3) that “the Holy Ghost came upon the Virgin,” (of whom Christ was to be born without original sin) “purifying her.” But this purification would not have been necessary, if the infection of original sin were not contracted from the mother. Therefore the infection of original sin is contracted from the mother: so that if Eve had sinned, her children would have contracted original sin, even if Adam had not sinned. On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 5:12): “By one man sin entered into this world.” Now if the woman would have transmitted original sin to her children, he should have said that it entered by two, since both of them sinned, or rather that it entered by a woman, since she sinned first. Therefore original sin is transmitted to the children, not by the mother, but by the father. I answer that, The solution of this question is made clear by what has been said. For it has been stated [1826](A[1]) that original sin is transmitted by the first parent in so far as he is the mover in the begetting of his children: wherefore it has been said [1827](A[4]) that if anyone were begotten materially only, of human flesh, they would not contract original sin. Now it is evident that in the opinion of philosophers, the active principle of generation is from the father, while the mother provides the matter. Therefore original sin, is contracted, not from the mother, but from the father: so that, accordingly, if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children would not contract original sin: whereas, if Adam, and not Eve, had sinned, they would contract it. Reply to Objection 1: The child pre-exists in its father as in its active principle, and in its mother, as in its material and passive principle. Consequently the comparison fails. Reply to Objection 2: Some hold that if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children would be immune from the sin, but would have been subject to the necessity of dying and to other forms of suffering that are a necessary result of the matter which is provided by the mother, not as punishments, but as actual defects. This, however, seems unreasonable. Because, as stated in the [1828]FP, Q[97], AA[1], 2, ad 4, immortality and impassibility, in the original state, were a result, not of the condition of matter, but of original justice, whereby the body was subjected to the soul, so long as the soul remained subject to God. Now privation of original justice is original sin. If, therefore, supposing Adam had not sinned, original sin would not have been transmitted to posterity on account of Eve’s sin; it is evident that the children would not have been deprived of original justice: and consequently they would not have been liable to suffer and subject to the necessity of dying.

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  3. Secondly, we must consider what he means by when “is” is predicated as a third element in the enunciation, in the mode in which we have explained, there are two oppositions. In the enunciations already treated, in which the name is posited only on the part of the subject, there was one opposition in relation to any subject. For example, if the subject was a finite name not taken universally there was only one opposition, “Man is,” “Man is not.” But when “is” is predicated in addition there are two oppositions with regard to the same subject corresponding to the difference of the predicate name, which can be finite or infinite. There is the opposition of “Man is just,” “Man is not just,” and the opposition, “Man is non-just,” “Man is not non-just.” For the negation is effected by applying the negative particle to the verb “is,” which is a sign of a predication. 4. When he says, I mean by this that in an enunciation such as”Man is just,” etc., he explains what he means by when “is” is predicated as a third element in the enunciation. When we say “Man is just,” the verb “is” is added to the predicate as a third name or verb in the affirmation. Now “is,” like any other word, may be called a name, and thus it is a third name, i.e., word. But because, according to common usage, a word signifying time is called a verb rather than a name Aristotle adds here, or verb, as if to say that with respect to the fact that it is a third thing, it does not matter whether it is called a name or a verb. 5. He goes on to say, In this case, therefore, there will be four enunciations, etc. Here he concludes to the number of the enunciations, first giving the number, and then their relationship where he says, two of which will correspond in their sequence, in respect of affirmation and negation, with the privations but two will not. Finally, he explains the reason for the number where he says, I mean that the “is” will be added either to “just” or to “non-just,” etc. He says first, then, that since there are two oppositions when “is” is predicated as a third element in the enunciation, and since every opposition is between two enunciations, it follows that there are four enunciations in which “is” is predicated as a third element when the subject is finite and is not taken universally. When he says, two of which will correspond in their sequence, etc., he shows their relationship. Two of these enunciations are related to affirmation and negation according to consequence (or according to correlation or proportion, as it is in the Greek) like privations; the other two are not. Because this is said so briefly and obscurely, it has been explained in diverse ways.

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  On the second point: these retributions are said to have been divinely wrought because they were the result of the divine moving, not because of their connection with wilful deceit. This is especially the case with regard to the king of Babylon, who besieged Tyre with the intention of usurping the throne, rather than of serving God. Neither had the midwives any integrity of will, since they fabricated falsehoods, even though their will did happen to be good when they liberated the children. On the third point: temporal evils are inflicted on the ungodly as punishments, in so far as they do not help them to attain to eternal life. But they are not punishments to the just, who are helped by them. Rather are they as medicines, as we said in Q. 87, Art. 8. On the fourth point: all things come alike to the good and to the wicked as regards the substance of temporal goods and evils, but not as regards the end. For the good are guided to blessedness by them, whereas the wicked are not. TREATISE ON THE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES I. ON FAITH. SECUNDA SECUNDAE, QUESTIONS 1 – 7 QUESTION ONE THE OBJECT OF FAITHTHE FIRST OF THE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES WHICH we must consider is faith. The second is hope, and the third is charity. Concerning faith, we shall consider first the object of faith, secondly the act of faith, and thirdly the habit of faith. There are ten questions concerning the object of faith. 1 . Whether the object of faith is the first truth. 2. Whether the object of faith is that which is simple or that which is complex, i.e., whether it is the reality itself or what can be said about it. 3. Whether what is false can be believed by faith. 4. Whether the object of faith can be something that is seen. 5. Whether it can be something known scientifically. 6. Whether matters of faith ought to be divided into certain articles. 7. Whether the same articles are articles of faith for all time. 8. Concerning the number of articles. 9. Concerning the manner of setting forth the articles in a symbol. 10. As to who is entitled to draw up a symbol of the faith. ARTICLE ONE Whether the Object of Faith is the First Truth1. It seems that the object of faith is not the first truth. For whatever is proposed for our belief would seem to be the object of faith, and there are proposed for our belief not only things pertaining to the Godhead, which is the first truth, but also things pertaining to the humanity of Christ, to the sacraments of the Church, and to the condition of creatures. Hence not only the first truth is the object of faith.

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  8. Moses says (Levit. xvii, 14): The soul of all flesh is in the blood. Now blood is transmitted with the semen, especially as the seed of the male is merely blood depurated by heat. Therefore the soul is transmitted with the semen. 9. Moreover the embryo before it is perfected with the rational soul, has certain animate actions, namely growth, nourishment and sensation: and where there is animate action there is life: consequently it lives. Now the soul is the principle of life in a body: consequently it has a soul. But it cannot be said that it receives yet another soul: because then there would be two souls in one body. Therefore the soul which was from the beginning transmitted in the semen is the rational soul. 10. Souls differing in species constitute animals of different species. If, then, before the rational soul there was in the semen a soul that was not rational, there was an animal of a different species from man: which consequently could not become a man since animals do not pass from one species to another. 11. You will say that these actions belong to the embryo not through the soul, but by some power of the soul known as the formative power.—On the contrary, power is rooted in substance; hence it occupies a place between substance and operation according to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. xi). Consequently if the soul’s power is there, its substance is there also. 12. The Philosopher says (De Gener. Anim. ii, 3) that the embryo is a living being before it is an animal, and an animal before it is a human being. Now every animal has a soul. Therefore it has a soul before it has a rational soul whereby it is a human being. 13. According to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, i) a soul is “the act of a living body as such.” Now if the embryo is a living being and has vital functions by means of this formative power, this very power will be its act in so far as it is a living thing. Therefore it will be a soul. 14. According to De Anima i, 2, life comes into all living things by the vegetal soul. Now it is clear that the embryo lives before the infusion of the rational soul, since it gives signs of exercising vital functions. Therefore the vegetal soul is in it before the rational soul. 15. The Philosopher (De Anima ii, 4) disproves the assertion that growth is not the effect of fire as principal agent, but of the vegetal soul. Now the embryo grows before the advent of the rational soul. Therefore it has a vegetal soul.

• From History of the Christian Church: The Complete Set of Eight Volumes (1858)

  Diocletian, Emperor, in Roman characters, Diocles Augustus, counting only some of the letters, namely: DIo CLes aVg Vst Vs.1271 Diocletian was the last of the persecuting emperors (d. 313). So Bossuet. To his worthless guess the Huguenots opposed the name of the "grand monarch" and persecutor of Protestants, Louis XIV., which yields the same result (LVDo VICVs). The Roman Emperors from Augustus To Vespasian. Märcker (in the "Studien und Kritiken" for 1868, p. 699) has found out that the initial letters of the first ten Roman emperors from Octavianus (Augustus) to Titus, including the three usurpers Galba, Otho, and Vitellius, yield the numerical value of 666. Düsterdieck (p. 467) calls this "eine frappante Spielerei." Caesar Augustus. Kaisarsebaston (for-", suited to the neuter qhrivon), i.e., the "Caesar Augustan" beast.1272 The official designation of the Roman emperors was Kaivsar Sebastov" (Caesar Augustus), in which their blasphemous apotheosis culminates. In support of it may be quoted "the names of blasphemy on the heads of the beast," Rev. 13:1. This is the conjecture proposed by Dr. Wieseler in his book: Zur Geschichte der Neutest. Schrift und des Urchristenthums, 1880, p. 169. It is certainly ingenious and more consistent with the character of the Apocalypse than the Nero-hypothesis. It substantially agrees with the interpretation Lateinos. But the substitution of a final n for " is an objection, though not more serious than the omission of the yodh from qyrs The Chronological Solutions.—The Duration of Antichrist. The number 666 signifies the duration of the beast or antichristian world power, and the false prophet associated with the beast. (1) The duration of Heathenism. But heathen Rome, which persecuted the church, was Christianized after the conversion of Constantine, A.D. 311. The other forms and subsequent history of heathenism lie outside of the apocalyptic vision. (2) Mohammedanism. Pope Innocent III., when rousing Western Europe to a new crusade, declared the Saracens to be the beast, and Mohammed the false prophet whose power would last six hundred and sixty-six years. See his bull of 1213, in which he summoned the fourth Lateran Council, in Hardouin, Conc., Tom. VII. 3. But six hundred and sixty-six years have passed since the Hegira (622), and even since the fourth Lateran Council (1215); yet Islam still sits on the throne in Constantinople, and rules over one hundred and sixty million of consciences.

• From The Divine Comedy (1950)

  He married Beatrice Lancia, the daughter of Provenzan Salvani (see Canto xi ) and died at a great age in 1293.—Federico Tignoso: a nobleman of Rimini, noted for his generosity, who appears to have lived in the first half of the 13th century.—The Traversari and Anastagi were noble Ghibelline families of Ravenna. On the death of Pier Traversaro, his son Paolo turned Guelf—a volte-face that soon undermined the influence of the family. About the middle of the 13th century, the Anastagi were very much to the fore, owing to their strife with the Polentani and other Guelfs of Ravenna. A reconciliation was effected ca. 1258, and after this date there is no mention of them in the records.-Brettinoro (now Bertinoro), a little town between Forlì and Cesena; its inhabitants, several of whom figure in this canto, had a great reputation for hospitality. Dante is apparently alluding here to the compulsory exodus of the Ghibellines from the town (see above, note i, on Guido del Duca), and rejoicing that they were spared the spectacle of the place in its present condition.—The Malavicini, Counts of Bagnacavallo (between Imola and Ravenna), were Ghibellines. In 1249 they drove Guido da Polenta and his fellow Guelfs from Ravenna. Subsequently they were notorious for their frequent change of party.—Castrocaro and Conio: strongholds near Forlì; the counts of the former place were Ghibellines, those of the latter Guelfs.—The Pagani were Ghibellines of Faenza (or Imola). For Mainardo see Inf. xxvii, note 7 ( cf. Villani, vii). According to Benvenuto, he was called “devil” because of his cunning.—Ugolino de’ Fantolini (d. 1278) did not take part in public affairs, but led an honourable retired life. One of his sons was killed at Forlì (1282) in the engagement with Guido of Montefeltro (see Inf. xxvii), and the other died before 1291. 7. The words of Cain, after he had slain his brother Abel ( Gen. iv. 14). 8. Aglauros, the daughter of Cecrops, King of Athens, being jealous of Mercury’s love for her sister, Hersë, was changed by the God into stone (see Ovid, Metam. xiv).

• From What Are Biblical Values? (2019)

  Hunt, Lynn. Inventing Human Rights: A History . New York: Norton, 2007. Ishay, Micheline R. The History of Human Rights: From Ancient Times to the Globalization Era . Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004. Jackson, Bernard S. Wisdom-Laws: A Study of the Mishpatim of Exodus 21:1–22:16 . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. Jacobs, A. J. The Year of Living Biblically . New York: Simon & Schuster, 2007. Janzen, Waldemar. Old Testament Ethics: A Paradigmatic Approach . Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 1994. Johnson, Luke Timothy. Sharing Possessions . Philadelphia: Fortress, 1981. Juergensmeyer, Mark. Terror in the Mind of God . Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003. Kaminsky, Joel. Yet I Loved Jacob: Reclaiming the Biblical Concept of Election . Nashville, TN: Abingdon, 2007. Kant, Immanuel. The Conflict of the Faculties . Translated by Mary Gregor. New York: Abaris, 1979. Klawans, Jonathan. Impurity and Sin in Ancient Judaism . New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. Kraybill, J. Nelson. Imperial Cult and Commerce in John’s Apocalypse . Sheffield, UK: Sheffield Academic, 1996. Kreitzer, Larry J. Philemon . Sheffield, UK: Sheffield Phoenix, 2008. Krentz, Edgar M. “Thessalonians, First and Second Epistles to the.” Pages 515–23 in vol. 6 of Freedman, The Anchor Bible Dictionary . Kugel, James L. The Traditions of the Bible . Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998. LaHaye, Tim, and Jerry B. Jenkins. Left Behind: A Novel of the Earth’s Last Days . Wheaton, IL: Tyndale, 1995. Lanfer, Peter. Remembering Eden: The Reception History of Genesis 3:22–24 . New York: Oxford University Press, 2012. Lawrence, D. H. Apocalypse . New York: Viking, 1932. LeFebvre, Michael. Collections , Codes, and Torah: The Re-characterization of Israel’s Written Law . New York: Clark, 2006. Lemos, Tracy M. Marriage Gifts and Social Change in Ancient Palestine: 1200 BCE to 200 CE . New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010. ———. “Were Israelite Women Chattel? Shedding New Light on an Old Question.” Pages 227–41 in Worship , Women, and War: Essays in Honor of Susan Niditch . Edited by J. J. Collins, T. M. Lemos, and S. M. Olyan. Brown Judaic Studies 357. Providence, RI: Brown University Press, 2015. Leske, Adrian M. “Matthew 6:25–34: Human Anxiety and the Natural World.” In Habel and Balabanski, Earth Story in the New Testament , 15–27. Levenson, Jon D. Creation and the Persistence of Evil: The Jewish Drama of Divine Omnipotence . San Francisco: Harper, 1988. ———. The Death and Resurrection of the Beloved Son . New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993. ———. The Hebrew Bible , the Old Testament , and Historical Criticism . Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 1993. ———. The Love of God: Divine Gift , Human Gratitude , and Mutual Faithfulness in Judaism . Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016. ———. Sinai and Zion: An Entry into the Jewish Bible . Minneapolis: Winston, 1985. Levine, Baruch A. Numbers 21–36 . Anchor Bible 4A. New York: Doubleday, 2000. Levinson, Bernard M.

• From From Shame to Sin: The Christian Transformation of Sexual Morality in Late Antiquity (2013)

  12 . For this argument, see Harper, “Porneia ;” F. Hauck and S. Schulz, “π ό ρ ν η , κ τ λ ,” TDNT 6:579–595; BDAG, “π ο ρ ν ε ί α ,” 854–855; Fitzmeyer, First Corinthians, 233, 255, 279; Deming, Paul on Marriage and Celibacy, 13; Gaca, Making of Fornication; Osiek, “Female Slaves, Porneia, and the Limits of Obedience”; Glancy, “Obstacles to Slaves’ Participation in the Corinthian Church”; Martin, Corinthian Body, 169; Kirchhoff, Die Sünde gegen den eigenen Leib; Peter J. Tomson, Paul and the Jewish Law: Halakha in the Letters of the Apostle to the Gentiles (Minneapolis, 1990), 97–103; Gerhard Dautzenberg, “Φ ε ύ γ ε τ ε τ ὴ ν π ο ρ ν ε ί α ν (1 Kor 6,18): Eine Fallstudie zur paulinishen Sexualethik in ihrem Verhältnis zur Sexualethik des Frühjudentums,” in Neues Testament und Ethik: Für Rudolf Schnackenburg, ed. Helmut Merklein (Freiberg, 1989), 271–298; Joseph Jensen, “Does Porneia Mean Fornication? A Critique of Bruce Malina,” Novum Testamentum 20 (1978): 161–184; Bruce Malina, “Does Porneia Mean Fornication?” Novum Testamentum 14 (1972): 10–17; Hanz Conzelmann, 1 Corinthians: A Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians (Philadelphia, 1975), 95–96; C. K. Barrett, A Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians (New York, 1968): 121–122; Heinrich Baltensweiler, Die Ehe im Neuen Testament: Exegetische Untersuchungen über Ehe, Ehelosigkeit und Ehescheidung (Stuttgart, 1967), 197–202; on the Latin, J. N. Adams, “Words for ‘Prostitute’ in Latin,” Rheinische Museum für Philologie 126 (1983): 321–358, at 337–338. 13 . S. Erlandsson, “zānāh,” TDOT 4: 99–104; Phyllis Bird, “ ‘To Play the Harlot’: An Inquiry into an Old Testament Metaphor,” in Gender and Difference in Ancient Israel, ed. Peggy Day (Minneapolis, 1989), 75–94; Phyllis Bird, “Prostitution in the Social World and the Religious Rhetoric of Ancient Israel,” in Prostitutes and Courtesans in the Ancient World, ed. C. Faraone and L. McClure (Madison, 2006), 40–58. 14 . This fact, along with the inability to sustain the preferred meaning (“exogamy”) in close readings of specific passages, are among the obstacles to accepting the reconstruction of Gaca, Making of Fornication. 15 . “Mother”: Test. Sim. 5.3; “polity”: Philo Spec. leg. 3.51; miasma: Philo Spec. leg. 3.51; on Philo’s sexual ideology generally, see David Winston, “Philo and the Rabbis on Sex and the Body,” Poetics Today 19 (1998): 41–62. 16 . Various NT meanings, see Harper, “Porneia” ; apostolic decree: RSV Act. apost. 15:20, 15:29, 21:25; Joseph A. Fitzmeyer, The Acts of the Apostles: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary (New York, 1998), 557; Terrance Callan, “The Background of the Apostolic Decree (Acts 15:20, 29; 21:25),” Catholic Biblical Quarterly 55 (1993): 284–297; S. G. Wilson, Luke and the Law (Cambridge, 1983), 84–94; A. J. M. Wedderburn, “The ‘Apostolic Decree’: Tradition and Redaction,” Novum Testamentum 35 (1993): 362–389; Peder Borgen, “Catalogues of Vices, the Apostolic Decree, and the Jerusalem Meeting,” in The Social World of Formative Christianity and Judaism, ed. Jacob Neusner et al. (Philadelphia, 1988), 126–141.

• From Quiet (2012)

  Salesmanship as a Virtue: Live with Tony Robbins “Are you excited?” cries a young woman named Stacy as I hand her my registration forms. Her honeyed voice rises into one big exclamation point. I nod and smile as brightly as I can. Across the lobby of the Atlanta Convention Center, I hear people shrieking. “What’s that noise?” I ask. “They’re getting everyone pumped up to go inside!” Stacy enthuses. “That’s part of the whole UPW experience.” She hands me a purple spiral binder and a laminated nametag to wear around my neck. UNLEASH THE POWER WITHIN, proclaims the binder in big block letters. Welcome to Tony Robbins’s entry-level seminar. I’ve paid $895 in exchange, according to the promotional materials, for learning how to be more energetic, gain momentum in my life, and conquer my fears. But the truth is that I’m not here to unleash the power within me (though I’m always happy to pick up a few pointers); I’m here because this seminar is the first stop on my journey to understand the Extrovert Ideal. I’ve seen Tony Robbins’s infomercials—he claims that there’s always one airing at any given moment—and he strikes me as one of the more extroverted people on earth. But he’s not just any extrovert. He’s the king of self-help, with a client roster that has included President Clinton, Tiger Woods, Nelson Mandela, Margaret Thatcher, Princess Diana, Mikhail Gorbachev, Mother Teresa, Serena Williams, Donna Karan—and 50 million other people. And the self-help industry, into which hundreds of thousands of Americans pour their hearts, souls, and some $11 billion a year, by definition reveals our conception of the ideal self, the one we aspire to become if only we follow the seven principles of this and the three laws of that. I want to know what this ideal self looks like. Stacy asks if I’ve brought my meals with me. It seems a strange question: Who carries supper with them from New York City to Atlanta? She explains that I’ll want to refuel at my seat; for the next four days, Friday through Monday, we’ll be working fifteen hours a day, 8:00 a.m. to 11:00 p.m., with only one short afternoon break. Tony will be onstage the entire time and I won’t want to miss a moment. I look around the lobby. Other people seem to have come prepared—they’re strolling toward the hall, cheerfully lugging grocery bags stuffed with PowerBars, bananas, and corn chips. I pick up a couple of bruised apples from

• From Going Clear (2013)

  95 “James Dean of the occult”: Hugh B. Urban, “The Occult Roots of Scientology? L. Ron Hubbard, Aleister Crowley, and the Origins of a Controversial New Religion,” Nova Religio: The Journal of Alternative and Emergent Religions (February 2012): 94. 96 He acquired a three-story: Kansa, Wormwood Star , p. 28. 97 twelve-car garage: Sara Elizabeth Hollister (formerly Sara Northrup Hubbard) tapes, Stephen A. Kent Collection on Alternative Religions. 98 The house had once belonged: Letter from Arthur Fleming to John Muir, Feb. 8, 1911; Pendle, Strange Angel , p. 208. 99 “Must not believe in God”: Russell Miller interview with Nieson Himmel, “The Bare-Faced Messiah Interviews,” www.cs.cmu.edu/~dst/Library/Shelf/miller/interviews/himmel.htm . 100 Among those passing: Carter, Sex and Rockets , pp. 84–86; Pendle, Strange Angel , pp. 244–45. 101 “women in diaphanous gowns”: Carter, Sex and Rockets , p. 84. 102 captured in a portrait: Pendle, Strange Angel , p. 209. 103 “The breakup of the home”: Parsons, Freedom Is a Two-Edged Sword , p. 69. 104 Sara Elizabeth “Betty” Northrup: Pendle, Strange Angel , p. 255; Miller, Bare-Faced Messiah , p. 116. 105 lost her virginity: Pendle, Strange Angel , p. 203. 106 “Her chief interest”: Ibid. 107 when she was fifteen: Sara Elizabeth Hollister (formerly Sara Northrup Hubbard) tapes, Stephen A. Kent Collection on Alternative Religions. 108 “He was not only a writer”: Ibid. 109 “He dominated the scene”: Alva Rogers, quoted in Carter, Sex and Rockets , p. 103. 110 “the most gorgeous”: Miller, Bare-Faced Messiah , p. 117. 111 “a gentleman, red hair”: Ibid., p. 118. 112 angry debate: The Church of Scientology forced the authors of a 1952 Crowley biography, The Great Beast , to remove any suggestion that there was a connection between Scientology and black magic. Church of Scientology of California and John Symonds, MacDonald & Co. (Publishers) Limited, Hazell Watson & Viney . High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division, 1971. The church also provided me with its correspondence with the London Sunday Times in 1969 and 1970, in which the newspaper agreed to retract similar statements and not make such references in the future. 113 envious of his talent: Grant and Symonds, The Confessions of Aleister Crowley , p. 18. 114 He may have served: Spence, Secret Agent 666 . 115 “Do what thou wilt”: Grant and Symonds, The Confessions of Aleister Crowley , p. 18. 116 Nibs—Hubbard’s estranged: Allan Sonnenschein, “Inside the Church of Scientology: An Exclusive Interview with L. Ron Hubbard, Jr.,” Penthouse , June 1983.

• From History of the Christian Church: The Complete Set of Eight Volumes (1858)

  § 73. The Free-will Controversy. 1524–1527. See Literature in § 73. After halting some time between approval and disapproval, Erasmus found it impossible to keep aloof from the irrepressible conflict. Provoked by Hutten, and urged by King Henry and English friends, he declared open war against Luther, and broke with the Reformation. He did so with great reluctance; for he felt that he could not satisfy either party, and that he was out of his element in a strictly theological dispute. He chose for his attack Luther’s doctrine of total depravity. Here lay the chief dogmatic difference between the two. Erasmus was an admirer of Socrates, Cicero, and Jerome; while Luther was a humble pupil of St. Paul and Augustin. Erasmus lacked that profound religious experience through which Luther had passed in the convent, and sympathized with the anthropology of the Greek fathers and the semi-Pelagian school. In September, 1524, Erasmus appeared on the field with his work on the "Freedom of the Will." It is a defence of freedom as an indispensable condition of moral responsibility, without which there can be no meaning in precept, repentance, and reward. He maintains essentially the old semi-Pelagian theory, but in the mildest form, and more negatively than positively; for he wished to avoid the charge of heresy. He gives the maximum of glory to God, and a minimum to man. "I approve," he says, "of those who ascribe something to free-will, but rely most upon grace." We must exert our will to the utmost, but the will is ineffective without the grace of God. He urged against Luther Christ’s call upon Jerusalem to repent (Matt. 23:37), and the will of God that no one should perish, but that all should be saved (Ezek. 33:11; 1 Tim. 2:4; 2 Pet. 3:9). He treated him with respect, but charged him with attempting to drive out one extreme by another.

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  I answer that, The abodes of souls are distinguished according to the souls’ various states. Now the soul united to a mortal body is in the state of meriting, while the soul separated from the body is in the state of receiving good or evil for its merits; so that after death it is either in the state of receiving its final reward, or in the state of being hindered from receiving it. If it is in the state of receiving its final retribution, this happens in two ways: either in the respect of good, and then it is paradise; or in respect of evil, and thus as regards actual sin it is hell, and as regards original sin it is the limbo of children. On the other hand, if it be in the state where it is hindered from receiving its final reward, this is either on account of a defect of the person, and thus we have purgatory where souls are detained from receiving their reward at once on account of the sins they have committed, or else it is on account of a defect of nature, and thus we have the limbo of the Fathers, where the Fathers were detained from obtaining glory on account of the guilt of human nature which could not yet be expiated. Reply to Objection 1: Good happens in one way, but evil in many ways, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) and the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6): wherefore it is not unfitting if there be one place of blissful reward and several places of punishment. Reply to Objection 2: The state of meriting and demeriting is one state, since the same person is able to merit and demerit: wherefore it is fitting that one place should be assigned to all: whereas of those who receive according to their merits there are various states, and consequently the comparison fails. Reply to Objection 3: One may be punished in two ways for original sin, as stated above, either in reference to the person, or in reference to nature only. Consequently there is a twofold limbo corresponding to that sin. Reply to Objection 4: This darksome air is assigned to the demons, not as the place where they receive retribution for their merits, but as a place befitting their office, in so far as they are appointed to try us. Hence it is not reckoned among the abodes of which we are treating now: since hell fire is assigned to them in the first place (Mat. 25). Reply to Objection 5: The earthly paradise belongs to the state of the wayfarer rather than to the state of those who receive for their merits; and consequently it is not reckoned among the abodes whereof we are treating now.

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  388. Now from the fact that the infinite is as a being in potency, not only does it follow that the infinite is contained and does not contain, but two other conclusions also follow. One is that the infinite, as such, is unknown, because it is as matter without species, i.e., form, and matter is not known except through form. The other conclusion, which has the same source, is that the infinite has more the notion of a part than that of a whole, since matter is compared to the whole as a part. And it is not a surprise that the infinite conducts itself as a part, inasmuch as only a part of it is ever actual. 389. Then [263] he rejects an opinion of Plato who posited an infinite both in sensible and in intelligible things. And he states that from this it is plain also that if “ the large ” and “ the small. ” to which Plato attributed infinity, are in sensible and intelligible things as containing (by virtue of containment being attributed to the infinite), it follows that the infinite contains the intelligible things. But this seems unfitting and impossible, namely, that the infinite, since it is unknown and undetermined, should contain and determine intelligible things. For the known is not determined by the unknown, but rather the converse is true. LECTURE 12 EXPLANATIONS IN THE LIGHT OF THE DEFINITION OF THE INFINITE390. After giving a definition of the infinite, the Philosopher now assigns reasons for the things that are said about the infinite. First, the reason for what is said about addition and division of the infinite; Secondly, the reason for saying that the infinite is found in different things according to a certain order, at 397; Thirdly, the reason for saying that mathematicians use the infinite, at 398; Fourthly, the reason why the infinite is called a principle, at 399. About the first he does two things: First he presents the reason for what is said about the infinite in relation to division and addition in magnitudes; Secondly, the reason for what is said of it in numbers by comparison to magnitudes, at 392.

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  Reply to Objection 3: One due circumstance does not suffice to make a good act, and consequently it does not follow that, no matter how one use one’s own property, the use is good, but when one uses it as one ought according to all the circumstances. Reply to Objection 4: Although it is not evil in itself to intend to keep oneself in good health, this intention becomes evil, if one intend health by means of something that is not naturally ordained for that purpose; for instance if one sought only bodily health by the sacrament of baptism, and the same applies to the marriage act in the question at issue. Whether it is a mortal sin for a man to have knowledge of his wife, with the intention not of a marriage good but merely of pleasure?Objection 1: It would seem that whenever a man has knowledge of his wife, with the intention not of a marriage good but merely of pleasure, he commits a mortal sin. For according to Jerome (Comment. in Eph. 5:25), as quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 31), “the pleasure taken in the embraces of a wanton is damnable in a husband.” Now nothing but mortal sin is said to be damnable. Therefore it is always a mortal sin to have knowledge of one’s wife for mere pleasure. Objection 2: Further, consent to pleasure is a mortal sin, as stated in the Second Book (Sent. ii, D, 24). Now whoever knows his wife for the sake of pleasure consents to the pleasure. Therefore he sins mortally. Objection 3: Further, whoever fails to refer the use of a creature to God enjoys a creature, and this is a mortal sin. But whoever uses his wife for mere pleasure does not refer that use to God. Therefore he sins mortally. Objection 4: Further, no one should be excommunicated except for a mortal sin. Now according to the text (Sent. ii, D, 24) a man who knows his wife for mere pleasure is debarred from entering the Church, as though he were excommunicate. Therefore every such man sins mortally. On the contrary, As stated in the text (Sent. ii, D, 24), according to Augustine (Contra Jul. ii, 10; De Decem Chord. xi; Serm. xli, de Sanct.), carnal intercourse of this kind is one of the daily sins, for which we say the “Our Father.” Now these are not mortal sins. Therefore, etc. Further, it is no mortal sin to take food for mere pleasure. Therefore in like manner it is not a mortal sin for a man to use his wife merely to satisfy his desire.