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Pride

Pride is the upright feeling — the chest lifting, the spine straightening, the quiet or open satisfaction in something done, made, or belonged to. It is the emotion the tradition is most divided about, named a sin in one inheritance and a dignity in another. Vela reads pride as a primary emotion that runs both ways, distinct from the defensive pride that only braces against shame, and follows the writers who have held its honest version.

Working definition · Upright satisfaction in self, lineage, or work—earned or defended.

3462 passages · 1 Vela essay · in 2 clusters

Vela’s read on this emotion

Pride is the emotion with the longest moral rap sheet, and the reading takes that history seriously without accepting its verdict. The pride the contemplative tradition warned against is real, but so is the pride a person earns by surviving, by making, by refusing to be made small — and the two are not the same feeling.

The reading splits along that seam. The memoir of escape and self-making reads pride as something reclaimed — the pride of having left, of having built a self the family or the system did not authorize. Trevor Noah's Born a Crime and the memoir of leaving hold a pride that is inseparable from dignity. The contemplative inheritance reads the other pride: Augustine of Hippo named superbia — pride — as the first and root sin, the self curving in toward itself, and the Western moral imagination has argued with that ranking ever since. The literature of identity and belonging — the pride claimed by those a culture tried to shame — reads pride as a political act, a refusal of the assigned verdict.

Pride is not the same as vanity, arrogance, or pride-as-defense. Vanity needs an audience; pride can be private. Arrogance compares and ranks; pride can simply stand. Pride-as-defense is pride mobilized to shield against shame — the upright posture held precisely because the ground feels unsafe — and the reading gives it its own page. The four are kin and the reading keeps them separate, because the difference between earned pride and defended pride is the whole moral question.

Study and magazine

Long-form guide in the magazine

An essay on how this word lives in language, in the tagged corpus, and in figurative art when curators pair passage with image — not a list of stages, not permission to feel.

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Passages

Every passage tagged with this emotion in the Vela corpus. Search the body text, narrow by source or register, click through to a book’s profile to see how the passage sits with the rest of the work.

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3462 tagged passages

  • From The Genius of Judy: How Judy Blume Rewrote Childhood for All of Us (2023)

    “I was a gadfly, no doubt about it,” Dishnow said, “[but] they’re not going to take my rights away from me, so I fought it.” The case went on for three long years, during which Dishnow looked for another position but claims he was kneecapped by the very public details of his dismissal, and the fact that he couldn’t get a letter of recommendation from his former employer. A jury agreed, awarding him $400,000 in damages (that number was reduced to approximately $180,000 in subsequent appeals, according to Dishnow). Dishnow eventually took the one and only employment offer he received, in another small town in Wisconsin, where he still resides, at a significantly lower salary from the already modest one he was making at Rib Lake. “But I wasn’t in it for the money to begin with,” Dishnow said. “Nobody else would touch me at that point. It was a long time ago but it was a pretty trying experience.” He is still in contact with some former colleagues at Rib Lake High School and they told him that to this day, Forever remains on a restricted shelf in the library. Dishnow’s campaign seems to have done nothing to change the principal’s mind about the book, but he did get one high-profile shoutout for his efforts. In Places I Never Meant to Be , Blume mentions Dishnow among a number of examples of people who stood up to book bans and experienced dire personal and professional consequences. “Guidance counselor Mike Dishnow was fired for writing critically of the board of education’s decision to ban my book Forever ,” she notes. “Ultimately, he won a court settlement, but by then his life had been turned upside down.” For a while, it looked like the culture wars over children’s books had been diffused. Two blockbuster series took over bookstores in the mid-1980s: The Baby-sitters Club and Sweet Valley High. Ann M. Martin, who created the Connecticut band of business-minded babysitters, had them talk about serious issues—diabetes, divorce and remarriage, cultural differences, death—but left the puberty stuff to Blume. Sweet Valley High, about a pair of pretty blond twins, was straight fluff. Fleissner said her mother hated those books, which crowded out complex novels like hers: “From my mom’s point of view and the other seventies-era writers, it was such a step backwards, to this much more 1950s sanitized version of like, ‘Oh, who’s dating who?’ Little high school dramas.” Parents and politicians argued over Satanism, rap lyrics, Beavis and Butt-Head , and whether or not it was cool that Britney Spears dressed like a sexy schoolgirl. But now, book challenges are back—and they’re more cutthroat than ever. In April 2023, Blume told the BBC that the current movement to ban books is “so much worse than it was in the ’80s,” because instead of being stoked by grassroots movements, it’s driven by the politicians themselves.

  • From The Story of My Experiments with Truth (An Autobiography) (1927)

    I had realized early enough in South Africa that there was no genuine friendship between the Hindus and the Musalmans. I never missed a single opportunity to remove obstacles in the way of unity. It was not in my nature to placate anyone by adulation, or at the cost of self- respect. But my South African experiences had convinced me that it would be on the question of Hindu- Muslim unity that my Ahimsa would be put to its severest test, and that the question presented the widest field for my experiments in Ahimsa. The conviction is still there. Every moment of my life I realize that God is putting me on my trial. Having such strong convictions on the question when I returned from South Africa, I prized the contact with the Brothers. But before closer touch could be established they were isolated. Maulana Mahomed Ali used to write long letters to me from Betul and Chhindwada whenever his jailers allowed him to do so. I applied for permission to visit the Brothers but to no purpose. It was after the imprisonment of the Ali Brothers that I was invited by Muslim friends to attend the session of the Muslim League at Calcutta. Being requested to speak, I addressed them on the duty of the Muslims to secure the Brother’s release. A little while after this I was taken by these friends to the Muslim College at Aligarh. There I invited the young men to be fakirs for the service of the motherland. Next I opened correspondence with the Government for the release of the Brothers. In that connection I studied the Brothers’ views and activities about the Khilafat. I had discussions with Musalman friends. I felt that, if I would become a true friend of the Muslims, I must render all possible help in securing the release of the Brothers, and a just settlement of the Khilafat question. It was not for me to enter into the absolute merits of the question, provided there was nothing immoral in their demands. In matters of religion beliefs differ, and each one’s is supreme for himself. If all had the same belief about all matters of religion, there would be only one religion in the world, As time progressed I found that the Muslim demand about the Khilafat was not only not against any ethical principle, but that the British Prime Minister had admitted the justice of the Muslim demand. I felt, therefore, bound to render what help I could in securing a due fulfilment of the prime Minister’s pledge. The pledge had been given in such clear terms that the examination of the Muslim demand on the merits was needed only to satisfy my own concience.

  • From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

    Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (Super Joan., Tract. v): “After John, baptism was administered, and the reason why was because he gave not Christ’s baptism, but his own . . . That which Peter gave . . . and if any were given by Judas, that was Christ’s. And therefore if Judas baptized anyone, yet were they not rebaptized . . . For the baptism corresponds with him by whose authority it is given, not with him by whose ministry it is given.” For the same reason those who were baptized by the deacon Philip, who gave the baptism of Christ, were not baptized again, but received the imposition of hands by the apostles, just as those who are baptized by priests are confirmed by bishops. Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says to Seleucianus (Ep. cclxv), “we deem that Christ’s disciples were baptized either with John’s baptism, as some maintain, or with Christ’s baptism, which is more probable. For He would not fail to administer baptism so as to have baptized servants through whom He baptized others, since He did not fail in His humble service to wash their feet.” Reply to Objection 3: As Chrysostom says (Hom. iv in Matth. [*From the supposititious Opus Imperfectum]): “Since, when John said, ‘I ought to be baptized by Thee,’ Christ answered, ‘Suffer it to be so now’: it follows that afterwards Christ did baptize John.” Moreover, he asserts that “this is distinctly set down in some of the apocryphal books.” At any rate, it is certain, as Jerome says on Mat. 3:13, that, “as Christ was baptized in water by John, so had John to be baptized in the Spirit by Christ.” Reply to Objection 4: The reason why these persons were baptized after being baptized by John was not only because they knew not of the Holy Ghost, but also because they had not received the baptism of Christ. Reply to Objection 5: As Augustine says (Contra Faust. xix), our sacraments are signs of present grace, whereas the sacraments of the Old Law were signs of future grace. Wherefore the very fact that John baptized in the name of one who was to come, shows that he did not give the baptism of Christ, which is a sacrament of the New Law. OF THE BAPTIZING OF CHRIST (EIGHT ARTICLES)We have now to consider the baptizing of Christ, concerning which there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether Christ should have been baptized? (2) Whether He should have been baptized with the baptism of John? (3) Of the time when He was baptized; (4) Of the place; (5) Of the heavens being opened unto Him; (6) Of the apparition of the Holy Ghost under the form of a dove; (7) Whether that dove was a real animal? (8) Of the voice of the Father witnessing unto Him.

  • From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

    Then he adds ‘ Primarily ’ because even though nature is a principle of the motion of composite things, nevertheless it is not such primarily. Hence that an animal is moved downwards is not because of the nature of animal insofar as it is animal, but because of the nature of the dominant element. He explains why he says ‘ per se and not per accidens ’ where he says, ‘ I say “ not in virtue of... ”‘ (192 b 24). It sometimes happens that a doctor is the cause of his own health, and so the principle of his own coming to health is in him, but per accidens. Hence nature is not the principle of his coming to health. For it is not insofar as he is cured that he has the art of medicine, but insofar as he is a doctor. Hence the same being happens to be a doctor and to be cured, and he is cured insofar as he is sick. And so because these things are joined per accidens, they are also at times separated per accidens. For it is one thing to be a doctor who cures, and another thing to be a sick person who is cured. But the principle of a natural motion is in the natural body which is moved insofar as it is moved. For insofar as fire has lightness, it is carried upward. And these two things are not divided from each other so that the lightness is different than the body which is moved upward. Rather they are always one and the same. And all artificial things are like the doctor who cures. For none of them has in itself the principle of its own making. Rather some of them come to be from something outside, as a house and other things which are carved by hand, while others come to be through an intrinsic principle, but per accidens, as was said [142]. And so it has been stated what nature is. 146. Next where he says, ‘ Things “ have a nature ” ... ’ (192 b 33), he defines those things which are given the name ‘ nature ’ . He says that those things which have in themselves a principle of their motion have a nature. And such are all subjects of nature. For nature is a subject insofar as it is called matter, and nature is in a subject insofar as it is called form. 147. Next where he says, ‘ The term “ according to nature ” (192 b 35), he explains what is ‘ according to nature ’ . He says that ‘ to be according to nature ’ is said both of subjects whose existence is from nature and also of the accidents which are in them and caused by such a principle. Thus to be carried upward is not a nature itself, nor does it have nature, but it is caused by nature.

  • From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

    49. Now someone might have suspected that Hesiod was the first to have investigated this sort of cause, or anyone else who held that love or desire is a principle in existing things, as Parmenides did. For in the place where he attempts to explain the generation of the universe, he says that “ Love, the first of all the gods, was made. ” And Hesiod says that “ The first of all things to be made was chaos, then broad earth, and love, who is pre-eminent among the immortals ” —as though there must be in the world some cause which moves things and brings them together. How one must arrange these thinkers in sequence will be decided later on. COMMENTARY93. Having given the philosophers opinions about the material cause, Aristotle now gives their opinions about the efficient cause, which is the source of motion. This is divided into two parts. First, he gives the opinion of those who assigned without qualification a cause of motion and generation. Second (97), he examines the opinion of those who posited an efficient cause, which is also the principle of good and evil in the world ( “ After these men ” ). In regard to the first he does two things. First, he gives the reasoning which compelled them to posit an efficient cause. Second (94), he shows the different positions which different men have held regarding this ( “ Now in general ” ). He says (45), then, that some philosophers have proceeded in this way in positing a material cause, but that the very nature of reality clearly provided them with a course for understanding or discovering the truth, and compelled them to investigate a problem which led them to the efficient cause. This problem is as follows: no thing or subject changes itself; for example, wood does not change itself so that a bed comes from it, nor does bronze cause itself to be changed in such a way that a statue comes from it; but there must be some other principle which causes the change they undergo, and this is the artist. But those who posited a material cause, whether one or more than one, said that the generation and corruption of things come from this cause as a subject. Therefore there must be some other cause of change, and to seek this is to seek another class of principle and cause, which is called the source of motion. 94. Now in general (46). He shows here that the philosophers have adopted three positions with respect to the foregoing issue. For those who adopted this course from the very beginning, and said that there is one material cause, were not greatly concerned with the solution of this problem. For they were content with their view of matter and neglected the cause of motion altogether.

  • From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

    Further. It has been proved that God cannot will what is impossible. Now it is impossible for anything to accrue to Him that He has not already, since He is nowise in potentiality, as we have shown. Therefore He cannot will to have what He has not. Whatever then He wills He has. Nor does He will anything ill, as we have proved. Therefore He is happy, according as some assert that a happy man is one who has whatever he desires, and desires nothing amiss. Holy Writ also bears witness to His happiness (1 Tim. 6): Which in His times He shall show, Who is blessed and … mighty. CHAPTER CI THAT GOD IS HIS OWN HAPPINESSIT follows from this that God is His own happiness. For His happiness is His intellectual operation, as we have shown: and it was proved above that God’s act of intelligence is His substance. Therefore He is His own happiness. Again. Happiness, since it is the last end, is that which everyone wills principally, whether he has a natural inclination for it, or possesses it already. Now it has been proved that God principally wills His essence. Therefore His essence is His happiness. Further. Whatever a person wills he directs to his happiness: for happiness is what is not desired on account of something else, and is the term of the movement of desire in one who desires one thing for the sake of another, else that movement will be indefinite. Since then God wills all other things for the sake of His goodness Which is His essence, it follows that He is His own happiness, even as He is His own essence and His own goodness. Moreover. There cannot be two sovereign goods: for if either lacked what the other has, neither would be sovereign and perfect. Now it has been shown above that God is the sovereign good. And it will be proved that happiness is the supreme good since it is the last end. Therefore happiness and God are one and the same. Therefore God is His own happiness. CHAPTER CII THAT GOD’S HAPPINESS IS PERFECT AND SINGULAR, SURPASSING ALL OTHER HAPPINESSFURTHERMORE, from what has been said we are able to consider the excellence of the divine happiness. For the nearer a thing is to happiness, the more perfectly is it happy. Hence, although a person be called happy on account of his hope of obtaining happiness, his happiness can nowise be compared to the happiness of one who has already actually obtained it. Now that which is happiness itself is nearest of all to happiness: and this has been proved to be true of God. Therefore He is singularly and perfectly happy.

  • From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

    I answer: God loves all things that exist. For all things that exist are good, in so far as they are. The very existence of anything whatsoever is a good, and so is any perfection of it. Now we proved in Q. 19, Art. 4, that God is the cause of all things. A thing must therefore be, and be good, to the extent which God wills. It follows that God wills some good to each thing that is. Now to love is just to will good for something. Clearly, then, God loves all things that are. But God does not love as we love. Our will is not the cause of the goodness in things, but is moved by their goodness as its object. Consequently, the love by which we will good for anyone is not the cause of his goodness. On the contrary, it is his goodness, whether real or imagined, that inspires the love whereby we will both the preservation of the good which he has and the provision of the good which he lacks, and whereby we also work to this end. God ’ s love, on the other hand, creates and infuses the goodness in things. On the first point: the lover is carried beyond himself and transferred to the loved one in the sense that he wills good for him, and works to provide it as if for himself. Thus Dionysius says in the same passage: “ in the interest of truth we must say that even God, who in his abundant loving-kindness causes all things, is carried beyond himself by his care for all that exists. ” On the second point: it is only in God that creatures have existed from eternity. Yet, since they have existed in himself from eternity, God has known their proper natures from eternity, and for the same reason has also loved them from eternity. Our own knowledge of things as they are in themselves is similar. We know them through their likenesses which exist in us. On the third point: friendship is possible only with rational creatures who can return it, and who can share in the work of life, and fare well in fortune and happiness. Benevolence, also, is properly towards rational creatures. Irrational creatures can neither love God nor share his intellectual life of happiness. Properly speaking, therefore, God does not love them with the love of friendship. But he does love them with the love of desire. For he has ordained them for rational creatures, indeed for himself — not as if he needed them, but for the sake of his loving-kindness, in as much as they are useful to us. We can desire something for others no less than for ourselves.

  • From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

    The second cause of this error was defective reason. For since that which is common is specified or individualized by addition, they deemed the divine being, to which nothing is added, not to be some proper being, but the common being of all, not perceiving that the common or universal cannot be without some addition, though it be considered apart from any addition: for animal cannot be apart from the difference of rational or irrational, although we think of it apart from these differences. Moreover although we think of the universal without an addition, we do not think of it apart from its receptivity of addition: for if no difference could be added to animal, it would not be a genus; and the same applies to all other names of things. Now the divine being is without addition, not only in thought but also in reality; and not only is it without addition, but also without receptivity of addition. Wherefore from the very fact that it neither receives nor can receive addition, we should conclude rather that God is not common but proper being; since His being is distinct from all others for the very reason that nothing can be added to it. Hence the Commentator says (De causis) that the first cause, by reason of the very purity of its goodness, is distinct from others and, so to speak, individualized. The third cause of this error is the consideration of the divine simplicity. For since God is the extreme of simplicity, they thought that if we make an analysis of all that is in us, the last thing, being the most simple, must be God; for we cannot proceed indefinitely in the composition of the things that are in us. In this again their reason was lacking, that they failed to observe that what is most simple in us, is not so much a complete thing as some part of a thing: whereas simplicity is ascribed to God as to a perfect subsistent being. The fourth thing that might lead them into this error, is the expression whereby we say that God is in all things: for they failed to perceive that He is in things, not as part thereof, but as the cause of things, which is nowise wanting to its effect. For we do not say that the form is in the body in the same sense as we say that the sailor is in the boat. CHAPTER XXVII THAT GOD IS NOT THE FORM OF A BODYACCORDINGLY, having shown that God is not the being of all, it can be proved in like manner that God is not the form of any thing. For the divine being cannot be the being of a quiddity that is not its own being, as shown above. Now that which is the divine being itself is no other than God. Therefore it is impossible for God to be the form of any other thing.

  • From History of the Christian Church: The Complete Set of Eight Volumes (1858)

    Baur (Aug.): Zwingli’s Theologie, vol. II. (1888), 1–267. An elaborate discussion and defence of Zwingli’s conduct towards the radicals, with full extracts from his writings, but unjust to the Baptists. The monographs of Schreiber on Hübmaier (1839 and 1840, unfinished), Keim on Ludwig Hätzer (1856), and Keller on Hans Denck (Ein Apostel der Wiedertäufer, 1882), touch also on the Anabaptist movement in Switzerland. Kurtz, in the tenth ed. of his Kirchengeschichte (1887), II. 150–164, gives a good general survey of the Anabaptist movement in Germany, Switzerland, and Holland, including the Mennonites. Having considered Zwingli’s controversy with Romanism, we must now review his conflict with Radicalism, which ran parallel with the former, and exhibits the conservative and churchly side of his reformation. Radicalism was identical with the Anabaptist movement, but the baptismal question was secondary. It involved an entire reconstruction of the Church and of the social order. It meant revolution. The Romanists pointed triumphantly to revolution as the legitimate and inevitable result of the Reformation; but history has proved the difference. Liberty is possible without license, and differs as widely from it as from despotism. The Swiss Reformation, like the German, was disturbed and checked by the radical excesses. It was placed between the two fires of Romanism and Ultraprotestantism. It was attacked in the front and rear, from without and within, by the Romanists on the ground of tradition, by the Radicals on the ground of the Bible. In some respects the danger from the latter was greater. Liberty has more to fear from the abuses of its friends than from the opposition of its foes. The Reformation would have failed if it had identified itself with the revolution. Zwingli applied to the Radicals the words of St. John to the antichristian teachers: "They went out from us, but they were not of us" (1 John 2:19). He considered the controversy with the Papists as mere child’s play when compared to that with the Ultraprotestants.122 The Reformers aimed to reform the old Church by the Bible; the Radicals attempted to build a new Church from the Bible. The former maintained the historic continuity; the latter went directly to the apostolic age, and ignored the intervening centuries as an apostasy. The Reformers founded a popular state-church, including all citizens with their families; the Anabaptists organized on the voluntary principle select congregations of baptized believers, separated from the world and from the State. Nothing is more characteristic of radicalism and sectarianism than an utter want of historical sense and respect for the past. In its extreme form it rejects even the Bible as an external authority, and relies on inward inspiration. This was the case with the Zwickau Prophets who threatened to break up Luther’s work at Wittenberg. The Radicals made use of the right of protest against the Reformation, which the Reformers so effectually exercised against popery. They raised a protest against Protestantism. They charged the Reformers with inconsistency and semipopery; yea, with the worst kind of popery.

  • From Extraordinary Everyday Photography: Awaken Your Vision to Create Stunning Images Wherever You Are (2012)

    J: After twilight was just about gone, I did a picture of the Zipper as well. I knew that a slow shutter speed would express the ride’s moving and shaking, but I wanted the structure that held the ride down to earth to be sharp. I used my tripod and opened my shutter when the ride began spinning quickly. 25–85mm lens at 85mm, f/8 for 4 seconds B: I photographed the Zipper, a ride at our local fair, at twilight to capture the warm colors of the ride against the deep blue sky. 24–70mm lens at 70mm, f/11 for 2 seconds Pay Attention to the Background Watch your background when photographing at night. Brightly lit windows of shops or homes will overexpose quickly when you are doing a long exposure and, if too bright, could become a distraction. Darker backgrounds may make it hard to see your subject, as it may not separate from the background, and you’ll lose your focal point. You just have to experiment to figure out what works best in your situation.

  • From Untrue (2018)

    Untrue is a book with a point of view—namely that whatever else we may think of them, women who reject monogamy are brave, and their experiences and possible motivations are instructive. Not only because female infidelity is far from uncommon but also because the fact of it and our reactions to it are useful metrics of female autonomy, and of the price women continue to pay for seizing privileges that have historically belonged to men. This book is not an exhaustive review of the literature on infidelity, though it does reference the dozens of articles and books I read in a range of fields in an attempt to get my arms around the topic. But for the many studies I cite that suggest female “extra-pair” sexual behavior is a social and reproductive strategy that has served females in particular contexts well over the millennia, there are other studies that argue or suggest otherwise. I am only your guide to my view—informed by the social science and science to which I was drawn and to which I was referred by experts whom I believe are correcting bias in their fields—that what we today call female promiscuity is a behavior with a remarkably long tail, so to speak, a fascinating history and prehistory, and a no less intriguing future. And that it merits open-minded consideration from multiple perspectives. For too long we have handed our sexual problems and peccadillos exclusively to therapists and psychologists, presuming the issues to be personal, even pathological—rooted primarily in our emotional baggage, our families of origin, our “unique difficulties” with trust and commitment—and presuming they have solutions. But these ostensibly most personal matters—how and why we have sex, why we struggle with monogamy—have deep historic and prehistoric underpinnings as well. Biological factors, social control, cultural context, ecologies—female sexuality and our menu of options are shaped by all these factors and more. Rethinking topics as complex as female infidelity and our often heated responses to it arguably requires multiple lenses—sociology, evolutionary biology, primatology, and literary theory are just a few discourses that can enhance our understanding, reframing the adulteress in ways that facilitate greater empathy and understanding of her—and of ourselves.

  • From Born on the Fourth of July (1976)

    One night in late August I came home very drunk and pushed myself back into my house, up the wooden ramp my father had built when I was at the hospital. I pushed my wheelchair down the hallway to my room, trying not to wake my mother and father or any of my brothers and sisters. When I got there, I sat in my wheelchair staring at myself in the mirror for a long time, thinking back to the promise I had made to myself and the others in the Bronx VA hospital that I would walk again. I had not taken my braces out of the closet or tried to walk in several months, but on that night I was determined to get up again. Sometime after midnight, I took the braces out of the closet, transferred into my bed, and put the braces on, locking them in place. I then transferred back into my wheelchair, grabbed my crutches, and lifted myself slowly out of my chair into an upright position. After taking a deep drunken breath, I began to stubbornly drag myself around the room. I had only gone a few steps when I found myself facing the mirror once again. I remember staring at my twisted and atrophied body and with one last superhuman effort, refusing to be defeated, I spun around angrily, dragging myself across the floor of my room. After several steps I lost my balance and went crashing to the floor. I thought for a moment of getting up again, of making one last vain attempt to walk, but I was too tired and drunk and instead I began to cry, tears streaming down my face, hoping my mother and father wouldn’t hear me. A few minutes later I pulled myself back into my wheelchair where I slowly unstrapped my braces and threw them into the closet. I know the truth is that someday they will find a way to fuse the spine together, but not in my lifetime or the lifetime of the others around me. Our job here is to keep on living, to keep getting up and making it through each day any way we can. END OF EXCERPT More about Hurricane Street ___________________ “The author of Born on the Fourth of July (1976) recounts the brief 1974 movement he initiated to change how Veterans Affairs hospitals cared for wounded soldiers . . . The great strength of this book is that the author never minces words. With devastating candor, he memorializes a short-lived but important movement and the men who made it happen. Sobering reflections on past treatment of America’s injured war veterans.” —Kirkus Reviews “[A] compelling snapshot of early 1980s activism. . . . Without social media or cell phones to boost the signal, it was Kovic’s flair for the dramatic and ability to marshal reporters that turned the protest into a battle victory. . . .

  • From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

    Therefore the self-same virtue which is severed together with the semen and is called the formative virtue, is not the soul, nor does it become the soul in the process of generation: but, since it is based, as on its proper subject, on the (vital) spirit contained in the frothy semen, it causes the formation of the body in so far as it operates by virtue of the father’s soul, to whom generation is ascribed as the principal agent, and not by virtue of the soul of the person conceived, even after the soul is in that person: for the subject conceived does not generate itself, but is generated by the father. This is clear to anyone who considers each power of the soul separately. For it cannot be ascribed to the soul of the embryo by reason of the generative power; not only because the generative power does not exercise its operation until the work is completed of the nutritive and augmentative powers which are its auxiliaries, since to generate belongs to that which is perfect; but also because the work of the generative power is directed, not to the perfection of the individual, but to the preservation of the species. Nor again can it be ascribed to the nutritive power, the work of which is to assimilate nourishment to the subject nourished, which is not apparent here; since in the process of formation the nourishment is not assimilated to something already existing, but is advanced to a more perfect form and more approaching to a likeness to the father. Likewise neither can it be ascribed to the augmentative power: since it belongs to this power to cause a change, not of form, but of quantity. As to the sensitive and intellective part, it is clear that it has no operation appropriate to such a formation. It remains then that the formation of the body, especially as regards the foremost and principal parts, is not from the form of the subject generated, nor from a formative power acting by virtue of that form, but from (a formative power) acting by virtue of the generative soul of the father, the work of which soul is to produce the specific like of the generator. Accordingly this formative power remains the same in the aforesaid spirit from the beginning of the formation until the end. Yet the species of the subject formed remains not the same: because at first it has the form of semen, afterwards of blood, and so onwards until it arrives at its final complement. For although the generation of simple bodies does not proceed in order, since each of them has an immediate form of primary matter; in the generation of other bodies, there must be an order in the generations, by reason of the many intermediate forms between the first elemental form and the final form which is the term of generation: wherefore there are a number of generations and corruptions following one another.

  • From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

    For this reason the relation which arises from the act of the mind cannot be in that thing. The same applies to sense and the sensible object: for although the sensible object by its own action affects the organ of sense, and consequently bears a relation to it, just as other natural agents have a relation to the things on which they act, nevertheless it is not the alteration of the organ that perfects the act of perception, but the act of the sensitive power; to which act the sensible object outside the soul is altogether foreign. In like manner a man who stands to the right of a pillar bears a corresponding relation to the pillar by reason of his motive power whereby he is competent to be to the right or to the left, before or behind, above or below. Wherefore such-like relations in man or animal are real, but not in the thing which lacks that power. In like manner again money is external to the action whereby prices are fixed, which action is a convention between certain persons: and man is outside the genus of those actions whereby the artist produces his image. Hence there is not a real relation either in a man to his image, or in money to the price, but vice versa. Now God does not work by an intermediary action to be regarded as issuing from God and terminating in the creature: but his action is his substance and is wholly outside the genus of created being whereby the creature is related to him. Nor again does any good accrue to the creator from the production of the creature: wherefore his action is supremely liberal as Avicenna says (Metaph. viii, 7). It is also evident that he is not moved to act, and that without any change in himself he makes all changeable things. It follows then that there is no real relation in him to creatures, although creatures are really related to him, as effects to their cause. In this matter Rabbi Moses erred in many ways, for he wished to prove that there is no relation between God and the creature, because seeing that God is not a body he has no relation to time or place. Thus he considered only the relation which results from quantity and not that which arises from action and passion.

  • From Sex Matters: How Modern Feminism Lost Touch with Science, Love, and Common Sense (2018)

    35 (July 2016), ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/​pmc/​articles/​PMC4964018/.27.Editor’s Profile, Biology of Sex Differences, n.d., bsd.biomedcentral.com.28.Ibid.29.Cahill, “Equal ≠ Same: Sex Differences in the Human Brain.”30.Brizendine, The Female Brain, 26.31.Rhoads, Taking Sex Differences Seriously, 29.32.Andrew Sullivan, “The He Hormone,” New York Times Magazine, April 2, 2000, nytimes.com/​2000/​04/​02/​magazine/​the-he-hormone.html.33.Rhoads, Taking Sex Differences Seriously, 199.34.Steven Pinker, The Blank Slate, 348.35.Quoted ibid., 349.36.Elaine Woo, “David Reimer, 38; After Botched Surgery, He Was Raised as a Girl in Gender Experiment,” Los Angeles Times, May 13, 2004, articles.latimes.com/​2004/​may/​13/​local/​me-reimer13/​2.37.Steven Pinker, The Blank Slate, 349.38.Ewen Callaway, “Male Monkeys Prefer Boys’ Toys,” New Scientist, April 4, 2008, newscientist.com/​article/​dn13596-male-monkeys-prefer-boys-toys/.39.Sax, Why Gender Matters, 61.40.Simon Baron-Cohen, The Essential Difference: The Truth About the Male and Female Brain (New York: Basic Books, 2003), 30.41.Rhoads, Taking Sex Differences Seriously, 145.42.“Genders Differ Dramatically in Evolved Mate Preferences,” UT News, Aug. 6, 2015, news.utexas.edu/​2015/​08/​06/​genders-differ-dramatically-in-evolved-mate-preferences.43.Matt Ridley, The Red Queen: Sex and the Evolution of Human Nature (New York: Macmillan, 1994), 275.44.Baron-Cohen, The Essential Difference, 36.45.Susan Pinker, The Sexual Paradox, 222.46.Baron-Cohen, The Essential Difference, 35.47.Sullivan, “The He Hormone.”48.Brizendine, The Female Brain, 91.49.Moir and Jessel, Brain Sex, 79.50.Brizendine, The Female Brain, 91.51.Sax, Why Gender Matters, 125.52.Ibid., 126.53.Ibid., 125.54.Letitia Anne Peplau, “Human Sexuality: How Do Men and Women Differ?” Current Directions in Psychological Science, 12, no. 2 (April 2003), sites.oxy.edu/​clint/​physio/​article/​humansexuality.pdf, 37.55.Ibid., 37.56.Rhoads, Taking Sex Differences Seriously, 51.57.Andrew Sullivan, speech at National Review Summit, Washington, DC, January 1993.58.Mercedes Tappé et al., “Gender Differences in Receptivity to Sexual Offers: A New Research Prototype,” Interpersona 7, no. 2 (2013), interpersona.psychopen.eu/​article/​view/​121/​155.59.American Psychological Association, Answers to Your Questions About Transgender People, Gender Identity and Gender Expression (pamphlet), apa.org/​topics/​lgbt/​transgender.pdf.60.Quoted in Lawrence S. Mayer and Paul R. McHugh, “Sexuality and Gender,” The New Atlantis, no. 50 (Fall 2016), 87.61.Quoted ibid., 88.62.Quoted in Molly Fischer, “Think Gender Is Performance? You Have Judith Butler to Blame for That,” New York magazine, June 21, 2016, nymag.com/​thecut/​2016/​06/​judith-butler-c-v-r.html.63.“Dear Colleague Letter on Transgender Students,” Archived Information, U.S. Dept. of Justice and U.S. Dept. of Education, May 13, 2016, ed.gov/​about/​offices/​list/​ocr/​letters/​colleague-201605-title-ix-transgender.pdf.64.Anne Fausto-Sterling, “How Many Sexes Are There?” New York Times, March 12, 1993, nytimes.com/​1993/​03/​12/​opinion/​how-many-sexes-are-there.html.65.Ibid.66.Leonard Sax, “How Common Is Intersex?” Journal of Sex Research (August 2002), leonardsax.com/​how-common-is-intersex-a-response-to-anne-fausto-sterling/.67.Christopher Wanjek, “Being Transgender Has Nothing to Do with Hormonal Imbalance,” LiveScience, July 23, 2015, livescience.com/​51652-transgender-youth-dont-have-hormonal-imbalance.html.68.Mayer and McHugh, “Sexuality and Gender,” 103.69.“Schools Homecoming Strives to Be Inclusive,” Washington Post, Sept. 28, 2016.70.“How British Schools Are Adapting to Growing Numbers of Transgender Pupils,” The Economist, May 4, 2017, economist.com/​news/​britain/​21717739-new-efforts-accommodate-transgender-students-contrast-sharply-controversy.71.Jan Hoffman, “Estimate of U.S. Transgender Population Doubles to 1.4 Million Adults,” New York Times, June 30, 2016, nytimes.com/​2016/​07/​01/​health/​transgender-population.html.72.Mark Hemingway, “In Oregon, 15-Year-Olds Can Get Taxpayer-Funded Sex Changes Without Parental Consent,” Weekly Standard, June 17, 2015, weeklystandard.com/​in-oregon-15-year-olds-can-get-taxpayer-funded-sex-changes-without-parental-consent/​article/​973130.73.Amber Phillips, “These States Are Opening the Doors to Bathroom Wars,” Washington Post, Jan. 24, 2017, washingtonpost.com/​news/​the-fix/​wp/​2017/​01/​24/​new-fronts-emerge-in-the-bathroom-wars.74.Petula Dvorak, “Transgender at Five,” Washington Post, May 19, 2012, washingtonpost.com/​local/​transgender-at-five/​2012/​05/​19/​gIQABfFkbU_story.html.75.Michelle Cretella, “Gender Dysphoria in Children and the Suppression of Debate,” Journal of American Physicians and Surgeons 21, no. 4 (Summer 2016).76.Ibid.77.Ibid.78.Jesse Singal, “How the Fight over Transgender Kids Got a Leading Sex Researcher Fired,” The Cut, Feb.

  • From History of the Christian Church: The Complete Set of Eight Volumes (1858)

    A new collection, called the Sixth Book, liber sextus — or, as by English writers, the Sext,—was issued by the authority of Boniface VIII., 1298, and carried the collections of Gratian and Gregory IX. into Boniface’s reign. In 1314, Clement V. issued another collection, which included his own decretals and the decrees of the council of Vienne and was called the Seventh Book, liber septimus, or the Clementines. In 1317, John XXII. officially sent Clement’s collection to the universities of Bologna and Paris. Subsequent to the publication of the Clementines, twenty of John’s own decretals were added. In 1500 John Chappuis, in an edition of the liber sextus and the Clementines, added the decretals of John and seventy-one of other popes. This series of collections, namely, Gratian’s Decretum, Gregory IX,’s Decretales, the Sext, the Clementines, and the Extravagantes of John XXII., constitutes the official body of canon law—corpus juris canonici — and was published in the edition of Gregory XllI. The canon law attempted the task of legislating in detail for all phases of human life—clerical, ecclesiastical, social, domestic—from the cradle to the grave by the sacramental decisions of the priesthood. It invaded the realm of the common law and threatened to completely set it aside. The Church had not only its own code and its specifically religious penalties, but also its own prisons. This body of law was an improvement upon the arbitrary and barbaric severity of princes. It, at least, started out from the principles of justice and humanity. But it degenerated into an attempt to do for the individual action of the Christian world what the Pharisees attempted to do for Jewish life. It made the huge mistake of substituting an endless number of enactments, often the inventions of casuistry, for inclusive, comprehensive moral principles. It put a crushing restraint upon the progress of thought and bound weights, heavy to be borne, upon the necks of men. It had the virtues and all the vices of the papal system. It protected the clergy in the commission of crimes by demanding that they be tried in ecclesiastical courts for all offences whatsoever. It became a mighty support for the papal claims. It confirmed and perpetuated the fiction of the pseudo-Isidorian decretals and perpetrated new forgeries. It taught that the decisions of Rome are final.1849 As Christ is above the law, even so is the pope.1850 Döllinger closes his examination of the Decretum, by pronouncing it; "filled through and through with forgery and error" and says "it entered like a mighty wedge into the older structural organization of the Church and split it apart. "

  • From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

    REASONS FOR THIS COMMANDMENTThere are five reasons for this Commandment. The first reason was to put aside error, for the Holy Spirit saw that in the future some men would say that the world had always existed. “In the last days there shall come deceitful scoffers, walking after their own lusts, saying: Where is His promise or His coming? For since the time that the fathers slept, all things continue as they were from the beginning of creation. For this they are willfully ignorant of, that the heavens were before, and the earth out of water, and through water, created by the word of God” [2 Pet 3:3-5]. God, therefore, wished that one day should be set aside in memory of the fact that He created all things in six days, and that on the seventh day He rested from the creation of new creatures. This is why the Lord placed this Commandment in the law, saying: “Remember that you keep holy the Sabbath day.” The Jews kept holy the Sabbath in memory of the first creation; but Christ at His coming brought about a new creation. For by the first creation an earthly man was created, and by the second a heavenly man was formed: “For in Christ Jesus neither circumcision is worth any thing, nor uncircumcision, but a new creature” [Gal 6:15]. This new creation is through grace, which came by the Resurrection: “That as Christ is risen from the dead by the glory of the Father, so we also may walk in newness of life. For if we have been planted together in the likeness of His death, so shall we also be in the likeness of His resurrection” [Rm 6:4-5]. And thus, because the Resurrection took place on Sunday, we celebrate that day, even as the Jews observed the Sabbath on account of the first creation. The second reason for this Commandment is to instruct us in our faith in the Redeemer. For the flesh of Christ was not corrupted in the sepulchre, and thus it is said: “Moreover My flesh also shall rest in hope” [Ps 15:9]. “Nor will You let your holy one see corruption” [Ps 15:10]. Wherefore, God wished that the Sabbath should be observed, and that just as the sacrifices of the Old Law signified the death of Christ, so should the quiet of the Sabbath signify the rest of His body in the sepulchre. But we do not now observe these sacrifices, because with the advent of the reality and the truth, figures of it must cease, just as the darkness is dispelled with the rising of the sun. Nevertheless, we keep the Saturdays in veneration of the Blessed Virgin, in whom remained a firm faith on that Saturday while Christ was dead.

  • From The Story of My Experiments with Truth (An Autobiography) (1927)

    With a view to steeling the hearts of those who were frightened, I advised the people, under the leadership of Sjt. Mohanlal Pandya, to remove the crop of onion, from a field which had been, in my opinion wrongly attached. I did not regard this as civil disobedience, but even if it was, I suggested that this attachment of standing crops, though it might be in accordance with law, was morally wrong, and was nothing be in accordance with law, was morally wrong, and was nothing short of looting, and that therefore it was the people’s duty to remove the onion in spite of the order of attachment. This was a good opportunity for the people to learn a lesson in courting fines or imprisonment, which was the necessary consequence of such disobedience. For Sjt. Mohanlal Pandya it was a thing after his heart. He did not like the campaign to end without someone undergoing suffering in the shape of imprisonment for something done consistently with the principles fof Satyagraha. So he volunteered to remove the onion crop from the field, and in this seven or eight friends joined him. It was impossible for the Government to leave them free. The arrest of Sjt. Mohanlal and his companions added to the people’s enthusiasm. When the fear of jail disappears, repression puts heart into the people. Crowds of them besieged the court-house on the day of the hearing. Pandya and his companions were convicted and sentenced to a brief term of imprisonment. I was of opinion that the conviction was wrong, because the act of removing the onion crop could not come under the definition of ‘theft’ in the Penal Code. But no appeal was filed as the policy was to avoid the law courts. A procession escorted the ‘convicts’ to jail, and on that day Sjt. Mohanlal Pandya earned from the people the honoured title of dungli Chor (onion thief) which he enjoys to this day. The conclusion of the Kheda Satyagraha I will leave to the next chapter.

  • From Beyond Respectability: The Intellectual Thought of Race Women (2017)

    This chapter moves across the span of her career, mapping her development of a concept called “dignified agitation,” which she introduces in a 1913 speech. She returns to this formulation throughout her career, and I argue that this idea of dignified agitation is one that she both learned and propagated as part of the NACW school of thought. But it also acts as a bridge concept, and she, as a bridge figure to Civil Rights–era Black women intellectuals, who both respected the NACW school of thought and sought to move beyond it in critical ways. Because of the deliberate ways that Terrell wrote about her love of dancing in her autobiography, I also consider in this chapter the ways in which she is part of a genealogy of Black women’s pleasure politics, even though the current Black feminist discourse on pleasure typically focuses on blues women in this time period. Because Terrell is considered one of the foremost proselytizers of respectability, a turn toward her articulation of pleasure politics richly complicates the manner in which we read her as a theorist of racial resistance and gender progressivism. In chapter three , I turn to the work of Pauli Murray, one of the young activists that Terrell mentored. In the 1940s, Murray enrolled at Howard University Law School and went on to graduate as the only woman and top student in her class. In the 1930s, the convergence of several important Black male intellectuals at Howard University, including Abram Harris, E. Franklin Frazier, and Ralph Bunche, had cemented a new formal model of the academically trained Black male public intellectual. When Murray enrolled in the 1940s, she experienced great sexism from these Black male intellectuals. She termed their treatment of her Jane Crow . While she went on to have a storied career as a legal expert, Episcopal priest, poet, and writer, all of which place her firmly in the tradition of the race woman, her identity as both a woman and queer person in the 1940s and 1950s collided with the Howard model of public intellectual work. This chapter brings together Murray’s time and training at Howard, her archives, and an examination of her two autobiographies to suggest that her concept of Jane Crow grew out of the collision of race-based sexual politics and limited ideas among Black men about who could provide intellectual leadership for Black people. Moreover, Jane Crow exposed the heterosexist proclivities of Black public leadership traditions, and offers a framework for thinking about how Black women negotiated gender and sexual politics even as they devoted their lives to theorizing new strategies for racial uplift.

  • From History of the Christian Church: The Complete Set of Eight Volumes (1858)

    In the reign of Louis XI., who gloried in the title "the first Christian king," French poets celebrated his deeds. The homage of royalty took in part the place among the literary men of France that the cult of antiquity occupied in Italy.1096 Greek, which had been completely forgotten in France, had its first teachers in Gregory Tifernas, who reached Paris, 1458, John Lascaris, who returned with Charles VIII., and Hermonymus of Sparta, who had Reuchlin and Budaeus among his scholars. An impetus was given to the new studies by the Italian, Aleander, afterwards famous for his association with Luther at Worms. He lectured in Paris, 1509, on Plato and issued a Latino-Greek lexicon. In 1512 his pupil, Vatable, published the Greek grammar of Chrysoloras. William Budaeus, perhaps the foremost Greek scholar of his day, founded the Collège de France, 1530, and finally induced Francis I. to provide for instruction in Hebrew and Greek. The University of Paris at the close of the 14th century was sunk into a low condition and Erasmus bitterly complained of the food, the morals and the intellectual standards of the college of Montague which he attended. Budaeus urged the combination of the study of the Scriptures with the study of the classics and exclaimed of the Gospel of John, "What is it, if not the almost perfect sanctuary of the truth!"1097 He persisted in setting himself against the objection that the study of the languages of Scripture led on to Lutheranism. Lefèvre studied in Paris, Pavia, Padua and Cologne and, for longer or shorter periods, tarried in the greater Italian cities. He knew Greek and some Hebrew. From 1492–1506 he was engaged in editing the works of Aristotle and Raymundus Lullus and then, under the protection of Briçonnet, bishop of Meaux, he turned his attention to theology. It was his purpose to offset the Sentences of Peter the Lombard by a system of theology giving only what the Scriptures teach. In 1509, he published the Psalterum quintuplex, a combination of five Latin versions of the Psalms, including a revision and a commentary by his own hand. In 1512, he issued a revised Latin translation of the Pauline Epistles with commentary. In this work, he asserted the authority of the Bible and the doctrine of justification by faith, without appreciating, however, the far-reaching significance of the latter opinion.1098 He also called in question the merit of good works and priestly celibacy. In his Preface to the Psalms Lefèvre said, "For a long time I followed Humanistic studies and I scarcely touched my books with things divine, but then these burnt upon me with such light, that profane studies seemed to be as darkness in comparison." Three years after the appearance of Luther’s New Testament, Lefèvre’s French translation appeared, 1523. It was made from the Vulgate, as was his translation of the Old Testament, 1528. In 1522 and 1525, appeared his commentaries on the four Gospels and the Catholic Epistles.

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