Gratitude

Passages

Every passage tagged with this emotion in the Vela corpus. Search the body text, narrow by source or register, click through to a book’s profile to see how the passage sits with the rest of the work.

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• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  I answer that, Thanksgiving [gratiarum actio] in the recipient corresponds to the favor [gratia] of the giver: so that when there is greater favor on the part of the giver, greater thanks are due on the part of the recipient. Now a favor is something bestowed “gratis”: wherefore on the part of the giver the favor may be greater on two counts. First, owing to the quantity of the thing given: and in this way the innocent owes greater thanksgiving, because he receives a greater gift from God, also, absolutely speaking, a more continuous gift, other things being equal. Secondly, a favor may be said to be greater, because it is given more gratuitously; and in this sense the penitent is more bound to give thanks than the innocent, because what he receives from God is more gratuitously given: since, whereas he was deserving of punishment, he has received grace. Wherefore, although the gift bestowed on the innocent is, considered absolutely, greater, yet the gift bestowed on the penitent is greater in relation to him: even as a small gift bestowed on a poor man is greater to him than a great gift is to a rich man. And since actions are about singulars, in matters of action, we have to take note of what is such here and now, rather than of what is such absolutely, as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iii) in treating of the voluntary and the involuntary. This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. Whether a man is bound to give thanks to every benefactor?Objection 1: It seems that the a man is not bound to give thanks to every benefactor. For a man may benefit himself just as he may harm himself, according to Ecclus. 14:5, “He that is evil to himself, to whom will he be good?” But a man cannot thank himself, since thanksgiving seems to pass from one person to another. Therefore thanksgiving is not due to every benefactor. Objection 2: Further, gratitude is a repayment of an act of grace. But some favors are granted without grace, and are rudely, slowly and grudgingly given. Therefore gratitude is not always due to a benefactor. Objection 3: Further, no thanks are due to one who works for his own profit. But sometimes people bestow favors for their own profit. Therefore thanks are not due to them. Objection 4: Further, no thanks are due to a slave, for all that he is belongs to his master. Yet sometimes a slave does a good turn to his master. Therefore gratitude is not due to every benefactor .

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  Reply to Objection 4: He that is unaware of a favor conferred on him is not ungrateful, if he fails to repay it, provided he be prepared to do so if he knew. It is nevertheless commendable at times that the object of a favor should remain in ignorance of it, both in order to avoid vainglory, as when Blessed Nicolas threw gold into a house secretly, wishing to avoid popularity: and because the kindness is all the greater through the benefactor wishing not to shame the person on whom he is conferring the favor. Whether favors should be withheld from the ungrateful?Objection 1: It seems that favors should withheld from the ungrateful. For it is written (Wis. 16:29): “The hope of the unthankful shall melt away as the winter’s ice.” But this hope would not melt away unless favors were withheld from him. Therefore favors should be withheld from the ungrateful. Objection 2: Further, no one should afford another an occasion of committing sin. But the ungrateful in receiving a favor is given an occasion of ingratitude. Therefore favors should not be bestowed on the ungrateful. Objection 3: Further, “By what things a man sinneth, by the same also he is tormented” (Wis. 11:17). Now he that is ungrateful when he receives a favor sins against the favor. Therefore he should be deprived of the favor. On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 6:35) that “the Highest . . . is kind to the unthankful, and to the evil.” Now we should prove ourselves His children by imitating Him (Lk. 6:36). Therefore we should not withhold favors from the ungrateful. I answer that, There are two points to be considered with regard to an ungrateful person. The first is what he deserves to suffer and thus it is certain that he deserves to be deprived of our favor. The second is, what ought his benefactor to do? For in the first place he should not easily judge him to be ungrateful, since, as Seneca remarks (De Benef. iii), “a man is often grateful although he repays not,” because perhaps he has not the means or the opportunity of repaying. Secondly, he should be inclined to turn his ungratefulness into gratitude, and if he does not achieve this by being kind to him once, he may by being so a second time. If, however, the more he repeats his favors, the more ungrateful and evil the other becomes, he should cease from bestowing his favors upon him. Reply to Objection 1: The passage quoted speaks of what the ungrateful man deserves to suffer. Reply to Objection 2: He that bestows a favor on an ungrateful person affords him an occasion not of sin but of gratitude and love. And if the recipient takes therefrom an occasion of ingratitude, this is not to be imputed to the bestower.

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  Reply to Objection 5: A poor man is certainly not ungrateful if he does what he can. For since kindness depends on the heart rather than on the deed, so too gratitude depends chiefly the heart. Hence Seneca says (De Benef. ii): “Who receives a favor gratefully, has already begun to pay it back: and that we are grateful for favors received should be shown by the outpourings of the heart, not only in his hearing but everywhere.” From this it is evident that however well off a man may be, it is possible to thank him for his kindness by showing him reverence and honor. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 14): “He that abounds should be repaid with honor, he that is in want should be repaid with money”: and Seneca writes (De Benef. vi): “There are many ways of repaying those who are well off, whatever we happen to owe them; such as good advice, frequent fellowship, affable and pleasant conversation without flattery.” Therefore there is no need for a man to desire neediness or distress in his benefactor before repaying his kindness, because, as Seneca says (De Benef. vi), “it were inhuman to desire this in one from whom you have received no favor; how much more so to desire it in one whose kindness has made you his debtor!” If, however, the benefactor has lapsed from virtue, nevertheless he should be repaid according to his state, that he may return to virtue if possible. But if he be so wicked as to be incurable, then his heart has changed, and consequently no repayment is due for his kindness, as heretofore. And yet, as far as it possible without sin, the kindness he has shown should be held in memory, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 3). Reply to Objection 6: As stated in the preceding reply, repayment of a favor depends chiefly on the affection of the heart: wherefore repayment should be made in such a way as to prove most beneficial. If, however, through the benefactor’s carelessness it prove detrimental to him, this is not imputed to the person who repays him, as Seneca observes (De Benef. vii): “It is my duty to repay, and not to keep back and safeguard my repayment.” Whether a man is bound to repay a favor at once?Objection 1: It seems that a man is bound to repay a favor at once. For we are bound to restore at once what we owe, unless the term be fixed. Now there is no term prescribed for the repayment of favors, and yet this repayment is a duty, as stated above [3188](A[3]). Therefore a man is bound to repay a favor at once. Objection 2: Further, a good action would seem to be all the more praiseworthy according as it is done with greater earnestness. Now earnestness seems to make a man do his duty without any delay. Therefore it is apparently more praiseworthy to repay a favor at once.

• From The Unexpected Legacy of Divorce: A 25-Year Landmark Study (2000)

  Little girls do not for many years see their mother’s courage in breaking free. Only as adults did the young women in this study begin to understand the wisdom of their mother’s decision. Most of the women raised in violent families in this study were able to break out of the pattern by their early thirties—but only with great difficulty and only with individual or group therapy. Some who escaped violent relationships ended up in lasting unhappy marriages or remained caught in demeaning long-term relationships without marriage. (I’ll talk more about this group in Chapter 14 when we examine early, impulsive marriages.) Anja was helped by the encouragement of her mother and her brother plus several years of psychotherapy. She was eventually able to find a man who loved her and was not abusive. But when I saw her at age thirty, she was extremely worried about the future. Her self-confidence was still poor. Although she had graduated from college, her career plans were shaky. Compared to Larry, she was floundering. Siblings LIKE MANY SIBLINGS in divorced families, Larry and Anja were very helpful to each other during the postdivorce years. Larry’s first awareness of his father’s flaws as a parent came from watching his father treat his sister so unfairly. He felt sorry for her at an early age and suffered at the unfairness of her treatment. Anja in turn leaned on her brother in her many sad experiences with violent men. He was the one who took her home from the emergency room. And he was the one who encouraged her to leave abusive men and seek professional help. After divorce, siblings are often drawn closer together. Amid the shifting moods of troubled parents, they turn to each other for safety and warmth. After all, they share a special history that binds them together. Unlike only children after a divorce, they help each other every step of the way. As adults they say things like, “My brother saved my life” or “Because of my sister I kept my sanity.” Only children often have a much harder time and are more likely to feel lonely, isolated, and overwhelmed by their parents’ problems. Siblings after divorce often form small subcultures within the family, creating a united front vis-à-vis their parents and the adult world. They lie awake at night discussing their parents and trying to make sense out of what they observe.

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  JEROME. The Saviour bade them go, not as yielding to their request, but that by the death of the swine, an occasion of man’s salvation might be offered. But they went out, (to wit, out of the men,) and went into the swine; and, lo, the whole herd rushed violently headlong into the sea, and perished in the waters. Let Manichæus blush; if the souls of men and of beasts be of one substance, and one origin, how should two thousand swine have perished for the sake of the salvation of two men? CHRYSOSTOM. The dæmons destroyed the swine because they are ever striving to bring men into distress, and rejoice in destruction. The greatness of the loss also added to the fame of that which was done; for it was published by many persons; namely, by the men that were healed, by the owners of the swine, and by those that fed them; as it follows, But they that fed them fled, and went into the town, and told all, and concerning them that had the dæmons; and, behold, the whole town went out to meet Jesus. But when they should have adored Him, and wondered at His excellent power, they cast Him from them, as it follows, And when they saw him, they besought him that he would depart out of their coasts. Observe the clemency of Christ next to His excellent power; when those who had received favours from Him would drive Him away, He resisted not, but departed, and left those who thus pronounced themselves unworthy of His teaching, giving them as teachers those who had been delivered from the dæmons, and the feeders of the swine. JEROME. Otherwise; This request may have proceeded from humility as well as pride; like Peter, they may have held themselves unworthy of the Lord’s presence, Depart from me, for I am a sinful man, O Lord. (Luke 5:8.) RABANUS. Gerasa is interpreted ‘casting out the dweller,’ or, ‘a stranger approaching;’ this is the Gentile world which cast out the Devil from it; and which was first far off, but now made near, after the resurrection being visited by Christ through His preachers. AMBROSE. (in Luc. 8. 30.) The two dæmoniacs are also a type of the Gentile world; for Noah having three sons, Shem, Ham, and Japhet, Shem’s posterity alone was taken into the inheritance of God, while from the other two sprang the nations of the Gentiles. HILARY. Thus the dæmons held the two men among the tombs without the town, that is, without the synagogue of the Law and the Prophets; that is, they infested the original seats of the two nations, the abodes of the dead, making the way of this present life dangerous to the passers by.

• From Hillbilly Elegy (2016)

  In his religious habits, Dad lived the stereotype of a culturally conservative Protestant with Southern roots, even though the stereotype is mostly inaccurate. Despite their reputation for clinging to their religion, the folks back home resembled Mamaw more than Dad: deeply religious but without any attachment to a real church community. Indeed, the only conservative Protestants I knew who attended church regularly were my dad and his family. 17 In the middle of the Bible Belt, active church attendance is actually quite low. 18 Despite its reputation, Appalachia—especially northern Alabama and Georgia to southern Ohio—has far lower church attendance than the Midwest, parts of the Mountain West, and much of the space between Michigan and Montana. Oddly enough, we think we attend church more than we actually do. In a recent Gallup poll, Southerners and Midwesterners reported the highest rates of church attendance in the country. Yet actual church attendance is much lower in the South. This pattern of deception has to do with cultural pressure. In southwestern Ohio, where I was born, both the Cincinnati and Dayton metropolitan regions have very low rates of church attendance, about the same as ultra-liberal San Francisco. No one I know in San Francisco would feel ashamed to admit that they don’t go to church. (In fact, some of them might feel ashamed to admit that they do.) Ohio is the polar opposite. Even as a kid, I’d lie when people asked if I attended church regularly. According to Gallup, I wasn’t alone in feeling that pressure. The juxtaposition is jarring: Religious institutions remain a positive force in people’s lives, but in a part of the country slammed by the decline of manufacturing, joblessness, addiction, and broken homes, church attendance has fallen off. Dad’s church offered something desperately needed by people like me. For alcoholics, it gave them a community of support and a sense that they weren’t fighting addiction alone. For expectant mothers, it offered a free home with job training and parenting classes. When someone needed a job, church friends could either provide one or make introductions. When Dad faced financial troubles, his church banded together and purchased a used car for the family. In the broken world I saw around me—and for the people struggling in that world—religion offered tangible assistance to keep the faithful on track. Dad’s faith attracted me even though I learned early on that it had played a significant role in the adoption that led to our long separation. While I really enjoyed the time we spent together, the pain of that adoption remained, and we spoke often of how and why it happened in the first place. For the first time, I heard his side of the story: that the adoption had nothing to do with a desire to avoid child support and that, far from simply “giving me away,” as Mom and Mamaw had said, Dad had hired multiple lawyers and done everything within reason to keep me.

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  Reply to Objection 2: No man is excused from ingratitude through inability to repay, for the very reason that the mere will suffices for the repayment of the debt of gratitude, as stated above ([3192]Q[106], A[6], ad 1). Forgetfulness of a favor received amounts to ingratitude, not indeed the forgetfulness that arises from a natural defect, that is not subject to the will, but that which arises from negligence. For, as Seneca observes (De Benef. iii), “when forgetfulness of favors lays hold of a man, he has apparently given little thought to their repayment.” Reply to Objection 3: The debt of gratitude flows from the debt of love, and from the latter no man should wish to be free. Hence that anyone should owe this debt unwillingly seems to arise from lack of love for his benefactor. Whether ingratitude is a special sin?Objection 1: It seems that ingratitude is not a special sin. For whoever sins acts against God his sovereign benefactor. But this pertains to ingratitude. Therefore ingratitude is not a special sin. Objection 2: Further, no special sin is contained under different kinds of sin. But one can be ungrateful by committing different kinds of sin, for instance by calumny, theft, or something similar committed against a benefactor. Therefore ingratitude is not a special sin. Objection 3: Further, Seneca writes (De Benef. iii): “It is ungrateful to take no notice of a kindness, it is ungrateful not to repay one, but it is the height of ingratitude to forget it.” Now these do not seem to belong to the same species of sin. Therefore ingratitude is not a special sin. On the contrary, Ingratitude is opposed to gratitude or thankfulness, which is a special virtue. Therefore it is a special sin. I answer that, Every vice is denominated from a deficiency of virtue, because deficiency is more opposed to virtue: thus illiberality is more opposed to liberality than prodigality is. Now a vice may be opposed to the virtue of gratitude by way of excess, for instance if one were to show gratitude for things for which gratitude is not due, or sooner than it is due, as stated above ([3193]Q[106], A[4]). But still more opposed to gratitude is the vice denoting deficiency of gratitude, because the virtue of gratitude, as stated above ([3194]Q[106], A[6]), inclines to return something more. Wherefore ingratitude is properly denominated from being a deficiency of gratitude. Now every deficiency or privation takes its species from the opposite habit: for blindness and deafness differ according to the difference of sight and hearing. Therefore just as gratitude or thankfulness is one special virtue, so also is ingratitude one special sin.

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  I answer that, The repayment of a favor may belong to three virtues, namely, justice, gratitude and friendship. It belongs to justice when the repayment has the character of a legal debt, as in a loan and the like: and in such cases repayment must be made according to the quantity received. On the other hand, repayment of a favor belongs, though in different ways, to friendship and likewise to the virtue of gratitude when it has the character of a moral debt. For in the repayment of friendship we have to consider the cause of friendship; so that in the friendship that is based on the useful, repayment should be made according to the usefulness accruing from the favor conferred, and in the friendship based on virtue repayment should be made with regard for the choice or disposition of the giver, since this is the chief requisite of virtue, as stated in Ethic. viii, 13. And likewise, since gratitude regards the favor inasmuch as it is bestowed gratis, and this regards the disposition of the giver, it follows again that repayment of a favor depends more on the disposition of the giver than on the effect. Reply to Objection 1: Every moral act depends on the will. Hence a kindly action, in so far as it is praiseworthy and is deserving of gratitude, consists materially in the thing done, but formally and chiefly in the will. Hence Seneca says (De Benef. i): “A kindly action consists not in deed or gift, but in the disposition of the giver or doer.” Reply to Objection 2: Gratitude is a part of justice, not indeed as a species is part of a genus, but by a kind of reduction to the genus of justice, as stated above ([3189]Q[80]). Hence it does not follow that we shall find the same kind of debt in both virtues. Reply to Objection 3: God alone sees man’s disposition in itself: but in so far as it is shown by certain signs, man also can know it. It is thus that a benefactor’s disposition is known by the way in which he does the kindly action, for instance through his doing it joyfully and readily. Whether the repayment of gratitude should surpass the favor received?Objection 1: It seems that there is no need for the repayment of gratitude to surpass the favor received. For it is not possible to make even equal repayment to some, for instance, one’s parents, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 14). Now virtue does not attempt the impossible. Therefore gratitude for a favor does not tend to something yet greater.

• From Just Mercy: A Story of Justice and Redemption (2014)

  When I interviewed him for the job, he was apologetic about the darker episodes in his past, but I thought he was perfect for the kind of staff we were trying to build. He signed up, moved to Montgomery, and without hesitation jumped into the McMillian case with me. We spent days tracking leads, interviewing dozens of people, following wild rumors, investigating different theories. I was increasingly persuaded that we would have to figure out who really had killed Ronda Morrison to win Walter’s release. Aside from my appreciation for Michael’s invaluable help with the work itself, I was grateful finally to have someone around to share the insanity of the case with—just as I was discovering that it was even crazier than I thought. After a few months of investigation, we’d uncovered strong evidence to support Walter’s innocence. We discovered that Bill Hooks had been paid by Sheriff Tate for his testimony against Walter—we found checks in the county’s financial records showing close to $5,000 in payments to Hooks in reward money and “expenses.” Sheriff Tate had also paid Hooks money to travel back and forth out of the county around the time of the trial. This information should have been disclosed to Walter’s counsel prior to trial so that they could have used it to cast doubt on the credibility of Hooks’s testimony. We also found out that Hooks had been released from jail immediately after giving the police his statement that he’d seen Walter’s “low-rider” truck at the cleaners on the day of the murder. We found court records revealing that the D.A. and the sheriff, who are county officials, had somehow gotten city charges and fines against Hooks dismissed, even though they had no authority in city courts. Under U.S. Supreme Court precedent, that Hooks had charges against him dismissed in exchange for cooperation with authorities was information that the State was obligated to reveal to the defense. But, of course, they hadn’t. We found the white man who was running the store on the day that Ralph Myers came in for the purpose of giving a note to Walter. Walter had tried to persuade his original lawyers to speak to this man, but they had failed to do so. After Walter described the location of the store, we were able to track him down. The storeowner recounted his memory of that day: Myers had sought out Walter—but had to ask the storeowner which of the several black men in the store was Walter McMillian. Months after the crime, the storeowner was adamant that Myers had never seen Walter McMillian before.

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says in his book De Disciplina Christi (Tract. de divers, i), everything whatsoever man has on earth, and whatsoever he owns, goes by the name of “‘pecunia’ [money], because in olden times men’s possessions consisted entirely of ‘pecora’ [flocks].” And the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1): “We give the name of money to anything that can be valued in currency.” Reply to Objection 3: Justice establishes equality in external things, but has nothing to do, properly speaking, with the regulation of internal passions: wherefore money is in one way the matter of liberality, and in another way of justice. Whether using money is the act of liberality?Objection 1: It seems that using money is not the act of liberality. For different virtues have different acts. But using money is becoming to other virtues, such as justice and magnificence. Therefore it is not the proper act of liberality. Objection 2: Further, it belongs to a liberal man, not only to give but also to receive and keep. But receiving and keeping do not seem to be connected with the use of money. Therefore using money seems to be unsuitably assigned as the proper act of liberality. Objection 3: Further, the use of money consists not only in giving it but also in spending it. But the spending of money refers to the spender, and consequently is not an act of liberality: for Seneca says (De Benef. v): “A man is not liberal by giving to himself.” Therefore not every use of money belongs to liberality. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1): “In whatever matter a man is virtuous, he will make the best use of that matter: Therefore he that has the virtue with regard to money will make the best use of riches.” Now such is the liberal man. Therefore the good use of money is the act of liberality. I answer that, The species of an act is taken from its object, as stated above ([3240]FS, Q[18], A[2]). Now the object or matter of liberality is money and whatever has a money value, as stated in the foregoing Article (ad 2). And since every virtue is consistent with its object, it follows that, since liberality is a virtue, its act is consistent with money. Now money comes under the head of useful goods, since all external goods are directed to man’s use. Hence the proper act of liberality is making use of money or riches.

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  I answer that, Three conditions are requisite for prayer. First, that the person who prays should approach God Whom he prays: this is signified in the word “prayer,” because prayer is “the raising up of one’s mind to God.” The second is that there should be a petition, and this is signified in the word “intercession.” In this case sometimes one asks for something definite, and then some say it is “intercession” properly so called, or we may ask for some thing indefinitely, for instance to be helped by God, or we may simply indicate a fact, as in Jn. 11:3, “Behold, he whom Thou lovest is sick,” and then they call it “insinuation.” The third condition is the reason for impetrating what we ask for: and this either on the part of God, or on the part of the person who asks. The reason of impetration on the part of God is His sanctity, on account of which we ask to be heard, according to Dan. 9:17,18, “For Thy own sake, incline, O God, Thy ear”; and to this pertains “supplication” [obsecratio] which means a pleading through sacred things, as when we say, “Through Thy nativity, deliver us, O Lord.” The reason for impetration on the part of the person who asks is “thanksgiving”; since “through giving thanks for benefits received we merit to receive yet greater benefits,” as we say in the collect [*Ember Friday in September and Postcommunion of the common of a Confessor Bishop]. Hence a gloss on 1 Tim. 2:1 says that “in the Mass, the consecration is preceded by supplication,” in which certain sacred things are called to mind; that “prayers are in the consecration itself,” in which especially the mind should be raised up to God; and that “intercessions are in the petitions that follow, and thanksgivings at the end.” We may notice these four things in several of the Church’s collects. Thus in the collect of Trinity Sunday the words, “Almighty eternal God” belong to the offering up of prayer to God; the words, “Who hast given to Thy servants,” etc. belong to thanksgiving; the words, “grant, we beseech Thee,” belong to intercession; and the words at the end, “Through Our Lord,” etc. belong to supplication. In the “Conferences of the Fathers” (ix, cap. 11, seqq.) we read: “Supplication is bewailing one’s sins; prayer is vowing something to God; intercession is praying for others; thanksgiving is offered by the mind to God in ineffable ecstasy.” The first explanation, however, is the better. Reply to Objection 1: “Supplication” is an adjuration not for the purpose of compelling, for this is forbidden, but in order to implore mercy. Reply to Objection 2: “Prayer” in the general sense includes all the things mentioned here; but when distinguished from the others it denotes properly the ascent to God.

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  I answer that, As stated above ([3184]FS, Q[60], A[3]), the nature of the debt to be paid must needs vary according to various causes giving rise to the debt, yet so that the greater always includes the lesser. Now the cause of debt is found primarily and chiefly in God, in that He is the first principle of all our goods: secondarily it is found in our father, because he is the proximate principle of our begetting and upbringing: thirdly it is found in the person that excels in dignity, from whom general favors proceed; fourthly it is found in a benefactor, from whom we have received particular and private favors, on account of which we are under particular obligation to him. Accordingly, since what we owe God, or our father, or a person excelling in dignity, is not the same as what we owe a benefactor from whom we have received some particular favor, it follows that after religion, whereby we pay God due worship, and piety, whereby we worship our parents, and observance, whereby we worship persons excelling in dignity, there is thankfulness or gratitude, whereby we give thanks to our benefactors. And it is distinct from the foregoing virtues, just as each of these is distinct from the one that precedes, as falling short thereof. Reply to Objection 1: Just as religion is superexcelling piety, so is it excelling thankfulness or gratitude: wherefore giving thanks to God was reckoned above ([3185]Q[83], A[17]) among things pertaining to religion. Reply to Objection 2: Proportionate repayment belongs to commutative justice, when it answers to the legal due; for instance when it is contracted that so much be paid for so much. But the repayment that belongs to the virtue of thankfulness or gratitude answers to the moral debt, and is paid spontaneously. Hence thanksgiving is less thankful when compelled, as Seneca observes (De Beneficiis iii). Reply to Objection 3: Since true friendship is based on virtue, whatever there is contrary to virtue in a friend is an obstacle to friendship, and whatever in him is virtuous is an incentive to friendship. In this way friendship is preserved by repayment of favors, although repayment of favors belongs specially to the virtue of gratitude. Whether the innocent is more bound to give thanks to God than the penitent?Objection 1: It seems that the innocent is more bound to give thanks to God than the penitent. For the greater the gift one has received from God, the more one is bound to give Him thanks. Now the gift of innocence is greater than that of justice restored. Therefore it seems that the innocent is more bound to give thanks to God than the penitent.

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  TITUS BOSTRENSIS. (non occ.) He calls her daughter, as already healed because of her faith, for faith claims the grace of adoption. EUSEBIUS. (Eccles. Hist. l. vii. c. 18.) Now they say that the woman set up in Paneas (Cæsarea Philippi, whence she came) a noble triumphal monument of the mercy vouchsafed to her by the Saviour. For there stood upon a lofty pedestal near the entrance to her house a brasen statue of a woman on bended knees, and with her hands joined as if in prayer; opposite to which was erected another statue like to a man, made of the same material, clothed in a stole, (διπλοῑς.a) and holding forth his hand to the woman. At his feet upon the base itself a strange kind of plant was growing, which reaching to the hem of the brasen stole, was said to be the cure of all diseases. And they said that this statue represents Christ. It was destroyed by Maximinus. AMBROSE. Now mystically Christ had left the synagogue in Gerasa, and Him whom His own received not we strangers receive. BEDE. Or at the end of the world the Lord is about to return to the Jews, and to be gladly received by them through confession of the faith. AMBROSE. But whom do we suppose the chief of the synagogue to be, but the Law, from consideration of which our Lord had not entirely abandoned the synagogue. BEDE. Or, by the ruler of the synagogue is understood Moses. Hence he is rightly called Jairus, that is, “enlightening” or “enlightened,” as he who receives the words of life to give to us, thereby both enlightens others, and is himself also enlightened by the Holy Spirit. But the ruler of the synagogue fell at the feet of Jesus, because the lawgiver with the whole race of the patriarchs knew that Christ, appearing in the flesh, would be far preferred to them. For if the head of Christ is God, (1 Cor. 11:3.) His feet must agreeably to this be taken for the Incarnation, by which He touched the earth of our mortality. The ruler asked Him to enter into his house, because he was desirous to behold His coming. His only daughter is the Synagogue, which alone was framed with a legal institution; which at twelve years of age, that is, when the time of puberty was approaching, lay dying; for having been brought up nobly by the prophets, as soon as it came to years of discretion, when it ought to bring forth spiritual fruits to God, being suddenly subdued through its weakness and error, it forgot to enter the way of spiritual life, and unless Christ had come to its help, would have fallen away into destruction. But the Lord going to heal the girl is thronged by the crowd, because giving wholesome warnings to the Jewish nation, He was borne down by the customs of a carnal people.

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  THEOPHYLACT. Now to the Publicans and soldiers he gives a commandment to abstain from evil, but the multitudes, as not living in an evil condition, he commands to perform some good work, as it follows, He that hath two coats, let him give one. GREGORY. (ubi sup.) Because a coat is more necessary for our use than a cloak, it belongs to the bringing forth of fruits worthy of repentance, that we should divide with our neighbours not only our superfluities but those which are absolutely necessary to us, as our coat, or the meat with which we support our bodies; and hence it follows, And he who has meat, let him do likewise. BASIL. But we are hereby taught, that every thing we have over and above what is necessary to our daily support, we are bound to give to him who hath nothing for God’s sake, who hath given us liberally whatever we possess. GREGORY. (ubi sup.) For because it was written in the law, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself, he is proved to love his neighbour less than himself, who does not share with him in his distress, those things which are even necessary to himself. Therefore that precept is given of dividing with one’s neighbour the two coats, since if one is divided no one is clothed. But we must remark in this, of how much value are works of mercy, since of the works worthy of repentance these are enjoined before all others. AMBROSE. For other commands of duty have reference only to individuals, mercy has a common application. It is therefore a common commandment to all, to contribute to him that has not. Mercy is the fulness of virtues, yet in mercy itself a proportion is observed to meet the capacities of man’s condition, in that each individual is not to deprive himself of all, but what he has to share it with the poor. ORIGEN. But this place admits of a deeper meaning, for as we ought not to serve two masters, so neither to have two coats, lest one should be the clothing of the old man, the other of the new, but we ought to cast off the old man, and give to him who is naked. For one man has one coat, another has none at all, the strength therefore of the two is exactly contrary, and as it has been written that we should cast all our crimes to the bottom of the sea, so ought we to throw from us our vices and errors, and lay them upon him who has been the cause of them. THEOPHYLACT. But some one has observed that the two coats are the spirit and letter of Scripture, but John advises him that hath these two to instruct the ignorant, and give him at least the letter.

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  Objection 2: Further, a man owes love to his benefactor just as he owes him gratitude. Now Augustine says (Confess. ii): “What man, weighing his own infirmity, would dare to ascribe his purity and innocence to his own strength; that so he should love Thee the less, as if he had less needed Thy mercy, whereby Thou remittest sins to those that turn to Thee?” And farther on he says: “And for this let him love Thee as much, yea and more, since by Whom he sees me to have been recovered from such deep torpor of sin, by Him he sees himself to have been from the like torpor of sin preserved.” Therefore the innocent is also more bound to give thanks than the penitent. Objection 3: Further, the more a gratuitous favor is continuous, the greater the thanksgiving due for it. Now the favor of divine grace is more continuous in the innocent than in the penitent. For Augustine says (Confess. iii): “To Thy grace I ascribe it, and to Thy mercy, that Thou hast melted away my sins as it were ice. To Thy grace I ascribe also whatsoever I have not done of evil; for what might I not have done? . . . Yea, all I confess to have been forgiven me, both what evils I committed by my own wilfulness, and what by Thy guidance committed not.” Therefore the innocent is more bound to give thanks than the penitent. On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 7:43): “To whom more is forgiven, he loveth more [*Vulg.: ‘To whom less is forgiven, he loveth less’ Lk. 7:47].” Therefore for the same reason he is bound to greater thanksgiving.

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  I answer that, Thanksgiving [gratiarum actio] in the recipient corresponds to the favor [gratia] of the giver: so that when there is greater favor on the part of the giver, greater thanks are due on the part of the recipient. Now a favor is something bestowed “gratis”: wherefore on the part of the giver the favor may be greater on two counts. First, owing to the quantity of the thing given: and in this way the innocent owes greater thanksgiving, because he receives a greater gift from God, also, absolutely speaking, a more continuous gift, other things being equal. Secondly, a favor may be said to be greater, because it is given more gratuitously; and in this sense the penitent is more bound to give thanks than the innocent, because what he receives from God is more gratuitously given: since, whereas he was deserving of punishment, he has received grace. Wherefore, although the gift bestowed on the innocent is, considered absolutely, greater, yet the gift bestowed on the penitent is greater in relation to him: even as a small gift bestowed on a poor man is greater to him than a great gift is to a rich man. And since actions are about singulars, in matters of action, we have to take note of what is such here and now, rather than of what is such absolutely, as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iii) in treating of the voluntary and the involuntary. This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. Whether a man is bound to give thanks to every benefactor?Objection 1: It seems that the a man is not bound to give thanks to every benefactor. For a man may benefit himself just as he may harm himself, according to Ecclus. 14:5, “He that is evil to himself, to whom will he be good?” But a man cannot thank himself, since thanksgiving seems to pass from one person to another. Therefore thanksgiving is not due to every benefactor. Objection 2: Further, gratitude is a repayment of an act of grace. But some favors are granted without grace, and are rudely, slowly and grudgingly given. Therefore gratitude is not always due to a benefactor. Objection 3: Further, no thanks are due to one who works for his own profit. But sometimes people bestow favors for their own profit. Therefore thanks are not due to them. Objection 4: Further, no thanks are due to a slave, for all that he is belongs to his master. Yet sometimes a slave does a good turn to his master. Therefore gratitude is not due to every benefactor .

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  14. And when he saw them, he said unto them, Go shew yourselves unto the priests. And it came to pass, that, as they went, they were cleansed. 15. And one of them, when he saw that he was healed, turned back, and with a loud voice glorified God, 16. And fell down on his face at his feet, giving him thanks: and he was a Samaritan. 17. And Jesus answering said, Were there not ten cleansed? but where are the nine? 18. There are not found that returned to give glory to God, save this stranger. 19. And he said unto him, Arise, go thy way: thy faith hath made thee whole. AMBROSE. After speaking the foregoing parable, our Lord censures the ungrateful; TITUS BOSTRENSIS. saying, And it came to pass, shewing that the Samaritans were indeed well disposed towards the mercies above mentioned, but the Jews not so. For there was enmity between the Jews and the Samaritans, and He to allay this, passed into the midst of both nations, that he might cement both into one new man. CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. The Saviour next manifests His glory by drawing over Israel to the faith. As it follows, And as he entered into a certain village, there met him ten men that were lepers, men who were banished from the towns and cities, and counted unclean, according to the rites of the Mosaic law. TITUS BOSTRENSIS. They associated together from the sympathy they felt as partakers of the same calamity, and were waiting till Jesus passed, anxiously looking out to see Him approach. As it is said, Which stood afar off, for the Jewish law esteems leprosy unclean, whereas the law of the Gospel calls unclean not the outward, but the inward leprosy. THEOPHYLACT. They therefore stand afar off as if ashamed of the uncleanness which was imputed to them, thinking that Christ would loathe them as others did. Thus they stood afar off, but were made nigh unto Him by their prayers. For the Lord is nigh unto all them that call upon him in truth. (Ps. 145:18.) Therefore it follows, And they lifted up their voices, and said, Jesus, Master, have mercy upon us. TITUS BOSTRENSIS. They pronounce the name of Jesus, and gain to themselves the reality. For Jesus is by interpretation Saviour. They say, Have mercy upon us, because they were sensible of His power, and sought neither for gold and silver, but that their bodies might put on again a healthful appearance. THEOPHYLACT. They do not merely supplicate or entreat Him as if He were a man, but they call Him Master or Lord, as if almost they looked upon Him as God. But He bids them shew themselves to the priests, as it follows, And when he saw them, he said, Go, shew yourselves unto the priests. For they were examined whether they were cleansed from their leprosy or not.

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  One is assisted directly by those who have discovered the truth; because, as has been pointed out, when each of our predecessors has discovered something about the truth, which is gathered together into one whole, he also introduces his followers to a more extensive knowledge of truth. One is assisted indirectly insofar as those who have preceded us and who were wrong about the truth have bequeathed to their successors the occasion for exercising their mental powers, so that by diligent discussion the truth might be seen more clearly. 288. Now it is only fitting that we should be grateful to those who have helped us attain so great a good as knowledge of the truth. Therefore he says that “ It is only right that we should be grateful, ” not merely to those whom we think have found the truth and with whose views we agree by following them, but also to those who, in the search for truth, have made only superficial statements, even though we do not follow their views; for these men too have given us something because they have shown us instances of actual attempts to discover the truth. By way of an example he mentions the founders of music; for if there “ had been no Timotheus, ” who discovered a great part of the art of music, we would not have many of the facts that we know about melodies. But if Timotheus had not been preceded by a wise man named “ Phrynis, ” he would not have been as well off in the subject of music. The same thing must be said of those philosophers who made statements of universal scope about the truth of things; for we accept from certain of our predecessors whatever views about the truth of things we think are true and disregard the rest. Again, those from whom we accept certain views had predecessors from whom they in turn accepted certain views and who were the source of their information. LESSON 2 The Supreme Science of Truth, and Knowledge of Ultimate Causes

• From The Golden Ass (Metamorphoses) (2)

  The priest being admonished the night before, as I might well perceive stood still and holding out his hand, thrust out the garland of roses into my mouth, I (trembling) devoured with a great affection: And as soone as I had eaten them, I was not deceived of the promise made unto me. For my deforme and Assie face abated, and first the rugged haire of my body fell off, my thick skin waxed soft and tender, the hooves of my feet changed into toes, my hands returned againe, my neck grew short, my head and mouth began round, my long eares were made little, my great and stonie teeth waxed lesse like the teeth of men, and my tayle which combred me most, appeared no where: then the people began to marvaile, and the religious honoured the goddesse, for so evident a miracle, they wondered at the visions which they saw in the night, and the facilitie of my reformation, whereby they rendered testimonie of so great a benefit which I received of the goddesse. When I saw my selfe in such estate, I stood still a good space and said nothing, for I could not tell what to say, nor what word I shoulde first speake, nor what thanks I should render to the goddesse, but the great Priest understanding all my fortune and miserie, by divine advertisement, commanded that one should give me garments to cover me: Howbeit as soone as I was transformed from an asse to my humane shape, I hid the privitie of my body with my hands as shame and necessity compelled mee. Then one of the company put off his upper robe and put it on my backe: which done, the Priest looked upon me, with a sweete and benigne voice, gan say in this sort: O my friend Lucius, after the endurance of so many labours, and the escape of so many tempests of fortune, thou art at length come to the port and haven of rest and mercy: neither did thy noble linage, thy dignity, thy doctrine, or any thing prevaile, but that thou hast endured so many servil pleasures, by a little folly of thy youthfullnes, whereby thou hast had a sinister reward for thy unprosperous curiositie, but howsoever the blindnes of fortune tormented thee in divers dangers: so it is, that now unwares to her, thou art come to this present felicitie: let fortune go, and fume with fury in another place, let her finde some other matter to execute her cruelty, for fortune hath no puissance against them which serve and honour our goddesse. For what availed the theeves: the beasts savage: thy great servitude: the ill and dangerous waits: the long passages: the feare of death every day?

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  Objection 3: Further, Seneca says (De Benef. ii) that “it is proper to a benefactor to act freely and quickly.” Now repayment ought to equal the favor received. Therefore it should be done at once. On the contrary, Seneca says (De Benef. iv): “He that hastens to repay, is animated with a sense, not of gratitude but of indebtedness.” I answer that, Just as in conferring a favor two things are to be considered, namely, the affection of the heart and the gift, so also must these things be considered in repaying the favor. As regards the affection of the heart, repayment should be made at once, wherefore Seneca says (De Benef. ii): “Do you wish to repay a favor? Receive it graciously.” As regards the gift, one ought to wait until such a time as will be convenient to the benefactor. In fact, if instead of choosing a convenient time, one wished to repay at once, favor for favor, it would not seem to be a virtuous, but a constrained repayment. For, as Seneca observes (De Benef. iv), “he that wishes to repay too soon, is an unwilling debtor, and an unwilling debtor is ungrateful.” Reply to Objection 1: A legal debt must be paid at once, else the equality of justice would not be preserved, if one kept another’s property without his consent. But a moral debt depends on the equity of the debtor: and therefore it should be repaid in due time according as the rectitude of virtue demands. Reply to Objection 2: Earnestness of the will is not virtuous unless it be regulated by reason; wherefore it is not praiseworthy to forestall the proper time through earnestness. Reply to Objection 3: Favors also should be conferred at a convenient time and one should no longer delay when the convenient time comes; and the same is to be observed in repaying favors. Whether in giving thanks we should look at the benefactor’s disposition or at the deed?Objection 1: It seems that in repaying favors we should not look at the benefactor’s disposition but at the deed. For repayment is due to beneficence, and beneficence consists in deeds, as the word itself denotes. Therefore in repaying favors we should look at the deed. Objection 2: Further, thanksgiving, whereby we repay favors, is a part of justice. But justice considers equality between giving and taking. Therefore also in repaying favors we should consider the deed rather than the disposition of the benefactor. Objection 3: Further, no one can consider what he does not know. Now God alone knows the interior disposition. Therefore it is impossible to repay a favor according to the benefactor’s disposition. On the contrary, Seneca says (De Benef. i): “We are sometimes under a greater obligation to one who has given little with a large heart, and has bestowed a small favor, yet willingly.”