Confusion

Passages

Every passage tagged with this emotion in the Vela corpus. Search the body text, narrow by source or register, click through to a book’s profile to see how the passage sits with the rest of the work.

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• From Introduction to the Hebrew Bible and Deutero-Canonical Books (2018)

  Symbolic Actions In 3:22-23 Ezekiel has another encounter with the glory of the Lord. On this occasion he is told to perform a series of symbolic actions. During this period, the prophet is dumb except when he is impelled to prophesy. More than any other prophet, Ezekiel exhibits phenomena that are associated with unusual psychological conditions, and that seem to call for psychological analysis. There have been many attempts to diagnose his condition. One famous philosopher, Karl Jaspers, suggested that Ezekiel was schizophrenic. Any such attempt to diagnose an ancient figure about whom we have very limited evidence is problematic, but there is no doubt that Ezekiel’s personal life and his psychological condition were deeply affected by his prophetic calling. The first symbolic action, in chapter 4, calls for the prophet to build a model of a city under siege. Next he was to lie on his left side and “bear the iniquity of the house of Israel” for 390 days. Then he was to lie on his right side for 40 days, to “bear the iniquity” of the house of Judah. He was to be bound with cords so that he could not turn from one side to the other. We do not know how the prophet carried out these commands. One tradition of interpretation, going back to Maimonides, a great Jewish philosopher in the Middle Ages, argued the action was only within the context of the vision—that the prophet did not carry it out physically. It is of the essence of the symbolic actions of the prophets, however, that they are public signs, performed so as to attract the attention of bystanders. They have aptly been compared to street theater as a way of engaging public interest. We must assume, then, that Ezekiel did the things described. To lie on one side for 390 days would require (or cause!) a pathological condition, but we do not know whether he was allowed to leave his position periodically or to move. By lying in these positions, the prophet is said to “bear the iniquity” of Israel and Judah in turn. “Bear the iniquity” is a technical term in the Priestly laws of the Pentateuch. In Lev 16:21-22 the scapegoat is said to “bear the sins” of the house of the people of Israel and carry them away to the desert. In Lev 10:17 the priests are given the sin offering “to bear the iniquity of the congregation.” The

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  2. Again, it is said in 2 De Anima, text 49, that each thing should be denominated by what is most prominent in it. Now the remission of sins is brought about primarily by faith, according to Acts 15:9; “ purifying their hearts by faith, ” and also by charity, according to Prov. 10:12: “ love covereth all sins. ” It should therefore be denominated by faith, or by charity, rather than by justice. 3. Again, the remission of sins seems to be the same as calling, since one who is called is at a distance, and since we are separated from God by sin. Now according to Rom. 8:30: “ whom he called, them he also justified, ” calling comes before justification. It follows that justification is not the remission of sins. On the other hand: a gloss on Rom. 8:30, “ whom he called, them he also justified, ” says: “ that is, by the remission of sins. ” It follows that the remission of sins is justification. I answer: understood passively, justification means the movement towards justice, in the same way as to be heated means the movement towards heat. But justice, considered in its own nature, means a certain right order, and may be understood in two senses. In one sense it means the right order of a man ’ s action. Such justice is reckoned as one of the virtues, either as particular justice, which regulates a man ’ s action in relation to another individual, or as legal justice, which regulates his action in relation to the good of the community, as explained in 5 Ethics 1. In a second sense it means the right order of a man ’ s inward disposition, signifying the subordination of his highest power to God, and the subordination of the lower powers of his soul to the highest, which is reason. The philosopher calls this “ metaphorical justice, ” in 5 Ethics 11.

• From The Body and Society: Explorations in Social Theory (2008)

  underprivileged status to the body which was simply a machine. To some extent Foucault reversed this situation by denying any centrality to subjectivity (the thinking, Cartesian subject) and by treating the body as the focus of modern discourse. Having rejected the transcendental Subject as merely a modern substitute for God or Logos, Foucault appears reluctant to have the Body as a controlling centre of social theory. The body is thus problematic for his theory. It looks as if Foucault wants to write the history of discourses about the body, of how the body is theoretically constructed, but this is specifically denied when he claims not to be producing a ‘history of mentalities’ which, would take account of bodies only through the manner in which they have been perceived and given meaning and value; but a ‘history of bodies’ and the manner in which what is most material and most vital in them has been invested. (Foucault, 1981: 152) To some extent, part of these difficulties is a product of his prior commitment to certain epistemological problems and thus the difficulties may be somewhat artificial. To reject Cartesianism it is not necessary to deny the corporeal nature of human existence and consciousness. To accept the corporeality of human life it is not necessary to deny the fact that the nature of the human body is also an effect of cultural, historical activity. The body is both natural and cultural. Foucault and the Origins of Sociology Foucault’s approach to the history of ideas has major implications for the sociology of knowledge, but specifically for the history of sociology. Foucault has rejected the conventional view that sociology had its origins in French positivism: Countless people have sought the origins of sociology in Montesquieu and Comte. That is a very ignorant enterprise. Sociological knowledge (savoir) is formed rather in practices like those of the doctors. For instance, at the start of the nineteenth century Guepin wrote a marvellous study of the city of Nantes. (Foucault, 1980a: 151) The rise of modern medicine was associated with the development of new bureaucratic techniques in the panopticon system, the utilization of social surveys to map the distribution of diseases, the adoption of clinical methods for case-records and the elaboration of societal surveillance. Modern medicine is essentially social medicine as a policing of populations and a clinic of bodies. Sociology has it origins, along with social medicine, in the knowledge and control of populations which survey techniques made possible. The implication of Foucault’s view of the birth of the clinic (1973) is that medical sociology as the study of the health of populations and of the body of individuals is central to the sociological enterprise as a whole and that sociology cannot be divorced from medicine. This view runs counter to the conventional interpretation of medical sociology which treats the subdiscipline as a late addition to the sociological curriculum.

• From The Christian Tradition: A History of the Development of Doctrine, Vol. 4: Reformation of Church and Dogma (1300-1700) (1984)

  Ott. Fach. Paen.Med. Pasc. Aug. Pens. Poss.com. Proh.gr. Prov. Pasch. Patav./wst. Paul.III. Init. Paul. IV. Luth.haer. Paul.V.Form. Pch. Def. Ep. Resp. Per.TW. Perf.am. Pet. Fam. Ign. Ot.rel. Seer. Sen. Petr.Aur. Comm. Reper. Sent. Tract. Petr.Br. Petr.Brun. Act. cone. Bas. Petr.Cand. Immac. Petr.Cell. Ep. Petr.Lut. Lig.frat. Pont.emin. Petr.Pal. Pot.pap. Authors and Texts xxxvii Luciano degli Ottoni Pedro Pacheco Milanese Penitential [Paenitentiale Mediolanense] Blaise Pascal Opinions of Saint Augustine, the Pelagians, and Calvin about the Problem of Grace Pensees On the Possibility of the Commandments Summary Exposition of the Problem of Grace Provincial Letters Angelus Paschalis Illyricus Chnstophorus Patavinus. On Justification Pope Paul III Initio nostri hujus Pontificatus Pope Paul IV [Johannes Petrus Carafa] On Repressing the Heresy of the Lutherans and Reforming the Church Pope Paul V. Formula for Ending the Disputes about the Aids to Grace Andrew Poach Defense Epistles Reply [to Mörlin] Martin Perez de Ayala. On Divine, Apostolic, and Ecclesiastical Traditions. Cologne, 1562 Treatise on Perfect Love [Tractatus de perfecto amore] Petrarch Letters to Intimates [Familiäres] On His Own Ignorance and That of Many Others On the Repose of the Religious [De otio religioso] My Secret Letters of Old Age [Seniles] Peter Aureoli Commentary on the Entire Bible [Aurea ac pene divina totius sacre pagine commentaria]. Venice, 1507 Reply to the Adversary of the Innocence of the Mother of God [Repercussorium editum contra adversarmm innocentiae Matris Dei] Commentary on the Sentences Tractate on the Conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary Peter of Brussels Peter Bruneti Acts of the Council of Basel Petrus de Candia [Antipope Alexander V] Treatise on the Immaculate Conception Peter of Celle Epistles Petrus de Lutra [Kaiserlautern] An Alliance of Brethren [Liga fratrum] On the Eminence of the Supreme Pontiff Peter of La Palu [Paludanus] Treatise on the Power of the Pope

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  878. The third argument is at (672) and is this: Since motion is always in a period of time and never in a “ now ” , and since all time is divisible, as was shown above, then in every time in which something is . moved, there must be a lesser time in which a lesser mobile is moved. For, supposing the same speed, it is plain that in a lesser time the lesser mobile crosses a given mark than does a greater mobile, as in a lesser time the part than the whole, as is evident from what is above. If, therefore, a point is in motion, there must be a time less than that in which it is moved. But this is impossible, for it would follow that in that lesser time something less than a point would be moved, and thus the indivisible would be divisible into something less, just as time is divisible. This would be the only condition under which the indivisible could be in motion, namely, if it were possible for something to be moved in an indivisible “ now ” , for just as there is nothing smaller than the “ now ” in time, so one cannot take a smaller mobile. And so it is evident that in the two questions—that of motion in a “ now ” and that of an indivisible being moved—the same principle is involved. But it is impossible for motion to occur in a “ now ” . Therefore, it is impossible for an indivisible to be moved. LECTURE 13 BY NATURE, NO CHANGE IS INFINITE. HOW MOTION MAY BE INFINITE IN TIME878. After showing that things which cannot be divided into parts are not moved, the Philosopher now intends to show that no change is infinite, This is against Heraclitus, who supposed that things are always in motion. About this he does two things: First he shows that no change is infinite according to its own species; Secondly, how there can be infinites in time, at 883, About the first he does two things: First he shows for all changes except local motion that no change is infinite according to its species; Secondly, he shows the same thing for local motion, at 881. 880. The first reason is this: Every change is from something to something. Indeed, in some changes, namely, those which occur between contradictories, as do generation and ceasing-to-be, or between contraries, as do alteration and growing and decreasing, it is evident that they have pre-defined termini. Hence in changes that occur between contradictory termini, the terminus is either affirmation or negation, as the terminus of generation is a being, and that of ceasing-to-be, non-being. Likewise, in regard to changes that are between contraries, the contraries are termini at which, as at ultimate goals, changes of this kind are terminated. Hence it follows, since every alteration is from contrary to contrary, that every alteration has some terminus.

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  Reply to Objection 2: This reason is based on fear in so far as it regards the evil object. Reply to Objection 3: Perfect charity casts out servile fear, which principally regards punishment. But this kind of fear was not in Christ. Whether the gratuitous graces were in Christ?Objection 1: It would seem that the gratuitous graces were not in Christ. For whoever has anything in its fulness, to him it does not pertain to have it by participation. Now Christ has grace in its fulness, according to Jn. 1:14: “Full of grace and truth.” But the gratuitous graces would seem to be certain participations, bestowed distributively and particularly upon divers subjects, according to 1 Cor. 12:4: “Now there are diversities of graces.” Therefore it would seem that there were no gratuitous graces in Christ. Objection 2: Further, what is due to anyone would not seem to be gratuitously bestowed on him. But it was due to the man Christ that He should abound in the word of wisdom and knowledge, and to be mighty in doing wonderful works and the like, all of which pertain to gratuitous graces: since He is “the power of God and the wisdom of God,” as is written 1 Cor. 1:24. Therefore it was not fitting for Christ to have the gratuitous graces. Objection 3: Further, gratuitous graces are ordained to the benefit of the faithful. But it does not seem that a habit which a man does not use is for the benefit of others, according to Ecclus. 20:32: “Wisdom that is hid and treasure that is not seen: what profit is there in them both?” Now we do not read that Christ made use of these gratuitously given graces, especially as regards the gift of tongues. Therefore not all the gratuitous graces were in Christ. On the contrary, Augustine says (Ep. ad Dardan. cclxxxvii) that “as in the head are all the senses, so in Christ were all the graces.” I answer that, As was said above ([3943]FS, Q[3], AA[1],4), the gratuitous graces are ordained for the manifestation of faith and spiritual doctrine. For it behooves him who teaches to have the means of making his doctrine clear; otherwise his doctrine would be useless. Now Christ is the first and chief teacher of spiritual doctrine and faith, according to Heb. 2:3,4: “Which having begun to be declared by the Lord was confirmed unto us by them that heard Him, God also bearing them witness by signs and wonders.” Hence it is clear that all the gratuitous graces were most excellently in Christ, as in the first and chief teacher of the faith.

• From Anna Karenina (1877)

  Levin was standing rather far off. A nobleman breathing heavily and hoarsely at his side, and another whose thick boots were creaking, prevented him from hearing distinctly. He could only hear the soft voice of the marshal faintly, then the shrill voice of the malignant gentleman, and then the voice of Sviazhsky. They were disputing, as far as he could make out, as to the interpretation to be put on the act and the exact meaning of the words: “liable to be called up for trial.” The crowd parted to make way for Sergey Ivanovitch approaching the table. Sergey Ivanovitch, waiting till the malignant gentleman had finished speaking, said that he thought the best solution would be to refer to the act itself, and asked the secretary to find the act. The act said that in case of difference of opinion, there must be a ballot. Sergey Ivanovitch read the act and began to explain its meaning, but at that point a tall, stout, round-shouldered landowner, with dyed whiskers, in a tight uniform that cut the back of his neck, interrupted him. He went up to the table, and striking it with his finger ring, he shouted loudly: “A ballot! Put it to the vote! No need for more talking!” Then several voices began to talk all at once, and the tall nobleman with the ring, getting more and more exasperated, shouted more and more loudly. But it was impossible to make out what he said. He was shouting for the very course Sergey Ivanovitch had proposed; but it was evident that he hated him and all his party, and this feeling of hatred spread through the whole party and roused in opposition to it the same vindictiveness, though in a more seemly form, on the other side. Shouts were raised, and for a moment all was confusion, so that the marshal of the province had to call for order.

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  That a heavenly body has no potency to non-existence happens, he says, because a heavenly body is not composed of matter and form as though of potency and act. Rather, says he, such a body is matter existing in act, while its form is its soul, in such a way that it is not constituted in being through the form, but only in motion. Consequently, says he, there is present in it not a potency to existence, but solely a potency to “ where ” (place), as the Philosopher says in Metaphysics XI. 1153. But this solution conforms neither to the truth nor to the intention of Aristotle. It is not in conformity with truth on a number of counts: First, because he says that a heavenly body is not composed of matter and form—which is utterly impossible. For it is plain that a heavenly body is something actual, otherwise it would not be in motion—something that is in potency only is not a subject of motion, as was proved in Book VI. But, whatever is actual is either a subsisting form, as are the separated substances, or has form in something else, which is related to the form as matter, and as potency to act. Now, it cannot be said that a heavenly body is a subsistent form, because then it would be understood in act and neither sensible nor existing under quantity. Therefore, it must be a composite of matter and form, and of potency and act. Consequently, there is in it in some sense a potency to non-existence. But even if a heavenly body were not a composite of matter and form, it would still be necessary to place in it, in some sense, a potency in respect of existence. For every simple self-subsisting substance is necessarily either its own existence or it shares in existence. But a simple substance which is self-subsistent existence itself cannot be but one, just as whiteness, if whiteness were a subsistent being, could be but one. Consequently, every substance after the first simple substance participates existence. But every participant is composed of the participant and what it participates, and the participant is in potency to what it participates. Therefore, in every substance, however simple, other than the first simple substance, there is a potency to existence.

• From Deceptions and Myths of the Bible (1975)

  According to the Tupi-Guarani of western Brazil, their god Monan was so vexed with their evil ways that he tried to destroy them with fire, but a great magician, Irin-Magé, extinguished it with a deluge of water. The Quichi (Mayans) say that only four men and four women escaped from a rain and hail. These had taken refuge in a mountain and when they sought a better abode the waters parted and they passed through on dry land. The Man-deans of Mesopotamia tell of a flood of fire-water, from which only a pair escaped. The Mundari of Central India say their god Sing Bonga, perceiving that all men had become evil, destroyed them with fire and water. The Tolowas tell us of a great flood following a torrential rain. All were drowned except one pair. From this pair the Tolowas sprang. A Welsh myth says that Dwyvan and Dwyvach alone escaped the Great Flood. And even the Jews had other Deluge myths. In one a wrathful God scalded the sinful antediluvians. There are some who contend that the other races copied from the Hebrew account, this being the one and only “revealed” account, yet the Hindu, Chaldean, Babylonian and Egyptian accounts antedate the Hebrew version by many centuries. Who did the copying then is obvious. Speaking of this Dr. Driver said:”. . . their materials it is plain were obtained by them from the best human sources obtainable.” And again:”. . . the author has utilized elements derived ultimately from a heathen source.” The truth is that the entire Bible is derived from this heathen source. The mythoplasm of all myths is that of the creation of the world, and all antiquity dramatized it. Below are a few of the better known deluge myths with their Noahs and their gods. [image "image" file=Image00008.jpg] While on the subject of myths and “lost” races let us consider another—the “lost” Atlantis. Atlantis is also a myth, but as we know it, no part of the mythopoeic legacy. It belongs to historic times and Plato is the author. But Plato had no firsthand knowledge of this land or the original myth either. He got the idea from a pupil of his, who got it from a relative, Solon, who got it from Egyptian priests, who did not know its meaning either. Thus remote, in more ways than one, Plato just fictionized a myth into a fact. If you don’t believe this can be done, just read your Bible. The facts of the case are these: While visiting Sais in Egypt, Solon was shown two pillars inscribed with hieroglyphics, ancient even then. Curious to know their meaning, he asked the priests to interpret them to him. This they did and the story they told is the story of Atlantis, another fabulous land in the west , now sunk in the Atlantic. This too was a wondrous place, but not as Plato described it—the philosopher needed a basis for his ideal Republic.

• From The Decameron (1353)

  It could be argued that the narrator’s light-hearted attitude towards his narrative indicates that this, the most problematical story in the whole of the Decameron, should be read rather as an elaborate parable on obedience to the Lord’s will rather than as a literal, realistic account of a husband’s sadistic cruelty. Parallels with the biblical story of the patience of Job are evident, both in the text and in the narrative itself. The Clerk’s Tale, Chaucer’s version of the same story, was almost certainly based on Petrarch’s Latin translation of B.’s novella, as can be seen for instance in its bowdlerization of the episode in which Griselda is stripped naked in the presence of all the bystanders, men and women alike. Both in Petrarch and in Chaucer, she is stripped of her peasant’s garb and regally re-clothed in private by the ladies of the court.2. Saluzzo A town at the foot of the Alps about thirty miles south of Turin, the seat of the marquises of Saluzzo from 1142 to 1548.3. Griselda The name appears to be an invention of B.’s own, perhaps constructed from that of a very different character, Criseida (Cressida), the heroine of his narrative poem Filostrato, on which Chaucer’s Troilus and Criseyde is based.4. My lord, deal with me as you think best Griselda’s words recall the response of the Virgin Mary to the Angel Gabriel in Luke i, 38: ‘Fiat mihi secundum verbum tuurn (‘Be it unto me according to thy word’).5. do exactly as your lord… has instructed you Griselda’s apparent sacrifice of her daughter (and later of her son) at her lord’s command forms part of a long tradition of such intensely dramatic moments in classical and biblical literature, for instance Agamemnon’s sacrifice of his daughter Iphigenia, Idomeneo’s sacrifice of his son Idamante and God’s command to Abraham (as a test of his obedience) that he sacrifice his only son, Isaac.6. naked as on the day I was born Griselda’s submissive reply to her husband’s announcement echoes the words of Job: ‘Naked came I out of my mother’s womb, and naked shall I return thither: the Lord gave, and the Lord hath taken away’ (Job i, 21).7. Panago A form taken from popular speech, Panago (i.e. Pánico, near Bologna) was a feudatory of the counts of Alberti.8. My lord, I am ready to do as you ask Yet another biblical echo, this time of the Virgin’s ‘Ecce ancilla Dei’ (‘Behold the handmaid of the Lord’). from Luke i, 38.9. I think I can boast The Italian text reads ‘credendomi poter dar vanto’. Luigi Russo pointed out that the phrase had a precise and solemn meaning in feudal society. It has to do with the ‘vaunts’ or boasts made by knights, often over the dinner table, concerning some outstanding personal achievement, defying their companions to cite a more worthy deed of their own.

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  Secondly, a change in the natural law may be understood by way of subtraction, so that what previously was according to the natural law, ceases to be so. In this sense, the natural law is altogether unchangeable in its first principles: but in its secondary principles, which, as we have said [2020](A[4]), are certain detailed proximate conclusions drawn from the first principles, the natural law is not changed so that what it prescribes be not right in most cases. But it may be changed in some particular cases of rare occurrence, through some special causes hindering the observance of such precepts, as stated above [2021](A[4]). Reply to Objection 1: The written law is said to be given for the correction of the natural law, either because it supplies what was wanting to the natural law; or because the natural law was perverted in the hearts of some men, as to certain matters, so that they esteemed those things good which are naturally evil; which perversion stood in need of correction. Reply to Objection 2: All men alike, both guilty and innocent, die the death of nature: which death of nature is inflicted by the power of God on account of original sin, according to 1 Kings 2:6: “The Lord killeth and maketh alive.” Consequently, by the command of God, death can be inflicted on any man, guilty or innocent, without any injustice whatever. In like manner adultery is intercourse with another’s wife; who is allotted to him by the law emanating from God. Consequently intercourse with any woman, by the command of God, is neither adultery nor fornication. The same applies to theft, which is the taking of another’s property. For whatever is taken by the command of God, to Whom all things belong, is not taken against the will of its owner, whereas it is in this that theft consists. Nor is it only in human things, that whatever is commanded by God is right; but also in natural things, whatever is done by God, is, in some way, natural, as stated in the [2022]FP, Q[105], A[6], ad 1. Reply to Objection 3: A thing is said to belong to the natural law in two ways. First, because nature inclines thereto: e.g. that one should not do harm to another. Secondly, because nature did not bring in the contrary: thus we might say that for man to be naked is of the natural law, because nature did not give him clothes, but art invented them. In this sense, “the possession of all things in common and universal freedom” are said to be of the natural law, because, to wit, the distinction of possessions and slavery were not brought in by nature, but devised by human reason for the benefit of human life. Accordingly the law of nature was not changed in this respect, except by addition.

• From The Erotic Engine (2011)

  More than anything else, it was this phrase that made me want to pursue his ideas beyond what appeared in his published work. Though he is supposedly retired, he had just returned to Alaska after visiting several archaeological digs in North Africa when I contacted him. He is still deeply committed to pushing his interpretations of cave drawings. While some scholars engaged in the debate, many of Guthrie’s colleagues have greeted his thesis with silence. I asked him why so many scholars tend toward the spiritual aspects of these images and resist acknowledging the bawdy. He said it has more to do with discomfort than disagreement. “We have a lot of very odd aspects to our morality,” he said. “Those that revolve around sex are especially potent. It’s just a delicate subject.” A delicate subject that seems to wield as great a clout in the ancient world of artistic expression as it does in the modern media business. There are other scholars who are willing to discuss the universality of sexual depiction. Many tie the phenomenon back to the basics of survival. Sex, along with breathing, eating and drinking, are the fundamental actions necessary to ensure the continued existence of both individual human beings and humanity as a whole. Classic arguments from evolutionary biology explain why activities vital to survival are so pleasurable—organisms that did not enjoy food or sex would not live long enough to reproduce, and therefore would be filtered out of the gene pool in short order. There are also sound, simple reasons why watching other people eat or looking at food can foster hunger, or why viewing depictions of sex and sexuality can spark erotic desire. Human beings, though, have a tendency to take the basics and complicate them. “I really equate sex and food,” erotologist C. J. Scheiner told me over lunch near his home in Manhattan. (An erotologist is an expert in the depictions of sex and lovemaking, as opposed to a sexologist, who studies sex itself.) “You need food to stay alive, but you need the barest plainest food to stay alive. Yet what we have in front of us here”—we were at a Szechuan restaurant—”is nicely prepared, it looks pleasant and it tastes good. It’s way more than we need to just give us the calories to keep us going to tomorrow. And if you go to a five-star restaurant, it is just way beyond anything that you need for pure survival.” His point was that humans experiment and test, try out new recipes and techniques, seek out exotic alternatives, acquire new tools and equipment, and generally push the limits of tastes and appetites.

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  This error seems to have originated from two statements of the ancients. For those who first began to observe the nature of things, being unable to rise above their imagination, supposed that nothing but bodies existed. Therefore they said that God was a body, which they considered to be the principle of other bodies. And since they held that the soul was of the same nature as that body which they regarded as the first principle, as is stated De Anima i, 2, it followed that the soul was of the nature of God Himself. According to this supposition, also, the Manichaeans, thinking that God was corporeal light, held that the soul was part of that light bound up with the body. Then a further step in advance was made, and some surmised the existence of something incorporeal, not apart from the body, but the form of a body; so that Varro said, “God is a soul governing the world by movement and reason,” as Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei vii, 6 [*The words as quoted are to be found iv. 31.]) So some supposed man’s soul to be part of that one soul, as man is a part of the whole world; for they were unable to go so far as to understand the different degrees of spiritual substance, except according to the distinction of bodies. But, all these theories are impossible, as proved above ([753]Q[3], AA[1],8; and [754]Q[75], A[1]), wherefore it is evidently false that the soul is of the substance of God. Reply to Objection 1: The term “breathe” is not to be taken in the material sense; but as regards the act of God, to breathe [spirare], is the same as to “make a spirit.” Moreover, in the material sense, man by breathing does not send forth anything of his own substance, but an extraneous thing. Reply to Objection 2: Although the soul is a simple form in its essence, yet it is not its own existence, but is a being by participation, as above explained ([755]Q[75], A[5], ad 4). Therefore it is not a pure act like God. Reply to Objection 3: That which differs, properly speaking, differs in something; wherefore we seek for difference where we find also resemblance. For this reason things which differ must in some way be compound; since they differ in something, and in something resemble each other. In this sense, although all that differ are diverse, yet all things that are diverse do not differ. For simple things are diverse; yet do not differ from one another by differences which enter into their composition. For instance, a man and a horse differ by the difference of rational and irrational; but we cannot say that these again differ by some further difference.

• From History of the Christian Church: The Complete Set of Eight Volumes (1858)

  But the Elector John Sigismund, who by travels and personal intercourse with Calvinistic princes and divines conceived a high regard for their superior Christian piety and courtesy, embraced the Reformed faith in 1606, and openly professed it in February, 1614, by declaring his assent to the four oecumenical symbols (including the Chalcedonense) and the altered Augsburg Confession of 1540, without imposing his creed upon his subjects, only prohibiting the preachers to condemn the Calvinists from the pulpit. In May, 1514, he issued a personal confession of faith, called the "Confession of Sigismund," or the "Brandenburg Confession" (Confessio Marchica). It teaches a moderate, we may say, Melanchthonian and unionistic Calvinism, and differs from the Lutheran Formula of Concord in the following points: It rejects Eutychianism and the ubiquity of Christ’s body, consubstantiation in the Lord’s Supper, the use of the wafer instead of the broken bread, and exorcism in baptism; on the other hand, it teaches the Calvinistic view of the spiritual real presence for believers, and unconditional election, but without an unconditional decree of reprobation; it distinctly declares that God sincerely wishes the salvation of all men, and is not the author of sin and damnation. The change of Sigismund was the result of conscientious conviction, and not dictated by political motives. The people and his own wife re-mained Lutheran. He made no use of his territorial summepiscopate and the jus reformandi. He disclaimed all intention to coerce the conscience, since faith is a free gift of God, and cannot be forced. No man should pre-sume to exercise dominion over man’s religion. He thus set, in advance of his age, a noble example of toleration, which became the traditional policy of the Prussian rulers. The pietistic movement of Spener and Francke, which was supported by the theological faculty at Halle, weakened the confessional dissensus, and strengthened the consensus. The Moravian brotherhood exhibited long before the Prussian Union, in a small community, the real union of evangelical believers of both confessions. Frederick the Great was an unbeliever, and had as little sympathy with Pietism and Moravianism as with Lutheranism and Calvinism; but he was a decided upholder of religious toleration, which found expression in his famous declaration that in his kingdom everybody must be at liberty to get saved "after his own fashion." The toleration of indifferentism, which prevailed in the last century, broke down the reign of bigotry, and prepared the way for the higher and nobler principle of religious liberty.

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  In creatures a likeness to this trinity appears in three ways. First as an effect reflects its cause; and in this way the principle of the whole Godhead, i.e. the Father, is represented by that which holds the first place in the creature, namely by being in itself one subsistent thing. The Word is represented by the form of each creature; because in those things which are done by an intellectual agent the form of the effect derives from the concept of his intelligence. Love is represented it the order of creatures: because from the fact that God loves himself, he directs all things to himself in a certain order. Wherefore this likeness is called a vestigiary likeness in that this bears the trace of the foot as an effect bears a trace of its cause. Secondly, by reason of a similar kind of operation: and thus it is represented in the rational creature alone who like God can understand and love himself, and consequently produces his own word and love: and this is called the likeness of the natural image; because in order that one thing be the image of another it must present a like species. I Thirdly, on account of the unity of object, inasmuch as the rational creature understands and loves God: this is a kind of conformity of union that is found in the saints alone who understand and love the same thing as God understands and loves. Of the first kind of likeness it is written (Job xi, 7) Peradventure thou wilt understand the steps of God? Of the second (Gen. i, 26): Let us make man to our own image and likeness: and this is called the image of creation. Of the third it is written (2 Cor. iii, 18): But we beholding the gloty of the Lord with open face are transformed into the same image: and this is called the image of re-creation.

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  Whether in the state of innocence man would have acquired immortality by the tree of life?Objection 1: It would seem that the tree of life could not be the cause of immortality. For nothing can act beyond its own species; as an effect does not exceed its cause. But the tree of life was corruptible, otherwise it could not be taken as food; since food is changed into the substance of the thing nourished. Therefore the tree of life could not give incorruptibility or immortality. Objection 2: Further, effects caused by the forces of plants and other natural agencies are natural. If therefore the tree of life caused immortality, this would have been natural immortality. Objection 3: Further, this would seem to be reduced to the ancient fable, that the gods, by eating a certain food, became immortal; which the Philosopher ridicules (Metaph. iii, Did. ii, 4). On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 3:22): “Lest perhaps he put forth his hand, and take of the tree of life, and eat, and live for ever.” Further, Augustine says (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test. qu. 19 [*Work of an anonymous author, among the supposititious works of St. Augustine]): “A taste of the tree of life warded off corruption of the body; and even after sin man would have remained immortal, had he been allowed to eat of the tree of life.”

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  493. The first things which are said to be relative numerically are such, either without qualification, or in some definite relation to them, or to unity; as double is related to half as a definite number. And the multiple is related numerically to the unit, but not in a definite numerical relation such as this or that. But what is one and a half times as great as something else is related to it in a definite numerical relation to a number. And the superparticular is related to the subparticular in an indefinite relation, as what is multiple is related to a number. And what includes is related to what is included in it as something altogether indefinite in number, for number is commensurable. For what includes is related to what is included in it according to so much and something more; but this something more is indefinite. For whatever the case may be, it is either equal or not equal to it. Therefore all these relations are said to be numerical and are properties.of number. 494. Further, equal, like and same are said to be relative, but in a different way, because all these terms are referred to unity. For those things are the same whose substance is one; and those are alike whose quality is one; and those are equal whose quantity is one. And unity is the principle and measure of number. Hence all these are said to be relative numerically, yet not in the same way. 495. Active and passive things are relative in virtue of active and passive potencies and the operations of potencies; for example, what can heat is relative to what can be heated, because it can heat it; and what is heating is relative to what is being heated; and what is cutting to what is being cut, inasmuch as they are doing these things. But of those things which are relative numerically there are no operations, except in the sense stated elsewhere; and operations which imply motion are not found in them. Moreover, of things which are relative potentially, some are said to be relative temporally also, as what makes to what is made, and what will make to what will be made. For in this way a father is said to be the father of his son, because the former has acted, whereas the latter has been acted upon. Again, some things are said to be relative according to the privation of potency; for example, the incapable and other terms used in this way, as the invisible.

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  948. Then at (749) because he had said that we must consider the question of the differences of motion, i.e., whether motions differ specifically, he now inquires how specific differences may be taken in motions and in other things as well. And because the definition designates the essence of the species, he poses two questions: one about the species, and one about the definition. He first of all asks about species: “ When is something to be reckoned of a different species from another? Is it only because the same nature is found in different receivers, as Plato held? ” According to the foregoing this cannot be the case. For it has been said that a genus is not absolutely one; therefore a difference of species is not reckoned on the basis that some same thing is in one and another, except for the Platonists who posited that a genus is absolutely one. On this account, as though answering the question, Aristotle adds that a species is different, not because the same thing is in a different subject, but because a different nature is in a different subject. The second question is about definition, and it is this: “ What is a term, i.e., what is the definition which declares a species? ” And because things that have the same definition are absolutely the same, he then, as if answering the question, adds that the proper definition of a thing is that by which we can discern whether some thing is the same or other, e.g. white or sweet. And “ other ” may be taken in two ways as before: in one way, as meaning that the white is said to be something other than the sweet, because in the white thing is found a subject nature other than the one in the sweet; in another way, as meaning that they differ not only in subject nature but that they are wholly not the same. These two are the same as the two he mentioned above, when he said: “ If the same thing is found in things that are other, or if differing things are found in differing things. ” For it is clear that there is a same reason of identity and diversity in species and in definition. 949. Then at (730) he discusses the comparison of alterations, About this he does two things: First he shows that one alteration is as equally fast as another; Secondly, he investigates from what aspect equality of quickness in alteration is considered, at 950. He asks therefore first about alteration, how one alteration is as equally fast as another. And that two alterations are equally fast, he proves. For being healed is to be altered. But one can be healed swiftly and another slowly, and likewise some come to be healed at the same time. Therefore, one alteration is as equally swift as another, for what is moved in an equal time is said to be moved with equal speed.

• From Composition & Photography: Working with Photography Using Design Concepts (2022)

  Understand the importance of the vanishing point to your image, and to the way your viewers visually interpret the relationship of your image to the world, and to their overall sense of the reality of your work. Keeping this importance in mind, it is important to work with your camera when photographing to find compositions where the location of the vanishing point best complements your compositional intent. Multi-Point PerspectiveIf one vanishing point is good, then two should be better, and multiple vanishing points should be great—at least, so you’d think. We have been trained since early childhood via almost all the media that we see—televisions, movie screens, books, our mobile phones—to view the world in a single-point rendition. Any image with more than one vanishing point automatically seems weird and feels uncomfortable. If you look for them, out in the world there are many scenes that do have more than one vanishing point. The most common scenario is when something splits our vision. This could be a building, a fence, maybe a post, a rock, or even a car. The key issue is that we see something differently on either side of the object that splits our vision. Any time we see something like this, visual parts of our brains tend to work overtime, and it can be like decoding a visual puzzle. [image "Photos" file=image_rsrc30S.jpg] The Alameda and El Dorado—If you stand at the corner of many streets and hold yourself in exactly the right position, it’s fairly easy to encounter a scene with two vanishing points. It’s a little harder than you might think to capture these two vanishing points photographically, but it can be done with the aid of a wide-angle lens. At the meeting of these two streets in Berkeley, California, the angle of intersection is particularly acute. The white picket fence comes together in a V-shape, making the two-point perspective particularly obvious. It also helps that the vanishing points of both perspectives are very similar. I used a 21mm wide-angle lens to make this image showing a simple example of two vanishing points. My camera was on a tripod and it was tricky to find the right position so I could see both vanishing points equally. One inch to the left or right, or up or down, would have completely changed the whole image. Both paths are not exactly the same in terms of geometry or what is at the vanishing point, but they are similar enough that at first glance they look the same.

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  And there is another descent whereby He descended “into the lower regions of the earth,” as is written Eph. 4:9; and this is local descent: hence this belongs to Christ according to the condition of human nature. Reply to Objection 3: Christ is said to ascend to the Father, inasmuch as He ascends to sit on the right hand of the Father; and this is befitting Christ in a measure according to His Divine Nature, and in a measure according to His human nature, as will be said later ([4318]Q[58], A[3]) Whether Christ ascended by His own power?Objection 1: It would seem that Christ did not ascend by His own power, because it is written (Mk. 16:19) that “the Lord Jesus, after He had spoken to them, was taken up to heaven”; and (Acts 1:9) that, “while they looked on, He was raised up, and a cloud received Him out of their sight.” But what is taken up, and lifted up, appears to be moved by another. Consequently, it was not by His own power, but by another’s that Christ was taken up into heaven. Objection 2: Further, Christ’s was an earthly body, like to ours. But it is contrary to the nature of an earthly body to be borne upwards. Moreover, what is moved contrary to its nature is nowise moved by its own power. Therefore Christ did not ascend to heaven by His own power. Objection 3: Further, Christ’s own power is Divine. But this motion does not seem to have been Divine, because, whereas the Divine power is infinite, such motion would be instantaneous; consequently, He would not have been uplifted to heaven “while” the disciples “looked on,” as is stated in Acts 1:9. Therefore, it seems that Christ did not ascend to heaven by His own power. On the contrary, It is written (Is. 63:1): “This beautiful one in his robe, walking in the greatness of his strength.” Also Gregory says in a Homily on the Ascension (xxix): “It is to be noted that we read of Elias having ascended in a chariot, that it might be shown that one who was mere man needed another’s help. But we do not read of our Saviour being lifted up either in a chariot or by angels, because He who had made all things was taken up above all things by His own power.” I answer that, There is a twofold nature in Christ, to wit, the Divine and the human. Hence His own power can be accepted according to both. Likewise a twofold power can be accepted regarding His human nature: one is natural, flowing from the principles of nature; and it is quite evident that Christ did not ascend into heaven by such power as this. The other is the power of glory, which is in Christ’s human nature; and it was according to this that He ascended to heaven.