Confusion

Passages

Every passage tagged with this emotion in the Vela corpus. Search the body text, narrow by source or register, click through to a book’s profile to see how the passage sits with the rest of the work.

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• From The Decameron (1353)

  And all that Solomon said by way of reply was: ‘Love.’ This said, Melissus was promptly shown the door, and Joseph explained his own reason for coming. But the only answer he received from Solomon was: ‘Go to Goosebridge,’ and the words were scarcely out of the King’s mouth before Joseph, too, was removed from his presence. Outside, he found Melissus waiting for him, and told him about the answer he had been given. After pondering upon these words without succeeding in extracting a meaning from them, or anything that might help to resolve their problems, the two young men, feeling they had been made to look foolish, began to make their way homewards. After travelling for several days, they came to a fine-looking bridge across a river; and since a lengthy baggage-train of mules and horses happened to be using the bridge, they were forced to wait till all the animals had crossed it. When all but a few of them had done so, one of the mules took fright, in the way they frequently do, and refused to take another step. So one of the muleteers took hold of a stick and began to beat it, quite gently to begin with, in order to make it go across. But the mule, veering from one side of the road to the other and occasionally turning back, was utterly determined not to go on. This caused the muleteer to lose his temper completely, and he began to beat it with his stick quite unmercifully, raining a series of terrible blows on its head, its flanks, and its hindquarters, but all to no avail. Melissus and Joseph, who were standing there watching all this, directed a stream of abuse at the muleteer, saying: ‘Hey! villain, what are you doing? Do you want to kill the poor beast? Why don’t you try talking nicely to him and leading him across gently? He’ll come more quickly that way than by beating him as you are doing.’ ‘You know your horses and I know my mule,’ replied the muleteer. ‘Just you leave him to me.’ Having said this he began to beat the mule all over again, and administered so many blows to each of its flanks that the mule moved on, and the muleteer’s point was made. As the two young men were about to proceed on their way, Joseph saw a fellow sitting on the farther side of the bridge and asked him what the place was called. ‘Sir,’ the good man replied, ‘this place is called Goosebridge.’ No sooner did Joseph hear the name than he recalled the words of Solomon, and said to Melissus: ‘I do declare, my friend, that the advice I had from Solomon may yet turn out to be sound and sensible.

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  Reply to Objection 4: Other things being equal, the state of the soul in the body is more perfect than outside the body, because it is a part of the whole composite; and every integral part is material in comparison to the whole: and though it were conformed to God in one respect, it is not simply. Because, strictly speaking, a thing is more conformed to God when it has all that the condition of its nature requires, since then most of all it imitates the Divine perfection. Hence the heart of an animal is more conformed to an immovable God when it is in movement than when it is at rest, because the perfection of the heart is in its movement, and its rest is its undoing. Reply to Objection 5: Bodily death was brought about by Adam’s sin which was blotted out by Christ’s death: hence its punishment lasts not for ever. But mortal sin which causes everlasting death through impenitence will not be expiated hereafter. Hence that death will be everlasting. Whether the resurrection will be for all without exception?Objection 1: It would seem that the resurrection will not be for all without exception. For it is written (Ps. 1:5): “The wicked shall not rise again in judgment.” Now men will not rise again except at the time of the general judgment. Therefore the wicked shall in no way rise again. Objection 2: Further, it is written (Dan. 12:2): “Many of those that sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake.” But these words imply a restriction. Therefore all will not rise again. Objection 3: Further, by the resurrection men are conformed to Christ rising again; wherefore the Apostle argues (1 Cor. 15:12, seqq.) that if Christ rose again, we also shall rise again. Now those alone should be conformed to Christ rising again who have borne His image, and this belongs to the good alone. Therefore they alone shall rise again. Objection 4: Further, punishment is not remitted unless the fault be condoned. Now bodily death is the punishment of original sin. Therefore, as original sin is not forgiven to all, all will not rise again. Objection 5: Further, as we are born again by the grace of Christ, even so shall we rise again by His grace. Now those who die in their mother’s womb can never be born again: therefore neither can they rise again, and consequently all will not rise again. On the contrary, It is said (Jn. 5:28, 25): “All that are in the graves shall hear the voice of the Son of God . . . and they that hear shall live.” Therefore the dead shall all rise again. Further, it is written (1 Cor. 15:51): “We shall all indeed rise again,” etc.

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  Arg. 4. A voluntary agent does not delay the execution of his purpose except in expectation of some future condition not yet realised. And this unfulfilled futurity is sometimes in the agent himself, as when maturity of active power or the removal of some hindrance is the condition expected: sometimes it is without the agent, as when there is expected the presence of some one before whom the action is to take place, or the arrival of some opportune time that is not yet come. A complete volition is at once carried into effect by the executive power, except for some defect in that power. Thus at the command of the will a limb is at once moved, unless there be some break-down in the motor apparatus. Therefore, when any one wishes to do a thing and it is not at once done, that must be either for some defect of power, the removal of which has to be waited for, or because of the incompleteness of the volition to do the thing. I call it completeness of volition,’ when there is a will absolutely to do the thing, anyhow. The volition I say is incomplete,’ when there is no will absolutely to do the thing, but the will is conditioned on the existence of some circumstance not yet present, or the withdrawal of some present impediment. But certainly, whatever God now wills to be, He has from eternity willed to be. No new motion of the will can come upon Him: no defect or impediment can have clogged His power: there can have been nothing outside Himself for Him to wait for in the production of the universe, since there is nothing else uncreated save Him alone (Chapp.VI,XV). It seems therefore necessary that God must have brought the creature into being from all eternity. Reply. The object of the divine will is not the mere being of the creature, but its being at a certain time. What is thus willed, namely, the being of the creature at that time, is not delayed: because the creature began to exist then exactly when God from eternity arranged that it should begin to exist.

• From Christianity: The First Three Thousand Years (2009)

  text), 64. 12 MacCulloch, 610–11. 13 J. Arrizabalaga, J. Henderson and R. French, The Great Pox: The French Disease in Renaissance Europe (New Haven and London, 1997), Ch. 4. 14 C. S. Dixon, ‘Popular Astrology and Lutheran Propaganda in Reformation Germany’, History, 84 (1999), 403–18; on astrology, E. Cameron, ‘Philipp Melanchthon: Image and Substance’, JEH, 48 (1997), 705–22, at 711–12, and Calvin’s critique, J. Calvin, ed. J. T. McNeill and F. L. Battles, Institutes of the Christian Religion (2 vols., Philadelphia: Library of Christian Classics XX, XXI, 1960), 201 [Institutes I.xvi.3]. 15 On the leadership and crucial role of Sephardic crypto-Jews at the Collège de Guyenne, P. J. McGinnis and A. H. Williamson (eds.), George Buchanan: The Political Poetry (Edinburgh, 1995), 6–7, 16–18, 313. 16 J. Friedman, ‘The Reformation in Alien Eyes: Jewish Perceptions of Christian Troubles’, SCJ, 13/1 (Spring 1983), 23–40. 17 Z. David, ‘Hájek, Dubravius and the Jews: A Contrast in Sixteenth-century Czech Historiography’, SCJ, 27 (1996), 997–1013, at 998, 1009. 18 J. Friedman, ‘Unitarians and New Christians in Sixteenth-century Europe’, ARG, 81 (1996), 9–37. 19 Cf. discussion of sodomy in MacCulloch, 620–29. 20 J. Edwards, ‘Portugal and the Expulsion of the Jews from Spain’, in Medievo hispano: estudios in memoriam del Prof. Derek W. Lomax (Madrid, 1995), 121–39, at 137. 21 B. J. Kaplan, ‘“Remnants of the Papal Yoke”: Apathy and Opposition in the Dutch Reformation’, SCJ, 25 (1994), 653–68. 22 A. Fix, Prophecy and Reason: The Dutch Collegiants in the Early Enlightenment (Princeton, 1991). 23 D. M. Swetschinki, Reluctant Cosmopolitans: The Portuguese Jews of Seventeenth-century Amsterdam (London, 2000). 24 J. I. Israel, Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity 1650–1750 (Oxford, 2001), 159–74. 25 B. Spinoza, tr. S. Shirley, with introd. by B. S. Gregory, Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (2nd edn, Leiden, 1991), 51 [Preface]. 26 B. Spinoza, ed. M. L. Morgan and tr. S. Shirley, The Essential Spinoza: Ethics and Related Writings (Indianapolis, 2006), 53 [Pt II, proposition 43]. 27 M. Stewart, The Courtier and the Heretic: Leibniz, Spinoza and the Fate of God in the Modern World (New Haven and London, 2005), esp. 58–60, 65–7. 28 P. Bayle, Miscellaneous Reflections, occasion’d by the Comet which appear’d in December 1680 … (2 vols., London, 1708 [first French edn

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 16) the price of things salable does not depend on their degree of nature, since at times a horse fetches a higher price than a slave; but it depends on their usefulness to man. Hence it is not necessary for the seller or buyer to be cognizant of the hidden qualities of the thing sold, but only of such as render the thing adapted to man’s use, for instance, that the horse be strong, run well and so forth. Such qualities the seller and buyer can easily discover. Whether the seller is bound to state the defects of the thing sold?Objection 1: It would seem that the seller is not bound to state the defects of the thing sold. Since the seller does not bind the buyer to buy, he would seem to leave it to him to judge of the goods offered for sale. Now judgment about a thing and knowledge of that thing belong to the same person. Therefore it does not seem imputable to the seller if the buyer be deceived in his judgment, and be hurried into buying a thing without carefully inquiring into its condition. Objection 2: Further, it seems foolish for anyone to do what prevents him carrying out his work. But if a man states the defects of the goods he has for sale, he prevents their sale: wherefore Tully (De Offic. iii, 13) pictures a man as saying: “Could anything be more absurd than for a public crier, instructed by the owner, to cry: ‘I offer this unhealthy horse for sale?’” Therefore the seller is not bound to state the defects of the thing sold. Objection 3: Further, man needs more to know the road of virtue than to know the faults of things offered for sale. Now one is not bound to offer advice to all or to tell them the truth about matters pertaining to virtue, though one should not tell anyone what is false. Much less therefore is a seller bound to tell the faults of what he offers for sale, as though he were counseling the buyer. Objection 4: Further, if one were bound to tell the faults of what one offers for sale, this would only be in order to lower the price. Now sometimes the price would be lowered for some other reason, without any defect in the thing sold: for instance, if the seller carry wheat to a place where wheat fetches a high price, knowing that many will come after him carrying wheat; because if the buyers knew this they would give a lower price. But apparently the seller need not give the buyer this information. Therefore, in like manner, neither need he tell him the faults of the goods he is selling.

• From History of the Christian Church: The Complete Set of Eight Volumes (1858)

  23:11, 15, 16—namely, whether it was the morrow following the first day of the Passover, i.e. the 16th of Nisan, or the day after the regular Sabbath in the Passover week; partly on the date of Christ’s crucifixion, which took place on a Friday, namely, whether this was the 14th or 15th of Nisan. If we assume that the Friday of Christ’s death was the 14th of Nisan, then the 15th was a Sabbath, and Pentecost in that year fall on a Sunday; but if the Friday of the crucifixion was the 15th of Nisan (as I hold myself, see § 16, p. 133), then Pentecost fell on a Jewish Sabbath (so Wieseler, who fixes it on Saturday, May 27, A.D. 30), unless we count from the end of the 16th of Nisan (as Wordsworth and Plumptre do, who put Pentecost on a Sunday). But if we take the "Sabbath" in Lev. 23 in the usual sense of the weekly Sabbath (as the Sadducees and Karaites did), then the Jewish Pentecost fell always on a Sunday. At all events the Christian church has uniformly observed Whit-Sunday on the eighth Lord’s Day after Easter, adhering in this case, as well as in the festivals of the resurrection (Sunday) and of the ascension (Thursday), to the old tradition as to the day of the week when the event occurred. This view would furnish an additional reason for the substitution of Sunday, as the day of the Lord’s resurrection and the descent of the Holy Spirit, for the Jewish Sabbath. Wordsworth: "Thus the first day of the week has been consecrated to all the three Persons of the ever-blessed and undivided Trinity; and the blessings of Creation, Redemption, and Sanctification are commemorated on the Christian Sunday." Wieseler assumes, without good reason, that the ancient church deliberately changed the day from opposition to the Jewish Sabbath; but the celebration of Pentecost together with that of the Resurrection seems to be as old as the Christian church and has its precedent in the example of Paul, Acts 18:21; 20:16.—Lightfoot (Horae Hebr. in Acta Ap. 2:1; Opera II. 692) counts Pentecost from the 16th of Nisan, but nevertheless puts the first Christian Pentecost on a Sunday by an unusual and questionable interpretation of Acts 2:1 ejn tw'/ sunplhrou'sqai th;n hJmevran th'" Penthkosth'", which he makes to mean "when the day of Pentecost was fully gone," instead of "was fully come." But whether Pentecost fell on a Jewish Sabbath or on a Lord’s Day, the coincidence in either case was significant. (2) As to the place, Luke calls it simply a "house" (oi\ko", Acts 2:2), which can hardly mean the temple (not mentioned till 2:46). It was probably the same "upper room" or chamber which he had mentioned in the preceding chapter, as the well known usual meeting place of the, disciples after the ascension, to; uJperw'/on ...ou| h\san katamevnonte", 1:13). So Neander, Meyer, Ewald, Wordsworth, Plumptre, Farrar, and others.

• From History of the Christian Church: The Complete Set of Eight Volumes (1858)

  We add a list of the early archbishops and bishops of the four principal English sees, in the order of their foundation:43 Canterbury London Rochester. York Augustin 597 Mellitus 604 Justus 604 Paulinus 625 Laurentius 604 [Cedd in Essex 654] Romanus 624 Chad 665 Mellitus 619 Wini 666 Paulinus 633 Wilfrid, consecrated 665, in possession 669 Justus 624 Erconwald 675 Ithamar 644 Honorius 627 Waldhere 693 Damian 655 669 Deusdedit 655 Ingwald 704 Putta 669 Bosa 678 Theodore 668 Cwichelm 676 Wilfrid again 686 Brihtwald 693 Gebmund 678 Bosa again 691 Tatwin 731 Tobias 693 John 706 § 14. The Conversion of Ireland. St. Patrick and St. Bridget. Literature. I. The writings of St. Patrick are printed in the Vitae Sanctorum of the Bollandists, sub March 17th; in Patricii Opuscula, ed. Warsaeus (Sir James Ware, Lond., 1656); in Migne’s Patrolog., Tom. LIII. 790–839, and with critical notes in Haddan and Stubbs, Councils, etc., Vol. II, Part II, (1878), pp. 296–323. II. The Life of St. Patrick in the Acta Sanctorum, Mart., Tom. II. 517 sqq. Tillemont: Mémoires, Tom. XVI. 452, 781. Ussher: Brit. Eccl. Antiqu. J. H. Todd: St. Patrick, Apostle of Ireland. Dublin, 1864. C. Joh. Greith (R.C.): Geschichte der altirischen Kirche und ihrer Verbindung mit Rom., Gallien und Alemannien, als Einleitung in die Geschichte des Stifts St. Gallen. Freiburg i. B. 1867. Daniel de Vinné: History Of the Irish Primitive Church, together with the Life of St. Patrick. N. York, 1870 J. Francis Sherman (R.C.): Loca Patriciana: an Identification of Localities, chiefly in Leinster, visited by St. Patrick. Dublin, 1879. F. E. Warren (Episc.): The Manuscript Irish Missal at Corpus Christi College, Oxford. London, 1879. Ritual of the Celtic Church. Oxf. 1881. Comp. also the works of Todd, McLauchan, Ebrard, Killen, and Skene, quoted in § 7, and Forbes, Kalendars of Scottish Saints, p. 431.

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  Reply to Objection 2: The argument holds good as to the heaven, in so far as it denotes the entire sum of corporeal creation, for in that sense it is one. Reply to Objection 3: All the heavens have in common sublimity and some degree of luminosity, as appears from what has been said. ON THE WORK OF THE THIRD DAY (TWO ARTICLES)We next consider the work of the third day. Under this head there are two points of inquiry: (1) About the gathering together of the waters; (2) About the production of plants. Whether it was fitting that the gathering together of the waters should take place, as recorded, on the third day?Objection 1: It would seem that it was not fitting that the gathering together of the waters should take place on the third day. For what was made on the first and second days is expressly said to have been “made” in the words, “God said: Be light made,” and “Let there be a firmament made.”But the third day is contradistinguished from the first and the second days. Therefore the work of the third day should have been described as a making not as a gathering together. Objection 2: Further, the earth hitherto had been completely covered by the waters, wherefore it was described as “invisible” [*[579]Q[66], A[1], OBJ[1]]. There was then no place on the earth to which the waters could be gathered together. Objection 3: Further, things which are not in continuous contact cannot occupy one place. But not all the waters are in continuous contact, and therefore all were not gathered together into one place. Objection 4: Further, a gathering together is a mode of local movement. But the waters flow naturally, and take their course towards the sea. In their case, therefore, a Divine precept of this kind was unnecessary. Objection 5: Further, the earth is given its name at its first creation by the words, “In the beginning God created heaven and earth.” Therefore the imposition of its name on the third day seems to be recorded without necessity. On the contrary, The authority of Scripture suffices.

• From Quit: The Power of Knowing When to Walk Away (2022)

  See also grit for certainty, 15 free solo climbing and, 67–70 honor and, xx–xxi Mount Everest and, 4 as positive attribute, xx resisting, 16 scientific studies on, xxiii–xxiv uncertainty fought with, 15 persistence, xvi as bad advice, xix blind, 17 downside of, xvii as not always a virtue, 5 success and, xviii–xix pessimism, 186 Philips, 176–78 , 223 , 274 n Pinker, Steven, 207 pivoting, xxii planning, for quitting, 5 , 261 n playing time, NBA draft and, 148 Plum, Kelsey, 219 , 220 poker as career, 211–13 escalation of commitment in, 97 EV and, 35 , 101 expertise and, 59 flexible schedule of, 211–12 holding and folding in, 18–21 kill criteria for, 125–26 as long game, 100–102 probability and, 35 quitting and, 18–21 , 49 quit while you’re ahead and, 58–59 uncertainty in, 20 , 212 “unless” in, 239 politics, 169 “poltroon,” 9–10 positive expected value, 33–34 , 58 positive visualization, 186 The Power of Positive Thinking (Peale), 185 precommitment contracts, 117 premortem, for kill criteria, 119–20 prior commitment, 98–100 professional sports innovation rewards in, 155–56 NBA draft and, 146–49 NBA shot selection and, 154–55 progress measures, 240–42 Project Foghorn, 110 , 112 Project Loon, 110 , 112 , 241 prospect theory, 52 , 91 , 147 , 261 n, 265 n Pryor, Richard, 12–14 , 256–57 n public works projects, 92–95 . See also specific projects Qquality of life, expected value for, 39 quitting. See also specific topics decision-making and, 10–14 endowment effect and, 143 euphemisms and, xxii–xxiii , 255 n as exceptional, 83 grit compared to, xviii–xxi , 254 n historical wisdom for, 39–41 identity and, 131–32 invisibility of, 8–9 , 256 n as life or death, 9 negative connotation to, xix–xx opportunities from, 28 , 46 , 113 , 115 , 209 , 213 optimal, 18 , 200 option for, 12 , 14 planning for, 5 , 261 n in poker, 18–21 , 49 for progress, 32 scientific studies on, xxiii–xxiv states and dates for, 122 timing of, 27–32 on top, 45–46 uncertainty and, 14 quitting bind, 44–46 quitting coaches.

• From History of the Christian Church: The Complete Set of Eight Volumes (1858)

  He wavered in his own view, but expressly says: "The Latin custom (Latina consuetudo) does not receive it among the canonical Scriptures;" and in another place: "All the Greeks receive the Epistle to the Hebrews, and some Latins (et nonnulli Latinorum)." Augustin, a profound divine, but neither linguist nor critic, likewise wavered, but leaned strongly toward the Pauline origin. The prevailing opinion in the West ascribed only thirteen Epistles to Paul. The Synod of Hippo (393) and the third Synod of Carthage (397), under the commanding influence of Augustin, marked a transition of opinion in favor of fourteen.1233 This opinion prevailed until Erasmus and the Reformers revived the doubts of the early Fathers. The Council of Trent sanctioned it. (b) The absence of the customary name and salutation. This has been explained from modesty, as Paul was sent to the Gentiles rather than the Jews (Pantaenus), or from prudence and the desire to secure a better hearing from Jews who were strongly prejudiced against Paul (Clement of Alexandria). Very unsatisfactory and set aside by the authoritative tone of the Epistle. (c) In 2:3 the writer expressly distinguishes himself from the apostles, and reckons himself with the second generation of Christians, to whom the word of the Lord was "confirmed by them that heard" it at the first from the Lord. Paul, on the contrary, puts himself on a par with the other apostles, and derives his doctrine directly from Christ, without any human intervention (Gal. 1:1, 12, 15, 16). This passage alone is conclusive, and decided Luther, Calvin, and Beza against the Pauline authorship.1234 (d) The difference, not in the substance, but in the form and method of teaching and arguing.1235 (e) The difference of style (which has already been discussed). This argument does not rest on the number of peculiar words for such are found in every book of the New Testament, but in the superior purity, correctness, and rhetorical finish of style. (f) The difference in the quotations from the Old Testament. The author of Hebrews follows uniformly the Septuagint, even with its departures from the Hebrew; while Paul is more independent, and often corrects the Septuagint from the Hebrew. Bleek has also discovered the important fact that the former used the text of Codex Alexandrinus, the latter the text of Codex Vaticanus.1236 It is incredible that Paul, writing to the church of Jerusalem, should not have made use of his Hebrew and rabbinical learning in quoting the Scriptures. 3 Conjectures concerning the probable author. Four Pauline disciples and co-workers have been proposed, either as sole or as joint authors with Paul, three with some support in tradition—Barnabas, Luke, and Clement—one without any Apollos. Silvanus also has a few advocates.1237 (a) Barnabas.1238 He has in his favor the tradition of the African church (at least Tertullian), his Levitical training, his intimacy with Paul, his close relation to the church in Jerusalem, and his almost apostolic authority.

• From History of the Christian Church: The Complete Set of Eight Volumes (1858)

  Still above the metropolitans stood the five Patriarchs,495 the oligarchical summit, so to speak, the five towers in the edifice of the Catholic hierarchy of the Graeco-Roman empire. These patriarchs, in the official sense of the word as already fixed at the time of the fourth ecumenical council, were the bishops of the four great capitals of the empire, Rome, Alexandria, Antioch, and Constantinople; to whom was added, by way of honorary distinction, the bishop of Jerusalem, as president of the oldest Christian congregation, though the proper continuity of that office had been broken by the destruction of the holy city. They had oversight of one or more dioceses; at least of two or more provinces or eparchies.496 They ordained the metropolitans; rendered the final decision in church controversies; conducted the ecumenical councils; published the decrees of the councils and the church laws of the emperors; and united in themselves the supreme legislative and executive power of the hierarchy. They bore the same relation to the metropolitans of single provinces, as the ecumenical councils to the provincial. They did not, however, form a college; each acted for himself. Yet in important matters they consulted with one another, and had the right also to keep resident legates (apocrisiarii) at the imperial court at Constantinople. In prerogative they were equal, but in the extent of their dioceses and in influence they differed, and had a system of rank among themselves. Before the founding of Constantinople, and down to the Nicene council, Rome maintained the first rank, Alexandria the second, and Antioch the third, in both ecclesiastical and political importance. After the end of the fourth century this order was modified by the insertion of Constantinople as the second capital, between Rome and Alexandria, and the addition of Jerusalem as the fifth and smallest patriarchate. The patriarch of Jerusalem presided only over the three meagre provinces of Palestine;497 the patriarch of Antioch, over the greater part of the political diocese of the Orient, which comprised fifteen provinces, Syria, Phenicia, Cilicia, Arabia, Mesopotamia, &c.;498 the patriarch of Alexandria, over the whole diocese of Egypt with its nine rich provinces, Aegyptus prima and secunda, the lower and upper Thebaid, lower and upper Libya, &c.;499 the patriarch of Constantinople, over three dioceses, Pontus, Asia Minor, and Thrace, with eight and twenty provinces, and at the same time over the bishoprics among the barbarians;500 the patriarch of Rome gradually extended his influence over the entire West, two prefectures, the Italian and the Gallic, with all their dioceses and provinces.501

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  Whether this is a fitting definition of faith: “Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not?” Whether faith resides in the intellect? Whether charity is the form of faith? Whether lifeless faith can become living, or living faith, lifeless? Whether faith is a virtue? Whether faith is one virtue? Whether faith is the first of the virtues? Whether faith is more certain than science and the other intellectual virtues? OF THOSE WHO HAVE FAITH (FOUR ARTICLES) Whether there was faith in the angels, or in man, in their original state? Whether in the demons there is faith? Whether a man who disbelieves one article of faith, can have lifeless faith in the other articles? Whether faith can be greater in one man than in another? OF THE CAUSE OF FAITH (TWO ARTICLES) Whether faith is infused into man by God? Whether lifeless faith is a gift of God? OF THE EFFECTS OF FAITH (TWO ARTICLES) Whether fear is an effect of faith? Whether faith has the effect of purifying the heart? OF THE GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING (EIGHT ARTICLES) Whether understanding is a gift of the Holy Ghost? Whether the gift of understanding is compatible with faith? Whether the gift of understanding is merely speculative or also practical? Whether the gift of understanding is in all who are in a state of grace? Whether the gift of understanding is found also in those who have not sanctifying grace? Whether the gift of understanding is distinct from the other gifts? Whether the sixth beatitude, “Blessed are the clean of heart,” etc., responds to the gift of understanding? Whether faith, among the fruits, responds to the gift of understanding? OF THE GIFT OF KNOWLEDGE (FOUR ARTICLES) Whether knowledge is a gift? Whether the gift of knowledge is about Divine things? Whether the gift of knowledge is practical knowledge? Whether the third beatitude, “Blessed are they that mourn,” etc. corresponds to the gift of knowledge? OF UNBELIEF IN GENERAL (TWELVE ARTICLES) Whether unbelief is a sin? Whether unbelief is in the intellect as its subject? Whether unbelief is the greatest of sin? Whether every act of an unbeliever is a sin? Whether there are several species of unbelief? Whether the unbelief of pagans or heathens is graver than other kinds? Whether one ought to dispute with unbelievers in public? Whether unbelievers ought to be compelled to the faith? Whether it is lawful to communicate with unbelievers? Whether unbelievers may have authority or dominion over the faithful? Whether the rites of unbelievers ought to be tolerated? Whether the children of Jews and other unbelievers ought to be baptized against their parents’ will? OF HERESY (FOUR ARTICLES) Whether heresy is a species of unbelief? Whether heresy is properly about matters of faith? Whether heretics ought to be tolerated? Whether the Church should receive those who return from heresy? OF APOSTASY (TWO ARTICLES) Whether apostasy pertains to unbelief?

• From History of the Christian Church: The Complete Set of Eight Volumes (1858)

  9. These views of the middle state in connection with prayers for the dead show a strong tendency to the Roman Catholic doctrine of Purgatory, which afterwards came to prevail in the West through the great weight of St. Augustin and Pope Gregory I. But there is, after all, a considerable difference. The ante-Nicene idea of the middle state of the pious excludes, or at all events ignores, the idea of penal suffering, which is an essential part of the Catholic conception of purgatory. It represents the condition of the pious as one of comparative happiness, inferior only to the perfect happiness after the resurrection. Whatever and wherever Paradise may be, it belongs to the heavenly world; while purgatory is supposed to be a middle region between heaven and hell, and to border rather on the latter. The sepulchral inscriptions in the catacombs have a prevailingly cheerful tone, and represent the departed souls as being "in peace" and "living in Christ," or "in God."1134 The same view is substantially preserved in the Oriental church, which holds that the souls of the departed believers may be aided by the prayers of the living, but are nevertheless "in light and rest, with a foretaste of eternal happiness."1135 Yet alongside with this prevailing belief, there are traces of the purgatorial idea of suffering the temporal consequences of sin, and a painful struggle after holiness. Origen, following in the path of Plato, used the term "purgatorial fire,"1136 by which the remaining stains of the soul shall be burned away; but he understood it figuratively, and connected it with the consuming fire at the final judgment, while Augustin and Gregory I. transferred it to the middle state. The common people and most of the fathers understood it of a material fire; but this is not a matter of faith, and there are Roman divines1137 who confine the purgatorial sufferings to the mind and the conscience. A material fire would be very harmless without a material body. A still nearer approach to the Roman purgatory was made by Tertullian and Cyprian, who taught that a special satisfaction and penance was required for sins committed after baptism, and that the last farthing must be paid (Matt. 5:20) before the soul can be released from prison and enter into heaven. § 157. After Judgment. Future Punishment. The doctrine of the Fathers on future punishment is discussed by Dr. Edward Beecher, l.c., and in the controversial works called forth by Canon Farrar’s Eternal Hope (Five Sermons preached in Westminster Abbey, Nov. 1877. Lond., 1879.) See especially Dr. Pusey: "What is of Faith as to Everlasting Punishment?" A Reply to Dr. Farrar’s Challenge. Oxf. and Lond., second ed. 1880 (284 pages).

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  Yet it is not to be believed that Augustine, by these words, meant that we are able in this life to see God in His essence. We must therefore inquire how, in this life, we see that unchangeable truth, or these eternal ideas, and how judge of them according to it. Augustine allows that truth is in the soul (2 Solil. xix.): wherefore he proves the immortality of the soul from the eternity of truth. Now truth is in the soul not only in the same way as God is said to be in all things by His essence; or as He is in all things by His likeness,—a thing being true so far as it is like to God—for then the soul would not be higher than other things in this respect. It is therefore in the soul in a special way, forasmuch as the soul knows the truth. Accordingly just as the soul and other things are said to be true in their nature, according as they are likened to that supreme nature, which is truth itself, since it is its own being understood by itself; so too, that which is known by the soul, is true so far as it bears a likeness to that divine truth which God knows. Wherefore a gloss on Ps. 11:2, Truths are decayed from among the children of men, says that as a mirror gives many reflections of one face, so are many truths reflected in men’s minds from the first truth. Now although different things are known, and different things believed to be true, by different people, yet some truths there are in which all men agree, such as first principles both of the speculative and of the practical intellect: inasmuch as a kind of image of the divine truth is reflected in the minds of all men. Consequently when a mind knows with certitude anything at all, and by tracing it back to the principles by which we judge of everything, comes to see it in those principles, it is said to see all such things in the divine truth or in the eternal ideas, and to judge of all things according to them. This explanation is confirmed by Augustine’s words (1 Solil. viii.): The speculations of science are seen in the divine truth, even as these visible things are seen in the light of the sun: for it is evident that these things are not seen in the body of the sun, but by the light, which is a likeness of the solar brilliance reflected in the air, and cast upon such bodies. Therefore, from these words of Augustine, we cannot conclude that God is seen in His essence in this life, but only as in a mirror: and to this the Apostle witnesses as regards the knowledge of this life (1 Cor. 13:12): We see now through a glass in a dark manner.

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  The disposition of the orders which is mentioned by Gregory is also reasonable. For since the “Dominations” appoint and order what belongs to the Divine ministrations, the orders subject to them are arranged according to the disposition of those things in which the Divine ministrations are effected. Still, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii), “bodies are ruled in a certain order; the inferior by the superior; and all of them by the spiritual creature, and the bad spirit by the good spirit.” So the first order after the “Dominations” is called that of “Principalities,” who rule even over good spirits; then the “Powers,” who coerce the evil spirits; even as evil-doers are coerced by earthly powers, as it is written (Rom. 13:3,4). After these come the “Virtues,” which have power over corporeal nature in the working of miracles; after these are the “Angels” and the “Archangels,” who announce to men either great things above reason, or small things within the purview of reason. Reply to Objection 1: The angel’s subjection to God is greater than their presiding over inferior things; and the latter is derived from the former. Thus the orders which derive their name from presiding are not the first and highest; but rather the orders deriving their name from their nearness and relation to God. Reply to Objection 2: The nearness to God designated by the name of the “Thrones,” belongs also to the “Cherubim” and “Seraphim,” and in a more excellent way, as above explained. Reply to Objection 3: As above explained ([877]Q[27], A[3]), knowledge takes place accordingly as the thing known is in the knower; but love as the lover is united to the object loved. Now higher things are in a nobler way in themselves than in lower things; whereas lower things are in higher things in a nobler way than they are in themselves. Therefore to know lower things is better than to love them; and to love the higher things, God above all, is better than to know them. Reply to Objection 4: A careful comparison will show that little or no difference exists in reality between the dispositions of the orders according to Dionysius and Gregory. For Gregory expounds the name “Principalities” from their “presiding over good spirits,” which also agrees with the “Virtues” accordingly as this name expressed a certain strength, giving efficacy to the inferior spirits in the execution of the Divine ministrations. Again, according to Gregory, the “Virtues” seem to be the same as “Principalities” of Dionysius. For to work miracles holds the first place in the Divine ministrations; since thereby the way is prepared for the announcements of the “Archangels” and the “Angels.”

• From Fifty Shades of Grey (2011)

  His brow knits. “I told you, I have issues with wasted food. Eat,” he snaps. His eyes are dark, pained. Holy crap. What is that all about? I pick up my fork and eat slowly, trying to chew. I must remember not to put so much on my plate if he’s going to be weird about food. His expression softens as I carefully make my way through my breakfast. I note that he cleans his plate. He waits for me to finish, then he clears my plate. “You cooked, I’ll clear.” “That’s very democratic.” “Yes.” He frowns. “Not my usual style. After I’ve done this, we’ll take a bath.” “Oh, okay.” Oh my… I’d much rather have a shower. My cell rings, interrupting my reverie. It’s Kate. “Hi.” I wander over to the glass doors of the balcony, away from him. “Ana, why didn’t you text last night?” She’s angry. “I’m sorry. I was overtaken by events.” “You’re okay?” “Yes, I’m fine.” “Did you?” She’s fishing for information. I roll my eyes at the expectation in her voice. “Kate, I don’t want to talk over the phone.” Christian glances up at me. “You did… I can tell.” How can she tell? She’s bluffing, and I can’t talk about this. I’ve signed a damned agreement. “Kate, please.” “What was it like? Are you okay?” “I’ve told you I’m okay.” “Was he gentle?” “Kate, please!” I can’t hide my exasperation. “Ana, don’t hold out on me. I’ve been waiting for this day for nearly four years.” “I’ll see you this evening.” I hang up. That is going to be one difficult square to circle. She’s so tenacious, and she wants to know—in detail, and I can’t tell her because I’ve signed a… What was it called? NDA. She’ll freak and rightly so. I need a plan. I head back to watch Christian move gracefully around his kitchen. “The NDA, does it cover everything?” I ask tentatively. “Why?” He turns and gazes at me while putting the Twinings away. “Well, I have a few questions, you know, about sex.” I stare down at my fingers. “And I’d like to ask Kate.” “You can ask me.” “Christian, with all due respect…” My voice fades. I can’t ask you. I’ll get your biased, kinky-as-hell, distorted worldview regarding sex. I want an impartial opinion. “It’s just about mechanics. I won’t mention the Red Room of Pain.” He raises his eyebrows. “Red Room of Pain? It’s mostly about pleasure, Anastasia. Believe me,” he says. “Besides”—his tone is harsher—“your roommate is making the beast with two backs with my brother. I’d really rather you didn’t.” “Does your family know about your…um, predilection?” “No. It’s none of their business.” He saunters toward me until he’s standing in front of me. “What do you want to know?” he asks and, raising his hand, runs his fingers gently down my cheek to my chin, tilting my head back so he can look directly into my eyes.

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  Reply to Objection 3: Evil is twofold. One is a true evil, for the reason that it is incompatible with one’s natural good, and the hatred of such an evil may have priority over the other passions. There is, however, another which is not a true, but an apparent evil, which, namely, is a true and connatural good, and yet is reckoned evil on account of the corruption of nature: and the hatred of such an evil must needs come last. This hatred is vicious, but the former is not. Whether hatred arises from envy?Objection 1: It seems that hatred does not arise from envy. For envy is sorrow for another’s good. Now hatred does not arise from sorrow, for, on the contrary, we grieve for the presence of the evil we hate. Therefore hatred does not arise from envy. Objection 2: Further, hatred is opposed to love. Now love of our neighbor is referred to our love of God, as stated above ([2625]Q[25], A[1];[2626] Q[26], A[2]). Therefore hatred of our neighbor is referred to our hatred of God. But hatred of God does not arise from envy, for we do not envy those who are very far removed from us, but rather those who seem to be near us, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii). Therefore hatred does not arise from envy. Objection 3: Further, to one effect there is one cause. Now hatred is caused by anger, for Augustine says in his Rule that “anger grows into hatred.” Therefore hatred does not arise from envy. On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that “out of envy cometh hatred.” I answer that, As stated above [2627](A[5]), hatred of his neighbor is a man’s last step in the path of sin, because it is opposed to the love which he naturally has for his neighbor. Now if a man declines from that which is natural, it is because he intends to avoid that which is naturally an object to be shunned. Now every animal naturally avoids sorrow, just as it desires pleasure, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vii, x). Accordingly just as love arises from pleasure, so does hatred arise from sorrow. For just as we are moved to love whatever gives us pleasure, in as much as for that very reason it assumes the aspect of good; so we are moved to hate whatever displeases us, in so far as for this very reason it assumes the aspect of evil. Wherefore, since envy is sorrow for our neighbor’s good, it follows that our neighbor’s good becomes hateful to us, so that “out of envy cometh hatred.”

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  Reply to Objection 1: That which is first seized by the intellect is being: wherefore everything that we apprehend we consider as being, and consequently as one, and as good, which are convertible with being. Wherefore we say that essence is being and is one and is good; and that oneness is being and one and good: and in like manner goodness. But this is not the case with specific forms, as whiteness and health; for everything that we apprehend, is not apprehended with the notion of white and healthy. We must, however, observe that, as accidents and non-subsistent forms are called beings, not as if they themselves had being, but because things are by them; so also are they called good or one, not by some distinct goodness or oneness, but because by them something is good or one. So also is virtue called good, because by it something is good. Reply to Objection 2: Good, which is put in the definition of virtue, is not good in general which is convertible with being, and which extends further than quality, but the good as fixed by reason, with regard to which Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) “that the good of the soul is to be in accord with reason.” Reply to Objection 3: Virtue cannot be in the irrational part of the soul, except in so far as this participates in the reason (Ethic. i, 13). And therefore reason, or the mind, is the proper subject of virtue. Reply to Objection 4: Justice has a righteousness of its own by which it puts those outward things right which come into human use, and are the proper matter of justice, as we shall show further on (Q[60], A[2]; [1501]SS, Q[58], A[8]). But the righteousness which denotes order to a due end and to the Divine law, which is the rule of the human will, as stated above (Q[19], A[4]), is common to all virtues. Reply to Objection 5: One can make bad use of a virtue objectively, for instance by having evil thoughts about a virtue, e.g. by hating it, or by being proud of it: but one cannot make bad use of virtue as principle of action, so that an act of virtue be evil. Reply to Objection 6: Infused virtue is caused in us by God without any action on our part, but not without our consent. This is the sense of the words, “which God works in us without us.” As to those things which are done by us, God causes them in us, yet not without action on our part, for He works in every will and in every nature. OF THE SUBJECT OF VIRTUE (SIX ARTICLES)We now have to consider the subject of virtue, about which there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether the subject of virtue is a power of the soul? (2) Whether one virtue can be in several powers? (3) Whether the intellect can be the subject of virtue?

• From The Mating Mind: How Sexual Choice Shaped the Evolution of Human Nature (2000)

  However, in most animals, distinct sexes have evolved. They simply specialize in making DNA packets of different sizes. The female sex evolved to make large packets in which their DNA comes with additional nutrients to give offspring a jump-start to their development. The male sex evolved to make the smallest possible packets in which their DNA is almost naked, contributing no nutrients to their offspring. Females make eggs; males make sperm. The fundamental sex difference is that females invest more nutrient energy in offspring than males. In the early 1970s, biologist Robert Trivers realized that, from this difference in “parental investment,” all else follows. Because eggs cost more for females to make than sperm costs for males, females make fewer eggs than males make sperm. But since each offspring requires only one of each, the rarer type of DNA packet, the egg, becomes the limiting resource. Thus, Trivers argued, it makes sense that males should compete more intensely to fertilize eggs than females do to acquire sperm, and that females should be choosier than males. Males compete for quantity of females, and females compete for quality of males. Trivers’ supply-and-demand logic explained why, in most species, males court and females choose. In female mammals the costs of pregnancy and milk production are especially high, amplifying the difference between male competitiveness and female choosiness. For example, the minimum investment human female ancestors could have made in their offspring would have been a nine-month pregnancy followed by at least a couple of years of breast-feeding. The minimum investment our male ancestors could have made in their offspring would have been a few minutes of copulation and a teaspoonful of semen. (For most male primates, that is not only the minimum, but the average.) Females could have produced a child every three years or so. Males could have produced a child every night, if they could find a willing sexual partner. This theoretical difference often plays out as a practical difference. In hunter-gatherer societies, almost no woman bears more than eight children, whereas highly attractive men often sire a couple of dozen children by different women. Before contraception, a man’s reproductive success would have increased with his number of sexual partners, without limit. Every fertile woman he could seduce represented an extra potential child to carry his genes. But a woman’s reproductive success reached its limit much more quickly. Conception with one partner was enough to keep her reproductively busy for the next three years. One might think that two children should be enough for each man, because that would sustain the population size. But that implies that evolution is for the good of the species, which it is not. The genes of sexually ambitious men would have quickly replaced the genes of men satisfied with just one sexual partner and two children.

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  276. As to the first [189] he uses the following argument: Nature is the principle of motion and change, as is evident from the definition set down in Book II. (But how motion and change differ, will be shown in Book V.) And thus it is evident that if one does not know motion, one does not know nature, since the former [motion] is placed in the definition of the latter [nature]. Since, therefore, we intend to present the science of nature, we must make motion understood. 277. Then [196] he adds certain things which accompany motion. And he employs two sets of reasons [for including them], the first of which is as follows [the second at no. 2778, below]: Whoever determines something, must determine those things which follow upon it—for the subject and its accidents [Properties] are considered in a single science. But the infinite follows upon motion intrinsically, as the following makes plain: Motion is of the number of continuous things, as will be evident below in Book VI (l.6). But “ infinite ” enters into the definition of “ continuum. ” And he [Aristotle] adds “ first of all, ” because the infinite which is found in the addition of number, is caused from the infinite which is in the division of the continuum. And that the infinite enters [first of all] into the definition of the continuum, he shows from the fact that those defining the continuum often use “ infinite ” —as, for example, when they say that the “ continuum ” is that which is ” divisible to infinity. ” And he [Aristotle] says “ often, ” since there is also found another definition of the continuum, which is given in the Predicaments [or Categories]: the “ continuum ” is that “ whose parts are joined at a common boundary. ” Now these two definitions differ. For the continuum, since it is a certain whole, is properly defined through its parts. But parts are compared to the whole in a twofold way, namely, as its components, i.e., according to composition, insofar as the whole is composed out of the parts; and as its resolutes, i.e., according to resolution, insofar as the whole is divided into the parts. The present definition, therefore, of the contintium , is given according to the mode of resolution [division into parts]; while that which is set down in the Predicaments is according to the mode of composition [composition out of parts]. Hence it is clear that the infinite follows upon motion intrinsically. But there are some things which follow upon motion extrinsically, as certain external measures: such as place, and the void, and time. For time is the measure of motion itself; while the measure of the mobile thing is indeed place according to truth, but the void according to the opinion of some. And therefore he adds that motion cannot be without place, the void, and time.