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Confusion

Cognitive unsettling when signals do not resolve into a clear story or next step.

2221 passages · 1 Vela essay · in 1 cluster

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An essay on how this word lives in language, in the tagged corpus, and in figurative art when curators pair passage with image — not a list of stages, not permission to feel.

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Every passage tagged with this emotion in the Vela corpus. Search the body text, narrow by source or register, click through to a book’s profile to see how the passage sits with the rest of the work.

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2221 tagged passages

  • From Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (1990)

    1 SUBJECTS OF SEX/GENDER/DESIRE DOI: 10.4324/9780203824979-1 One is not born a woman, but rather becomes one. —Simone de Beauvoir Strictly speaking, “women” cannot be said to exist. —Julia Kristeva Woman does not have a sex. —Luce Irigaray The deployment of sexuality ... established this notion of sex. —Michel Foucault The category of sex is the political category that founds society as heterosexual. —Monique Wittig I “WOMEN” AS THE SUBJECT OF FEMINISM For the most part, feminist theory has assumed that there is some existing identity, understood through the category of women, who not only initiates feminist interests and goals within discourse, but constitutes the subject for whom political representation is pursued. But politics and representation are controversial terms. On the one hand, representation serves as the operative term within a political process that seeks to extend visibility and legitimacy to women as political subjects; on the other hand, representation is the normative function of a language which is said either to reveal or to distort what is assumed to be true about the category of women. For feminist theory, the development of a language that fully or adequately represents women has seemed necessary to foster the political visibility of women. This has seemed obviously important considering the pervasive cultural condition in which women’s lives were either misrepresented or not represented at all. Recently, this prevailing conception of the relation between feminist theory and politics has come under challenge from within feminist discourse. The very subject of women is no longer understood in stable or abiding terms. There is a great deal of material that not only questions the viability of “the subject” as the ultimate candidate for representation or, indeed, liberation, but there is very little agreement after all on what it is that constitutes, or ought to constitute, the category of women. The domains of political and linguistic “representation” set out in advance the criterion by which subjects themselves are formed, with the result that representation is extended only to what can be acknowledged as a subject. In other words, the qualifications for being a subject must first be met before representation can be extended. Foucault points out that juridical systems of power produce the subjects they subsequently come to represent. 1 Juridical notions of power appear to regulate political life in purely negative terms—that is, through the limitation, prohibition, regulation, control, and even “protection” of individuals related to that political structure through the contingent and retractable operation of choice. But the subjects regulated by such structures are, by virtue of being subjected to them, formed, defined, and reproduced in accordance with the requirements of those structures. If this analysis is right, then the juridical formation of language and politics that represents women as “the subject” of feminism is itself a discursive formation and effect of a given version of representational politics. And the feminist subject turns out to be discursively constituted by the very political system that is supposed to facilitate its emancipation.

  • From The Erotic Engine (2011)

    Though its revenue still comes from erotica, Playboy is far from marginal. Well before Christie Hefner took over the company, Playboy was already a publicly traded, multi-million-dollar operation. Under her leadership, the company moved ever closer to the mainstream, seeking a brand that was sexy in a more publicly consumable way. Playboy faced the inevitable consequence that comes with mainstream legitimacy: increased risk aversion. When you’re answerable to shareholders, you don’t mess around with content that might run afoul of the law, and you don’t experiment with new technologies that demand large investments for questionable payoffs. Playboy would no more be out on the fringes of some experimental medium than NBC or Universal. In some ways, anti-pornography activists and lawmakers actually play a role in keeping the industry at the forefront of technology. Attempts to limit pornography and drive it from the mainstream can inadvertently force it to innovate. Financial and legal suffering sometimes breeds great technology. Of course, this doesn’t stop some pro-pornography activists from advocating movement in the other direction. “Pornography, far from being an evil that the First Amendment must endure, is a positive good that encourages experimentation with new media,” writes American lawyer Peter Johnson in “Pornography Drives Technology,” in the Federal Communications Law Review. “The First Amendment thus has not only intellectual, moral, political, and artistic value, but practical and economic value as well. It urges consenting adults, uninhibited by censorship, to look for novel ways to use the new media and novel ways to make money out of the new uses. Therefore, while it may be politically impossible and socially unwise to encourage computer pornography, legislators should at least leave it alone and let the medium follow where pornography leads.” Ultimately, legislation governing pornography is not based on whether technological development can best be served via greater or lesser freedom; it reflects what society finds acceptable or offensive. It does seem, though, that the porn industry gets more innovative when it is forced to struggle. Legal, cultural or even financial struggles just seem to make the industry stronger. “A primary reason for the profitability of so many online sites is the lack of available outside investment capital,” writes Lewis Perdue in EroticaBiz. “There are no venture capital firms with deep pockets behind adult sites. Most are bootstrapped by small entrepreneurs or built as an extension of an existing print or video porn business. As such, profitability, cost cutting, and serving the customer’s desires have always come first for adult webmasters.”

  • From The John Dominic Crossan Essential Set (Jesus; The Birth of Christianity; The Power of Parable; The Greatest Prayer) (2004)

    The major thematic question running through Chapters 7 to 10 and all four gospel versions as megaparables about Jesus is this: Were attack parables—as distinct from challenge parables—characteristic of the historical Jesus? In this book I concentrate exclusively on parables in the Christian biblical tradition of Old and New Testaments, and you now have a map of the terrain ahead. But there is still one obvious question with which to conclude this Prologue. What is this thing “parable” that we have been discussing? Apart from this type or that type, apart from riddle or example, challenge or attack, what is a parable, all by itself, as it were, before any such distinctions? “The basic challenge of the parable is to write a good story in as short a space as possible” writes Howard Schwartz in the preface to Imperial Messages, his superb collection of one hundred modern parables.* But that definition seems both a little inaccurate and a lot inadequate. Granted that a parable is definitely a story, is it to be recognized only by length and judged only by word count? Is Jesus a famous parabler because—at least in Luke’s Greek—his Good Samaritan had around a hundred words and his Prodigal Son around four hundred? I do not accept brevity as the defining characteristic of a parable. On the one hand, Julius Caesar recorded his victory of 47 BCE at Zela, inland from Turkey’s mid-southern Black Sea coast, with the lapidary Latin Veni, Vidi, Vici —“I came, I saw, I conquered,” but we do not usually think of that as the perfect—because minimalist—parable. On the other, John Bunyan’s Pilgrim’s Progress and Herman Melville’s Moby Dick are certainly very long stories. Yet we think of them as parables. But, even if we accepted brevity as an important characteristic of parabling, is that all we need to identify a parable? Do brevity and narrativity constitute a parable? I propose, instead, to bracket brevity as a possible, but not necessary, characteristic of parable and to define parable as follows: Parable = Metaphoricity + Narrativity A parable—whether it is short, medium-length, or long—is a metaphor expanded into a story, or, more simply, a parable is a metaphorical story . But what is a metaphor, what is a story, and how does their combination as metaphorical story differ from any other type of story—from, say, the novel you have just read or the film you have just seen? Metaphor. The term “metaphor” comes from two Greek roots; one is meta, “over” or “across,” and the other is pherein, “to bear” or “to carry.” Metaphor means “carrying something over” from one thing to another and thereby “seeing something as another” or “speaking of something as another.” Think of a simple, everyday clichéd example: “The clouds are sailing across the sea.” That description is metaphorical, because it sees the blue sky as the blue sea and it sees the white clouds as white-sailed ships.

  • From Banned Books, Burned Books: Forbidden Literary Works

    21. The Textbook Wars Martin who had written a book about Marxism . That embarrassing falsehood could quickly be corrected . However, the deeper questions contained in these arguments over textbooks concern the stories Americans want their children to read to understand both the kind of country that has been and the kind of country that they want to be . Such arguments are about national identity . You could suggest they’re also about the intellectual freedom to question and even to revise the historical and cultural orthodoxies you may have grown up with . READING Collier, Kiah . “Texas Controversial Social Studies Textbooks Under Fire Again .” The Texas Tribune, October 5, 2015 . https://www .texastribune . org/2015/10/05/controversial-social-studies-textbooks-under-fire-/ . Kopplin, Zack . “Was Moses a Founding Father?” The Atlantic Monthly, November 25, 2014 . https://www .theatlantic .com/education/ archive/2014/11/was-moses-a-founding-father/383153/ . Martin, William . “The Guardians Who Slumbereth Not .” Texas Monthly, November 1982 . https://www .texasmonthly .com/news-politics/the- guardians-who-slumbereth-not/ . 182 22 THE BACKLASH AGAINST HARRY POTTER H as there ever been a series that’s inspired as much anticipatory glee among children and young adults (not to mention many adults as well) as the Harry Potter series? It has been anointed as the best-selling fiction series in all of human history, selling more than 500 million copies worldwide . Rowling is the first, and so far the only, author who’s become a billionaire from her books . There have been eight films based on the books, a Broadway play, and two Harry Potter theme parks in the United States . However, as this lecture demonstrates, no book series—or author—is immune to criticism . 183

  • From The Distancing-Embracing model of the enjoyment of negative emotions in art reception (2017)

    (2017)How emotions are made: The secret life of the brain.Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. [GCC] Barrett, L. F. & Bar, M. (2009) See it with feeling: Affective predictions during object perception.Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London B: Biological Sciences364:1325–34. [MN] Barrett, L. F., Gross, J., Christensen, T. C. & Benvenuto, M. (2001) Knowing what you’re feeling and knowing what to do about it: Mapping the relation between emotion differentiation and emotion regulation.Cognition and Emotion 15:713–24. [NFB] Barrett, L. F., Mesquita, B., Ochsner, K. N. & Gross, J. J. (2007) The experience of emotion.Annual Review of Psychology58:373–403. Barrett, L. F., Quigley, K. S., Hamilton, P. (2016) An active inference theory of allostasis and interoception in depression.Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London B: Biological Sciences371(1708):20160011. [RTA] Barrett, L. F. & Wager, T. (2006) The structure of emotion: Evidence from the neuroimaging of emotion.Current Directions in Psychological Science15:79– 85. [MN] References/Menninghaus et al.: The Distancing-Embracing model of the enjoyment of negative emotions in art reception BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES, 40 (2017)51 https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X17000309 Published online by Cambridge University Press

  • From Design, Evaluation, and Analysis of Questionnaires for Survey Research (Wiley Series in Survey Methodology)

    The influence of question and respondent attributes. Sociological Methods and Research, 20, 139–181. Andrews F. M. 1984. Construct validity and error components of survey measures: A structural equation approach. Public Opinion Quarterly, 48, 409–442. Andrews F. M., and S. B. Withey 1974. Developing measures of perceived life quality: Results from several surveys. Social Indicators Research, 1, 1–26. Aquilino W. S. 1993. Effects of spouse presence during the interview on survey responses concerning marriage. Public Opinion Quarterly, 57, 358–376. Aquilino W. S. 1994. Interview mode effects in surveys of drug and alcohol use. Public Opinion Quarterly, 58, 210–240. Aquilino W. S., and L. LoSciuto 1990. Effect of interview mode on self-reported drug use. Public Opinion Quarterly, 54, 362–395. Arminger G., and M. E. Sobel 1991. Pseudo-maximum likelihood estimation of mean and covariance structures with missing data. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 85, 195–203. Bagozzi R. P. 1989. An investigation in the role of affective and moral evaluations in the purposeful behavior model of attitude. British Journal of Social Psychology, 28, 97–113. Bagozzi R. P., and Y. Yi 1991. Multitrait-multimethod matrices in consumer research. Journal of Consumer Research, 17, 426–439. Barker M. 1981. The New Racism: Conservatives and the Ideology of the Tribe. London: Junction Books. Bartelds J. F., E. P Jansen, and Th. H. Joosten 1994. Enquêteren: Het opstellen en gebruiken van vragenlijsten. Groningen: Wolters- Noordhoff. Belson W. 1981. The Design and Understanding of Survey Questions. London: Gower. Bemelmans-Spork M., and D. Sikkel 1986. Data collection with handheld computers. In Proceedings of the International Statistical Institute, 3, Voorburg: International Statistical Institute. Billiet J. G., and J. McClendon 2000. Modelling acquiescence in measurement models for two balanced sets of items. Structural Equation Modeling, 7, 608–629. Billiet J., G. Loosveldt, and L. Waterplas 1986. Het Survey-interview onderzocht: Effecten van het onderwerp en gebruik van vragenlijsten op de kwaliteit van antwoorden. Leuven: Sociologisch Onderzoeksinstituut KU Leuven. Blalock H. M. Jr. 1964. Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Blalock H. M. Jr. 1968. The measurement problem: A gap between languages of theory and research. In H. M. Blalock and A. B. Blalock (eds.), Methodology in the Social Sciences. London: Sage, 5–27. Blalock H. M. Jr. 1990. Auxiliary measurement theories revisited. In J. J. Hox and J. de Jong-Gierveld (eds.), Operationalization and Research Strategy. Amsterdam: Swets and Zeitlinger, 33–49. Blauner R. 1966. Work satisfaction and industrial trends in modern society. In R. Bendix and S. M. Lipset (eds.) Class, Status and Power. New York: The Free Press, 473–487. Bobo L., J. R. Kluegel, and R. A. Smith 1997. Laissez faire racism: The crystallization of a kinder, gentler anti-black ideology. In S. A. Tuch and J. K. Martin (eds.), Racial Attitudes in the 1990’s: Continuity and Change. Westport: Praeger, 76–90. Bollen K. A. 1989. Structural Equations with Latent Variables. New York: Wiley. Bollen K. A., and R. Lennox 1991. Conventional wisdom on measurement: A structural equation perspective. Psychological Bulletin, 110, 305–314.

  • From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

    From the proposition which has now been made clear the argument proceeds as follows: those who ask questions concerning opposites use the term whether, as has been mentioned above. But we use this term in the case of the equal, the large and the small; for we ask whether one thing is more or less than or equal to another. Hence there is some kind of opposition between the equal and the large and the small. But it cannot. be said that the equal is contrary to either the large or the small, because there is no reason why it should be contrary to the large rather than to the small. And again, according to what has been said before, it does not seem that it is contrary to both, because one thing has one contrary. 2062. Again, the equal (860). He now gives the second argument, which runs thus: the equal is contrary to the unequal. But the unequal signifies something belonging to both the large and the small. Therefore the equal is contrary to both. 2063. And this difficulty (861). Then he gives the third argument, and this is based on the opinion of Pythagoras, who attributed inequality and otherness to the number two and to any even number, and identity to an odd number. And the reason is that the equal is opposed to the unequal; but the unequal is proper to the number two; therefore the equal is contrary to the number two. 2064. But it follows (862). Next, he gives two arguments for the opposite opinion. The first is as follows: the large and the small are two things. Therefore, if the equal is contrary to the large and to the small, one is contrary to two. This is impossible, as has been shown above (861:C 2o63). 2065. Further, the equal (863). He now gives the second argument, which runs thus: there is no contrariety between an intermediate and its extremes. This is apparent to the senses, and it is also made clear from the definition of contrariety, because it is complete difference. But whatever is intermediate between any two things is not completely different from either of them, because extremes differ from each other more than from an intermediate. Thus it follows that there is no contrariety between an intermediate and its extremes. But contrariety pertains rather to things which have some intermediate between them. Now the equal seems to be the intermediate between the large and the small. Therefore the equal is not contrary to the large and to the small. Equal, large, small 2066. It follows, then (864).

  • From Amplified Holy Bible (2015)

    God declares a believer to be acquitted (absolved, freed of all charges), then designates the believer to be brought into right standing before Him. l 13:44 Antioch in Pisidia. m 13:51 A symbolic act expressing contempt for a place that had rejected the message of salvation. Acts 14 a 14:2 Lit brethren . b 14:11 An ancient dialect no longer known. c 14:11 Lit having become like humans . d 14:14 This was the customary Jewish response to blasphemy, which in this case was appropriate because the apostles were wrongly being identified as gods. e 14:26 This was the third largest city in the Roman Empire and was part of the province of Galatia. f 14:26 The first missionary journey lasted about eighteen months. Acts 15 a 15:3 Lit brethren . b 15:13 Jesus’ half brother, James, was leader of the church in Jerusalem. c 15:14 This Greek transliteration of Peter’s Hebrew name is also used in 2 Pet 1:1 . d 15:20 Lit the pollutions of idols . e 15:20 For the OT prohibition against eating blood, and the reasons for it, see Lev 17:10–14 . There, in v 13 , hunters are instructed to pour out the blood of an animal before eating it. f 15:21 I.e. the first five books of the OT, Gen through Deut. g 15:32 Lit brethren . h 15:34 Early mss do not contain this v. Acts 16 a 16:9 Northern Greece. b 16:10 At this point Luke (the writer) apparently joined the journey and includes himself in the narrative, speaking in the first person. c 16:13 Apparently there were not enough Jews living in Philippi to establish a synagogue. d 16:14 The first recorded believer in Europe. e 16:14 This was an important and valuable fabric, having great demand, being used on the official toga in Rome and its colonies. f 16:16 Lit a python spirit . In Greek mythology, Python the earth-dragon (serpent goddess), was associated with the oracle at Delphi. g 16:38 Paul was a Roman citizen because he was born in Tarsus (22:28 ), capitol of Cilicia and a city that the emperor Augustus had pronounced “free” because of its support of Rome. Nothing is known of Silas’ family background, but if his name is short for “Silvanus,” it is a Roman name (taken from the god of the forest) and it could be that Silas was also born a Roman citizen. Details on Roman citizenship at that time are sketchy at best, but it is clear from Acts that punishing a citizen without a trial and guilty verdict was illegal, probably involving severe penalties for the magistrates in charge. Also, a Roman citizen charged with a crime had the right to go to Rome and be tried in the emperor’s court (25:9–12 ). Acts 17 a 17:2 Paul had earlier announced that he was turning to the Gentiles (13:46 ), but he nevertheless kept to his practice of speaking to Jews first while focusing primarily on Gentiles.

  • From History of the Christian Church: The Complete Set of Eight Volumes (1858)

    Three routes were chosen by the Crusaders to reach the Holy Land. The first was the overland route by way of the Danube, Constantinople, and Asia Minor. The second, adopted by Philip and Richard in the Third Crusade, was by the Mediterranean to Acre. The route of the last two Crusades, under Louis IX., was across the Mediterranean to Egypt, which was to be made the base of operations from which to reach Jerusalem. § 49. The Call to the Crusades. "the romance Of many colored Life that Fortune pours Round the Crusaders." Wordsworth, Ecclesiastical Sonnets. The call which resulted in the first expedition for the recovery of Jerusalem was made by Pope Urban II. at the Council of Clermont, 1095. Its chief popular advocate was Peter the Hermit. The idea of such a movement was not born at the close of the eleventh century. Gregory VII., appealed to by Michael VII. of Constantinople, had, in two encyclicals, 1074,324 urged the cause upon all Christians, and summoned them to go to the rescue of the Byzantine capital. He reminded them that the pagans had forced their way almost up to the walls of the city and killed many thousands of their brethren like cattle.325 He also repeatedly called attention to the project in letters to the counts of Burgundy and Poitiers and to Henry IV. His ulterior hope was the subjection of the Eastern churches to the dominion of the Apostolic see. In the year 1074 he was able to announce to Henry IV. that fifty thousand Christian soldiers stood ready to take up arms and follow him to the East, but Gregory was prevented from executing his design by his quarrel with the emperor. There is some evidence that more than half a century earlier Sergius IV., d. 1012, suggested the idea of an armed expedition against the Mohammedans who had "defiled Jerusalem and destroyed the church of the Holy Sepulchre." Earlier still, Sylvester II., d. 1003, may have urged the same project.326

  • From Art and Visual Perception: A Psychology of the Creative Eye (1974)

    If, for example, the purpose of a drawing is limited to describing the triangularity of a pyramid as distinguished from the roundness of a cloud, the drawing may show nothing more specific than triangularity vs. roundness. Second, the law of differentiation states that until a visual feature becomes differentiated, the total range of its possibilities will be represented by the structurally simplest among them. For example, I mentioned that the circle, being the simplest of all possible shapes, stands for the totality of all shapes until shape becomes differentiated. It follows that at the stage preceding differentiation, the circle does not yet represent roundness—the saw teeth in Figure 120 are not intended as round—but merely includes roundness in the undifferentiated array of all possible shapes. Only when other shapes, e.g., straight lines or squares, have become articulated, do round shapes begin to stand for roundness: heads, the sun, palms of hands. We can also express this principle by saying, with E. H. Gombrich, that the meaning of a particular visual feature depends on the alternatives considered by the draftsman. A circle is a circle only when triangles are available as an alternative. In this connection it is useful to refer to a distinction made by linguists between marked and unmarked units. As an example John Lyons uses the words “dog” and “bitch.” He says that “dog” is semantically unmarked (or neutral) since it can be applied to either males or females (“that’s a lovely dog you’ve got there: is it a he or a she?”) But “bitch” is marked (or positive) since it is restricted to females. It may be used in contrast with the unmarked word to determine the sense of the latter as negative rather than neutral (“Is it a dog or a bitch?”). Lyons concludes that “the unmarked term has a more general sense, neutral with respect to a certain contrast; its more specific negative sense is derivative and secondary, being a consequence of its contextual opposition with the positive (non-neutral) term.” The parallel to the differentiation of visual shapes is very close. The circle is an unmarked or neutral shape, which stands for any shape at all until it is explicitly opposed to other, marked shapes, such as squares or triangles. In response to their opposition, the circle assumes the specific semantic function of designating roundness. Nevertheless, it still should be called “unmarked” because even amidst the other differentiated shapes, the circle retains a generality and simplicity not found in the others. Only for the purpose of systematic theory can the development of form be presented as a standard sequence of neatly separated steps. It is possible and useful to isolate various phases and to arrange them in order of increasing complexity. However, this ideal sequence corresponds only roughly to what happens in any particular case. Different children will cling to different phases for different periods of time. They may skip some and combine others in individual ways.

  • From Augustine: A New Biography (2005)

    Augustine does not much talk about the impact on his own congregation at Hippo of absorbing the larger church of Donatists down the street. We do not even know how the buildings were managed: Did Augustine move churches to take the new property? Most likely he did, for symbolic reasons, and to gain the larger space. In any event, the congregation Augustine addressed after 411 in Hippo was no longer the loyal remnant of Caecilianists he had started with but now numbered as many of the old Donatists as could stand to face him inside the walls of a church. If Augustine in his later years takes on more and more of the coloring of the African traditional church he had scorned when he was a child, one reason at least for the assimilation was the gravitational pull of all those new faces in the crowd. Nothing suggests there was any violence in Hippo at this point, but nothing we know rules out the possibility. In the far west of Roman Africa, a funeral inscription seems to record a Donatist perspective as late as 434; it memorializes an elderly virgin, the sister of a bishop, who was murdered by traditores in that year and earned the rank of martyr in the process.441 The later history of Christianity in Africa is still strongly marked by the Donatist-Caecilianist controversy. When the Vandals took political control of Africa, they quickly imposed their own brand of Christianity, which others rejected as Arian.442 For a hundred years, until the forces of Justinian destroyed the Vandal kingdom, that brand of Christianity owned the public space in Africa. Victor of Vita, a catholic writer from that period, gives us a lurid history of strife and persecution as the newcomers fought with the old residents. What is unknowable in that history is the extent to which the disruption of traditional loyalties and hierarchies by the putsch against the Donatists, led by Augustine and his friends, weakened the cohesiveness and powers of resistance of African Christianity. When, a century and a half after Justinian, Islam swept across Africa, the last native Christian dominance was washed quickly away. With the oldest and strongest-rooted Christianity in the Latin world eradicated, Italy and Gaul were left the beleaguered heartlands of western Christendom for another hundred years, until the kudzu-like church in Ireland sent its missionaries back to the continent to convert the Germans and to shape up the Frankish church. Did Augustine strike the initial blows that weakened that oldest church in critical ways?

  • From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

    Reply to Objection 1: The constant man, like the brave man, is fearless, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 4), not that he is altogether without fear, but because he fears not what he ought not to fear, or where, or when he ought not to fear. Reply to Objection 2: Sin is the greatest of evils, and consequently a constant man can nowise be compelled to sin; indeed a man should die rather than suffer the like, as again the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 6,9). Yet certain bodily injuries are less grievous than certain others; and chief among them are those which relate to the person, such as death, blows, the stain resulting from rape, and slavery. Wherefore the like compel a constant man to suffer other bodily injuries. They are contained in the verse: “Rape, status, blows, and death.” Nor does it matter whether they refer to his own person, or to the person of his wife or children, or the like. Reply to Objection 3: Although disgrace is a greater injury it is easy to remedy it. Hence fear of disgrace is not reckoned to influence a constant man according to law. Reply to Objection 4: The constant man is not compelled to lie, because at the time he wishes to give; yet afterwards he wishes to ask for restitution, or at least to appeal to the judge, if he promised not to ask for restitution. But he cannot promise not to appeal, for since this is contrary to the good of justice, he cannot be compelled thereto, namely to act against justice. Whether compulsory consent invalidates a marriage?Objection 1: It would seem that compulsory consent does not invalidate a marriage. For just as consent is necessary for matrimony, so is intention necessary for Baptism. Now one who is compelled by fear to receive Baptism, receives the sacrament. Therefore one who is compelled by fear to consent is bound by his marriage. Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1), that which is done on account of mixed violence is more voluntary than involuntary. Now consent cannot be compelled except by mixed violence. Therefore it is not entirely involuntary, and consequently the marriage is valid. Objection 3: Further, seemingly he who has consented to marriage under compulsion ought to be counseled to stand to that marriage; because to promise and not to fulfill has an “appearance of evil,” and the Apostle wishes us to refrain from all such things (1 Thess 5:22). But that would not be the case if compulsory consent invalidated a marriage altogether. Therefore, etc. On the contrary, A Decretal says (cap. Cum locum, De sponsal. et matrim.): “Since there is no room for consent where fear or compulsion enters in, it follows that where a person’s consent is required, every pretext for compulsion must be set aside.” Now mutual contract is necessary in marriage. Therefore, etc.

  • From Quit: The Power of Knowing When to Walk Away (2022)

    Essentially, regardless of the history they have with the decision, they ask themselves, “If I were approaching this decision fresh, would I want to enter into this course of action?” As an example, imagine you own a stock that’s trading for less than the amount you bought it for. In other words, you’re in the losses. You would ask yourself, “If I were looking at this as a new opportunity, would I be a buyer or a seller?” If you would make a fresh decision to buy the stock, you would continue to hold it (because holding means you continue to own the stock, meaning it is the same as buying). If you wouldn’t buy the stock, then you would sell it. Does this Jedi mind trick actually work? We can, once again, look to Barry Staw for the answer. In one of the follow-ups to the “Big Muddy” experiment, Itamar Simonson and Staw asked participants to make a corporate decision about allocating marketing funds to two products, a nonalcoholic beer and a lite beer. The first decision was, again, an all-or-nothing choice of which product should receive an additional $3 million in marketing support. After making their choice and receiving a simulation of three years of results based on that choice, the participants made a second decision as to how to split another $10 million marketing budget between the two products. The investigators tested several possible ways of mitigating escalation of commitment to the product that received the initial $3 million in marketing funds. One of those ways was the Jedi mind trick, where they asked some of the participants to approach the decision fresh, specifically instructing them to do an analysis listing the pros and cons of allocating funds to each product going forward. Despite the instruction to look forward rather than backward when making this new decision, the participants made a similar allocation ($5.1 million) to the product they earmarked the original funds to as compared to those who made the same prior, losing decision but were not given instruction to just look forward. In contrast, participants who actually came to the second allocation fresh gave just $3.7 million to the product that lost money after receiving the earlier addition of marketing funds. The instruction to treat it as a new decision did practically nothing to reduce escalation of commitment. Just knowing about the sunk cost effect doesn’t help. The Jedi mind trick doesn’t help. That’s a lot of bad news about sunk cost. It’s about time we get to the good news. Chapter 5 Summary The sunk cost effect is a cognitive illusion where people take into account resources they have previously sunk into an endeavor when making decisions about whether to continue and spend more. The sunk cost effect causes people to stick in situations that they ought to be quitting.

  • From The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion (2012)

    Carter, C. S. 1998. “Neuroendocrine Perspectives on Social Attachment and Love.” Psychoneuroendocrinology 23:779–818. Chan, W. T. 1963. A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Choi, J.-K., and S. Bowles. 2007. “The Coevolution of Parochial Altruism and War.” Science 318:636–40. Churchill, W. 2003. On the Justice of Roosting Chickens: Reflections on the Consequences of U.S. Imperial Arrogance and Criminality. Oakland, CA: AK Press. Clark, G. 2007. A Farewell to Alms: A Brief Economic History of the World. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Clarke, R. A. 2004. Against All Enemies: Inside America’s War on Terror. New York: Free Press. Cleckley, H. 1955. The Mask of Sanity. St. Louis, MO: Mosby. Clore, G. L., N. Schwarz, and M. Conway. 1994. “Affective Causes and Consequences of Social Information Processing.” In Handbook of Social Cognition, ed. R. S. Wyer and T. K. Srull, 1:323–417. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Cochran, G., and H. Harpending. 2009. The 10,000 Year Explosion: How Civilization Accelerated Human Evolution. New York: Basic Books. Cohen, E. E. A., R. Ejsmond-Frey, N. Knight, and R. I. M. Dunbar. 2009. “Rowers’ High: Behavioral Synchrony Is Correlated With Elevated Pain Thresholds.” Biology Letters 6:106–8. Coleman, J. S. 1988. “Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital.” American Journal of Sociology 94:S95–S120. Converse, P. E. 1964. “The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics.” In Ideology and Discontent, ed. D. E. Apter, 206–61. New York: Free Press. Conze, E. 1954. Buddhist Texts Through the Ages. New York: Philosophical Library. Cosmides, L., and J. Tooby. 2005. “Neurocognitive Adaptations Designed for Social Exchange.” In The Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology, ed. D. M. Buss, 584–627. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons. ______. 2006. “Evolutionary Psychology, Moral Heuristics, and the Law.” In Heuristics and the Law, ed. G. Gigerenzer and C. Engel, 175–205. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Coulter, A. 2003. Treason: Liberal Treachery from the Cold War to the War on Terrorism. New York: Crown. Dalai Lama XIV. 1999. Ethics for the New Millennium. New York: Riverhead Books. Damasio, A. 1994. Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain. New York: Putnam. ______. 2003. Looking for Spinoza. Orlando, FL: Harcourt. Darwin, C. 1998/1871. The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books. Dawkins, R. 1976. The Selfish Gene. New York: Oxford University Press. ______. 1999/1982. The Extended Phenotype: The Long Reach of the Gene. New York: Oxford University Press. ______. 2006. The God Delusion. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Decety, J. 2011. “The Neuroevolution of Empathy.” Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 1231:35–45. De Dreu, C. K., L. L. Greer, M. J. Handgraaf, S. Shalvi, G. A. Van Kleef, M. Baas, et al. 2010. “The Neuropeptide Oxytocin Regulates Parochial Altruism in Intergroup Conflict Among Humans.” Science 328:1408–11. De Dreu, C. K., L. L. Greer, G. A. Van Kleef, S. Shalvi, and M. J. Handgraaf. 2011. “Oxytocin Promotes Human Ethnocentrism.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 108:1262–66.

  • From the social construction of reality (1966)

    Some individuals “inhabit” the transmitted universe more definitely than others. Even among the more or less accredited “inhabitants,” there will always be idiosyncratic variations in the way they conceive of the universe. Precisely because the symbolic universe cannot be experienced as such in everyday life, but transcends the latter by its very nature, it is not possible to “teach” its meaning in the straightforward manner in which one can teach the meanings of everyday life. Children’s questions about the symbolic universe have to be answered in a more complicated way than their questions about the institutional realities of everyday life. The questions of idiosyncratic adults require further conceptual elaboration. In the previous example, the meaning of cousinhood is continually represented by flesh-and-blood cousins playing cousin roles in the experienced routines of everyday life. Human cousins are empirically available. Divine cousins, alas, are not. This constitutes an intrinsic problem for the pedagogues of divine cousinhood. Mutatis mutandis , the same is true of the transmission of other symbolic universes. This intrinsic problem becomes accentuated if deviant versions of the symbolic universe come to be shared by groups of “inhabitants.” In that case, for reasons evident in the nature of objectivation, the deviant version congeals into a reality in its own right, which, by its existence within the society, challenges the reality status of the symbolic universe as originally constituted. The group that has objectivated this deviant reality becomes the carrier of an alternative definition of reality. 81 It is hardly necessary to belabor the point that such heretical groups posit not only a theoretical threat to the symbolic universe, but a practical one to the institutional order legitimated by the symbolic universe in question. The repressive procedures customarily employed against such groups by the custodians of the “official” definitions of reality need not concern us in this context. What is important for our considerations is the need for such repression to be legitimated, which, of course, implies the setting in motion of various conceptual machineries designed to maintain the “official” universe against the heretical challenge. Historically, the problem of heresy has often been the first impetus for the systematic theoretical conceptualization of symbolic universes. The development of Christian theological thought as a result of a series of heretical challenges to the “official” tradition provides excellent historical illustrations for this process. As in all theorizing, new theoretical implications within the tradition itself appear in the course of this process, and the tradition itself is pushed beyond its original form in new conceptualizations. For instance, the precise Christological formulations of the early church councils were necessitated not by the tradition itself but by the heretical challenges to it.

  • From Available: The unfiltered and empowering new memoir for women about sex, dating and divorce after 40 (2021)

    Chapter 3: Looking for Men, Everywhere Chapter 4: Never Come Between a Man and His Dog Chapter 5: The Grief Game Chapter 6: A Question of Availability Chapter 7: Homemade Chapter 8: A Hug Won’t Fix This Chapter 9: Comfort Zone Chapter 10: Mama Bear Chapter 11: Busted Chapter 12: This Must Be Bad Chapter 13: The Only Way Out Is Through Chapter 14: Almost There Chapter 15: Breaking Point Chapter 16: Cookie Crumbs Chapter 17: Easy Access Chapter 18: Green Hulk Sauce Chapter 19: ‘Help Wanted’ Chapter 20: Number Four (and a Half) Chapter 21: Another White Girl with Curly Hair Chapter 22: Sunshine and Roses Chapter 23: Strut of Success Chapter 24: Every Five Minutes Chapter 25: Hot Potato Chapter 26: Outlook Chapter 27: Instincts Chapter 28: An Older Man Chapter 29: Saturday Night, Legs Up Chapter 30: Plurals Chapter 31: Dollar Store Candles Chapter 32: Hair Removal 101 Chapter 33: Definitely Not a Good Morning Chapter 34: Onward Chapter 35: Thanksgiving Chapter 36: Restoration of Faith Chapter 37: Slimegate Chapter 38: Laura’s Liberation Tour Chapter 39: Confessions Chapter 40: Bald Monkeys Chapter 41: G-spot Chapter 42: Lemonade Chapter 43: Passionfruit Chapter 44: Lost Condoms Chapter 45: Another Confession Chapter 46: Writing Chapter 47: Authorship Afterword Acknowledgements About the Author About the Publisher IntroductionIn February 2018, I discovered that my husband was having an affair. We had been together for 27 years, and I believed we would be together into our golden years. I envisioned us jockeying to be the first to hold our grandbabies when they were brought to visit us and reading the Sunday Times together with a pair of reading glasses we would pass back and forth. That we would not be married forever had not so much as crossed my mind, nor had I ever had a fleeting concern that he would have an affair. We loved each other deeply and truly and his tendency to think like an absent-minded professor seemed likely to preclude him from being able to organize and sustain such a thing as an affair anyway. We were young when we started dating – I had just turned 20 and a few weeks after we started dating he turned 21. Up to that point my dating and sexual experience had been limited. My best friend and I had been desperate to lose our virginity the summer before our senior year of high school and I succeeded a few weeks after she did, on the plaid pull-out sofa in the basement of my family’s house in the suburbs of New York. I had wanted to understand the allure of sex and why certain girls I knew had a sophisticated swagger. I was dating a boy named Rob who was home from art school for the summer and drove a yellow school bus for the camp at which I was a counselor.

  • From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

    Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says in the same book: “Christ is the head of all His disciples who are members of His body. Consequently, when they put into writing what He showed forth and said to them, by no means must we say that He wrote nothing: since His members put forth that which they knew under His dictation. For at His command they, being His hands, as it were, wrote whatever He wished us to read concerning His deeds and words.” Reply to Objection 2: Since the old Law was given under the form of sensible signs, therefore also was it fittingly written with sensible signs. But Christ’s doctrine, which is “the law of the spirit of life” (Rom. 8:2), had to be “written not with ink, but with the Spirit of the living God; not in tables of stone, but in the fleshly tables of the heart,” as the Apostle says (2 Cor. 3:3). Reply to Objection 3: Those who were unwilling to believe what the apostles wrote of Christ would have refused to believe the writings of Christ, whom they deemed to work miracles by the magic art. OF THE MIRACLES WORKED BY CHRIST, IN GENERAL (FOUR ARTICLES)We must now consider the miracles worked by Christ: (1) In general; (2) Specifically, of each kind of miracle; (3) In particular, of His transfiguration. Concerning the first, there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether Christ should have worked miracles? (2) Whether He worked them by Divine power? (3) When did He begin to work miracles? (4) Whether His miracles are a sufficient proof of His Godhead? Whether Christ should have worked miracles?Objection 1: It would seem that Christ should not have worked miracles. For Christ’s deeds should have been consistent with His words. But He Himself said (Mat. 16:4): “A wicked and adulterous generation seeketh after a sign; and a sign shall not be given it, but the sign of Jonas the prophet.” Therefore He should not have worked miracles. Objection 2: Further, just as Christ, at His second coming, is to come “with” great power and majesty, as is written Mat. 24:30, so at His first coming He came in infirmity, according to Is. 53:3: “A man of sorrows and acquainted with infirmity.” But the working of miracles belongs to power rather than to infirmity. Therefore it was not fitting that He should work miracles in His first coming. Objection 3: Further, Christ came that He might save men by faith; according to Heb. 12:2: “Looking on Jesus, the author and finisher of faith.” But miracles lessen the merit of faith; hence our Lord says (Jn. 4:48): “Unless you see signs and wonders you believe not.” Therefore it seems that Christ should not have worked miracles. On the contrary, It was said in the person of His adversaries (Jn. 11:47): “What do we; for this man doth many miracles?”

  • From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

    On the contrary, It is written (Eph. 2:8,9): “By grace you are saved through faith, and that not of yourselves . . . that no man may glory . . . for it is the gift of God.” I answer that, Two things are requisite for faith. First, that the things which are of faith should be proposed to man: this is necessary in order that man believe anything explicitly. The second thing requisite for faith is the assent of the believer to the things which are proposed to him. Accordingly, as regards the first of these, faith must needs be from God. Because those things which are of faith surpass human reason, hence they do not come to man’s knowledge, unless God reveal them. To some, indeed, they are revealed by God immediately, as those things which were revealed to the apostles and prophets, while to some they are proposed by God in sending preachers of the faith, according to Rom. 10:15: “How shall they preach, unless they be sent?” As regards the second, viz. man’s assent to the things which are of faith, we may observe a twofold cause, one of external inducement, such as seeing a miracle, or being persuaded by someone to embrace the faith: neither of which is a sufficient cause, since of those who see the same miracle, or who hear the same sermon, some believe, and some do not. Hence we must assert another internal cause, which moves man inwardly to assent to matters of faith. The Pelagians held that this cause was nothing else than man’s free-will: and consequently they said that the beginning of faith is from ourselves, inasmuch as, to wit, it is in our power to be ready to assent to things which are of faith, but that the consummation of faith is from God, Who proposes to us the things we have to believe. But this is false, for, since man, by assenting to matters of faith, is raised above his nature, this must needs accrue to him from some supernatural principle moving him inwardly; and this is God. Therefore faith, as regards the assent which is the chief act of faith, is from God moving man inwardly by grace. Reply to Objection 1: Science begets and nourishes faith, by way of external persuasion afforded by science; but the chief and proper cause of faith is that which moves man inwardly to assent. Reply to Objection 2: This argument again refers to the cause that proposes outwardly the things that are of faith, or persuades man to believe by words or deeds. Reply to Objection 3: To believe does indeed depend on the will of the believer: but man’s will needs to be prepared by God with grace, in order that he may be raised to things which are above his nature, as stated above ([2347]Q[2] , A[3]).

  • From Augustine: A New Biography (2005)

    391. Mend. 13.23.392. Frend, The Donatist Church.393. Epp. 56–57.394. Ep. 139.395. Ep. 58.396. This is how I read Ep. 112 (to Donatus) and Ep. 89 (to Festus).397. Ep. 66, see C. litt. Petil. 2.83.184.398. Ep. 52.399. Mor. 1.1.1, 1.34.75; cf. from the same period, Ep. 21.2.400. So in Ep. 10.2 he speaks favorably for himself and Nebridius of “becoming gods [godlike] in retirement” by contrast to the busy distraction of clergy.401. Julian has not yet found a suitably skeptical biographer. The best scholarly study is G. Bowersock, Julian the Apostate (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1978), but Gore Vidal’s novel Julian (Boston, 1964) is a very responsible, if partisan, attempt to do justice to the facts of his career.402. C. litt. Pet. 2.83.184.403. The word denotes a woman uprooted from her family and social situation to a committed life of celibate religious observance. “Nun” is the closest English equivalent.404. Ep. 35.4.405. Ep. 44.5.12.406. Ep. 93.5.17. On Augustine’s attitudes, see P. Brown, “Saint Augustine’s Attitude to Religious Coercion,” Journal of Roman Studies 54(1964) 107–16; R.A. Markus, Saeculum 133–53.407. Ep. 185.8.33.408. Epp. 33, 34, 35.409. Ep. 108.5.14.410. Ep. 108.6.18.411. En. Ps. 54.20.412. S. 46.15.413. Ep. 185.1.1.414. Ep. 44.5.6.415. Ep. 93.5.17.416. Ep. 185.9.35, Io. ev. tr. 6.25, where Augustine is very disingenuous in claiming to have no interest in property. He makes the argument there that since property was given to the church (when it was given to a Donatist bishop), it is appropriate for the true church to take it over.417. Ep. 20.3 (to a layman, Antoninus): probably the first mention of Donatism in Augustine’s surviving works.418. Ep. 23.419. That particular Donatist, Maximinus of Siniti, may be identical with a Maximinus who turns up in Ep. 105.4 around the year 407 or later, converted to Caecilianism.420. Ep. 33.2.421. C. litt. Pet. 2.38.90.422. En. Ps. 21.s.2.31.423. Epp. 43–44.424. Ep. 53.425. Brown 405 is keen-eyed on this difference between the law of 405 and the later, more successfully coercive, decision of 411. If any one of these failed attempts at suppression had been the last, we would now inherit a history of heroic persistence and victory over cruel government persecutors.426. Ep. 185.27 quoted; cf. C. Cresc. 3.43.47.427. One modern reader suggests this was a dungheap, but perhaps he was too mindful of the similar landing place for persecuted officials in the “defenestration of Prague” of 1618.428. Ep. 105.2.3–4.429. Frend 269–74.430. Augustine and Possidius mention the event repeatedly: S. Guelf. 28.7–8, Ench. 17, Possidius Vita 12.2; recently discovered: S. Dolbeau 26.45. Usually dated to about 410, with the new Dolbeau sermon it may more likely be placed in 403 (see Lancel 407).431. Coll. Carth. 1.142.432. S. 359.433. Ep. 173.1–4.434. S. Guelf. 28.435. Ep. 185.3.12.436. Ibid.437. Brown 420, Frend 296; Ep. 204 to Dulcitius.438. Ep. 204.5–6, instancing 2 Maccabees 14.37–46.439. Augustine makes a point of bringing up the same biblical story to refute in C. Gaud.

  • From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

    But if someone say that it is not natural to the soul to be united to the body, he must give the reason why it is united to a body. And the reason must be either because the soul so willed, or for some other reason. If because the soul willed it—this seems incongruous. First, because it would be unreasonable of the soul to wish to be united to the body, if it did not need the body: for if it did need it, it would be natural for it to be united to it, since “nature does not fail in what is necessary.” Secondly, because there would be no reason why, having been created from the beginning of the world, the soul should, after such a long time, come to wish to be united to the body. For a spiritual substance is above time, and superior to the heavenly revolutions. Thirdly, because it would seem that this body was united to this soul by chance: since for this union to take place two wills would have to concur—to wit, that of the incoming soul, and that of the begetter. If, however, this union be neither voluntary nor natural on the part of the soul, then it must be the result of some violent cause, and to the soul would have something of a penal and afflicting nature. This is in keeping with the opinion of Origen, who held that souls were embodies in punishment of sin. Since, therefore, all these opinions are unreasonable, we must simply confess that souls were not created before bodies, but are created at the same time as they are infused into them. Reply to Objection 1: God is said to have rested on the seventh day, not from all work, since we read (Jn. 5:17): “My Father worketh until now”; but from the creation of any new genera and species, which may not have already existed in the first works. For in this sense, the souls which are created now, existed already, as to the likeness of the species, in the first works, which included the creation of Adam’s soul. Reply to Objection 2: Something can be added every day to the perfection of the universe, as to the number of individuals, but not as to the number of species. Reply to Objection 3: That the soul remains without the body is due to the corruption of the body, which was a result of sin. Consequently it was not fitting that God should make the soul without the body from the beginning: for as it is written (Wis. 1:13, 16): “God made not death . . . but the wicked with works and words have called it to them.” OF THE PROPAGATION OF MAN AS TO THE BODY (TWO ARTICLES)We now consider the propagation of man, as to the body. Concerning this there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether any part of the food is changed into true human nature?