Realization

Passages

Every passage tagged with this emotion in the Vela corpus. Search the body text, narrow by source or register, click through to a book’s profile to see how the passage sits with the rest of the work.

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• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  I answer that, It belongs to persons in positions of dignity to govern subjects. Now to govern is to move certain ones to their due end: thus a sailor governs his ship by steering it to port. But every mover has a certain excellence and power over that which is moved. Wherefore, a person in a position of dignity is an object of twofold consideration: first, in so far as he obtains excellence of position, together with a certain power over subjects: secondly, as regards the exercise of his government. In respect of his excellence there is due to him honor, which is the recognition of some kind of excellence; and in respect of the exercise of his government, there is due to him worship, consisting in rendering him service, by obeying his commands, and by repaying him, according to one’s faculty, for the benefits we received from him. Reply to Objection 1: Worship includes not only honor, but also whatever other suitable actions are connected with the relations between man and man. Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([3160]Q[80]), debt is twofold. One is legal debt, to pay which man is compelled by law; and thus man owes honor and worship to those persons in positions of dignity who are placed over him. The other is moral debt, which is due by reason of a certain honesty: it is in this way that we owe worship and honor to persons in positions of dignity even though we be not their subjects. Reply to Objection 3: Honor is due to the excellence of persons in positions of dignity, on account of their higher rank: while fear is due to them on account of their power to use compulsion: and to the exercise of their government there is due both obedience, whereby subjects are moved at the command of their superiors, and tributes, which are a repayment of their labor. Whether observance is a greater virtue than piety?Objection 1: It seems that observance is a greater virtue than piety. For the prince to whom worship is paid by observance is compared to a father who is worshiped by piety, as a universal to a particular governor; because the household which a father governs is part of the state which is governed by the prince. Now a universal power is greater, and inferiors are more subject thereto. Therefore observance is a greater virtue than piety. Objection 2: Further, persons in positions of dignity take care of the common good. Now our kindred pertain to the private good, which we ought to set aside for the common good: wherefore it is praiseworthy to expose oneself to the danger of death for the sake of the common good. Therefore observance, whereby worship is paid to persons in positions of dignity, is a greater virtue than piety, which pays worship to one’s kindred.

• From The John Dominic Crossan Essential Set (Jesus; The Birth of Christianity; The Power of Parable; The Greatest Prayer) (2004)

  You would think from that formulation that Peter (Cephas) was more important than James at that time, at least from Paul’s point of view. The second visit is much more significant and took place, if Paul is dating both events from his conversion, in 49: Then after fourteen years I went up again to Jerusalem with Barnabas, taking Titus along with me….But even Titus, who was with me, was not compelled to be circumcised, though he was a Greek … and when James and Cephas and John, who were acknowledged pillars, recognized the grace that had been given to me, they gave to Barnabas and me the right hand of fellowship, agreeing that we should go to the Gentiles, and they to the circumcised. They asked only one thing, that we remember the poor [pt [image "image" file=Image00029.jpg] ch [image "image" file=Image00029.jpg] n] , which was actually what I was eager to do. (Galatians 2:1,3, 9, 10) At issue was whether male Christian pagans had to be circumcised at conversion, and Titus was a visual aid for the negative viewpoint. There were Christian Jews, termed “false brethren” by Paul in Galatians 2:4, with an affirmative viewpoint, but they were not supported by the leaders, now named with James in first place. Since God’s Law was not a menu from which one could pick and choose, how could that have been justified? Only in a context of apocalyptic consummation, as Paula Fredriksen has shown: “What place, if any, do Gentiles have in such a kingdom? We can cluster the material around two poles. At the negative extreme, the nations are destroyed, defeated, or in some way subjected to Israel….At the positive extreme, the nations participate in Israel’s redemption. The nations will stream to Jerusalem and worship the God of Jacob together with Israel” (1991:544–545). Gentiles will no ledger be pagans, but neither will they have to become Jews. “When God establishes his Kingdom, then, these two groups will together constitute ‘This people’; Israel, redeemed from exile, and the Gentiles, redeemed from idolatry. Gentiles are saved as Gentiles: they do not, eschatologically, become Jews’ (1991:547). You can, however, sense a tension even within that more benign program for spiritual conversion rather than physical extermination. Gentiles do not become Jews, but neither do they remain pagans. What is a nonpagan Gentile? What minimally or maximally must those pagans do? And who decides? At the Jerusalem Council, in any case, the immediate question of male Gentile circumcision was resolved. But a far greater one was created, because there was now a double mission, one to Jews led by Peter and one to pagans led by Barnabas and Paul. That would have worked well if Jews and pagans had lived in completely isolated enclaves. And if only Christian Jews preached to Jews and Christian pagans to pagans. It was magnificent as apocalyptic idealism. But how would it work as practical program?

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  276. As to the first [189] he uses the following argument: Nature is the principle of motion and change, as is evident from the definition set down in Book II. (But how motion and change differ, will be shown in Book V.) And thus it is evident that if one does not know motion, one does not know nature, since the former [motion] is placed in the definition of the latter [nature]. Since, therefore, we intend to present the science of nature, we must make motion understood. 277. Then [196] he adds certain things which accompany motion. And he employs two sets of reasons [for including them], the first of which is as follows [the second at no. 2778, below]: Whoever determines something, must determine those things which follow upon it—for the subject and its accidents [Properties] are considered in a single science. But the infinite follows upon motion intrinsically, as the following makes plain: Motion is of the number of continuous things, as will be evident below in Book VI (l.6). But “ infinite ” enters into the definition of “ continuum. ” And he [Aristotle] adds “ first of all, ” because the infinite which is found in the addition of number, is caused from the infinite which is in the division of the continuum. And that the infinite enters [first of all] into the definition of the continuum, he shows from the fact that those defining the continuum often use “ infinite ” —as, for example, when they say that the “ continuum ” is that which is ” divisible to infinity. ” And he [Aristotle] says “ often, ” since there is also found another definition of the continuum, which is given in the Predicaments [or Categories]: the “ continuum ” is that “ whose parts are joined at a common boundary. ” Now these two definitions differ. For the continuum, since it is a certain whole, is properly defined through its parts. But parts are compared to the whole in a twofold way, namely, as its components, i.e., according to composition, insofar as the whole is composed out of the parts; and as its resolutes, i.e., according to resolution, insofar as the whole is divided into the parts. The present definition, therefore, of the contintium , is given according to the mode of resolution [division into parts]; while that which is set down in the Predicaments is according to the mode of composition [composition out of parts]. Hence it is clear that the infinite follows upon motion intrinsically. But there are some things which follow upon motion extrinsically, as certain external measures: such as place, and the void, and time. For time is the measure of motion itself; while the measure of the mobile thing is indeed place according to truth, but the void according to the opinion of some. And therefore he adds that motion cannot be without place, the void, and time.

• From How Propaganda Works (2015)

  But this does not compromise the objectivity of my analysis. I suspect that there would be no avoiding the resources I develop in any investigation of ideology, even if it were directed at my own. This chapter has been in the service of explaining what Tamar Gendler calls the “unavoidable cognitive consequences” of being a member of a society that “violates one’s normative ideals.” 43 She marshals psychological evidence in favor of the claim that “either you will need to deliberately restrict your attention or experience so as not to encode certain sorts of genuine regularities … [o]r you will need to engage in … rationalization, changing your normative ideals to accord with the relevant sorts of experienced regularity (for example, by coming to endorse the legitimacy of these stereotypical associations).” I have sketched in some detail the processes by which this occurs. My focus in the next chapter is to complete the book’s argument for equality. It is worthwhile to be clear about its structure. We began this book with Martin Delany’s argument that failures of equality of attainment lead to failures of equal respect by causing the false belief that those who control less of the resources are inferior (as well as loss of self-respect by the negatively privileged groups). 44 But the book’s argument against inequality is not that failures of equal respect and the undermining of the self-respect are a moral harm (which they no doubt are). It is rather that the beliefs that enable these moral harms are particularly democratically problematic, because such beliefs make antidemocratic demagoguery effective. The beliefs that tend to arise in conditions of stark inequality, such as belief in the inferiority of other groups, or one’s own, tend to undermine democratic ideals, such as reasonableness. It is natural to think that the perspectives of inferior beings, or those less worthy of equality, are not reasonable perspectives. But this too is not the book’s argument against inequality, or not exactly. The argument is rather that such ideological beliefs occlude the unreasonable nature of certain claims, institutions, and policies. If there are social injustices, a policy seeking to address them is reasonable. But it will be treated as unreasonable, in a society committed to an ideology that there are no social injustices. Claims that contribute to injustice will fail to be recognized as such. In short, demagoguery will be effective. My goal is to develop the best version of this argument. I am less concerned with defending a reaction to its conclusion. I have argued that this argument has a lengthy philosophical tradition as an objection to democracy. Given the inevitability of certain kinds of inequality, say, due to the fact of disability or differences in natural capacities, one can understand its lengthy philosophical history as an antidemocratic argument. But it also can be taken as an argument that democracy should seek to minimize even material inequalities.

• From History of the Christian Church: The Complete Set of Eight Volumes (1858)

  But up to the time of Augustine the doctrine had never been an object of any very profound inquiry, and had therefore never been accurately defined, but only very superficially and casually touched. The Greek fathers, and Tertullian, Ambrose, Jerome, and Pelagius, had only taught a conditional predestination, which they made dependent on the foreknowledge of the free acts of men. In this, as in his views of sin and grace, Augustine went far beyond the earlier divines, taught an unconditional election of grace, and restricted the purpose of redemption to a definite circle of the elect, who constitute the minority of the race.1856 In Augustine’s system the doctrine of predestination is not, as in Calvin’s, the starting-point, but the consummation. It is a deduction from his views of sin and grace. It is therefore more practical than speculative. It is held in check by his sacramental views. If we may anticipate a much later terminology, it moves within the limits of infralapsarianism, but philosophically is less consistent than supralapsarianism. While the infralapsarian theory, starting with the consciousness of sin, excludes the fall—the most momentous event, except redemption, in the history of the world—from the divine purpose, and places it under the category of divine permission, making it dependent on the free will of the first man; the supralapsarian theory, starting with the conception of the absolute sovereignty of God, includes the fall of Adam in the eternal and unchangeable plan of God, though, of course, not as an end, or for its own sake (which would be blasphemy), but as a temporary means to an opposite end, or as the negative condition of a revelation of the divine justice in the reprobate, and of the divine grace in the elect. Augustine, therefore, strictly speaking, knows nothing of a double decree of election and reprobation, but recognizes simply a decree of election to salvation; though logical instinct does sometimes carry him to the verge of supralapsarianism. In both systems, however, the decree is eternal, unconditioned, and immutable; the difference is in the subject, which, according to one system, is man fallen, according to the other, man as such. It was a noble, inconsistency which kept Augustine from the more stringent and speculative system of supralapsarianism; his deep moral convictions revolted against making any allowance for sin by tracing its origin to the divine will; and by his peculiar view of the inseparable connection between Adam and the race, he could make every man as it were individually responsible for the fall of Adam. But the Pelagians, who denied this connection, charged him with teaching a kind of fatalism. The first sin, according to Augustine’s theory, was an act of freedom, which could and should have been avoided. But once committed, it subjected the whole race, which was germinally in the loins of Adam, to the punitive justice of God.

• From The Prophetic Imagination (1978)

  It is mind-boggling to think of the public expression of hope as a way of subverting the dominant royal embrace of despair. I am not talking about optimism or development or evolutionary advances but rather about promises made by one who stands distant from us and over against us but remarkably for us . Speech about hope cannot be explanatory and scientifically argumentative; rather, it must be lyrical in the sense that it touches the hopeless person at many different points. More than that, however, speech about hope must be primally theological, which is to say that it must be in the language of covenant between a personal God and a community. Promise belongs to the world of trusting speech and faithful listening. It will not be reduced to the “cool” language of philosophy or the private discourse of psychology. It will finally be about God and us, about his faithfulness that vetoes our faithlessness. Those who would be prophetic will need to embrace that absurd practice and that subversive activity. The urging to bring hope to public expression is based on a conviction about believing folks. It is premised on the capacity to evoke and bring to expression the hope that is within us (see 1 Pet 3:15). It is there within and among us, for we are ordained of God to be people of hope. It is there by virtue of our being in the image of the promissory God. It is sealed there in the sacrament of baptism. It is dramatized in the Eucharist—“until he come.” It is the structure of every creed that ends by trusting in God’s promises. Hope is the decision to which God invites Israel, a decision against despair, against permanent consignment to chaos (Isa 45:18), oppression, barrenness, and exile. Hope is the primary prophetic idiom not because of the general dynamic of history or because of the signs of the times but because the prophet speaks to a people who, willy-nilly, are God’s people. Hope is what this community must do because it is God’s community invited to be in God’s pilgrimage. And as Israel is invited to grieve God’s grief over the ending, so Israel is now invited to hope in God’s promises. That very act of hope is the confession that we are not children of the royal consciousness. Of course prophetic hope easily lends itself to distortion. It can be made so grandiose that it does not touch reality; it can be trivialized so that it does not impact reality; it can be “bread and circuses” so that it only supports and abets

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  4. Sin in man admits of expiation, because man’s choice is not immovably fixed on its object, but may be perverted from good to evil, and from evil brought back to good; and the like is the case of man’s reason, which, gathering the truth from sensible appearances and signs, can find its way to either side of a conclusion. But an angel has a fixed discernment of things through simple intuition; and as he is fixed in his apprehension, so is he fixed also in his choice. Hence he either does not take to evil at all; or if he does take to evil, he takes to it irrevocably, and his sin admits of no expiation. Since then the expiation of sin was the chief cause of the Incarnation, it was more fitting for human nature than for angelic nature to be assumed by God. 7. Though all created good is a small thing, compared with the divine goodness, still there can be nothing greater in creation than the salvation of the rational creature, which consists in the enjoyment of that divine goodness. And since the salvation of man has followed from the Incarnation of God, it cannot be said that that Incarnation has brought only slight profit to the world. Nor need all men be saved by the Incarnation, but they only who by faith and the sacraments of faith adhere to the Incarnation.

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  2046. He says, then, that privation “ is found either in a determinate potency, ” i.e., one with a capacity for possessing something, or at least “ is conceived along with something that is susceptible of it, ” i.e., along with a subject, even though it has no capacity for possessing something. This would be the case, for example, if we were to say that a word is invisible, or that a stone is dead. 2047. (~) Contradiction, then, cannot have an intermediate, whereas in a sense (+) privation has an intermediate; for everything must be either equal or not equal, whether it is a being or a non-being. However, it is not necessary to say that everything is either equal or unequal, but this is necessary only in the case of something that is susceptible of equality. 2048. Hence the opposition of contradiction has no intermediate whatsoever, whereas the opposition of privation has no intermediate in a determinate subject; but it is not without an intermediate in an absolute sense. And from this it is evident that contrariety, which is such as to have an intermediate, is closer to privation than to contradiction. Yet it still does not follow that privation is the same as contrariety. 2049. If, then, the processes (852). Third, it remains to be shown that contrariety is privation, and in regard to this he does two things. First, he shows by a syllogism that contrariety is privation. He argues as follows: everything from which a process of generation arises is either a form (i.e., the possession of some form) or the privation of some specifying principle (i.e., some form). He says “ everything ” because generation is twofold. For things are generated absolutely in the genus of substance, but in a qualified sense in the genus of accidents; for generations arise from contraries in matter. Hence it is evident that every contrariety is a privation; for if in any process of generation one of the two extremes is a privation, and each of the contraries is an extreme in the process of generation (because contraries are generated from each other, as white from black and black from white), then one of the two contraries must be a privation. 2050. But perhaps (853). Here he proves another assertion made above, that not every privation is a contrariety. He says that the reason for this is that there are many ways of being deprived; for a thing that is capable of having a form and does not have it in any way can be said to be deprived of it, and it makes no difference whether it is proximately or remotely disposed for that form.

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  JEROME. And built a tower therein, that is, the Temple, of which it is said by Micah, And thou, O cloudy tower of the daughter of Sion. (Mic. 4:8.) HILARY. Or, The tower is the eminence of the Law, which ascended from earth to heaven, and from which, as from a watch-tower, the coming of Christ might be spied. And let it out to husbandmen. PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. When, that is, Priests and Levites were constituted by the Law, and undertook the direction of the people. And as an husbandman, though he offer to his Lord of his own stock, does not please him so much as by giving him the fruit of his own vineyard; so the Priest does not so much please God by his own righteousness, as by teaching the people of God holiness; for his own righteousness is but one, but that of the people manifold. And went into a far country. JEROME. Not a change of place, for God, by whom all things are filled, cannot be absent from any place; but He seems to be absent from the vineyard, that He may leave the vine-dressers a freedom of acting. CHRYSOSTOM. Or, it applies to His long-suffering, in that He did not always bring down immediate punishment on their sins.

• From The John Dominic Crossan Essential Set (Jesus; The Birth of Christianity; The Power of Parable; The Greatest Prayer) (2004)

  The author of the Cross Gospel , or of any other gospel, did not say this: I know that the Roman authorities crucified Jesus, but I will blame the Jewish authorities; I will play the Roman card; I will write propaganda that I know is inaccurate. If they had done that, the resulting text would have been a lie. No matter how weak the gospel writers were, or how threatened their existence, such a tactic would not have been apologetics and polemics; it would have been libel and lie. That intuition helped me understand how the Cross Gospel was composed. But it helped me understand as well the continuing nature of the passion-resurrection tradition. That tradition, in my view, developed from the Cross Gospel basis and is a single genetic stream of transmission. No gospel written after the war of 66–73/74 C.E. is willing to leave the Romans totally guiltless, as did the Cross Gospel . No matter what Pilate thinks, he supplies the soldiers for the crucifixion. Mark blames the “crowd” in Jerusalem, Matthew blames “all the people,” and John blames “the Jews.” As Christian Jewish communities are steadily more alienated from their fellow Jews, so the “enemies” of Jesus expand to fit those new situations. By the time of John in the 90s, those enemies are “the Jews”—that is, all those other Jews except us few right ones. If we had understood gospel, we would have understood that. If we had understood gospel, we would have expected that. It is, unfortunately, tragically late to be learning it. CHAPTER 26EXEGESIS, LAMENT, AND BIOGRAPHYCould one suggest that women, whose involvement with the dead body is an intimate one (in most societies it is women who tend the dying, wash the corpse and dress it) need no heightened retelling of the stories of death to comprehend its reality or to quicken their emotional response? They move from experience to art, from tears to ideas. Men, whose experience of death is, in many traditional societies, less physical, in that they do not tend the dying or handle the corpse except when they kill one another (a situation which demands a particular relationship to the dead-as-enemy) must re-read death in art or play in order to experience it. The movement, in this case, might be seen as the obverse of women’s lamentation, one that progresses from ideas to tears. Gail Holst-Warhaft, Dangerous Voices , p. 22 Here is the argument so far. There is a consecutive and canonically independent passion-resurrection story, the Cross Gospel , within the Gospel of Peter . Its present form derives from the Jerusalem community in the early 40s. Its central theme of Jewish authorities versus Jewish people concerning Jesus’ passion-resurrection is the story presumed by the heirs of that Jerusalem community about a century later in the Ascents of James from Recognitions 1.41–43.

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  11. Preachers have no right to consort with persons of bad character, if there is danger that the vices of such persons may be attributed to them also, and if their preaching may, for this reason, fall into discredit. St. Gregory says: “If a man’s conduct is despised, his preaching will be contemned.” The Gloss speaks in like manner. If, however, preachers, without losing their own reputation, make friends with men of bad character in order to reform them, it is a praiseworthy act. It is done in imitation of our Lord. For we read in Matt. ix. 11, “The scribes and Pharisees said to his disciples: why does your Master eat with publicans and sinners? “The Gloss observes that Christ, by so doing, “gave His disciples an example of mercy.” But if sinners do not esteem it a favour that the preachers of the Gospel should consort with them, the fault lies with them, not with the preachers, 12. If those who preach the Word accept from their hearers the necessities of life, they do not sell the Gospel. For, as we have already said, material gain is not their primary motive in preaching. The Gloss, on the words: “let the priests that rule well” (1 Tim. v.), remarks: “Good and faithful dispensers of the Word ought not to attain heavenly glory only, but likewise earthly honour that so they may not have cause for sadness.” Again, “Alms are given from charity, and accepted through necessity. Nevertheless the Gospel is not venal. It is not preached in exchange for earthly goods. They who proclaim it do so for the sake of eternal happiness. For, were they to sell so great a treasure, they would show that they held it in contempt. Let preachers then, accept from the people as a necessity the means of existence, and let them receive from the Lord the reward of their labours. For they do not regard the alms of the faithful as a recompense or a motive for their work. Their ministry is one of love. They accept what is given them as a stipend whereby they may procure the supplies which are necessary to enable them to continue their labours.” 13. Although there might have been some appearance of evil in the conduct of the Apostles if they had taken alms from the Gentiles to whom they preached the Faith, and if they had thereby introduced a new custom, it cannot now be considered disedifying if preachers accept alms from the faithful. For this custom is sanctioned by the Gospel; and those to whom charity is given need it not for superfluities, but for the necessities of life. It is evident also that religious do not preach for the sake of gain; for the alms that they receive are far inferior in amount to the worldly possessions which they renounced for the love of Christ.

• From The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion (2012)

  Zhong has also shown the reverse process: immorality makes people want to get clean. People who are asked to recall their own moral transgressions, or merely to copy by hand an account of someone else’s moral transgression, find themselves thinking about cleanliness more often, and wanting more strongly to cleanse themselves.26 They are more likely to select hand wipes and other cleaning products when given a choice of consumer products to take home with them after the experiment. Zhong calls this the Macbeth effect, named for Lady Macbeth’s obsession with water and cleansing after she goads her husband into murdering King Duncan. (She goes from “A little water clears us of this deed” to “Out, damn’d spot! out, I say!”) In other words, there’s a two-way street between our bodies and our righteous minds. Immorality makes us feel physically dirty, and cleansing ourselves can sometimes make us more concerned about guarding our moral purity. In one of the most bizarre demonstrations of this effect, Eric Helzer and David Pizarro asked students at Cornell University to fill out surveys about their political attitudes while standing near (or far from) a hand sanitizer dispenser. Those told to stand near the sanitizer became temporarily more conservative.27 Moral judgment is not a purely cerebral affair in which we weigh concerns about harm, rights, and justice. It’s a kind of rapid, automatic process more akin to the judgments animals make as they move through the world, feeling themselves drawn toward or away from various things. Moral judgment is mostly done by the elephant. 4. PSYCHOPATHS REASON BUT DON’T FEELRoughly one in a hundred men (and many fewer women) are psychopaths. Most are not violent, but the ones who are commit nearly half of the most serious crimes, such as serial murder, serial rape, and the killing of police officers.28 Robert Hare, a leading researcher, defines psychopathy by two sets of features. There’s the unusual stuff that psychopaths do—impulsive antisocial behavior, beginning in childhood—and there are the moral emotions that psychopaths lack. They feel no compassion, guilt, shame, or even embarrassment, which makes it easy for them to lie, and to hurt family, friends, and animals. Psychopaths do have some emotions. When Hare asked one man if he ever felt his heart pound or stomach churn, he responded: “Of course! I’m not a robot. I really get pumped up when I have sex or when I get into a fight.”29 But psychopaths don’t show emotions that indicate that they care about other people. Psychopaths seem to live in a world of objects, some of which happen to walk around on two legs. One psychopath told Hare about a murder he committed while burglarizing an elderly man’s home:

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  THEOPHYLACT. While they were contending among themselves above concerning priority, He saith, It is not a time of dignities, but rather of danger and slaughter. Behold I even your Master am led to a disgraceful death, to be reckoned with the transgressors. For these things which are prophesied of Me have an end, that is, a fulfilment. Wishing then to hint at a violent attack, He made mention of a sword, not altogether revealing it, lest they should be seized with dismay, nor did He entirely provide that they should not be shaken by these sudden attacks, but that afterwards recovering, they might marvel how He gave Himself up to the Passion, a ransom for the salvation of men. BASIL. (Reg. Brev. int. 31.) Or the Lord does not bid them carry purse and scrip and buy a sword, but predicts that it should come to pass, that in truth the Apostles, forgetful of the time of the Passion, of the gifts and law of their Lord, would dare to take up the sword. For often does the Scripture make use of the imperative form of speech in the place of prophecy. Still in many books we do not find, Let him take, or buy, but, he will take, he will buy. THEOPHYLACT. Or He hereby foretels to them that they would incur hunger and thirst, which He implies by the scrip, and sundry kinds of misery, which he intends by the sword. CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Or else; When our Lord says, He who hath a purse, let him take it, likewise a scrip, His discourse He addressed to His disciples, but in reality He regards every individual Jew; as if He says, If any Jew is rich in resources, let him collect them together and fly. But if any one oppressed with extreme poverty applies himself to religion, let him also sell his cloak and buy a sword. For the terrible attack of battle shall overtake them, so that nothing shall suffice to resist it. He next lays open the cause of these evils, namely, that He suffered the penalty due to the wicked, being crucified with thieves. And when it shall have come at last to this, the word of dispensation will receive its end. But to the persecutors shall happen all that has been foretold by the Prophets. These things then God prophesied concerning what should befall the country of the Jews, but the disciples understood not the depth of His words, thinking they had need of swords against the coming attack of the traitor. Whence it follows; But they said, Lord, behold, here are two swords. CHRYSOSTOM. And in truth, if He wished them to use human aid, not a hundred swords would have sufficed; but if He willed not the assistance of man, even two are superfluous.

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  Reply to Objection 2: The consequent result which aggravates a sin was already present in the act as in its cause; wherefore when the sin was committed, its degree of gravity was already complete, and no further guilt accrued to it when the result took place. Nevertheless some accidental punishment accrues to it, in the respect of which the damned will have the more motives of regret for the more evils that have resulted from their sins. It is in this sense that Jerome [*Basil] speaks. Hence there is not need for contrition to be for other than past sins. Whether a man ought to have contrition for another’s sin?Objection 1: It would seem that a man ought to have contrition for another’s sin. For one should not ask forgiveness for a sin unless one is contrite for it. Now forgiveness is asked for another’s sin in Ps. 18:13: “From those of others spare thy servant.” Therefore a man ought to be contrite for another’s sins. Objection 2: Further, man is bound, ought of charity, to love his neighbor as himself. Now, through love of himself, he both grieves for his ills, and desires good things. Therefore, since we are bound to desire the goods of grace for our neighbor, as for ourselves, it seems that we ought to grieve for his sins, even as for our own. But contrition is nothing else than sorrow for sins. Therefore man should be contrite for the sins of others. On the contrary, Contrition is an act of the virtue of penance. But no one repents save for what he has done himself. Therefore no one is contrite for others’ sins. I answer that, The same thing is crushed [conteritur] which hitherto was hard and whole. Hence contrition for sin must needs be in the same subject in which the hardness of sin was hitherto: so that there is no contrition for the sins of others. Reply to Objection 1: The prophet prays to be spared from the sins of others, in so far as, through fellowship with sinners, a man contracts a stain by consenting to their sins: thus it is written (Ps. 17:27): “With the perverse thou wilt be perverted.” Reply to Objection 2: We ought to grieve for the sins of others, but not to have contrition for them, because not all sorrow for past sins is contrition, as is evident for what has been said already. Whether it is necessary to have contrition for each mortal sin?Objection 1: It would seem that it is not necessary to have contrition for each mortal sin. For the movement of contrition in justification is instantaneous: whereas a man cannot think of every mortal sin in an instant. Therefore it is not necessary to have contrition for each mortal sin.

• From Cults Inside Out: How People Get In and Can Get Out (2014)

  Remember that a destructive cult cannot be all bad and that there may have been some positive aspects or associations linked to cultic involvement. Time in the group or under the undue influence of a leader may have produced some positive changes, developments, or realizations. It’s important for those who are concerned not to make sweeping generalizations and needlessly negative comments. Destructive cults prey on and exploit human frailties and emotions to fulfill their needs. Those hoping to help former cult members must recognize their fragility and be sensitive to their situation. Don’t be critical of spirituality, idealism, or some form of awareness. The stated goals and ideals of the group may have been laudable despite the bad behavior. No one willingly joins a “cult” or volunteers to be abused and exploited. People are essentially tricked into cultic involvement. Don’t try to convince or convert a former cult member regarding a certain set of beliefs. Respect individual expression and the personal process of discovery. Each former cult member must begin to make his or her own choices, free of coercive persuasion and undue influence. As the surveys indicate, many cult members may take some time redeveloping their critical-thinking skills and beginning to think independently again. Likewise, their ability to tolerate ambiguity may slowly return. No one can reasonably expect an instant, overnight transformation after departing from a cultic situation. Placing pressure on former cult members to speed up the process is also unwise. As Conway and Siegelman noted, the longer a person has been in a destructive cult, the longer it may take him or her to sort things out and regain his or her past cognitive abilities. This may also depend on the severity of the group or leader. Some groups called “cults” are more destructive than others. Conway and Siegelman found that this was true depending upon the degree of personal involvement and the level of destructive behavior and control within a particular group. Because there are so few support groups devoted to the issue of cult involvement, simply reading books on the subject of cults and thought reform may be easier. It is also possible to gather historical information about cults and their coercive persuasion techniques through the World Wide Web. Understanding the common elements of deception, coercive persuasion, and undue influence inherently present in destructive cults may help to sort through postcult issues and serve to assuage unreasonable fears, ease stress, and reduce anxiety. The family and friends of a former cult member may also require help understanding cultic influence to better cope with someone who has recently ended such a situation. Again, this can be accomplished through a similarly focused educational process, which includes reading helpful books about cults and relevant research. Much like a former cult member who is coming to terms with the broader context of his or her involvement by learning about how cults affect others, family and friends can also benefit by broadening their knowledge base in regard to this subject.

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  BEDE. The mystical meaning I suppose is this, that at the coming in of the Gentiles all Israel shall be saved, (Rom. 11:26.) and that then the abundant grace of the Spirit will be poured out upon the teachers. CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 43. in Act.) He says then to them that stood by, Take from him the pound, because it is not the part of a wise man to punish, but he needs some one else as the minister of the judge in executing punishment. For even God does not Himself inflict punishment, but through the ministry of His angels. AMBROSE. Nothing is said of the other servants, who like wasteful debtors lost all that they had received. By those two servants who gained by trading, are signified that small number, who in two companies were sent as dressers of the vineyard; by the remainder all the Jews. It follows, And they said unto him, Lord, he has ten pounds. And lest this should seem unjust, it is added, For to every one that hath, it shall be given. THEOPHYLACT. For seeing that he gained ten, by multiplying his pound tenfold, it is plain that by having more to multiply, he would be an occasion of greater gain to his Lord. But from the slothful and idle, who stirs not himself to increase what he has received, shall be taken away even that which he possesses, that there may be no gap in the Lord’s account when it is given to others and multiplied. But this is not to be applied only to the words of God and teaching, but also to the moral virtues; for in respect of these also, God sends us His gracious gifts, endowing one man with fasting, another with prayer, another with mildness or humility; but all these so long as we watch strictly over ourselves we shall multiply, but if we grow cold we shall extinguish. He adds of His adversaries, But those mine enemies who would not that I should reign over them, bring them hither, and slay them before me. AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Whereby He describes the ungodliness of the Jews who refused to be converted to Him. THEOPHYLACT. Whom he will deliver to death, casting them into the outer fire. But even in this world they were most miserably slain by the Roman army. CHRYSOSTOM. These things are of force against the Marcionists. For Christ also says, Bring hither my enemies, and slay them before me. (Mat. 21:41). Whereas they say Christ indeed is good, but the God of the Old Testament evil. Now it is plain that both the Father and the Son do the same things. For the Father sends His army to the vineyard, and the Son causes His enemies to be slain before Him.

• From Reading Like a Writer: A Guide for People Who Love Books and for Those Who Want to Write Them (2006)

  All along, Patty had been unaware that time is as adhesive as love, and that the more time you spend with someone the greater the likelihood of finding yourself with a permanent sort of thing to deal with that people casually refer to as “friendship,” as if that were the end of the matter, when the truth is that even if “your friend” does something annoying, or if you and “your friend” decide that you hate each other, or if “your friend” moves away and you lose each other’s address, you still have a friendship, and although it can change shape, look different in different lights, become an embarrassment or an encumbrance or a sorrow, it can’t simply cease to have existed, no matter how far into the past it sinks, so attempts to disavow or destroy it will not merely constitute betrayals of friendship but, more practically, are bound to be fruitless, causing damage only to the humans involved rather than to that gummy jungle (friendship) in which those humans have entrapped themselves, so if sometime in the future you’re not going to want to have been a particular person’s friend, or if you’re not going to want to have had the particular friendship you and that person can make with one another, then don’t be friends with that person at all, don’t talk to that person, don’t go anywhere near that person, because as soon as you start to see something from that person’s point of view (which, inevitably, will be as soon as you stand next to that person) common ground is sure to slide under your feet. Yet another stylized and unique third-person voice—a voice that suggests the vocabulary and cadence of a highly educated, slightly batty, and neurotic child—narrates Jane Bowles’s Two Serious Ladies. Here, that voice is describing the behavior of children, but its tone will not alter much as the novel goes on to describe the tremulous forays into adult life attempted by Christina and her friends. Note how the voice keeps veering back and forth between high diction (“generally of a religious nature”) and a kind of childish plain speech (that very in “very sunny afternoon”); it’s also as if the narrator has not yet learned what an adult (let alone an omniscient one) is supposed to say and not say, for instance the reference to the fatness of little Christina’s legs: (Christina) was in the habit of going through many mental struggles—generally of a religious nature—and she preferred to be with other people and organize games. These games, as a rule, were very moral, and often involved God. However, no one else enjoyed them and she was obliged to spend a great part of the day alone... One very sunny afternoon Sophie went inside for her piano lesson, and Mary remained seated on the grass.... Christina...took off her shoes and stockings and remained in a short white underslip.

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  2. The second likeness is taken from spiritual conversion. Samuel promised Saul that he should be changed and have spiritual life. In this conversion or change the same four things are to be considered, namely, the container and the contained, the worker and the work. For in the state of sin our outward man is fair and pleasant; but our inward man is sick, being full of poison and the bitterness of sin. Thus when a man is converted by the Spirit of God, though the outward body remain the same, the inward bitterness and weakness of sin are changed into the health and sweetness of grace. The first, that is, the outward species of the body, remains; the second, that is, the bitterness of sin, passes into the fourth, namely, the sweetness of grace: and this is done by the third, that is to say, by the Spirit of God. So it comes about, as has been said before, in the consecration of our Lord’s Body. To one converted Eugenius says, ‘How great and how worthy of praise are those benefits which are worked by the might of the goodness of God! It ought not to be to you a new and impossible thing that earthly things are changed into the Body of Christ. You have only to look at yourself, and you will see that though, laying aside past wickedness, you have been suddenly clothed with new goodness, yet nothing has been added to the outside, but all the change is inward.’

• From Amplified Holy Bible (2015)

  18 “Was there no one found to return and to give thanks and praise to God, except this foreigner?” 19 Jesus said to him, “Get up and go [on your way]. Your faith [your personal trust in Me and your confidence in God’s power] has restored you to health.” 20 Now having been asked by the Pharisees when the kingdom of God would come, He replied, “The kingdom of God is not coming with signs to be observed or with a visible display; 21 nor will people say, ‘Look! Here it is!’ or, ‘There it is!’ For the kingdom of God is among you [because of My presence].” Second Coming Foretold 22 Then He said to the disciples, “The time will come when you will long to see [even] one of the days of the Son of Man, and you will not see it. 23 “They will say to you, ‘Look [the Messiah is] there!’ or ‘Look [He is] here!’ Do not go away [to see Him], and do not run after them. 24 “For just like the lightning, when it flashes out of one part d of the sky, gives light to the other part e of the sky, so [visible] will the Son of Man be in His day. 25 “But first He must suffer many things and be repudiated and rejected and considered unfit [to be the Messiah] by this [unbelieving] generation. 26 “And just as it was in the days of Noah, so it will be in the f time of [the second coming of] the Son of Man: 27 the people were g eating, they were drinking, they were marrying, they were being given in marriage, [they were indifferent to God] until the day that Noah went into the ark, and the flood came and destroyed them all. [Gen 6:5–8 ; 7:6–24 ] 28 “It was the same as it was in the days of Lot. People were eating, they were drinking, they were buying, they were selling, they were planting, they were building [carrying on business as usual, without regard for their sins]; 29 but on the [very] day that Lot left Sodom it rained fire and brimstone (burning sulfur) from heaven and destroyed them all. 30 “It will be just the same on the day that the Son of Man is revealed. [Gen 18:20–33 ; 19:24 , 25 ] 31 “On that day, whoever is on the housetop, with his belongings in the house, must not come down [and go inside] to take them out; and likewise whoever is in the field must not turn back. 32 “Remember [what happened to] Lot’s wife [when she looked back]! [Gen 19:26 ] 33 “Whoever seeks to save his h life will [eventually] lose it [through death], and whoever loses his life [in this world] will keep it [from the consequences of sin and separation from God].

• From The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion (1967)

  Men forget. They must, therefore, be reminded over and over again. Indeed, it may be argued that one of the oldest and most important prerequisites for the establishment of culture is the institution of such “reminders,” the terribleness of which for many centuries is perfectly logical in view of the “forgetfulness” that they were designed to combat (13). Religious ritual has been a crucial instrument of this process of “reminding.” Again and again it “makes present” to those who participate in it the fundamental reality-definitions and their appropriate legitimations. The farther back one goes historically, the more does one find religious ideation (typically in mythological form) embedded in ritual activity—to use more modern terms, theology embedded in worship. A good case can be made that the oldest religious expressions were always ritual in character (14). The “action” of a ritual (the Greeks called this its ergon or “work”—from which, incidentally, our word “orgy” is derived) typically consists of two parts—the things that have to be done (dromena) and the things that have to be said (legoumena). The performances of the ritual are closely linked to the reiteration of the sacred formulas that “make present” once more the names and deeds of the gods. Another way of putting this is to say that religious ideation is grounded in religious activity, relating to it in a dialectical manner analogous to the dialectic between human activity and its products discussed earlier in a broader context. Both religious acts and religious legitimations, ritual and mythology, dromena and legoumena, together serve to “recall” the traditional meanings embodied in the culture and its major institutions. They restore ever again the continuity between the present moment and the societal tradition, placing the experiences of the individual and the various groups of the society in the context of a history (fictitious or not) that transcends them all. It has been rightly said that society, in its essence, is a memory (15). It may be added that, through most of human history, this memory has been a religious one.