Pride

Passages

Every passage tagged with this emotion in the Vela corpus. Search the body text, narrow by source or register, click through to a book’s profile to see how the passage sits with the rest of the work.

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• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  Whether the vow of obedience is the chief of the three religious vows?Objection 1: It would seem that the vow of obedience is not the chief of the three religious vows. For the perfection of the religious life was inaugurated by Christ. Now Christ gave a special counsel of poverty; whereas He is not stated to have given a special counsel of obedience. Therefore the vow of poverty is greater than the vow of obedience. Objection 2: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 26:20) that “no price is worthy of a continent soul.” Now the vow of that which is more worthy is itself more excellent. Therefore the vow of continence is more excellent than the vow of obedience. Objection 3: Further, the greater a vow the more indispensable it would seem to be. Now the vows of poverty and continence “are so inseparable from the monastic rule, that not even the Sovereign Pontiff can allow them to be broken,” according to a Decretal (De Statu Monach., cap. Cum ad monasterium): yet he can dispense a religious from obeying his superior. Therefore it would seem that the vow of obedience is less than the vow of poverty and continence. On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxxv, 14): “Obedience is rightly placed before victims, since by victims another’s flesh, but by obedience one’s own will, is sacrificed.” Now the religious vows are holocausts, as stated above ([3799]AA[1],3, ad 6). Therefore the vow of obedience is the chief of all religious vows. I answer that, The vow of obedience is the chief of the three religious vows, and this for three reasons. First, because by the vow of obedience man offers God something greater, namely his own will; for this is of more account than his own body, which he offers God by continence, and than external things, which he offers God by the vow of poverty. Wherefore that which is done out of obedience is more acceptable to God than that which is done of one’s own will, according to the saying of Jerome (Ep. cxxv ad Rustic Monach.): “My words are intended to teach you not to rely on your own judgment”: and a little further on he says: “You may not do what you will; you must eat what you are bidden to eat, you may possess as much as you receive, clothe yourself with what is given to you.” Hence fasting is not acceptable to God if it is done of one’s own will, according to Is. 58:3, “Behold in the day of your fast your own will is found.” Secondly, because the vow of obedience includes the other vows, but not vice versa: for a religious, though bound by vow to observe continence and poverty, yet these also come under obedience, as well as many other things besides the keeping of continence and poverty.

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xliii. 3) Then after being so reviled, all that He says to vindicate His glory, is, But I honour My Father: as if to say, That you may not think Me arrogant, I tell you, I have One, Whom I honour. THEOPHYLACT. He honoured the Father, by revenging Him, and not suffering murderers or liars to call themselves the true sons of God. ORIGEN. (tom. xx. 29.) Christ alone honoured the Father perfectly. No one, who honours any thing which is not honoured by God, honours God. GREGORY. (Hom. xliii. 3) As all who have zeal toward God are liable to meet with dishonour from wicked men, our Lord has Himself set us an example of patience under this trial; And ye do dishonour Me. AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xliii. 3) As if to say, I do my duty: ye do not do yours. ORIGEN. (tom. xx. 29.) And this was not addressed to them only, but to all who by unrighteous deeds inflict injury upon Christ, who is righteousness; or by scoffing at wisdom wrong Him who is wisdom: and the like. GREGORY. (ut sup.) How we are to take injuries, He shews us by His own example, when He adds, I seek not Mine own glory, there is one that seeketh and judgeth. CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lv. 1) As if to say, I have told you thish on account of the honour which I have for My Father; and for this ye dishonour Me. But I concern not myself for your reviling: ye are accountable to Him, for whose sake I undergo it. ORIGEN. (tom. xx. s. 30.) God seeks Christ’s glory, in every one of those who receive Him: which glory He finds in those who cultivate the seeds of virtue implanted in them. And those in whom He finds not His Son’s glory, He punishes: There is one that seeketh and judgeth. AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xliii. 4) Meaning of course the Father. But how is it then that He says in another place, The Father judgeth no man, but hath committed all judgment unto the Son. (c. 5:22) Judgment is sometimes put for condemnation, whereas here it only stands for trial: as if to say, There is one, even My Father, who distinguishes My glory from yours; ye glory after this world, I not after this world. The Father distinguishes the glory of the Son, from that of all men: for that He has been made man, does not bring us to a comparison with Him. We men have sin: He was without sin, even when He was in the form of a servant; for, as the Word which was in the beginning, who can speak worthily of Him? ORIGEN. (tom. xx. 31.[Nic.]) Or thus; If that is true which our Saviour says below, All men are thine, (c. 17:10) it is manifest that the judgment itself of the Son, is the Father’s.

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  In the Blessed Virgin Mary, however, the lower powers were not so completely subject to reason as never to experience any movement not preordained by reason. Yet they were so restrained by the power of grace that they were at no time aroused contrary to reason. Because of this we usually say that after the Blessed Virgin was sanctified concupiscence remained in her according to its substance, but that it was shackled. CHAPTER 225 PERPETUAL VIRGINITY OF CHRIST’S MOTHERIf Mary was thus strengthened against every movement of sin by her first sanctification, much more did grace grow in her and much more was concupiscence weakened or even completely uprooted in her, when the Holy Spirit came upon her, according to the angel’s word, to form of her the body of Christ. After she had been made the shrine of the Holy Spirit and the tabernacle of the Son of God, we may not believe that there was ever any inclination to sin in her, or that she ever experienced any pleasurable feeling of carnal concupiscence. And so we must view with revulsion the error of Helvidius who, while admitting that Christ was conceived and born of the Virgin, asserted that she later bore other sons to Joseph. Certainly this error finds no support in Matthew’s statement that Joseph “knew her not” namely, Mary, “till she brought forth her first-born Son” (Matt. 1:25); as though he knew her after she gave birth to Christ. The word “till” in this text does not signify definite time but indicates indeterminate time. Sacred Scripture frequently asserts with emphasis that something was done or not done up to a certain time, as long as the issue could remain in doubt. Thus we read in Psalm 109:1: “Sit at my right hand until I make your enemies your footstool.” There could be some doubt whether Christ would sit at the right hand of God as long as His enemies did not seem to be subject to Him; but once we know that they are, no room for doubt could remain. Similarly there could be some doubt as to whether Joseph knew Mary before the birth of God’s Son. The Evangelist took pains to remove this doubt, thus giving us to understand beyond all question that she was not known after giving birth. Nor does the fact that Christ is called Mary’s first-born give any support to the error, as though she bore other sons after Him. For in scriptural usage the son before whom no other is born is called the first-born, even though no other should follow him. This is clear from the case of the first-born sons who according to the Law were consecrated to the Lord and offered to the priests.

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  Hence there could be sin in the will of a separate substance, through his not directing his own good and perfection to his last end, and adhering to his own good as his end. And since rules of action must needs be taken from the end, the consequence was that, through making himself his own end, he pretended to submit other things to his rule, and that his will was not subject to another higher than himself. But this belongs to God alone. In this sense then we are to understand that he desired to be equal to God: not that his good might be equal to the divine good; because such a thing could not come into his mind; and because by desiring it he would desire not to be, since the distinction of species is according to the various degrees of things, as is clear from what has been said above.—Now, the will to rule others, and the refusal to submit one’s will to the ruling of a superior, is the will to be supreme and, so to say, not to be subject, which is the sin of pride. Hence it is reasonably said that the demon’s first sin was pride.—But as from one error about a principle, errors various and manifold result, so from the first disorder in the demon’s will, there arose all manner of sins in his will: both of hate towards God as resisting his pride, and most justly punishing his fault; and of envy towards man; and of many such sins.

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  CHRIST’S BIRTH FROM A VIRGINSince, as we have shown, the Son of God was to take flesh from matter supplied by human nature, and since in human generation the woman provides matter, Christ appropriately took flesh from a woman. This is taught by the Apostle in Galatians 4:4: “God sent His Son, made of a woman.” A woman needs the cooperation of a man in order that the matter she supplies may be fashioned into a human body. But the formation of Christ’s body ought not to have been effected through the power of the male seed, as we said above. Hence that woman from whom the Son of God assumed flesh conceived without the admixture of male seed. Now the more anyone is detached from the things of the flesh, the more such a person is filled with spiritual gifts. For man is raised up by spiritual goods, whereas he is dragged down by carnal attractions. Accordingly, since the formation of Christ’s body was to be accomplished by the Holy Spirit, it behooved that woman from whom Christ took His body to be filled to repletion with spiritual gifts, so that not only her soul would be endowed with virtues by the Holy Spirit, but also her womb would be made fruitful with divine offspring. Therefore her soul had to be free from sin, and her body had to be far removed from every taint of carnal concupiscence. And so she had no association with a man at the conception of Christ; nor did she ever have such experience, either before or after. This was also due to Him who was born of her. The Son of God assumed flesh and came into the world for the purpose of raising us to the state of resurrection, in which men “shall neither marry nor be married, but shall be as the angels of God in heaven” (Matt. 22:30). This is why He inculcated the doctrine of continence and of virginal integrity, that an image of the glory that is to come might, in some degree, shine forth in the lives of the faithful. Consequently He did well to extol purity of life at His very birth, by being born of a virgin; and so the Apostles’ Creed says that He was “born of the Virgin Mary.” In the Creed of the Fathers He is said to have been made flesh of the Virgin Mary. This excludes the error of Valentinus and others, who taught that the body of Christ was either phantastic or was of another nature and was not taken and formed from the body of the Virgin. CHAPTER 222

• From Collected Essays (1998)

  "\ Vhy?" I asked. But to this she couldn't, or wouldn't, give me any anS\\·cr. I asked if there had been any reprisals taken against herself or her husband, if she was worried while G. was at school all day. She said that, no, there had been no reprisals, though some white people, under the pretext of giving her good ad \'icc, had expressed disapproval of her action. But she herself doesn't have a job and so doesn't risk losing one. Nor, she told me, had anyone said anything to her husband, who, how C\'Cr, by her own proud suggestion, is extremely close mouthed. And it developed later that he was not working at his regular trade but at something else. As to whether she was worried, "No," she told me; in much the same way that G., when asked about the blockade, had said, "Nothing, sir." In her case it was easier to sec what she meant: she hoped for the best and would not allow herself, in the meantime, to lose her head. "I don't feel like nothing's going to happen," she said, soberly. "I hope not. But I know if anybody tries to harm me or any one of my children, I'm going to strike back with all my strength. I'm going to strike them in God's name." G., in the meantime, on the sofa with his books, was pre paring himself for the next school day. His face was as impas si\'C as e\'er and I found myself wondering-again-how he managed to face what must surely have been the worst mo ment of his day-the morning, when he opened his eyes and realized that it was all to be gone through again. Insults, and incipient \'iolence, teachers, and-exams. "One among so many," his mother said, "that's kind of rough." A FL Y IN BU TTER MIL K 1 93 "D o you think you'll make it?" I asked him. "Would you rather go back to -- High?" "No," he said, "I 'll make it. I ain't going back. " "He ain't thinking about going back," said his mother proudly and sadly. I began to suspect that the boy managed to support the extreme tension of his situation by means of a nearly fanatical concentration on his schoolwork; by holding in the center of his mind the issue on which, when the deal went down, others would be forced to judge him. Pride and silence were his weapons. Pride comes naturally, and soon, to a Negro, but even his mother, I felt, was worried about G.' s silence, though she was too wise to break it. For what was all this doing to him really?

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  I answer that, Two things may be considered in reference to mendicancy. The first is on the part of the act itself of begging, which has a certain abasement attaching to it; since of all men those would seem most abased who are not only poor, but are so needy that they have to receive their meat from others. In this way some deserve praise for begging out of humility, just as they abase themselves in other ways, as being the most efficacious remedy against pride which they desire to quench either in themselves or in others by their example. For just as a disease that arises from excessive heat is most efficaciously healed by things that excel in cold, so proneness to pride is most efficaciously healed by those things which savor most of abasement. Hence it is said in the Decretals (II, cap. Si quis semel, de Paenitentia): “To condescend to the humblest duties, and to devote oneself to the lowliest service is an exercise of humility; for thus one is able to heal the disease of pride and human glory.” Hence Jerome praises Fabiola (Ep. lxxvii ad ocean.) for that she desired “to receive alms, having poured forth all her wealth for Christ’s sake.” The Blessed Alexis acted in like manner, for, having renounced all his possessions for Christ’s sake he rejoiced in receiving alms even from his own servants. It is also related of the Blessed Arsenius in the Lives of the Fathers (v, 6) that he gave thanks because he was forced by necessity to ask for alms. Hence it is enjoined to some people as a penance for grievous sins to go on a pilgrimage begging. Since, however, humility like the other virtues should not be without discretion, it behooves one to be discreet in becoming a mendicant for the purpose of humiliation, lest a man thereby incur the mark of covetousness or of anything else unbecoming. Secondly, mendicancy may be considered on the part of that which one gets by begging: and thus a man may be led to beg by a twofold motive. First, by the desire to have wealth or meat without working for it, and such like mendicancy is unlawful; secondly, by a motive of necessity or usefulness. The motive is one of necessity if a man has no other means of livelihood save begging; and it is a motive of usefulness if he wishes to accomplish something useful, and is unable to do so without the alms of the faithful. Thus alms are besought for the building of a bridge, or church, or for any other work whatever that is conducive to the common good: thus scholars may seek alms that they may devote themselves to the study of wisdom. In this way mendicancy is lawful to religious no less than to seculars. Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking there explicitly of those who beg from motives of covetousness.

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  Reply to Objection 1: We might answer briefly these quotations from Chrysostom by saying that he speaks not of a priest of lesser order who has the cure of souls, but of a bishop, who is called a high-priest; and this agrees with the purpose of that book wherein he consoles himself and Basil in that they were chosen to be bishops. We may, however, pass this over and reply that he speaks in view of the difficulty. For he had already said: “When the pilot is surrounded by the stormy sea and is able to bring the ship safely out of the tempest, then he deserves to be acknowledged by all as a perfect pilot”; and afterwards he concludes, as quoted, with regard to the monk, “who is not to be compared with one who, cast among the people . . . remains firm”; and he gives the reason why, because “both in the calm end in the storm he piloted himself to safety.” This proves nothing more than that the state of one who has the cure of souls is fraught with more danger than the monastic state; and to keep oneself innocent in face of a greater peril is proof of greater virtue. on the other hand, it also indicates greatness of virtue if a man avoid dangers by entering religion; hence he does not say that “he would prefer the priestly office to the monastic solitude,” but that “he would rather please” in the former than in the latter, since this is a proof of greater virtue. Reply to Objection 2: This passage quoted from Augustine also clearly refers to the question of difficulty which proves the greatness of virtue in those who lead a good life, as stated above (ad 1). Reply to Objection 3: Augustine there compares monks with clerics as regards the pre-eminence of order, not as regards the distinction between religious and secular life. Reply to Objection 4: Those who are taken from the religious state to receive the cure of souls, being already in sacred orders, attain to something they had not hitherto, namely the office of the cure, yet they do not put aside what they had already. For it is said in the Decretals (XVI, qu. i, can. De Monachis): “With regard to those monks who after long residence in a monastery attain to the order of clerics, we bid them not to lay aside their former purpose.” On the other hand, parish priests and archdeacons, when they enter religion, resign their cure, in order to enter the state of perfection. This very fact shows the excellence of the religious life. When religious who are not in orders are admitted to the clerical state and to the sacred orders, they are clearly promoted to something better, as stated: this is indicated by the very way in which Jerome expresses himself: “So live in the monastery as to deserve to be a clerk.”

• From Great Authors of the Western Literary Tradition (2004)

  194 Lecture 26: The Song of Roland and forgotten. Others argue that Ganelon’s betrayal has been so great that he must be punished. A trial by combat is decided upon. Ganelon will be represented by the great warrior Pinabel. Roland’s cause is to be upheld by the totally outclassed Thierry. Miraculously, Thierry prevails. Ganelon and 30 of his kinsmen are executed. As the poem ends, Bramimonde, Marsilie’s queen, who had been captured in Spain, embraces Christianity. How do we understand the poem? How might its contemporaries have understood it? One great critical theme is Oliver versus Roland, that is, prudence versus recklessness. Another theme centers on Roland himself and the question of démesure. Another theme is the con fl ict between duty and honor. Yet another theme is pragmatism versus lofty ideals. A fi nal theme is faith and religion. The genius of the poem lies precisely in tensions and paradoxes. The Muslims are presented as more than worthy foes. Christians worship a triune God; Muslims worship Apollo, Muhammad, and Termagant. The Franks are not presented as bloodthirsty: They mourn their dead; they want to go home; they weep when they see France. Composed at the time of the First Crusade, The Song of Roland opens a vista on the Europe of 1100. ■ Brault, trans., The Song of Roland. ———, The Song of Roland: An Analytical Edition. Cook, The Sense of the “Song of Roland.” 1. What is at stake in the “traditionalist” versus “individualist” dispute over Roland (or Beowulf for that matter)? 2. How is honor presented in Roland? Can you make a case that Ganelon is honorable? Essential Reading Questions to Consider

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  Objection 2: Further, it belongs to magnanimity that one should deem oneself worthy of great things. But a man is said to be presumptuous even if he deem himself worthy of small things, if they surpass his ability. Therefore presumption is not directly opposed to magnanimity. Objection 3: Further, the magnanimous man looks upon external goods as little things. Now according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3), “on account of external fortune the presumptuous disdain and wrong others, because they deem external goods as something great.” Therefore presumption is opposed to magnanimity, not by excess, but only by deficiency. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 3) that the “vain man,” i.e. a vaporer or a wind-bag, which with us denotes a presumptuous man, “is opposed to the magnanimous man by excess.” I answer that, As stated above ([3360]Q[129], A[3], ad 1), magnanimity observes the means, not as regards the quantity of that to which it tends, but in proportion to our own ability: for it does not tend to anything greater than is becoming to us. Now the presumptuous man, as regards that to which he tends, does not exceed the magnanimous, but sometimes falls far short of him: but he does exceed in proportion to his own ability, whereas the magnanimous man does not exceed his. It is in this way that presumption is opposed to magnanimity by excess. Reply to Objection 1: It is not every presumption that is accounted a sin against the Holy Ghost, but that by which one contemns the Divine justice through inordinate confidence in the Divine mercy. The latter kind of presumption, by reason of its matter, inasmuch, to wit, as it implies contempt of something Divine, is opposed to charity, or rather to the gift of fear, whereby we revere God. Nevertheless, in so far as this contempt exceeds the proportion to one’s own ability, it can be opposed to magnanimity. Reply to Objection 2: Presumption, like magnanimity, seems to tend to something great. For we are not, as a rule, wont to call a man presumptuous for going beyond his powers in something small. If, however, such a man be called presumptuous, this kind of presumption is not opposed to magnanimity, but to that virtue which is about ordinary honor, as stated above ([3361]Q[129], A[2]).

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  On the other hand, to desire to do good to one’s neighbor is in itself praiseworthy, and virtuous. Nevertheless, since considered as an episcopal act it has the height of degree attached to it, it would seem that, unless there be manifest and urgent reason for it, it would be presumptuous for any man to desire to be set over others in order to do them good. Thus Gregory says (Pastor. i, 8) that “it was praiseworthy to seek the office of a bishop when it was certain to bring one into graver dangers.” Wherefore it was not easy to find a person to accept this burden, especially seeing that it is through the zeal of charity that one divinely instigated to do so, according to Gregory, who says (Pastor. i, 7) that “Isaias being desirous of profiting his neighbor, commendably desired the office of preacher.” Nevertheless, anyone may, without presumption, desire to do such like works if he should happen to be in that office, or to be worthy of doing them; so that the object of his desire is the good work and not the precedence in dignity. Hence Chrysostom* says: “It is indeed good to desire a good work, but to desire the primacy of honor is vanity. For primacy seeks one that shuns it, and abhors one that desires it.” [*The quotation is from the Opus Imperfectum in Matth. (Hom. xxxv), falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom.] Reply to Objection 1: As Gregory says (Pastor. i, 8), “when the Apostle said this he who was set over the people was the first to be dragged to the torments of martyrdom,” so that there was nothing to be desired in the episcopal office, save the good work. Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19) that when the Apostle said, “‘Whoever desireth the office of bishop, desireth a good work,’ he wished to explain what the episcopacy is: for it denotes work and not honor: since {skopos} signifies ‘watching.’ Wherefore if we like we may render {episkopein} by the Latin ‘superintendere’ [to watch over]: thus a man may know himself to be no bishop if he loves to precede rather than to profit others.” For, as he observed shortly before, “in our actions we should seek, not honor nor power in this life, since all things beneath the sun are vanity, but the work itself which that honor or power enables us to do.” Nevertheless, as Gregory says (Pastor. i, 8), “while praising the desire” (namely of the good work) “he forthwith turns this object of praise into one of fear, when he adds: It behooveth . . . a bishop to be blameless,” as though to say: “I praise what you seek, but learn first what it is you seek.”

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  THAT IN SPIRITS THERE MAY BE SIN, AND HOWAS there is an order in active causes, so also in final causes, requiring that the secondary end should be subordinate to the primary, as the secondary agent depends on the primary. Now every will naturally wishes that which is the proper good of the person willing, namely, his own perfect well-being; and the will cannot possibly will aught to the contrary of this. If we can find a voluntary agent, whose good is a final end, such as not to be contained under the order leading to any other end, but rather all other ends being contained in the order leading up to it,—in such a voluntary agent there can be no fault of the will. Such a voluntary agent is God, whose being is sovereign goodness, which is the final end. In God then there can be no fault of the will. But in any other voluntary agent, whose proper good must necessarily be contained in the order leading to some other good, a sin of the will may occur,—considering the agent as he is in his own nature. In every voluntary agent there is a natural inclination to will and love his own perfect well-being, and that to such an extent that he cannot will the contrary. But a created agent has no natural endowment of so subordinating his own well-being to another end than himself as to be incapable of swerving from that end: for the higher end does not belong to the creature’s own nature, but to a superior nature. It is left therefore to the decision of his own will to subordinate his proper well-being to a higher end. Sin therefore might have found place in the will of a pure spirit in this way,—that he did not refer his own good and well-being to the final end, but made that good his end and adhered to it accordingly. And because rules of conduct necessarily are taken from the end in view, it followed as a matter of course that the said spirit arranged his other elections according to that same object (ex re ipsa) in which he had placed his last end. Hence his will was not regulated by any higher will, a position of independence proper to God alone. In this sense we must understand the saying that he aimed at equality with God [cf. Isai. xiv, 13], not that he ever expected his goodness to equal the divine goodness: such a thought could never have occurred to his mind. But to wish to rule others, and not to have one’s own will ruled by any superior, is to wish to be in power and cease to be a subject; and that is the sin of pride. Hence it is aptly said that the first sin that a spirit committed was pride. But because once error has been committed in regard to a first principle, a varied and manifold course of error is bound to ensue, so from the spirit’s first inordination of will there followed manifold other sin in his will, such as hatred of God for withstanding his pride and justly chastising his offence, envy against man, and the like.

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  Objection 2: Further, it is written (Mat. 18:20): “Where there are two or three gathered together in My name, there am I in the midst of them.” But nothing can be better than the fellowship of Christ. Therefore it would seem better to live in community than in solitude. Objection 3: Further, the vow of obedience is more excellent than the other religious vows; and humility is most acceptable to God. Now obedience and humility are better observed in company than in solitude; for Jerome says (Ep. cxxv ad Rustic. Monach.): “In solitude pride quickly takes man unawares, he sleeps as much as he will, he does what he likes”; whereas when instructing one who lives in community, he says: “You may not do what you will, you must eat what you are bidden to eat, you may possess so much as you receive, you must obey one you prefer not to obey, you must be a servant to your brethren, you must fear the superior of the monastery as God, love him as a father.” Therefore it would seem that the religious life of those who live in community is more perfect than that of those who lead a solitary life. Objection 4: Further, our Lord said (Lk. 11:33): “No man lighteth a candle and putteth it in a hidden place, nor under a bushel.” Now those who lead a solitary life are seemingly in a hidden place, and to be doing no good to any man. Therefore it would seem that their religious life is not more perfect. Objection 5: Further, that which is in accord with man’s nature is apparently more pertinent to the perfection of virtue. But man is naturally a social animal, as the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 1). Therefore it would seem that to lead a solitary life is not more perfect than to lead a community life. On the contrary, Augustine says (De oper. Monach. xxiii) that “those are holier who keep themselves aloof from the approach of all, and give their whole mind to a life of prayer.”

• From Great Authors of the Western Literary Tradition (2004)

  343 uncle’s house in Mexico City, where she taught herself literature, science, mathematics, philosophy, theology, and languages. At 13, she was presented at the Viceregal Court, the cultural center of the New World, where she became the lady-in-waiting of the vicereine. She refused to marry and entered the convent of San Jeronimo. Her cell soon became an academy and her library numbered 4,000 volumes. Sister Juana was ordered to refute an unorthodox sermon preached by a Portuguese Jesuit, a refutation applauded by many. The bishop of Puebla, however, qualifi ed his praise with the suggestion that she wasted her talents on secular matters. Rather than become only a theologian, she sold her library and musical and scienti fi c instruments and renounced the use of pen and ink. She contracted the plague and died in 1695. In 1690, at the request of an unnamed theologian, Sister Juana wrote a commentary on a sermon delivered 40 years before by a Jesuit priest that had disputed the claims of St. Augustine and St. Thomas about the nature of Christ’s love. Sister Juana’s commentary was published without her permission by the bishop of Puebla, who titled it “Athenagoric letter,” that is, “letter worthy of the wisdom of Athena.” The bishop, using the pseudonym Sor Filotea de la Cruz, appended a letter to Sister Juana, advising her to focus less on secular and more on theological matters. It is in Sister Juana’s reply to this letter, published in 1691, that she articulates her right to a life of the mind. Aphra Behn, 17th–century playwright and a notable exception, along with Sister Juana, to the limitation of literary achievement and recognition to men in the 17 th and 18th centuries. Frank and Frances Carpenter Collection, Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, LC-USZ62-127791.

• From The Swimming-Pool Library (1988)

  I breathed into his mouth again—a strange sensation, intimate and yet symbolic, tasting his lips in an impersonal and disinterested way. Then I massaged his chest, with deep, almost offensive pressure, one hand on top of the other; and already he had come back to life. It had all been so rapid and inevitable that it was only when he was breathing regularly and we had laid him down on a coat and done up his fly that I felt shaken by a surge of delayed elation. I raced up the steps into mild sunshine and hung around waiting for the ambulance, unable to stop grinning, my hands trembling. Even so, it was too soon to understand. I told myself that I had scooped someone back from the threshold of death, but that seemed incommensurate with the simple routine I had followed, the vital little drill retained from childhood along with all the more complex knowledge that would never prove so useful—convection, sonata form, the names of birds in Latin and French. The Corinthian Club in Great Russell Street is the masterpiece of the architect Frank Orme, whom I once met at my grandfather’s. I remember he carried on in a pompous and incongruous way, having recently, and as if by mistake, been awarded a knighthood. Even as a child I saw him as a fraud and a hotchpotch, and I was delighted, when I joined the Club and learned that he had designed it, to discover just the same qualities in his architecture. Like Orme himself, the edifice is both mean and self-important; a paradox emphasised by the modest resources of the Club in the 1930s and its conflicting aspiration to civic grandeur. As you walk along the pavement you look down through the railings into an area where steam issues from the ventilators and half-open toplights of changing-rooms and kitchens; you hear the slam of large institutional cooking trays, the hiss of showers, the inane confidence of radio disc-jockeys. The ground floor has a severe manner, the Portland stone punctuated by green-painted metal-framed windows; but at the centre it gathers to a curvaceous, broken-pedimented doorway surmounted by two finely developed figures—one pensively Negroid, the other inspiredly Caucasian—who hold between them a banner with the device ‘Men Of All Nations’. Before answering this call, step across the street and look up at the floors above. You see more clearly that it is a steel-framed building, tarted up with niches and pilasters like some bald fact inexpertly disguised. At the far corner there is a tremendous upheaving of cartouches and volutes crowned by a cupola like that of some immense Midland Bank. Finances and inspiration seem to have been exhausted by this, however, and alongside, above the main cornice of the building, rises a two-storey mansard attic, containing the cheap accommodation the Club provides in the cheapest possible form of building.

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  From this indeed the gravity of pride is made manifest. For just as a wise physician, in order to cure a worse disease, allows the patient to contract one that is less dangerous, so the sin of pride is shown to be more grievous by the very fact that, as a remedy, God allows men to fall into other sins. Whether pride is the first sin of all?Objection 1: It would seem that pride is not the first sin of all. For the first is maintained in all that follows. Now pride does not accompany all sins, nor is it the origin of all: for Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. xx) that many things are done “amiss which are not done with pride.” Therefore pride is not the first sin of all. Objection 2: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 10:14) that the “beginning of . . . pride is to fall off from God.” Therefore falling away from God precedes pride. Objection 3: Further, the order of sins would seem to be according to the order of virtues. Now, not humility but faith is the first of all virtues. Therefore pride is not the first sin of all. Objection 4: Further, it is written (2 Tim. 3:13): “Evil men and seducers shall grow worse and worse”; so that apparently man’s beginning of wickedness is not the greatest of sins. But pride is the greatest of sins as stated in the foregoing Article. Therefore pride is not the first sin. Objection 5: Further, resemblance and pretense come after the reality. Now the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7) that “pride apes fortitude and daring.” Therefore the vice of daring precedes the vice of pride. On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 10:15): “Pride is the beginning of all sin.” I answer that, The first thing in every genus is that which is essential. Now it has been stated above [3616](A[6]) that aversion from God, which is the formal complement of sin, belongs to pride essentially, and to other sins, consequently. Hence it is that pride fulfils the conditions of a first thing, and is “the beginning of all sins,” as stated above ([3617]FS, Q[84], A[2]), when we were treating of the causes of sin on the part of the aversion which is the chief part of sin. Reply to Objection 1: Pride is said to be “the beginning of all sin,” not as though every sin originated from pride, but because any kind of sin is naturally liable to arise from pride. Reply to Objection 2: To fall off from God is said to be the beginning of pride, not as though it were a distinct sin from pride, but as being the first part of pride. For it has been said above [3618](A[5]) that pride regards chiefly subjection to God which it scorns, and in consequence it scorns to be subject to a creature for God’s sake.

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  Reply to Objection 2: That which we receive from God is not vain but true glory: it is this glory that is promised as a reward for good works, and of which it is written (2 Cor. 10:17,18): “He that glorieth let him glory in the Lord, for not he who commendeth himself is approved, but he whom God commendeth.” It is true that some are heartened to do works of virtue, through desire for human glory, as also through the desire for other earthly goods. Yet he is not truly virtuous who does virtuous deeds for the sake of human glory, as Augustine proves (De Civ. Dei v). Reply to Objection 3: It is requisite for man’s perfection that he should know himself; but not that he should be known by others, wherefore it is not to be desired in itself. It may, however, be desired as being useful for something, either in order that God may be glorified by men, or that men may become better by reason of the good they know to be in another man, or in order that man, knowing by the testimony of others’ praise the good which is in him, may himself strive to persevere therein and to become better. In this sense it is praiseworthy that a man should “take care of his good name,” and that he should “provide good things in the sight of God and men”: but not that he should take an empty pleasure in human praise. Whether vainglory is opposed to magnanimity?Objection 1: It seems that vainglory is not opposed to magnanimity. For, as stated above [3365](A[1]), vainglory consists in glorying in things that are not, which pertains to falsehood; or in earthly and perishable things, which pertains to covetousness; or in the testimony of men, whose judgment is uncertain, which pertains to imprudence. Now these vices are not contrary to magnanimity. Therefore vainglory is not opposed to magnanimity. Objection 2: Further, vainglory is not, like pusillanimity, opposed to magnanimity by way of deficiency, for this seems inconsistent with vainglory. Nor is it opposed to it by way of excess, for in this way presumption and ambition are opposed to magnanimity, as stated above ([3366]Q[130], A[2];[3367] Q[131], A[2]): and these differ from vainglory. Therefore vainglory is not opposed to magnanimity. Objection 3: Further, a gloss on Phil. 2:3, “Let nothing be done through contention, neither by vainglory,” says: “Some among them were given to dissension and restlessness, contending with one another for the sake of vainglory.” But contention [*Cf. Q[38]] is not opposed to magnanimity. Neither therefore is vainglory. On the contrary, Tully says (De Offic. i) under the heading, “Magnanimity consists in two things: We should beware of the desire for glory, since it enslaves the mind, which a magnanimous man should ever strive to keep untrammeled.” Therefore it is opposed to magnanimity.

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  I answer that, As Isidore says (Etym. x) “a person is said to be pertinacious who holds on impudently, as being utterly tenacious.” “Pervicacious” has the same meaning, for it signifies that a man “perseveres in his purpose until he is victorious: for the ancients called ‘vicia’ what we call victory.” These the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 9) calls {ischyrognomones}, that is “head-strong,” or {idiognomones}, that is “self-opinionated,” because they abide by their opinions more than they should; whereas the effeminate man does so less than he ought, and the persevering man, as he ought. Hence it is clear that perseverance is commended for observing the mean, while pertinacity is reproved for exceeding the mean, and effeminacy for falling short of it. Reply to Objection 1: The reason why a man is too persistent in his own opinion, is that he wishes by this means to make a show of his own excellence: wherefore this is the result of vainglory as its cause. Now it has been stated above ([3414]Q[127], A[2], ad 1;[3415] Q[133], A[2]), that opposition of vices to virtues depends, not on their cause, but on their species. Reply to Objection 2: The pertinacious man exceeds by persisting inordinately in something against many difficulties: yet he takes a certain pleasure in the end, just as the brave and the persevering man. Since, however, this pleasure is sinful, seeing that he desires it too much, and shuns the contrary pain, he is like the incontinent or effeminate man. Reply to Objection 3: Although the other virtues persist against the onslaught of the passions, they are not commended for persisting in the same way as perseverance is. As to continence, its claim to praise seems to lie rather in overcoming pleasures. Hence pertinacity is directly opposed to perseverance. OF THE GIFT OF FORTITUDE (TWO ARTICLES)We must next consider the gift corresponding to fortitude, and this is the gift of fortitude. Under this head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether fortitude is a gift? (2) Which among the beatitudes and fruits correspond to it? Whether fortitude is a gift?Objection 1: It seems that fortitude is not a gift. For the virtues differ from the gifts: and fortitude is a virtue. Therefore it should not be reckoned a gift. Objection 2: Further, the acts of the gift remain in heaven, as stated above ([3416]FS, Q[68], A[6]). But the act of fortitude does not remain in heaven: for Gregory says (Moral. i) that “fortitude encourages the fainthearted against hardships, which will be altogether absent from heaven.” Therefore fortitude is not a gift. Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii) that “it is a sign of fortitude to cut oneself adrift from all the deadly pleasures of the passing show.” Now noisome pleasures and delights are the concern of temperance rather than of fortitude. Therefore it seems that fortitude is not the gift corresponding to the virtue of fortitude.

• From The Unexpected Legacy of Divorce: A 25-Year Landmark Study (2000)

  I assured him, “If they do, then I will have failed badly. I promise that I’ll protect your privacy. Your identity will be carefully disguised.” Larry nodded and turned brusquely to the business at hand. “What exactly do you want to know?” “I want to know how you got from where you were at twenty-two, which is the last time I saw you, to where you are today. What were the steps along the way?” Larry frowned. “Well, it was no piece of cake. I’ll start with the easy part. I got married four years ago. My wife’s name is Grace. We have a son, Alex, who is three and another baby is due in September. Grace is a school psychologist but she’ll probably take a year off after the new baby arrives. We figure we can afford it now. As for this,” he said, waving his hand at his paper-strewn office, “this is a new firm started by two young guys. I had just graduated from engineering at San Jose State and landed my first job here. That was three years ago and it’s been great. I may stay here forever.” Larry smiled briefly and then his mood turned somber. He had decided to tell the full truth. “I got this job through a lucky break and not because I was some kind of whiz kid. When I graduated, I didn’t have any self-confidence. I had to put myself through school and started out with a D grade point. So much for M.I.T. But after a while I did better at community college and finally transferred to San Jose. It’s a good school but not in the big leagues. So every time I went for a job interview the guy from Berkeley or Caltech or wherever was first choice. They had the connections. I felt so low, I almost sank through the floor. And then I decided to contact one of my professors who had liked my work, to see if he had any ideas. That was real tough for me because I never expect anyone to come through for me. He asked me lots of questions about how I had been able to go to school during the day and work all night and why it had taken me six years instead of the usual four. Bottom line, he said he liked my work, said I had talent and grit, and recommended me to another former student who was starting a new company. The rest is history.” “That’s a very nice story. And it’s a tribute to you.” Larry looked at me soberly and said, “That’s the only time in my life that I’ve gotten help from a man.” “I take it your dad didn’t help with your education?”

• From The Unexpected Legacy of Divorce: A 25-Year Landmark Study (2000)

  As these relationships develop, parents and children often become more like peers than separate generations, which in turn can make the children more independent and responsible. They are justifiably proud of their achievement. Many of our efforts to understand the impact of divorce on children have assumed incorrectly that the child is a passive vessel who is shaped by the changes ushered in by a divorce. But the child is an active agent. (This is a theme I will develop in depth in a later chapter.) No one asked Karen to step forward. She did it on her own. Her role in the postdivorce family was entirely different from her role in the predivorce family. In some homes, everyone benefits from the child’s new role. Adults gain needed help. Children gain maturity and self-confidence. They also show a moral sensibility and compassion for others far beyond their years, which they can draw upon later in their adult relationships and often in their career choices. Karen’s decision to study public health and to develop programs for crippled children was by her own account rooted in the early responsibility she took as a child. For the fortunate parent who is able to rely on the child to get through the extended divorce crisis, the child’s availability may tip the balance between chronic dysfunction and recovery. Of course, caregiving by a child can occur in intact families when a parent is ill or troubled. I recall one little girl, Martha, the oldest of three siblings, who took over running the household for a year when her mother was recovering from a serious car accident. Martha and her father shared in parenting the younger children and in taking care of Martha’s mother. The difference was that although the mother was in a wheelchair for many months, she maintained close touch with what was going on in the home. Both parents maintained adult responsibility for all their children at home. Martha matured as a result of her experience and was rewarded by both parents with appreciation and praise. In many immigrant families one of the older children often is responsible for helping the adults to understand the new language and strange culture. Here, too, the child performs vital functions that enable the family to keep going, but the adults maintain their responsibility at the head of the family.