Love

Passages

Every passage tagged with this emotion in the Vela corpus. Search the body text, narrow by source or register, click through to a book’s profile to see how the passage sits with the rest of the work.

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• From Great Authors of the Western Literary Tradition (2004)

  203 one another, one often meets the same characters in different situations or similar situations handled differently. Many scholars despair of talking about romance as a coherent genre. The greatest 12 th-century writer of French romances was Chrétien de Troyes, whose in fl uence lasted for centuries. We know almost nothing about him personally. His major works were composed, it seems, between 1159 and 1191. He was patronized by the countess of Champagne, then by the count of Flanders. His romances are all “Arthurian,” but they deal with fi gures from Arthur’s court, not with Arthur himself. In the opening of his Knight of the Cart —a story about the adulterous affair of Lancelot and Guinevere—Chrétien says this: Since my lady of Champagne [that is, Marie, the daughter of Eleanor of Aquitiane and wife of Count Henry the Liberal] wills me to undertake the making of a romance, I shall undertake it with great goodwill, as one so wholly devoted that he will do anything in the world for her without any intention of fl attery… Christian is beginning his book of the Knight of the Cart. The Countess presents him with the matter and the meaning, and he undertakes to shape the work, adding little to it except his effort and his careful attention. Chrétien wrote a romance about Tristan and Isolt, but because it does not survive, we turn to the masterpiece of Gottfried von Strassburg. About Gottfried, nothing is known. He wrote his Tristan around 1200/1210. Romance entered Germany from France in the middle of the 12 th century, and Gottfried almost certainly knew the works of Chrétien. Nevertheless, he patterned his own Tristan on that of Thomas of England, written perhaps in the 1150s at the court of King Henry II of England and his wife, Eleanor of Aquitaine. Because Thomas’s work survives only fragmentarily, we cannot compare Gottfried’s with it. Gottfried’s Tristan takes us into the Arthurian world but deals with Cornwall and Ireland, rather than with the familiar fi gures of the Round Table. Love is a mixture of pleasure and suffering; the woman is usually of higher social status than the man who loves—and serves—her.

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  I answer that, The act of teaching has a twofold object. For teaching is conveyed by speech, and speech is the audible sign of the interior concept. Accordingly one object of teaching is the matter or object of the interior concept; and as to this object teaching belongs sometimes to the active, sometimes to the contemplative life. It belongs to the active life, when a man conceives a truth inwardly, so as to be directed thereby in his outward action; but it belongs to the contemplative life when a man conceives an intelligible truth, in the consideration and love whereof he delights. Hence Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. Serm. civ, 1): “Let them choose for themselves the better part,” namely the contemplative life, “let them be busy with the word, long for the sweetness of teaching, occupy themselves with salutary knowledge,” thus stating clearly that teaching belongs to the contemplative life. The other object of teaching is on the part of the speech heard, and thus the object of teaching is the hearer. As to this object all doctrine belongs to the active life to which external actions pertain. Reply to Objection 1: The authority quoted speaks expressly of doctrine as to its matter, in so far as it is concerned with the consideration and love of truth. Reply to Objection 2: Habit and act have a common object. Hence this argument clearly considers the matter of the interior concept. For it pertains to the man having wisdom and knowledge to be able to teach, in so far as he is able to express his interior concept in words, so as to bring another man to understand the truth. Reply to Objection 3: He who prays for another does nothing towards the man for whom he prays, but only towards God Who is the intelligible truth; whereas he who teaches another does something in his regard by external action. Hence the comparison fails. Whether the active life remains after this life?Objection 1: It would seem that the active life remains after this life. For the acts of the moral virtues belong to the active life, as stated above [3738](A[1]). But the moral virtues endure after this life according to Augustine (De Trin. xiv, 9). Therefore the active life remains after this life. Objection 2: Further, teaching others belongs to the active life, as stated above [3739](A[3]). But in the life to come when “we shall be like the angels,” teaching will be possible: even as apparently it is in the angels of whom one “enlightens, cleanses, and perfects” [*Coel. Hier. iii, viii] another, which refers to the “receiving of knowledge,” according to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii). Therefore it would seem that the active life remains after this life.

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  Now love to God is the end of every human action and affection, wherein especially we attain our ultimate end, as we said in Q. 23, Art. 6. Love to God cannot then have a mode such as applies to things which are measured, and which may be either too much or too little. But it does have a mode such as applies to a measure, of which there is no excess, but the greater the conformity to rule the better. Hence love to God is the better, the more God is loved. On the first point: to have a quality essentially is more significant than to have it on account of something else. Thus a measure, which has a mode essentially, is better than a thing measured, which has a mode on account of something other than itself. Hence also charity, which has a mode as a measure, is more eminent than the other virtues, which have a mode as things which are measured. On the second point: as Augustine adds in the same passage, “ the mode of love to God is to love him with all our heart, ” which means that God ought to be loved as much as he can be loved. So it is with any mode which applies to a measure. On the third point: an affection is to be measured by reason if its object is subject to the judgment of reason. But the object of love to God is God, who transcends the judgment of reason. Hence love to God also transcends the judgment of reason, and is not to be measured by reason. Neither can we compare the inward act of charity with its outward acts. The inward act of charity has the nature of an end, since man ’ s ultimate good consists in the adherence of his soul to God, in accordance with Ps. 73:28: “ It is good for me to draw near to God. ” Its outward acts, on the other hand, are the means to this end. ARTICLE SEVEN Whether it is more Meritorious to Love an Enemy than to Love a Friend1. It seems that it is more meritorious to love an enemy than to love a friend. For it is said in Matt. 5:46: “ if ye love them which love you, what reward have ye? ” Thus love to a friend does not merit a reward. But love to an enemy does merit a reward, as the same passage shows. It is therefore more meritorious to love enemies than to love friends. 2. Again, an action is the more meritorious the greater is the charity from which it springs. Now Augustine says that it is the perfect sons of God who love their enemies (Enchirid. 73), whereas even those whose charity is imperfect love their friends. It is therefore more meritorious to love enemies than to love friends.

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  On the first point: the operation of the intellect is completed when the thing understood is in him who understands. The excellence of its operation is therefore measured by the intellect itself. But the operation of the will, and also of any appetitive power, is completed when the subject is inclined to something as an end. The excellence of its operation is therefore measured by the object sought. Now as the Book on Causes maintains (props. 12, 20), when one thing exists in another thing, it does so according to the mode of the thing in which it exists. Hence anything which is lower than the soul must exist in the soul in a mode higher than that in which it exists by itself. But anything which is higher than the soul must exist by itself in a mode higher than that in which it exists in the soul. It follows that knowledge of things beneath us is more excellent than love of them. This is the reason why the philosopher places the intellectual virtues above the moral virtues in 6 Ethics 7 and 12. But love of things higher than ourselves is more excellent than knowledge of them. This is especially true of love to God. Charity is therefore more excellent than faith. On the second point: faith does not use charity as an instrument, which is the way in which a master uses his servant, but as its own form. The reasoning is therefore false. On the third point: it is the same good which is the object of charity and of hope. But charity implies union with its object, whereas hope implies distance from it. This is the reason why charity does not look upon the good as arduous, as does hope. The good is not arduous for charity, since charity is already one with it. It is thus clear that charity is more excellent than hope. ARTICLE SEVEN Whether there can be any True Virtue without Charity1. It seems that there can be true virtue without charity. For it is a property of virtue to produce a good action, and those who lack charity nevertheless perform some good actions. They sometimes clothe the naked, feed the hungry, and do other similar things. There can therefore be true virtue without charity. 2. Again, there cannot be charity where there is no faith, since charity proceeds “ out of faith unfeigned ” (I Tim. 1:5). But those who lack faith can still have true chastity while they inhibit their desires, and true justice while they judge aright. There can therefore be true virtue without charity. 3. Again, it is evident from 6 Ethics 3 and 4 that science and art are virtues. But these are found in sinners who have no charity. There can therefore be true virtue without charity.

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  AUGUSTINE. (Tract. lxxxii. 3. et seq.) Who doubts that love precedes the observance of the commandments? For who loves not, has not that whereby to keep the commandments. These words then do not declare whence love arises, but how it is shewn, that no one might deceive himself into thinking that he loved our Lord, when he did not keep His commandments. Though the words, Continue ye in My love, do not of themselves make it evident which love He means, ours to Him, or His to us, yet the preceding words do: I love you, He says: and then immediately after, Continue ye in My love. Continue ye in My love, then, is, continue in My grace: and, If ye keep My commandments, ye shall abide in My love, is, Your keeping of My commandments, will be evidence to you that ye abide in My love. It is not that we keep His commandments first, and that then He loves; but that He loves us, and then we keep His commandments. This is that grace, which is revealed to the humble, but hidden from the proud. But what means the next words, Even as I have kept My Father’s commandments, and abide in His love: i. e. the Father’s love, wherewith He loveth the Son. Must this grace, wherewith the Father loves the Son, be understood to be like the grace wherewith the Son loveth us? No; for whereas we are sons not by nature, but by grace, the Only Begotten is Son not by grace, but by nature. We must understand this then to refer to the manhood in the Son, even as the words themselves imply: As My Father hath loved Me, even so love I you. The grace of a Mediator is expressed here; and Christ is Mediator between God and man, not as God, but as man. This then we may say, that since human nature does not pertain to the nature of God, but does by grace pertain to the Person of the Son, grace also pertains to that Person; such grace as has nothing superior, nothing equal to it. For no merits on man’s part preceded the assumption of that nature. ALCUIN. Even as I have kept My Father’s commandments. The Apostle explains what these commandments were: Christ became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross. (Phil. 2:8) CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxvii. 1) Then because the Passion was now approaching to interrupt their joy, He adds, These things have I spoken unto you, that my joy may remain in you: as if He said, And if sorrow fall upon you, I will take it away; so that ye shall rejoice in the end.

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  2. Again, what extends to the operations of all virtues cannot itself be a specific virtue. Now charity extends to the operations of all virtues, according to I Cor. 13:4: “ Charity suffereth long, and is kind, ” etc. It extends even to a man ’ s every deed, according to I Cor. 16:14: “ Let all your things be done with charity. ” Hence charity is not a specific virtue. 3. Again, the precepts of the law correspond to the acts of the virtues. Now Augustine says {De Perf. Just. 5): “ The general commandment is Thou shalt love, ’ and the general prohibition is Thou shalt not covet. ’” Charity is thus a general virtue. On the other hand: the general is never numbered together with the specific. But charity is numbered together with the specific virtues of hope and faith, as in I Cor. 13:13: “ And now abideth faith, hope, and charity, these three. ” Charity is therefore a specific virtue. I answer: we have already explained (12ae, Q. 18, Art. 2, and Q. 54, Art. 2) that an act and a habit both derive their species from their object, and that the proper object of love is the good (12ae, Q. 17, Art. 1). There is therefore a specific kind of love where there is a specific kind of good. Now in its aspect as the object of happiness, divine good is a specific kind of good. The love of charity is consequently a specific kind of love, since it is the love of this specific good. Charity is therefore a specific virtue. On the first point: charity is mentioned in the definition of virtue in general not because its nature is that which is common to every virtue, but because every virtue depends on it, as we shall show in Arts. 7 and 8. Prudence is mentioned in the definition of the moral virtues for a similar reason in 2 Ethics 6 and 6 Ethics 13, because they depend on prudence. On the second point: a virtue or an art which is concerned with an ultimate end has authority over such virtues as are concerned only with other subordinate ends. Thus the art of the soldier commands the art of horsemanship, as is said in 1 Ethics 1. Now the object of charity is the final end of human life, which is eternal blessedness. Hence charity extends to the whole activity of human life by way of authority, not by directly determining every virtuous action. On the third point: the precept of love is said to be the general commandment because all other precepts are subordinate to it as their end, according to I Tim. 1:5: “ the end of the commandment is charity. ” ARTICLE FIVE

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  I. On the first head it is to be noted, that for three reasons we ought chiefly to love our enemies. (1) On account of the precept, “But I say unto you, love your enemies; bless them that curse you, &c.… That ye may be the children of your Father which is in heaven,” S. Matt 5:44, 45. (2) On account of the example of God: “God commendeth His love towards us, in that, while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us.… For if, when we were enemies, we were reconciled to God by the death of His Son, much more, being reconciled, we shall be saved by His life,” Rom. 5:8–10. (3) On account of our profit; for charity towards our enemies causes us to become sons of the Most High God: “Pray for them which despitefully use you, and persecute you,” &c., S. Matt. 5:44. II. On the second head it is to be noted, that for three reasons we ought to persevere in good. (1) That we may avoid blame, since he is greatly blamed who begins and does not persevere: “For which of you, intending to build a tower, sitteth not down first, and counteth the cost, whether he have sufficient to finish it? Lest haply, after he hath laid the foundation, and is not able to finish it, all that behold it begin to mock him, saying, This man began to build, and was not able to finish,” S. Luke 14:28–30. (2) That punishment may be avoided; for he deserves a greater punishment who, having tasted how sweet it is to perform good works, has not persevered in them. “For it had been better for them not to have known the way of righteousness, than after they have known it, to turn from the holy commandment delivered unto them. But it is happened unto them, according to the true proverb, the dog is turned to his own vomit again; and the sow that was washed to her wallowing in the mire,” 2 S. Peter 21, 22. (3) On account of the reward to be acquired, for the reward is earned by perseverance alone: “He that endureth to the end shall be saved,” S. Matt. 10:22. III. On the third head it is to be noted, that for two reasons we ought to expect God alone to be our reward. (1) Because He alone is the true reward: “I am thy shield and thy exceeding great reward,” Gen. 15:1. S. Augustine says, that God will be the reward of all in all, because He will be to us life and salvation, strength and plenty, honour and glory, peace and joy, and all good things. (2) Because He will be an eternal reward: “This is life eternal, that they might know Thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom Thou hast sent,” S. John 17:3.

• From On Earth We're Briefly Gorgeous (2019)

  It’s true that, in Vietnamese, we rarely say I love you, and when we do, it is almost always in English. Care and love, for us, are pronounced clearest through service: plucking white hairs, pressing yourself on your son to absorb a plane’s turbulence and, therefore, his fear. Or now—as Lan called to me, “Little Dog, get over here and help me help your mother.” And we knelt on each side of you, rolling out the hardened cords in your upper arms, then down to your wrists, your fingers. For a moment almost too brief to matter, this made sense—that three people on the floor, connected to each other by touch, made something like the word family. You groaned with relief as we worked your muscles loose, unraveling you with nothing but our own weight. You lifted your finger and, speaking into the blanket, said, “Am I happy?” It wasn’t until I saw the mood ring that I realized you were asking me, once more, to interpret another portion of America. Before I could answer, Lan thrust her hand before my nose. “Check me too, Little Dog—am I happy?” It could be, in writing you here, I am writing to everyone—for how can there be a private space if there is no safe space, if a boy’s name can both shield him and turn him into an animal at once? “Yes. You’re both happy,” I answered, knowing nothing. “You’re both happy, Ma. Yes,” I said again. Because gunshots, lies, and oxtail—or whatever you want to call your god—should say Yes over and over, in cycles, in spirals, with no other reason but to hear itself exist. Because love, at its best, repeats itself. Shouldn’t it? “I’m happy!” Lan threw her arms in the air. “I’m happy on my boat. My boat, see?” She pointed to your arms, splayed out like oars, she and I on each side. I looked down and saw it, the brown, yellowish floorboards swirling into muddy currents. I saw the weak ebb thick with grease and dead grass. We weren’t rowing, but adrift. We were clinging to a mother the size of a raft until the mother beneath us grew stiff with sleep. And we soon fell silent as the raft took us all down this great brown river called America, finally happy. It is a beautiful country depending on where you look. Depending on where you look you might see the woman waiting on the shoulder of the dirt road, an infant girl wrapped in a sky-blue shawl in her arms. She rocks her hips, cups the girl’s head. You were born, the woman thinks, because no one else was coming. Because no one else is coming, she begins to hum.

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xlvii. 3) A speech of the greatest love: proving that Christ was more precious to them than father or mother. And that it might not seem to be said, from thinking that there was no one whose guidance they could look to, he adds, Thou hast the words of eternal life: which shewed that he remembered his Master’s words, I will raise Him up, and, hath eternal life. The Jews said, Is not this the Son of Joseph? how differently Peter: We believe and are sure, that Thou art that Christ, the Son of the living God. AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xxvii. s. 9) For we believed, in order to know. Had we wished first to know, and then to believe, we could never have been able to believe. This we believe, and know, that Thou art the Christ the Son of God; i. e. that Thou art eternal life, and that in Thy flesh and blood Thou givest what Thou art Thyself. CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xlvii. 3) Peter however having said, We believe, our Lord excepts Judas from the number of those who believed: Jesus answered them, Have not I chosen you twelve, and one of you is a devil? i. e. Do not suppose that, because you have followed Me, I shall not reprove the wicked among you. It is worth enquiring, why the disciples say nothing here, whereas afterwards they ask in fear, Lord, is it I? (Matt. 26:22) But Peter had not yet been told, Get thee behind Me, Satan; (Mat. 16:23) and therefore had as yet no fear of this sort. Our Lord however does not say here, One of you shall betray Me, but, is a devil: so that they did not know what the speech meant, and thought that it was only a case of wickedness in general, that He was reproving. The Gentiles on the subject of election blame Christ foolishly. His election does not impose any necessity upon the person with respect to the future, but leaves it in the power of His will to be saved or perish. BEDE. Or we must say, that He elected the eleven for one purpose, the twelfth for another: the eleven to fill the place of Apostles, and persevere in it unto the end; the twelfth to the service of betraying Him, which was the means of saving the human race.

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  AUGUSTINE. (Tract. cxxiv.) Or perhaps he will allow that John still lies in his sepulchre at Ephesus, but asleep, not dead; and will give us a proof, that the soil over his grave is moist and watery, owing to his respiration. But why should our Lord grant it as a great privilege to the disciple whom He loved, that he should sleep this long time in the body, when he released Peter front the burden of the flesh by a glorious martyrdom, and gave him what Paul had longed for, when he said, I have a desire to depart and be with Christ? If there really takes place at John’s grave that which report says, it is either done to commend his precious death, since that had not martyrdom to commend it, or for some other cause not known to us. Yet the question remains, Why did our Lord say of one who was about to die, I will that he tarry till I come? It may be asked too why our Lord loved John the most, when Peter loved our Lord the most? I might easily reply, that the one who loved Christ the more, was the better man, and the one whom Christ loved the more, the more blessed; only this would not be a defence of our Lord’s justice. This important question then I will endeavour to answer. The Church acknowledges two modes of life, as divinely revealed, that by faith, and that by sight. The one is represented by the Apostle Peter, in respect of the primacy of his Apostleship; the other by John: wherefore to the one it is said, Follow Me, i. e. imitate Me in enduring temporal sufferings; of the other it is said, I will that he tarry till I come: as if to say, Do thou follow Me, by the endurance of temporal sufferings, let him remain till I come to give everlasting bliss; or to open out the meaning more, Let action be perfected by following the example of My Passion, but let contemplation wait inchoate till at My coming it be completed: wait, not simply remain, continue, but wait for its completion at Christ’s coming. Now in this life of action it is true, the more we love Christ, the more we are freed from sin; but He does not love us as we are, He frees us from sin, that we may not always remain as we are, but He loves us heretofore rather, because hereafter we shall not have that which displeases Him, and which He frees us from. So then let Peter love Him, that we may be freed from this mortality; let John be loved by Him, that we may be preserved in that immortality. John loved less than Peter, because, as he represented that life in which we are much more loved, our Lord said, I will that he remain (i. e. wait) till I come; seeing that that greater love we have not yet, but wait till we have it at His coming. And this intermediate state is represented by Peter who loves, but is loved less, for Christ loves us in our misery less than in our blessedness: and we again love the contemplation of truth such as it will be then, less in our present state, because as yet we neither know nor have it. But let none separate those illustrious Apostles; that which Peter represented, and that which John represented, both were sometime to be.

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  OUR Lord Jesus Christ in a threefold manner showed Himself to us in eating. Firstly, sacramentally: S. Matt. 26:26, 27, “Take, eat; this is My Body,” &c. Secondly, spiritually: “For what hast thou designed teeth and stomach? Believe, and thou hast eaten” (S. Austin). Thirdly, eternally: “There Thou wilt satiate me of thee with a wonderful satiety” (S. Austin). According to this, He made to us a threefold Paschal Feast—(1) bodily; (2) spiritual; (3) eternal. These three mystical Passovers were those which the children of Israel celebrated—the first in the Exodus from Egypt (Ex. 12:21 et seq.); the second in the desert (Numb. 9:3–5); the third in the land of promise (Jos. 5:10). For the celebrating of the first Passover, in which we eat a Lamb without blemish, sacrified for all, the Apostle in this epistle shows five things to be necessary—(1) That we should be cleansed from carnal concupiscence: “Purge out, therefore, the old leaven.” The “old leaven” is carnal concupiscence, which from our first parent begun to corrupt the lump of human nature: 1 Cor. 5:6, “A little leaven leaveneth the whole lump.” (2) That we may be cleansed from pride: “Neither with the leaven of malice.” Malice is another term to express pride, which is the beginning of all malice: Ecclus. 10:15, “Pride is the beginning of every sin.” (3) That we may be cleansed from an evil covetousness, “And wickedness.” Covetousness is called wickedness because it desires that which is not; for all love the riches of the world, which they can never obtain: Ecclus. 10:10, “Nothing is more wicked than to love money.” (4) A cleansing of the heart is necessary, “But with the unleavened bread of sincerity.” For he who wishes to celebrate this solemn Passover ought himself to be most cleansed: Numb. 18:11, “Everyone that is clean in thy house shall eat of it.” (5) Truth of life is necessary: Ephes. 4:15, “And of truth,” “speaking the truth in love.” He who wishes, therefore, to celebrate this ineffable Passover must be purged from the sin of carnal concupiscence, and of avarice, and of pride; and must be delighted in purity of mind, in truth of life, and will come to that Passover which does not follow the Lenten fast, but will be there a perpetual and eternal solemnity. To which may Jesus Our God bring us. Amen. HOMILY II A RISEN SAVIOUR EASTER DAY.—(FROM THE GOSPEL)“He must rise again from the dead.”—S. John 20:9. IN these words five things are to be noted. Firstly, the infinite goodness of Our Lord Jesus Christ. Secondly, His delightful beauty. Thirdly, His wonderful love. Fourthly, the joyful solemnity of God. Fifthly, the fervent charity of the women.

• From Great Authors of the Western Literary Tradition (2004)

  213 early and eagerly, the vernacular poetry of France. In 1285, Dante married Gemma Donati, with whom he had four children, three sons (John, Peter, and James—named for the three apostles who witnessed Christ’s Transfi guration) and one daughter (Antonia). In 1273 or 1274, Dante caught sight of the lovely Beatrice—probably the daughter of the prominent Florentine Folco dei Portinari—and fell in love with her. Her death in 1290 evoked major changes (as we shall see) in his thought and writing. Dante’s family belonged to the Guelf party in Florence, the party that generally favored alliance with the papacy and the independence of Italian cities from the German emperors. In 1260, the Guelfs suffered a devastating military defeat at Monteperti; thus, Dante was born in a city dominated by the Ghibellines, the party that favored close alliance with the German empire. Between 1267 and 1289, the Guelfs gradually returned to power, aided by the papacy and France. Pope Boniface VIII, elected in 1294, angered many of the Geulfs and, most of all, Dante by his resolute efforts to dominate Tuscany. In 1295, Dante entered public of fi ce in Florence, and in 1300, he served a two-month term as one of the seven priors of the city. In the 1290s, Florentine politics had become more complicated than usual, with the Guelfs dividing into two bitterly opposed groups, the “Blacks” and the “Whites.” The sources make it impossible to identify all adherents or policies. Dante was a White Guelf, and his faction was expelled in 1301–1302, with assistance from troops supplied by Boniface VIII. In 1301, Dante was sent on a diplomatic mission, and in 1302, he was subjected to a decree of exile. From 1302 until his death in 1321, Dante was an exile from Florence, living for various periods under the patronage of prominent urban leaders and fi nally settling in Ravenna. The decade of the 1290s saw crucial changes in Dante’s life and outlook, beginning with his fi rst major work, La vita nuova (“The New Life”), which appeared between 1292 and 1294. The death of Beatrice was a crisis for Dante, whose resolution taught him something new about what poetry is and what it is for. Previously, Dante had written lyrics and sonnets in fairly conventional ways. The “New Life”of the title is Dante’s own. The work puts on display a characteristic that will be in evidence for the rest of Dante’s

• From Great Authors of the Western Literary Tradition (2004)

  434 Lecture 63: Stendhal Stendhal Lecture 63 Christened Henri Marie Beile, [Stendal] was born in 1783 in the city of Grenoble, France. His father was a rich, subtly bourgeois lawyer who eventually became deputy Mayor of the city, and the father’s reactionary politics, his preoccupation with social status, and his obsession with the buying and selling of land, all resurface in the character of Monsieur de Rênal. S tendhal left school at the age of 16 and came to Paris just after Napoleon had seized power in a coup. After serving in a variety of Napoleonic campaigns, Stendhal turned from fi ghting to writing when Napoleon fell, but he remained a partisan of revolution well into the years of restoration, especially when the July Revolution of 1830 gave France a constitutional monarchy under Louis-Philippe. Not surprisingly, Red and Black tells the story of a handsome, talented young man—Julien Sorel— who is devoted to the memory of Napoleon and is fi ercely ambitious. In his quest for advancement, he seduces a succession of increasingly rich and distinguished women: fi rst Madame de Rênal, wife of the mayor of Verrières, then Mathilde de la Mole, daughter of a Parisian aristocrat. Though Madame de Rênal loves him like a mother, her apparent betrayal of him just as he has won the love of Mathilde goads him to attempt a murder; he does not kill her, but his ambitions are destroyed when he is sentenced to be executed. In the end, however, Madame de Rênal’s self-sacri fi cing devotion shows him what it means to be unconditionally loved. Like Julien Sorel, whose life is a roller-coaster of triumphs and tribulations, Stendhal’s early years were marked by victories and setbacks. Arriving just after Napoleon had seized power in a coup, Stendhal landed a post in the Ministry of War. After serving in many of Napoleon’s campaigns and frequenting the theaters and drawing rooms of Paris, he became a sophisticated man of the world. When Napoleon fell in 1815, he became a writer—but with mixed success. Adopting his pen name (Stendhal), he wrote books on art and travel. Expelled

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  [77] First of all, among all worldly things there is nothing which seems worthy to be preferred to friendship. Friendship unites good men and preserves and promotes virtue. Friendship is needed by all men in whatsoever occupations they engage. In prosperity it does not thrust itself unwanted upon us, nor does it desert us in adversity. It is what brings with it the greatest delight, to such an extent that all that pleases is changed to weariness when friends are absent, and all difficult things are made easy and as nothing by love. There is no tyrant so cruel that friendship does not bring him pleasure. When Dionysius, sometime tyrant of Syracuse, wanted to kill one of two friends, Damon and Pythias, the one who was to be killed asked leave to go home and set his affairs in order, and the other friend surrendered himself to the tyrant as security for his return. When the appointed day was approaching and he had not yet returned, everyone said that his hostage was a fool, but he declared he had no fear whatever regarding his friend’s loyalty. The very hour when he was to be put to death, his friend returned. Admiring the courage of both, the tyrant remitted the sentence on account of the loyalty of their friendship, and asked in addition that they should receive him as a third member in their bond of friendship. [Cf. Valerius Maximus IV, 7, Ext. 1; Vincent of Beauvais, Specul. Doctrinale V, 84.] [78] Yet, although tyrants desire this very benefit of friendship, they cannot obtain it, for when they seek their own good instead of the common good there is little or no communion between them and their subjects. Now all friendship is concluded upon the basis of something common among those who are to be friends, for we see that those are united in friendship who have in common either their natural origin, or some similarity in habits of life, or any kind of social interests. Consequently there can be little or no friendship between tyrants and their subjects. When the latter are oppressed by tyrannical injustice and feel they are not loved but despised, they certainly do not conceive any love, for it is too great a virtue for the common man to love his enemies and to do good to his persecutors. Nor have tyrants any reason to complain of their subjects if they are not loved by them, since they do not act towards them in such a way that they ought to be loved by them. Good kings, on the contrary, are loved by many when they show that they love their subjects and are studiously intent on the common welfare, and when their subjects can see that they derive many benefits from this zealous care. For to hate their friends and return evil for good to their benefactors—this, surely, would be too great a malice to ascribe fittingly to the generality of men.

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  Again. Since man’s perfect happiness consists in the enjoyment of God, it was necessary for man’s affections to be disposed to desire it, since he has a natural desire for happiness. Now the desire for the enjoyment of a thing is caused by love of it. Hence it was necessary for man, who seeks perfect happiness, to be urged to the love of God. But nothing is a greater incentive to love someone than the experience of his love for us. And God’s love for man could not be proved more effectively than by His consenting to personal union with man: since it is peculiar to love that it unites lover and beloved, as far as this is possible. Therefore, since man seeks perfect happiness, it was necessary for God to become man. Moreover. Friendship is based on a certain equality, and consequently it would seem that those who are very unequal cannot be united in friendship. And so, that friendship between man and God might be more intimate, it was well for man that God should become man—since friendship between man and man is natural—in order that by knowing a God made visible to us, we might be drawn to the love of things invisible. It is also evident that heaven is the reward of virtue. Consequently those who are on their way to heaven should be disposed by virtue. Now we are incited to virtue by word and example; and a man’s example and word incite us to virtue so much the more efficaciously, as we are firmly convinced of his goodness. But it was not possible to be infallibly certain of a mere man’s goodness, since even the most holy men have at times been found wanting. Wherefore, that man might be strengthened in virtue, it was necessary for him to be taught virtue by the word and example of God incarnate. For which reason our Lord said (Jo. 13:15): I have given you an example, that as I have done to you, so you do also.

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  I answer: God loves all things that exist. For all things that exist are good, in so far as they are. The very existence of anything whatsoever is a good, and so is any perfection of it. Now we proved in Q. 19, Art. 4, that God is the cause of all things. A thing must therefore be, and be good, to the extent which God wills. It follows that God wills some good to each thing that is. Now to love is just to will good for something. Clearly, then, God loves all things that are. But God does not love as we love. Our will is not the cause of the goodness in things, but is moved by their goodness as its object. Consequently, the love by which we will good for anyone is not the cause of his goodness. On the contrary, it is his goodness, whether real or imagined, that inspires the love whereby we will both the preservation of the good which he has and the provision of the good which he lacks, and whereby we also work to this end. God ’ s love, on the other hand, creates and infuses the goodness in things. On the first point: the lover is carried beyond himself and transferred to the loved one in the sense that he wills good for him, and works to provide it as if for himself. Thus Dionysius says in the same passage: “ in the interest of truth we must say that even God, who in his abundant loving-kindness causes all things, is carried beyond himself by his care for all that exists. ” On the second point: it is only in God that creatures have existed from eternity. Yet, since they have existed in himself from eternity, God has known their proper natures from eternity, and for the same reason has also loved them from eternity. Our own knowledge of things as they are in themselves is similar. We know them through their likenesses which exist in us. On the third point: friendship is possible only with rational creatures who can return it, and who can share in the work of life, and fare well in fortune and happiness. Benevolence, also, is properly towards rational creatures. Irrational creatures can neither love God nor share his intellectual life of happiness. Properly speaking, therefore, God does not love them with the love of friendship. But he does love them with the love of desire. For he has ordained them for rational creatures, indeed for himself — not as if he needed them, but for the sake of his loving-kindness, in as much as they are useful to us. We can desire something for others no less than for ourselves.

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  2. Again, the apostle says (I Cor. 3:8): “ and every man shall receive his own reward, according to his own labour. ” But charity lightens labour rather than increases it, since “ love makes every hard and heavy task easy, and almost as nothing, ” as Augustine says (De Verb. Dom., Sermo 9; De Tempt., Sermo 49). Charity is not then the principle of merit more principally than other virtues. 3. Again, the virtue which is most principally the principle of merit would seem to be the virtue whose actions are the most meritorious. Now the most meritorious actions seem to be those of faith and patience, or fortitude. This is apparent from the martyrs, who for their faith remained stedfast unto death with patience and fortitude. Other virtues are therefore the principle of merit more principally than charity. On the other hand: our Lord says: “ he that loveth me shall be loved of my Father, and I will love him, and will manifest myself to him ” (John 14:21). Now eternal life consists in the manifest knowledge of God, according to John 17:3: “ this is life eternal, that they might know thee the only true God. ” The meriting of eternal life therefore depends principally on charity. I answer: there are two sources from which the meritorious character of a human action is derived, as may be understood from what we said in the first article. First and foremost, there is the divine ordination. This is the ground upon which an action is said to merit the good to which a man is divinely ordained. Secondly, there is the free will of man, which gives him the power to act voluntarily on his own part, more than any other creature. In regard to either source, the principle of merit depends especially on charity. For we must observe in the first place that eternal life consists in the enjoyment of God. The movement of man ’ s mind towards the enjoyment of divine good is the proper action of charity, and it is the action of charity that directs all actions of the other virtues to this end, since charity commands the other virtues. The meriting of eternal life therefore depends primarily on charity, and secondarily on other virtues, in so far as their actions are directed by charity. It is apparent, also, that we do most willingly what we do out of love. Even in respect of the voluntary character essential to its nature, therefore, merit depends principally on charity. On the first point: since charity has the ultimate end as its object, it moves the other virtues to act. A habit which relates to an end always commands the habits which relate to the means to it, as we explained in Q. 9, Art. 1.

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  I. On the first head it is be noted, that the Apostle taught us twelve ways of walking; five of them will be mentioned here, and the rest in Homily V. for the Third Sunday in Lent—(1) In humility, lest inflated with pride we are not able to pass up the narrow way. (2) In patience, that we may bear cheerful the toils and the misfortunes of the way. (3) In meekness, that we may have companions on our way, and may not perturb them in the journey. (4) In charity, that we may communicate good words to our companions. (5) In compassion, that we may help the infirmities of the saints. Of these five, Eph. 4:1, 2, “That ye walk worthy of the vocation, with all lowliness,” behold the first; “Long suffering,” behold the second; “Meekness,” behold the third; “Forbearing one another,” behold the fourth; “In love,” behold the fifth. II. On the second head it is to be noted, that five things are needful for us to please God. (1) That we should fear Him above all as omnipotent and just. (2) That we should hope in Him above all, as if in a liberator. Of these two, Ps. 147:11, “The Lord taketh pleasure in them that fear Him,” behold the first; “In those that hope in His mercy,” behold the second. (3) That we should love Him above all, as our highest good: Prov. 8:17, “I love them that love Me.” (4) That we shall sustain tribulations willingly for His sake: Judith 8:23, “All that pleased God passed through many tribulations, remaining faithful.” (5) That for His sake we should despise fleshly delights, and live after the Spirit: Rom. 8:8, 9, “They that are in the flesh cannot please God. But ye are not in the flesh, but in the Spirit,” &c. III. On the third head it is to be noted, that we ought to seek to be holy for five reasons—i.e., be made clean. (1) That we may become like God: 1 S. Pet. 1:16, “Be ye holy, for I am holy.” (2) Lest we should do injury to Christ, Who cleansed us with such great toil and cost: Apoc. 1:5, “Loved us, and washed us from our sins in His Own Blood.” (3) Lest we should be prevented from entering the Heavenly City: Apoc. 21:27, “There shall in no wise enter into it anything that defileth.” (4) That we may be made capable of receiving wisdom: Wisd. 7:27, “Conveyeth herself into holy souls; she maketh the friends of God and prophets.” (5) That we may be worthy to see God: S. Matt. 5:8, “Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God,” which vision Christ has procured for us. [Note, S. Thomas has not treated of the fourth head, and for the fifth he refers to Homily V. for the Third Sunday in Lent.] HOMILY IV

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  Hence God’s grace is designated in Scripture as being a kind of light; for the Apostle says (Ephes. 5:8): You were heretofore darkness, but now light in the Lord. And it is fitting that the perfection whereby man is assisted towards his last end, which consists in seeing God, be named light, which is a principle of vision. Hereby we refute the opinion of those who say that grace places nothing in man: even as nothing is posited in a man by saying that he has the king’s favour (gratiam), but only in the king himself who loves him. It is clear, then, that they were deceived through not observing the difference between divine and human love. For God’s love causes the good which He loves in a man: whereas human love does not so always. CHAPTER CLI THAT SANCTIFYING GRACE CAUSES IN US THE LOVE OF GODFROM what has been said it follows that by the assistance of sanctifying grace man is enabled to love God. For sanctifying grace is an effect in man of the divine love. Now, the proper effect of the divine love in man would seem to be that man loves God. Because the chief thing in the intention of one who loves, is that he be loved in return: since the endeavour of the lover tends especially to draw the beloved to love of him: and unless he accomplishes this, love must cease. Consequently the effect of sanctifying grace in man is that he loves God. Again. Things that have a common end must be united in so far as they are directed to that end: hence in a state men are joined together in concord that they may ensure the good of the commonwealth; and soldiers, when engaged in battle, must needs be united together, and act in unison in order to achieve the victory which is their common end. Now, the last end to which man is conducted by the assistance of divine grace, is the vision of God in His essence, which vision is proper to God himself: so that this final good is communicated to man by God. Consequently man cannot attain to this end unless he be united to God by conformity of will. And this is the proper effect of love; since it is proper to friends to like and dislike the same things, and to have common joys and griefs. Therefore by sanctifying grace man becomes a lover of God: because by it man is directed to an end communicated to him by God.

• From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)

  AUGUSTINE. (Tract. lxxxi. 1) Abide in Me, and I in you: not they in Him, as He in them; for both are for the profit not of Him, but them. The branches do not confer any advantage upon the vine, but receive their support from it: the vine supplies nourishment to the branches, takes none from them: so that the abiding in Christ, and the having Christ abiding in them, are both for the profit of the disciples, not of Christ; according to what follows, As the branch cannot bear fruit of itself, except it abide in the vine, no more can ye, except ye abide in Me. Great display of grace! He strengtheneth the hearts of the humble, stoppeth the mouth of the proud. They who hold that God is not necessary for the doing of good works, the subverters, not the assertors, of free will, contradict this truth. For he who thinks that he bears fruit of himself, is not in the vine; he who is not in the vine, is not in Christ; he who is not in Christ, is not a Christian. ALCUIN. All the fruit of good works proceeds from this root. He who hath delivered us by His grace, also carries us onward by his help, so that we bring forth more fruit. Wherefore He repeats, and explains what He has said: I am the vine, ye are the branches. He that abideth in Me, by believing, obeying, persevering, and I in Him, by enlightening, assisting, giving perseverance, the same, and none other, bringeth forth much fruit. AUGUSTINE. (Tract. lxxxi. 3) But lest any should suppose that a branch could bring forth a little fruit of itself, He adds, For without Me ye can do nothing. He does not say, ye can do little. Unless the branch abides in the vine, and lives from the root, it can bear no fruit whatever. Christ, though He would not be the vine, except He were man, yet could not give this grace to the branches, except He were God. CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxvi. 1) The Son then contributes no less than the Father to the help of the disciples. The Father changeth, but the Son keepeth them in Him, which is that which makes the branches fruitful. And again, the cleansing is attributed to the Son also, and the abiding in the root to the Father who begat the root. (c. 2.). It is a great loss to be able to do nothing, but He goes on to say more than this: If a man abide not in Me, he is cast forth as a branch, i. e. shall not benefit by the care of the husbandman, and withereth, i. e. shall lose all that it desires from the root, all that supports its life, and shall die. ALCUIN. And men gather them, i. e. the reapers, the Angels, and cast them into the fire, everlasting fire, and they are burned.