Contempt
Contempt is the cold emotion — not heat but a lowering of the gaze, the slight curl of the lip, the sense that something or someone has fallen beneath serious response. Where anger still believes the other can be reached, contempt has stopped believing it. Vela reads contempt as a primary emotion with a particular danger to it, distinct from the anger it cools into, and attends to what it costs both the one who feels it and the one it is aimed at.
Working definition · Cold disregard—the sense that something or someone is beneath serious response.
5055 passages · 1 Vela essay · in 1 cluster
Vela’s read on this emotion
Contempt is the most corrosive of the emotions Vela reads, and the reading does not soften that. Anger can clear the air; contempt poisons it slowly, because it has already decided the other does not merit the effort of being addressed. The writers worth following have read contempt as a verdict, and verdicts are the things relationships least survive.
The reading is densest where contempt has been organized against a group or turned against the self. The literature of stigma reads how contempt does its social work — the look that places a person below the line of full regard, aimed at the poor, the sick, the foreign, the queer. Erving Goffman's The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life maps the small social machinery through which standing is granted and withdrawn, which is the stage contempt performs on. The memoir of family harm holds the particular wound of a parent's contempt — worse, often, than a parent's anger, because contempt withdraws the relationship rather than engaging it. Self-contempt, the gaze turned inward, is the form chronic shame takes once it has built a settled stance toward its own bearer.
Contempt is not the same as anger, disgust, or hatred. Anger engages; contempt dismisses. Disgust recoils from contamination; contempt looks down from a height. Hatred is hot and attentive; contempt is cold and inattentive, which is part of why it wounds. The four overlap and the reading keeps them separate, because contempt's coldness is precisely the thing that distinguishes it.
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From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)
This opinion does not concern our point; but let us, for the moment presume it to be erroneous. From this error has arisen the presumption of certain men, especially of monks, who, elated by their holiness, have, at their own pleasure, usurped the functions of ecclesiastics—preaching, and giving absolution, without any episcopal commission. We find their audacity rebuked (XVI, quaest. I, Pervenit ad nos), in the following terms: “We are astonished that in your parish, certain monks, and abbots, have, contrary to the decrees of the holy Fathers, arrogated to themselves the rights and functions of bishops. They administer penance and remission of sins, bring about reconciliations, and dispose of tithes and churches. They ought not to presume to act thus, without license from the bishop, or authority of the Apostolic See,” Now in their condemnation of the presumption of these monks, certain men have fallen into the error of rashly saying that religious are unfitted to perform the duties just enumerated, even though they be appointed thereto by the authority of the Bishop. This error is thus mentioned (XVII, quaest. I), “There are certain men, filled rather with bitter jealousy than with love of truth, who, without any grounds for their assertion, have the presumption to state that monks, who have died to the world in order to live to God, are unworthy of exercising the priestly office, and are incapable of administering penance, of teaching Christianity, or of giving absolution, in spite of the power divinely committed to them at their ordination. But this is a complete error.” Other men, again, are led by their audacity into another mistake. They assert that religious are not merely precluded, by their state of life, from exercising the sacerdotal functions, but that, bishops cannot, without the consent of the parish priests, grant them faculties for their performance. Nay, the Pope himself, they say, cannot qualify religious to act as priests. Thus, this error leads to the same result as that which we have previously mentioned. For while one error detracts from the ecclesiastical power, the other asserts that the power of the church depends upon sanctity of life. Our next task will be to refute this error, and we shall proceed in the following order: First, we shall show that bishops and superior prelates can preach and absolve those who are under the care of priests, without needing the permission of those priests. Secondly, we shall prove that they can empower others to act in like manner. Thirdly, we shall make clear that religious are, when commissioned by a bishop, capable of exercising these functions. Fourthly, we shall demonstrate that it is expedient for the welfare of souls that others, besides parish priests, should be allowed to preach, and hear confessions. Fifthly, it will be shown that a religious order may advantageously be founded for the purpose of preaching and hearing confessions, with license from the bishops. Sixthly, we shall reply to the objections of our adversaries.
From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)
CHRYSOSTOM. What is said here is not opposed to what our Lord says elsewhere, Let your light shine before men; (Matt. 5:16.) that is, that we should be eager to do good for the glory of God, not our own. For vain-glory is a baneful thing, and from hence springs iniquity, and despair, and avarice, the mother of evil. But if thou seekest to turn away from this, ever raise thy eyes to God, and be content with that glory which is from Him. For if in all things we must choose the more learned for judges, how dost thou trust to the many the decision of virtue, and not rather to Him, who before all others knoweth it, and can give and reward it, whose glory therefore if thou desirest, avoid the praise of men. For no one more excites our admiration than he who rejects glory. And if we do this, much more does the God of all. Be mindful then, that the glory of men quickly faileth, seeing in the course of time it is past into oblivion. It follows, For so did their fathers to the false prophets. BEDE. By the false prophets are meant those, who to gain the favour of the multitude attempt to predict future events. The Lord on the mountain pronounces only the blessings of the good, but on the plain he describes also the “woe” of the wicked, because the yet uninstructed hearers must first be brought by terrors to good works, but the perfect need but be invited by rewards. AMBROSE. And mark, that Matthew by rewards called the people to virtue and faith, but Luke also frightened them from their sins and iniquities by the denunciation of future punishment. 6:27–3127. But I say unto you which hear, Love your enemies, do good to them which hate you, 28. Bless them that curse you, and pray for them which despitefully use you. 29. And unto him that smiteth thee on the one cheek offer also the other; and him that taketh away thy cloke forbid not to take thy coat also. 30. Give to every man that asketh of thee; and of him that taketh away thy goods ask them not again. 31. And as ye would that men should do to you, do ye also to them likewise. BEDE. Having spoken above of what they might suffer from their enemies, He now points out how they ought to conduct themselves towards their enemies, saying, But I say to you who hear. AMBROSE. Having proceeded in the enumeration of many heavenly actions, He not unwisely comes to this place last, that He might teach the people confirmed by the divine miracles to march onward in the footsteps of virtue beyond the path of the law. Lastly, among the three greatest, (hope, faith, and charity,) the greatest is charity, which is commanded in these words, Love your enemies.
From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)
AMBROSE. God is justified by baptism, wherein men justify themselves confessing their sins. For he that sins and confesses his sin unto God, justifies God, submitting himself to Him who overcometh, and hoping for grace from Him; God therefore is justified by baptism, in which there is confession and pardon of sin. EUSEBIUS. Because also they believed, they justified God, for He appeared just to them in all that He did. But the disobedient conduct of the Pharisees in not receiving John, accorded not with the words of the prophet, That thou mightest be justified when thou speakest. (Ps. 51:4.) Hence it follows, But the Pharisees and lawyers rejected the counsel of God, &c. BEDE. These words were spoken either in the person of the Evangelist, or, as some think, of the Saviour; but when he says, against themselves, he means that he who rejects the grace of God, does it against himself. Or, they are blamed as foolish and ungrateful for being unwilling to receive the counsel of God, sent to themselves. The counsel then is of God, because He ordained salvation by the passion and death of Christ, which the Pharisees and lawyers despised. AMBROSE. Let us not then despise (as the Pharisees did) the counsel of God, which is in the baptism of John, that is, the counsel which the Angel of great counsel searches out. (Is. 9:6. LXX.) No one despises the counsel of man. Who then shall reject the counsel of God? CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. There was a certain play among the Jewish children of this kind. A company of boys were collected together, who, mocking the sudden changes in the affairs of this life, some of them sang, some mourned, but the mourners did not rejoice with those that rejoiced, nor did those who rejoiced fall in with those that wept. They then rebuked each other in turn with the charge of want of sympathy. That such were the feelings of the Jewish people and their rulers, Christ implied in the following words, spoken in the person of Christ; Whereunto then shall I liken the men of this generation, and to what are they like? They are like to children sitting in the market-place. BEDE. The Jewish generation is compared to children, because formerly they had prophets for their teachers, of whom it is said, Out of the mouths of babes and sucklings hast thou perfected praise. AMBROSE. But the prophets sung, repeating in spiritual strains their oracles of the common salvation; they wept, soothing with mournful dirges the hard hearts of the Jews. The songs were not sung in the market-place, nor in the streets, but in Jerusalem. For that is the Lord’s forum, in which the laws of His heavenly precepts are framed.
From Collected Essays (1998)
The merciless ingenuity of Mr. James M. Cain hit upon an etTectivc solution to this problem in a recent novel by having his protagonist tall in love with a twelve year old, a tcmalc against whom no crime could be charged, who was not yet guilty of the shedding of blood and who thcrcatl:cr kept herself pure for the hero until he returned from his exhausting and improbable trials. This preposterous and tasteless notion did not seem, in Mr. Cain's world, to be preposterous or tasteless at all, but functioned, on the con trary, as an eminently t(>nunatc and farsighted inspiration. Mr. Cain, indeed, has achieved an enormous public and, I should hope, a not inconsiderable fi>rtunc on the basis of his remarkable preoccupation with the virile male. One may sug gest that it was the dynamism of his material which trapped him into introducing, briefly, and with the air of a man wear ing antiseptic gloves, an un attractive invert in an early novel, Serenade, who was promptly stabbed to death by the hero's mistress, a lusty and unli kely senorita. This novel contains a curious admission on the part of the hero to the eftect that there is always somewhere a homosexual who can wear down PRESER VA TION OF INNO CENCE 599 the resistance of the normal man by knowing which buttons to press. This is presented as a serious and melancholy warning and it is when the invert of Serenade begins pressing too many buttons at once that he arrives at his sordid and bloody end. Thus is that immaculate manliness within us protected; thu s summarily do we deal with any obstacle to the union of the Boy and the Girl. Can we doubt the wisdom of drawing the curtains when' they finally come together? For the instant that the Boy and Girl become the Bride and Groom we are forced to leave them; not really supposing that the drama is over or that we have witnessed the fulfillment of two human beings, though we would lik e to believe this, but constrained by the knowledge that it is not for our eyes to witness the pain and the tempest that will follow. (For we know what follows; we know that lif e is not really like this at all .) What are we to say, who have already been betrayed, when this boy, this girl, dis covers that the knife which preserved them for each other has unfitted them for experience? For the boy cannot know a woman since he has never become a man. Hence, violence: that brutality which rages unchecked in our literature is part of the harYest of this unfulfillment, stri dent and dreadful testimony to our renowned and cherished innocence.
From Collected Essays (1998)
Lockridge writes fur too much, there are times when he does not write badly. (It cannot honestly be said that he ever writes well .) His car fc:>r speech is accurate if it is not sensitive; his characterization is vivid-like Sinclair Lewis, or, more accu- 588 LO CKRI DGE: ' THE AM ERIC AN MY TH' 589 rately, like Dickens, he depends on a series of carefully exag gerated foibles-but it is never revelatory; his people are as clear as the sunlight in which they always seem to be bathed and, ultimately, as static and uninteresting. In corporating the nature of the American Myth between the covers of any novel is admittedly a gigantic task; and it is made almost impossible by the fact that so many versions of the same myth are used for so many warring purposes. Which America will you have? There is America for the In dians which Mr. Lockridge mentions hastily and drops. There is America for the people who settled the country, concerning whom Mr. Lockridge is vehemently lyrical but no more star tling than a Thanksgiving hymn. There is America for the laborer, for the financier, America of the north and south, America for the hillbilly, the urbanite, the farmer. And there is America for the Protestant, the Catholic, the Jew, the Mex ican, the Oriental and that arid sector which we have reserved for the Negro. These Americas diverge significantly and some times dangerously and they have much in common. All of them bound doubtfully together create a picture and a climate not indicated in Raint ree County. Mr. Lockridge is not en tirely unaware of these national contradictions; he simply docs not know what to make of them. ('The Union forever!' he cries desperately. '0, beautiful, unanalyzable concept!') At each impasse similar rhetoric is trotted out. The book, which had no core to begin with, becomes as amorphous as cotton candy under the drumming flow of words. These words are designed less to illu minate than they are to conceal; or, more accurately, Mr. Lockridge uses them as a kind of shimmering web, hiding everything with an insistent radiance and proving that, after all, everything is, or is going to be, all right. This dependence on the Word, especially as ill ustrated by this novel, strikes me as something quite peculiarly Amer ican. (In the beginning-and the Word was God.) Here is evinced a remarkable and touching regard tor all things writ ten and an almost slavish respect for anyone who writes. This does not, as one might think, lead to taste or discrimination or insight: the devotion is unqualified. Mr. Lockridge behaves in the presence of the Word like a child let loose in a well stocked ice-cream parlor.
From Collected Essays (1998)
Look at them.) I think of all the pain and sweat with which these greasy dimes were earned, with what trust they were given, in order to make the diff icult passage some what easier for the living, in order to show honor to the dead, and I then have no compassion whatever for this country, or my countrymen. Into this maelstrom, this present elaboration of the slave quarters, this rehearsal for a concentration camp, we place, armed, not for the protection of the ghetto but for the pro- +H NO NAME IN THE STREE T tection of American investments there, some blank American boy who is responsible only to some equally blank elder pa triot- Andy Hardy and his pious father. Richard Harris, in his �C\\' Yo rker article, The Turning Point, observes that "B ack in 19 69, a survey of three hundred police departments around the country had revealed that less than one percent required any college training. Three years later, a pilot study ordered by the President showed that most criminals were mentally below average, which suggested that that policemen who failed to stop or find them might not be much above it." The white cop in the ghetto is as ignorant as he is fright ened, and his entire concept of police work is to cow the natives. He is not compelled to answer to these natives for anything he does; whatever he does, he knows that he will be protected by his brothers, who will allow nothing to stain the honor of the f(>rce. When his working day is over, he goes home and sleeps soundly in a bed miles away-m iles away from the niggers, for that is the way he really thinks of black people. And he is assured of the rightness of his course and the justice of his bigotry every time Nixon, or Agnew, or Mitchell-or the Governor of the State of Calif ornia-open their mouths. Watching the Northern reaction to the Black Panthers, ob serving the abject cowardice with which the Northern popu lations allow them to be menaced, jailed, and murdered, and all this with but the faintest pretense to legality, can fill one with great contempt fix that emancipated North which, but only yesterday, was so full of admiration and sympathy for the heroic blacks in the South. Luckily, many of us were skeptical of the righteous Northern sympathy then, and so we are not overwhelmed or disappointed now. Luckily, many of us have always known, as one of my brothers put it to me something like twenty-f our years ago, that "the spirit of the South is the spirit of America." Now, exactly like the Germans at the time of the Third Reich, though innocent men arc being harassed, jailed, and murdered, in all the Northern cities, the citizens know nothing, and wish to know nothing, of what is happen ing around them.
From Just Mercy: A Story of Justice and Redemption (2014)
Although the federal government had promised racial equality for freed former slaves during the short period of Reconstruction, the return of white supremacy and racial subordination came quickly after federal troops left Alabama in the 1870s. Voting rights were taken away from African Americans, and a series of racially restrictive laws enforced the racial hierarchy. “Racial integrity” laws were part of a plan to replicate slavery’s racial hierarchy and reestablish the subordination of African Americans. Having criminalized interracial sex and marriage, states throughout the South would use the laws to justify the forced sterilization of poor and minority women. Forbidding sex between white women and black men became an intense preoccupation throughout the South. In the 1880s, a few years before lynching became the standard response to interracial romance and a century before Walter and Karen Kelly began their affair, Tony Pace, an African American man, and Mary Cox, a white woman, fell in love in Alabama. They were arrested and convicted, and both were sentenced to two years in prison for violating Alabama’s racial integrity laws. John Tompkins, a lawyer and part of a small minority of white professionals who considered the racial integrity laws to be unconstitutional, agreed to represent Tony and Mary to appeal their convictions. The Alabama Supreme Court reviewed the case in 1882. With rhetoric that would be quoted frequently over the next several decades, Alabama’s highest court affirmed the convictions, using language that dripped with contempt for the idea of interracial romance: The evil tendency of the crime [of adultery or fornication] is greater when committed between persons of the two races….Its result may be the amalgamation of the two races, producing a mongrel population and a degraded civilization, the prevention of which is dictated by a sound policy affecting the highest interests of society and government. The U.S. Supreme Court reviewed the Alabama court’s decision. Using “separate but equal” language that previewed the Court’s infamous decision in Plessy v. Ferguson twenty years later, the Court unanimously upheld Alabama’s restrictions on interracial sex and marriage and affirmed the prison terms imposed on Tony Pace and Mary Cox. Following the Court’s decision, more states passed racial integrity laws that made it illegal for African Americans, and sometimes Native Americans and Asian Americans, to marry or have sex with whites. While the restrictions were aggressively enforced in the South, they were also common in the Midwest and West. The State of Idaho banned interracial marriage and sex between white and black people in 1921 even though the state’s population was 99.8 percent nonblack. It wasn’t until 1967 that the United States Supreme Court finally struck down anti-miscegenation statutes in Loving v. Virginia, but restrictions on interracial marriage persisted even after that landmark ruling. Alabama’s state constitution still prohibited the practice in 1986 when Walter met Karen Kelly. Section 102 of the state constitution read:
From The Swimming-Pool Library (1988)
Aldo was rather delighted to be given a cue and produced a remark of the kind that pass for jokes among people who can barely speak the same language: ‘Ah yes, you see, I am a butcher.’ Gavin smiled and I explained that Staines had found him while doing some studies of working people in Smithfield. ‘I was carrying half a cow,’ said Aldo, ‘all covered in blood. Ronnie said I looked like bacon.’ There were a few seconds of puzzlement before I worked it out: ‘I expect he meant that you looked like a Bacon.’ But it was going to take too much explaining. Aldo continued pleasantly with an account of portering opportunities in offal and the many under-the-counter benefits of his trade (some nice heart or brains one day, the next perhaps some good fresh liver). I found my eyes resting with momentary respect on the chalked-up menu of alfalfa-sprout salad, chickpea casserole, lentil and parsnip pie … ‘Sorry, William, Gavin Croft-Parker, what an honour, Aldo poppet …’—Staines was among us, clutching at hands, emphatically friendly and humble on his great night. ‘Do forgive me. There was that dullest of men from the whatsit, Bright City Lights, whatever it’s called. Apparently everyone’s opinion is simply made by consulting his organ, so you have to be dreamily dreamily compliant and answer all his dreary dreary questions. So ignorant,’ Staines whispered, ‘he’d no idea what a pyx was; and as for a scapular … he said, “Do you mean the collarbone?” I said “I don’t—and anyway it isn’t the collarbone, it’s the shoulderblade.” Clearly he was never a Catholic, and then I’ve ticked him off and he’ll say something vile in his article just because I’ve made him feel small.’ He took a swig from his glass. ‘Still, I suppose it’ll only be half an inch under the “Gay Listings” ’ (a prophecy with which I was bound to agree). ‘I must have a look upstairs,’ said Gavin, weaving away from us, and I nodded to him, realising he was going altogether. When I turned back Staines was negligently fondling Aldo’s muscly shoulder and gazing distractedly around the crowded room. It was probably better to catch him while I could. ‘Excellent show,’ I said. ‘My dear, do you like it. I’m not utterly utterly displeased with it myself. But of course other people’s praise means more to one even than one’s own!’ ‘You’ve managed to find some fascinating models. I like your St Peter particularly—but then I have known him for some time.’ ‘Old Ashley!—or rather Billy, as he calls himself professionally.’ ‘I’d no idea.’ ‘Mm—he thought Ashley was too girly, especially after April … But I still think of him as “Old Ash”—Ash on an old man’s sleeve, dear …’ ‘Fabulous tits!’ ‘Don’t!’ Staines shivered, and looked at me with a new, suspicious curiosity.
From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)
CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. As if He says, You wish me to work many miracles among you, in whose country I have been brought up, but I am aware of a very common failing in the minds of many. To a certain extent it always happens, that even the very best things are despised when they fall to a man’s lot, not scantily, but ever at his will. So it happens also with respect to men. For a friend who is ever at hand, does not meet with the respect due to him. BEDE. Now that Christ is called a Prophet in the Scriptures, Moses bears witness, saying, God shall raise up a Prophet unto you from among your brethren. (Deut. 18:15.) AMBROSE. But this is given for an example, that in vain can you expect the aid of Divine mercy, if you grudge to others the fruits of their virtue. The Lord despises the envious, and withdraws the miracles of His power from them that are jealous of His divine blessings in others. For our Lord’s Incarnation is an evidence of His divinity, and His invisible things are proved to us by those which are visible. See then what evils envy produces. For envy a country is deemed unworthy of the works of its citizen, which was worthy of the conception of the Son of God. ORIGEN. As far as Luke’s narrative is concerned, our Lord is not yet said to have worked any miracle in Capernaum. For before He came to Capernaum, He is said to have lived at Nazareth. I cannot but think therefore that in these words, “whatsoever we have heard done in Capernaum,” there lies a mystery concealed, and that Nazareth is a type of the Jews, Capernaum of the Gentiles. For the time will come when the people of Israel shall say, “The things which thou hast shewn to the whole world, shew also to us.” Preach thy word to the people of Israel, that then at least, when the fulness of the Gentiles has entered, all Israel may be saved. Our Saviour seems to me to have well answered, No prophet is accepted in his own country, but rather according to the type than the letter; though neither was Jeremiah accepted in Anathoth his country, nor the rest of the Prophets. But it seems rather to be meant that we should say, that the people of the circumcision were the countrymen of all the Prophets. And the Gentiles indeed accepted the prophecy of Jesus Christ, esteeming Moses and the Prophets who preached of Christ, far higher than they who would not from these receive Jesus.
From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)
CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xli. 2) For I am not come to condemn, but to save. There is one that accuseth you, even Moses, in whom you trust. As He had said of the Scriptures above: In them ye think ye have eternal life. So now of Moses He says, In whom ye trust, always answering them out of their authorities. But they will say, How will he accuse us? What hast Thou to do with Moses, Thou who hast broken the sabbath? So He adds: For had ye believed Moses, ye would perhaps have believed Me, for he wrote of me, This is connected with what was said before. For where evidence that He came from God had been forced upon them by His words, by the voice of John, and the testimony of the Father, it was certain that Moses would condemn them; (alluding to Deut. 13:1.) for he had said, If any one shall come, doing miracles, leading men to God, and foretelling the future with certainty, you must obey him. Christ did all this, and they did not obey Him. ALCUIN. Perhaps, He says, in accommodation to our way of speaking, not because there is really any doubting in God. Moses prophesied of Christ, A Prophet shall the Lord your God raise up from among your brethren like unto me: Him shall ye hear. (Deut. 18:18) AUGUSTINE. (cont. Faust. l. xvi. c. 9) But, in fact, the whole that Moses wrote, was written of Christ, i. e. it has reference to Him principally; whether it point to Him by figurative actions, or expression; or set forth His grace and glory. But if ye believe not his writings, how shall ye believe My words. THEOPHYLACT. As if He said, He has even written, and has left his books among you, as a constant memento to you, lest you forget His words. And since you believe not his writings, how can ye believe My unwritten words? ALCUIN. From this we may infer too, that he who knows the commandments against stealing, and other crimes, and neglects them, will never fulfil the more perfect and refined precepts of the Gospel. CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xli. 2) Indeed had they attended to His words, they ought and would have tried to learn from Him, what the things were which Moses had written of Him. But they are silent. For it is the nature of wickedness to defy persuasion. Do what you will, it retains its venom to the last. CHAPTER 6 6:1–141. After these things Jesus went over the sea of Galilee, which is the sea of Tiberias. 2. And a great multitude followed him, because they saw his miracles which he did on them that were diseased. 3. And Jesus went up into a mountain, and there he sat with his disciples. 4. And the Passover, a feast of the Jews, was nigh.
From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)
Now it is not within the competency of the Church to punish unbelief in those who have never received the faith, according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor. 5:12): “What have I to do to judge them that are without?” She can, however, pass sentence of punishment on the unbelief of those who have received the faith: and it is fitting that they should be punished by being deprived of the allegiance of their subjects: for this same allegiance might conduce to great corruption of the faith, since, as was stated above (A[1], OBJ[2]), “a man that is an apostate . . . with a wicked heart deviseth evil, and . . . soweth discord,” in order to sever others from the faith. Consequently, as soon as sentence of excommunication is passed on a man on account of apostasy from the faith, his subjects are “ipso facto” absolved from his authority and from the oath of allegiance whereby they were bound to him. Reply to Objection 1: At that time the Church was but recently instituted, and had not, as yet, the power of curbing earthly princes; and so she allowed the faithful to obey Julian the apostate, in matters that were not contrary to the faith, in order to avoid incurring a yet greater danger. Reply to Objection 2: As stated in the article, it is not a question of those unbelievers who have never received the faith. Reply to Objection 3: Apostasy from the faith severs man from God altogether, as stated above [2409](A[1]), which is not the case in any other sin. OF THE SIN OF BLASPHEMY, IN GENERAL (FOUR ARTICLES)We must now consider the sin of blasphemy, which is opposed to the confession of faith; and (1) blasphemy in general, (2) that blasphemy which is called the sin against the Holy Ghost. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether blasphemy is opposed to the confession of faith? (2) Whether blasphemy is always a mortal sin? (3) Whether blasphemy is the most grievous sin? (4) Whether blasphemy is in the damned? Whether blasphemy is opposed to the confession of faith?Objection 1: It would seem that blasphemy is not opposed to the confession of faith. Because to blaspheme is to utter an affront or insult against the Creator. Now this pertains to ill-will against God rather than to unbelief. Therefore blasphemy is not opposed to the confession of faith. Objection 2: Further, on Eph. 4:31, “Let blasphemy . . . be put away from you,” a gloss says, “that which is committed against God or the saints.” But confession of faith, seemingly, is not about other things than those pertaining to God, Who is the object of faith. Therefore blasphemy is not always opposed to the confession of faith.
From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)
Whether it is unlawful to form a judgment from suspicions?Objection 1: It would seem that it is not unlawful to form a judgment from suspicions. For suspicion is seemingly an uncertain opinion about an evil, wherefore the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 3) that suspicion is about both the true and the false. Now it is impossible to have any but an uncertain opinion about contingent singulars. Since then human judgment is about human acts, which are about singular and contingent matters, it seems that no judgment would be lawful, if it were not lawful to judge from suspicions. Objection 2: Further, a man does his neighbor an injury by judging him unlawfully. But an evil suspicion consists in nothing more than a man’s opinion, and consequently does not seem to pertain to the injury of another man. Therefore judgment based on suspicion is not unlawful. Objection 3: Further, if it is unlawful, it must needs be reducible to an injustice, since judgment is an act of justice, as stated above [2877](A[1]). Now an injustice is always a mortal sin according to its genus, as stated above (Q[59], A[4]). Therefore a judgment based on suspicion would always be a mortal sin, if it were unlawful. But this is false, because “we cannot avoid suspicions,” according to a gloss of Augustine (Tract. xc in Joan.) on 1 Cor. 4:5, “Judge not before the time.” Therefore a judgment based on suspicion would seem not to be unlawful. On the contrary, Chrysostom [*Hom. xvii in Matth. in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John of the Cross] in comment on the words of Mat. 7:1, “Judge not,” etc., says: “By this commandment our Lord does not forbid Christians to reprove others from kindly motives, but that Christian should despise Christian by boasting his own righteousness, by hating and condemning others for the most part on mere suspicion.”
From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)
5. And still more clearly by what follows, declaring the nature of the potential intellect: “I call intellect that whereby the soul thinks and under stands”: in which it is manifestly shown that the intellect is something belonging to the human soul. The above tenet (of Averroes) therefore is contrary to the mind of Aristotle and contrary to the truth: hence it should be rejected as chimerical. CHAPTER LXII AGAINST THE OPINION OF ALEXANDER CONCERNING THE POTENTIAL INTELLECTUPON consideration of these words of Aristotle, Alexander determined the potential intellect to be some power in us, that so the general definition of soul assigned by Aristotle might apply to it. But because he could not understand how any subsistent intelligence could be the form of a body, he supposed the aforesaid faculty of potential intellect not to be planted in any subsistent intelligence, but to be the result of some combination of elements in the human body. Thus a definite mode of combination of the components of the human body puts a man in potentiality to receive the influence of the active intellect, which is ever in act, and according to him, is a spiritual being subsisting apart, under which influence man becomes actually intelligent. But that in man whereby he is potentially intelligent is the potential intellect: hence it seemed to Alexander to follow that the potential intellect in us arises from a definite combination of elements. But this statement appears on first inspection to be contrary to the words and argument of Aristotle. For Aristotle shows (De anima, III, iv, 2-4) that the potential intellect is unmingled with the body: but that could not be said of a faculty that was the result of a combination of bodily elements. To meet this difficulty Alexander says that the potential intellect is precisely the predisposition’ (praeparatio, epitedeotes) which exists in human nature to receive the influence of the active intellect; and that this predisposition’ is not any definite sensible nature, nor is it mingled with the body, for it is a relation and order between one thing and another. But this is in manifest disagreement with the mind of Aristotle, as the following reasons show: 3. Aristotle assigns these characteristics to the potential intellect: to be impressed by the intelligible presentation, to receive intelligible impressions, to be in potentiality towards them (De anima, III, iv, 11, 12): all which things cannot be said of any disposition,’ but only of the subject predisposed. It is therefore contrary to the mind of Aristotle, that the mere predisposition’ should be the potential intellect. 4. An effect cannot stand higher above the material order than its cause. But every cognitive faculty, as such, belongs to the immaterial order. Therefore it is impossible for any cognitive faculty to be caused by a combination of elements. But the potential intellect is the supreme cognitive faculty in us: therefore it is not caused by a combination of elements.
From Collected Essays (1998)
This allows him to speak, in the 590 OTH ER ESSAYS same affectionate, admiring tone, of Shakespeare and Shaw nessy, both boy poets. In the beginning one accepts this as a gentle kind of mockery, but, later on, when Mr. Lockridge has become more explicit about his concept of writing and his attitude towards Shakespeare-whose greatest play, by virtue of a dialect we have no room t<>r here, concerned the shooting of Abraham Lincoln and was, unhappily, never written-and has further allowed us to read some of the work produced by his Hero, one concludes that Mr. Lockridge was in earnest all the time. This terrible, blind, indiscriminate dependence on all things literary, which operates to dignity any and all rhet oric and makes of Shakespeare merely a superior rhetorician, is an integral part of this novel; perhaps, indeed, Raintree County would be inconceivable without it. An enduring part of our myth is the right of cvci1'onc to be heard, and this theoretical right has somehow become sufficiently debased so that the mere act of verbalization is endowed with a wholly disproportionate grandeur. This is due, in part perhaps, to the national uneasiness in the presence of a work of art and it is part of our culture, our popular culture: in America anyone can do anything. The writer has, of course, failed unless he is able to reach a large audience; if he is not sufficiently 'close' to the people, sufficiently 'American' he is regarded with sus picion and dislike. We have, in effect, defied the individual out of existence. At the same time there is a lurking distrust and dissatisfaction with the product of this psychology; we arc, as a nation, accused of being artistically shallow. Hence, 'greater' and 'greater' novels, 'mightier' movies, more 'searching' plays. (We have done dreadful things to the adjective, too.) Long articles appear in wide-selling periodicals concerning our na tive talent: we have artists, too, not one whit interior to those of other times and places, and ours arc better paid. The re sultant confused struggling is further cont(mnded by the ne cessity to be ultimately affirmative. (Weekly, Mr. Adams in the Times charts the wretched path trodden by those writers who arc not.) Gloom must have a comedy relict� the acid comment must be t<>llowcd by a cheer. In a word, since a work of art, literary art specifically, is almost always dangerous, we arc aim ing at a product which will be indisputably Art, which will be resoundingly popular-and financially successf ul- and, so tar LOCKR I DGE: 'TH E AM ERIC AN MY TH' 591 from being disturbing, will gratify the national ego and cause no- one-cxccpt, perhaps, our enemies-any trouble at all .
From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)
THEOPHYLACT. But the Lord introduces another parable taken from the same figure, as follows, But why seest thou the mote (that is, the slight fault) which is in thy brother’s eye, but the beam which is in thine own eye (that is, thy great sin) thou regardest not? BEDE. Now this has reference to the previous parable, in which He forewarned them that the blind cannot be led by the blind, that is, the sinner corrected by the sinner. Hence it is said, Or, how canst thou say to thy brother, Brother let me cast out the mote that is in thine eye, if thou seest not the beam that is in thine own eye? CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. As if He said, How can he who is guilty of grievous sins, (which He calls the beam,) condemn him who has sinned only slightly, or even in some cases not at all? For this the mote signifies. THEOPHYLACT. But these words are applicable to all, and especially to teachers, who while they punish the least sins of those who are put under them, leave their own unpunished. Wherefore the Lord calls them hypocrites, because to this end judge they the sins of others, that they themselves might seem just. Hence it follows, Thou hypocrite, first cast the beam out of thine own eye, &c. CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. That is to say, first shew thyself clean from great sins, and then afterwards shalt thou give counsel to thy neighbour, who is guilty only of slight sins. BASIL. (Hom. 9, in Hexameron.) In truth, self knowledge seems the most important of all. For not only the eye, looking at outward things, fails to exercise its sight upon itself, but our understanding also, though very quick in apprehending the sin of another, is slow to perceive its own defects. 6:43–4543. For a good tree bringeth not forth corrupt fruit; neither doth a corrupt tree bring forth good fruit. 44. For every tree is known by his own fruit. For of thorns men do not gather figs, nor of a bramble bush gather they grapes. 45. A good man out of the good treasure of his heart bringeth forth that which is good; and an evil man out of the evil treasure of his heart bringeth forth that which is evil: for of the abundance of the heart his mouth speaketh. BEDE. Our Lord continues the words which He had begun against the hypocrites, saying, For a good tree bringeth not forth corrupt fruit; i. e. as if He says, If thou wouldest have a true and unfeigned righteousness, what thou settest forth in words make up also in works, for the hypocrite though he pretends to be good is not good, who doeth evil works; and the innocent though he be blamed, is not therefore evil, who doeth good works.
From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)
BEDE. (in v. Joan.) That coming is put for believing we know, Come unto Him, and be lightened. He adds, That ye might have life; (Ps. 33) For, if the soul which sinneth dies, they were dead in soul and mind. And therefore He promises the life of the soul, i. e. eternal happiness. 5:41–4741. I receive not honour from men. 42. But I know you, that ye have not the love of God in you. 43. I am come in my Father’s name, and ye receive me not: if another shall come in his own name, him ye will receive. 44. How can ye believe, which receive honour one of another, and seek not the honour that cometh from God only? 45. Do not think that I will accuse you to the Father: there is one that accuseth you, even Moses, in whom ye trust. 46. For had ye believed Moses, ye would have believed me: for he wrote of me. 47. But if ye believe not his writings, how shall ye believe my words? CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xli. 1) Our Lord having made mention of John, and the witness of God, and His own works, many, who did not see that His motive was to induce them to believe, might suspect Him of a desire for human glory, and therefore He says, I receive not honour from men: i. e. I do not want it. My nature is not such as to want that glory, which cometh from men. For if the Son receives no addition from the light of a candle, much more am not I in want of human glory. ALCUIN. Or, I receive not honour from men: i. e. I seek not human praise; for I came not to receive carnal honour from men, but to give spiritual honour to men. I do not bring forward this testimony then, because I seek my own glory; but because I compassionate your wanderings, and wish to bring you back to the way of truth. Hence what follows, But I know you that ye have not the love of God in you. CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xli. 1) As if to say, I said this to prove that it is not from your love of God, that you persecute Me; for He bears witness to Me, by My own works, and by the Scriptures. So that, if ye loved God, as ye rejected Me, thinking Me against God, so now ye would come to Me. But ye do not love Him. And He proves this, not only from what they do now, but from what they will do in time to come: I am come in My Father’s name, and ye receive Me not; if another shall come in his own name, him ye will receive. He says plainly, I am come in the Father’s name, that they might never be able to plead ignorance as an excuse
From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)
I answer that As stated above [3310](A[2]), a martyr is so called as being a witness to the Christian faith, which teaches us to despise things visible for the sake of things invisible, as stated in Heb. 11. Accordingly it belongs to martyrdom that a man bear witness to the faith in showing by deed that he despises all things present, in order to obtain invisible goods to come. Now so long as a man retains the life of the body he does not show by deed that he despises all things relating to the body. For men are wont to despise both their kindred and all they possess, and even to suffer bodily pain, rather than lose life. Hence Satan testified against Job (Job 2:4): “Skin for skin, and all that a man hath he will give for his soul” [Douay: ‘life’] i.e. for the life of his body. Therefore the perfect notion of martyrdom requires that a man suffer death for Christ’s sake. Reply to Objection 1: The authorities quoted, and the like that one may meet with, speak of martyrdom by way of similitude. Reply to Objection 2: When a woman forfeits the integrity of the flesh, or is condemned to forfeit it under pretext of the Christian faith, it is not evident to men whether she suffers this for love of the Christian faith, or rather through contempt of chastity. Wherefore in the sight of men her testimony is not held to be sufficient, and consequently this is not martyrdom properly speaking. In the sight of God, however, Who searcheth the heart, this may be deemed worthy of a reward, as Lucy said. Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([3311]Q[123], AA[4],5), fortitude regards danger of death chiefly, and other dangers consequently; wherefore a person is not called a martyr merely for suffering imprisonment, or exile, or forfeiture of his wealth, except in so far as these result in death. Reply to Objection 4: The merit of martyrdom is not after death, but in the voluntary endurance of death, namely in the fact that a person willingly suffers being put to death. It happens sometimes, however, that a man lives for some time after being mortally wounded for Christ’s sake, or after suffering for the faith of Christ any other kind of hardship inflicted by persecution and continued until death ensues. The act of martyrdom is meritorious while a man is in this state, and at the very time that he is suffering these hardships.
From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)
15:16–2016. And the soldiers led him away into the hall, called Prætorium; and they call together the whole band. 17. And they clothed him with purple, and platted a crown of thorns, and put it about his head, 18. And began to salute him, Hail, King of the Jews! 19. And they smote him on the head with a reed, and did spit upon him, and bowing their knees worshipped him. 20. And when they had mocked him, they took off the purple from him, and put his own clothes on him. THEOPHYLACT. The vainglory of soldiers, ever rejoicing in disorder and in insult, here displayed what properly belonged to them. Wherefore it is said, And the soldiers led him away into the hall called Prætorium, and they call together the whole band, that is, the whole company of the soldiers, and they clothed him with purple as a king. BEDE. (ubi sup.) For since He had been called King of the Jews, and the scribes and priests had objected to Him as a crime that He usurped rule over the Jewish people, they in derision strip Him of His former garments, and put on Him a purple robe, which ancient kings used to wear. AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Evan. iii. 9) But we must understand that the words of Matthew, they put on him a scarlet robe, Mark expresses by clothed him in purple; for that scarlet robe was used by them in derision for the royal purple, and there is a sort of red purple, very like scarlet. It may also be that Mark mentions some purple which the robe had about it, though it was of a scarlet colour. BEDE. (ubi sup.) But instead of the diadem, they put on Him a crown of thorns, wherefore it goes on, And platted a crown of thorns, and put it about his head. And for a royal sceptre they give Him a reed, as Matthew writes, and they bow before Him as a king, wherefore there follows, And began to salute him, Hail, King of the Jews! And that the soldiers worshipped Him as one who falsely called Himself God, is clear from what is added: And bowing their knees, worshipped him, as though He pretended to be God. PSEUDO-JEROME. His shame took away our shame; His bonds made us free; by the thorny crown of His head, we have obtained the crown of the kingdom; by His wounds we are healed. AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) It appears that Matthew and Mark here relate things which took place previously, not that they happened when Pilate had already delivered Him to be crucified. For John says that these things took place at Pilate’s house; but that which follows, And when they had mocked him, they took off the purple from him, and put on him his own clothes, must be understood to have taken place last of all, when He was already being led to be crucified.
From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)
Hence we must say that the faith of those who believe in Christ is praised as being of the first kind. Devils, on the other hand, do not have faith of this kind, but only of the second kind. For they see many unmistakable signs by which they know that the doctrine of the Church is given by God, although they do not see the things themselves which the Church teaches, for example, that God is Three and also One, and the like. On the first point: the faith of devils is such as the evidence of signs compels. Their belief is therefore no credit to their will. On the second point: even though it should be unformed, faith which is the gift of grace inclines a man to believe out of regard for what is good. The faith of devils is therefore not the gift of grace. Rather are they compelled to believe by what they perceive by their natural intellect. On the third point: devils are displeased by the very obviousness of the signs which compel them to believe. Hence the evil in them is not diminished by their belief. ARTICLE THREE Whether One Who Disbelieves One Article of Faith can Have Unformed Faith in the Other Articles1. It seems that a heretic who disbelieves one article of faith can have unformed faith in the other articles. For the natural intellect of a heretic is no better than that of a catholic, and the intellect of a catholic needs the help of the gift of faith in order to believe in any of the articles. It seems, then, that neither can heretics believe in any articles of faith, unless through the gift of unformed faith. 2. Again, the faith contains many articles, just as a single science, such as geometry, contains many conclusions. Any man can have a scientific knowledge of geometry in respect of some geometrical conclusions, even though he is ignorant of others. Similarly, any man can have faith in some of the articles of faith, even though he does not believe the others. 3. Again, just as a man obeys God in believing the articles of faith, so does he obey him in keeping the commandments of the law. He may be obedient in regard to some of the commandments, and not in regard to others. He may therefore have faith in regard to some of the articles, and not in regard to others. On the other hand: as mortal sin is contrary to charity, so is disbelief in one article contrary to faith. Now charity does not remain after a single mortal sin. Neither then does faith remain after disbelief in a single article.
From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)
Besides, in the ceremonies of this art they employ certain characters and geometrical figures. But a figure is no principle of action, imparted or received: or else mathematical drawings would be active and passive. Matter therefore cannot be disposed by geometrical figures to the reception of any natural effect. It follows that these figures are not used as disposing causes, but as signs. Now we use signs only to address other intelligent beings. Magical arts therefore owe their efficacy to some intelligence, to whom the speech of the magician is addressed,—as is also shown by the sacrifices, prostrations, and other rites employed, which can be nothing else but signs of reverence paid to some intelligent nature. CHAPTER CVI THAT THE SUBSISTENT INTELLIGENCE, WHICH LENDS EFFICACY TO MAGICAL PERFORMANCES, IS NOT GOOD IN BOTH CATEGORIES OF BEINGIT remains to be further investigated, what that intelligent nature is, by whose power these operations are carried into effect. To begin with, it is apparent that it is no good and praiseworthy nature. For it is not the behaviour of an intelligence well disposed to lend countenance to acts contrary to virtue. But that is what is done by magical arts: they usually serve to bring about adulteries, thefts, killing, and the like evil practices. Hence they who use such arts are called evil practitioners’ (malefici). 3. The working of a benignant intelligence is to bring men to the proper good things of men, which are the good things of reason: but to draw men away from those good things, and allure them to trifles, is the conduct of an intelligence of a perverse bent. Now by these magical arts men make no profit in the good things of reason, which are sciences and virtues, but only in such trifles as the finding of things stolen, the catching of robbers, and the like. 4. There seems to be a certain grimace and character of unreasonableness attaching to the proceedings of the aforesaid arts. Thus they require an agent who abstains from sexual intercourse, and yet they are frequently employed for the procurement of sexual intercourse in its illicit forms. 6. As it belongs to the good to lead on to goodness, one might expect any right-minded intelligence to lead on to truth, truth being the proper good of the understanding. But the proceedings of magicians are generally of a character to mock men and deceive them. 8. It is not the way of a rightly ordered intelligence, supposing it to be a superior being, to take orders from an inferior; or, supposing it to be an inferior, to suffer itself to be entreated as though it were a superior being. But magicians invoke those whose assistance they use, with supplication, as though they were superior beings; and then, when they have come, they command them as though they were inferiors. CHAPTER CVII