Contempt
Contempt is the cold emotion — not heat but a lowering of the gaze, the slight curl of the lip, the sense that something or someone has fallen beneath serious response. Where anger still believes the other can be reached, contempt has stopped believing it. Vela reads contempt as a primary emotion with a particular danger to it, distinct from the anger it cools into, and attends to what it costs both the one who feels it and the one it is aimed at.
Working definition · Cold disregard—the sense that something or someone is beneath serious response.
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Vela’s read on this emotion
Contempt is the most corrosive of the emotions Vela reads, and the reading does not soften that. Anger can clear the air; contempt poisons it slowly, because it has already decided the other does not merit the effort of being addressed. The writers worth following have read contempt as a verdict, and verdicts are the things relationships least survive.
The reading is densest where contempt has been organized against a group or turned against the self. The literature of stigma reads how contempt does its social work — the look that places a person below the line of full regard, aimed at the poor, the sick, the foreign, the queer. Erving Goffman's The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life maps the small social machinery through which standing is granted and withdrawn, which is the stage contempt performs on. The memoir of family harm holds the particular wound of a parent's contempt — worse, often, than a parent's anger, because contempt withdraws the relationship rather than engaging it. Self-contempt, the gaze turned inward, is the form chronic shame takes once it has built a settled stance toward its own bearer.
Contempt is not the same as anger, disgust, or hatred. Anger engages; contempt dismisses. Disgust recoils from contamination; contempt looks down from a height. Hatred is hot and attentive; contempt is cold and inattentive, which is part of why it wounds. The four overlap and the reading keeps them separate, because contempt's coldness is precisely the thing that distinguishes it.
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From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)
I answer: There are different opinions about this question. Some say that the soul and, indeed, every substance, with the exception of God, is composed of matter and form. The first to maintain this position is Avicebron, the author of the Fons vitae. The reason for this position, which is also mentioned in one of the objections (Obj. 6), is this: that matter is found wherever the properties of matter exist. Wherefore, since the properties of matter are found in the soul, namely, to receive, to be in potency, and other things of this kind, Avicebron is of the opinion that there must be matter in the soul. But this argument is silly, and the position itself is impossible. Now the weakness of this argument become’s apparent if we consider that to receive, to be a subject, and other things of this sort, are not found in the soul and in prime matter in the same specific way. For prime matter is actuated by means of change and motion, and since every change and motion may be reduced to local motion, as the primary and most universal type of motion, as is proved in the Physics [VIII, 7, 260b 6], it follows that matter is present only in those things in which there is potency to place (ab ubi). Moreover, things of this kind, which are circumscribed by place alone, are corporeal. Hence, in accordance with the way in which the philosophers have spoken about matter, matter is present only in corporeal things; unless, of course, someone wishes to employ matter in an equivocal sense. The soul, however, does not receive something by means of motion and change, but, on the contrary, by being separated from motion and from movable things. Accordingly, it is said in the Physics [VII, 3, 247b 10] that the soul becomes cognitive and possesses prudence when at rest. Wherefore the Philosopher also states, in the De anima [III, 4, 429a 30] that intellection is referred to as a passion, but is a passion of a different nature from that present in corporeal things. Therefore, if anyone wishes to conclude that the soul is composed of matter because it is receptive or is acted upon, he is clearly deceived by an equivocation. Consequently it is evident that the aforesaid argument is foolish.
From The Swimming-Pool Library (1988)
I soon saw where I was going, three squat towers which rose above the rooftops of the street: they were some distance away and the shops had turned to curtained terraces by the time I branched off. At the end of a short side-street a narrow ginnel with concrete bollards led into the surprisingly wide area in which the blocks of flats stood. I wondered why they had been forced up to twenty storeys or so when they could easily have spread across the empty ground which they now overshadowed, where the streets which they replaced must once have run. With surreal bookishness the three towers had been named Casterbridge, Sandbourne and Melchester. To get to Sandbourne I wandered across the worn-out grass on a natural path eroded by feet and children’s bikes. In the odorous stillness of the day I thought of the tracks that threaded Egdon Heath, and of benign, elderly Sandbourne, with its chines and sheltered beach-huts. Away to the left a group of kids were skateboarding up the side of a concrete bunker. I somehow expected them to shout obscenities, and was glad I had come ordinarily dressed, in a sports shirt, an old linen jacket, jeans and daps. The buildings, prefabricated units slotted and pinned together, showed a systematic disregard for comfort and relief, for anything the eye or heart might fix on as homely or decent. Rainwater and the overflow pipes of lavatories had dribbled chalky stains across the blank panels, and above the concrete rims of the windows weeds and grass grew from the slime. The only variation came from the net curtains, some plain, some gathered back, a few fringed and archly raised in the middle like the hoop of a skirt. Behind them lay hundreds of invisible dwellings, very small and stuffy, despite the open windows from which, here and there, the thump and throb of pop music could be heard. I found myself sweating with gratitude that I did not live under such a tyranny, dispossessed in my own home by the insistent beat of rock or reggae. Casterbridge, which I came to first, was connected to Sandbourne by a serviceway with, on one side, a double row of garages with buckled up-and-over doors, and on the other a six-foot wall screening, in various compartments, a generator and a number of institutional dustbins on wheels, large enough to dump a body in. At the end of this alley a group of skinheads were playing around, kicking beercans against the wall and kneeing each other in spasmodic mock-fights. One of them, slobbish, with moronic sideburns, and braces hoisting his jeans up around a fat ass and a fat dick, was very good. I looked at him for only a second; a phrase from the Firbank I had just been reading came back to me: ‘Très gutter, ma’am.’
From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)
ORIGEN. (tom. xvii. c. 54) The country of the prophets was Judæa, and every one knows how little honour they received from the Jews, as we read, Whom of the prophets have not your fathers persecuted? (Mat. 23) One cannot but wonder at the truth of this saying, exemplified not only in the contempt cast upon the holy prophets and our Lord Himself, but also in the case of other teachers of wisdom who have been despised by their fellow-citizens and put to deathc. CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxxv. 2) But do we not see many held in admiration by their own people? We do; but we cannot argue from a few instances. If some are honoured in their own country, many more are honoured out of it, and familiarity generally subjects men to contempt. The Galileans however received our Lord: Then when He was come into Galilee, the Galileans received Him. Observe how those who are spoken ill of, are always the first to come to Christ. Of the Galileans we find it said below, Search and look, for out of Galilee ariseth no prophet. And He is reproached with being a Samaritan, Thou art a Samaritan, and hast a devil. And yet the Samaritans and Galileans believe, to the condemnation of the Jews. The Galileans however are superior to the Samaritans; for the latter believed from hearing the woman’s words, the former from seeing the signs which He did: Having seen all the things that He did at Jerusalem at the feast. ORIGEN. (tom. xvii. c. 55) Our Lord by ejecting those who sold sheep and oxen from the temple, had impressed the Galileans with a strong idea of His Majesty, and they received Him. His power was shewn no less in this act, than in making the blind to see, and the deaf to hear. But probably He had performed some other miracles as well. BEDE. They had seen Him at Jerusalem, For they also went unto the feast. Our Lord’s return has a mystical meaning, viz. that, when the Gentiles have been confirmed in the faith by the two precepts of love, i. e. at the end of the world, He will return to His country, i. e. Judæa. ORIGEN. (tom. xiii. c. 55) The Galilæans were allowed to keep the feast at Jerusalem, where they had seen Jesus. Thus they were prepared to receive Him, when He came: otherwise they would either have rejected Him; or He, knowing their unprepared state, would not have gone near them. 4:46–5446. So Jesus came again into Cana of Galilee, where he made the water wine. And there was a certain nobleman, whose son was sick at Capernaum. 47. When he heard that Jesus was come out of Judæa into Galilee, he went unto him, and besought him that he would come down, and heal his son: for he was at the point of death. 48. Then said Jesus unto him, Except ye see signs and wonders, ye will not believe.
From Buddenbrooks: The Decline of a Family (1901)
He had a strangely hunched skull, to which blond hair was glued smooth as a mirror, grey, black-rimmed eyes and long, brown ones Hands sticking out of the too-short sleeves of his neatly brushed jacket. He sat down next to Hanno Buddenbrook, smiled softly and a little slyly and bade the neighbor a good morning, accommodating the prevailing jargon which distorted the word into a bold and careless tone. Then, while everyone around him was chattering, getting ready, yawning and laughing, he began to work silently on the class register, manipulating the pen in an incomparably correct way with slender and straight fingers. After the lapse of two minutes footsteps were heard outside, the occupants of the front pews rose unhurriedly from their seats, and further back this and that followed their example, while others did not let themselves be disturbed in their occupations and hardly noticed that Mr Headteacher Ballerstedt came into the room, hung his hat on the door and went to the lectern. He was in his forties with a likeable embon point, with a large bald head, a reddish-yellow, short beard, a rosy complexion and a mixed expression of unction and comfortable sensuality about his moist lips. He picked up his notebook and leafed through it in silence; but as the quiet in the class left much to be desired, he raised his head, stretched out his arm on the desk, and, while his face slowly swelled so dark red that his beard appeared bright yellow, he flexed his weak and white fist several times, feebly up and down, his lips working convulsively and fruitlessly for half a minute, finally uttering nothing but a short, tight, and groaning "Well , swelled and was satisfied. This was Ballerstedt's way. He had once wanted to be a preacher, but his tendency to stutter and his penchant for worldly well-being made him prefer to turn to education. He was a bachelor, had some fortune, wore a small diamond on his finger and was fond of food and drink. He was the senior teacher who only socialized with his peers on official business, but otherwise mainly with the unmarried commercial life of the city, even with the officers of the garrison, ate twice a day in the first inn and was a member of the "club". If it met larger students anywhere in town at two or three o'clock in the morning, it would swell, never asked from him. The head teacher had gotten together with his uncle Christian too often in a purely human way for him to be happy to get into official conflicts with his nephew... "Well..." he said again, looking around the class, flexing his weakly clenched fist with the small diamond again, and glancing at his notebook. »Perleman. The overview." Somewhere in the class, Perlemann stood up. One hardly noticed that he was climbing up.
From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)
Thirdly, the enemies of religious exaggerate the degree of any evil that may prevail among them. Thus, the venial offences of religious are represented to the world as heinous crimes. St. John tells us that no one can live in the world without sin. “If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves “ (1 John, i. 8). But the men of whom we have been speaking magnify the slight faults observable even in the perfect, and speak of them as though they were serious crimes. Thereby they disobey the exhortation of the Book of Proverbs (xxiv. 15): “ Lie not in wait, nor seek after wickedness in the house of the just,” They call religious false apostles, because they say that they seek hospitality the houses of the wealthy, where they will be best fed; because they assist others in their affairs in order to be entertained by them; because they accept material assistance from those to whom they preach; and on other grounds of the like nature. Now though such actions be faulty, they cannot be called grave crimes, nor ought those guilty of them to be on that account named sinners or false apostles. The Gloss, commenting on the verse in Gal. ii., “We, by nature, are Jews and not of the Gentiles, sinners,” This epithet (i.e. sinner), is not used in the Scriptures of those who, although they live upright and praiseworthy lives, are not wholly free from sin.” This observation applies to those who see the mote in their brother’s eye, but not the beam in their own (Matt. iii. 3). The Gloss further remarks that “many, laden with grave sins, are so filled with envy, hatred and malice that they would rather blame and condemn their neighbour for his lesser offences, than strive to correct him.” In short, those who venomously attack religious for small faults, and remain unconscious of their own serious defects, are precisely those of whom our Lord said that they strain a gnat and swallow a camel (Mat. xxxiii. 24). CHAPTER 2 The Enemies of Religious Spread Abroad Against Them Reports of Which the Truth is Doubtful, for Instance, They Accuse Religious of Seeking Popularity and of Desiring to Gain Glory for Themselves, Instead of Labouring for the Glory of GodWE will next consider how the enemies of religious propagate against them accusations, of which the truth is doubtful.
From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)
PSEUDO-JEROME. He also refused to take sin for which He suffered, wherefore it is said of Him, I then paid the things that I never took. There follows: And when they had crucified him, they parted his garments, casting lots upon them, what every man should take. (Ps. 68:5. Vulg.) In this place salvation is figured by the wood; the first wood was that of the tree of knowledge of good and evil; the second wood is one of unmixed good for us, and is the wood of life. The first hand stretched out to the wood caught hold of death; the second found again the life which had been lost. By this wood we are carried through a stormy sea to the land of the living, for by His cross Christ has taken away our torment, and by His death has killed our death.b With the form of a serpent He kills the serpent, for the serpent made out of the rod swallowed up the other serpents. But what means the shape itself of the cross, save the four quarters of the world; the East shines from the top, the North is on the right, the South on the left, the West is firmly fixed under the feet. Wherefore the Apostle says: That we may know what is the height, and breadth, and length, and depth. (Eph. 3:18) Birds, when they fly in the air, take the shape of a cross; a man swimming in the waters is borne up by the form of a cross. A ship is blown along by its yards, which are in the shape of the cross. The letter Tau is written as the sign of salvation and of the cross. BEDE. (ubi sup.) Or else, in the transverse beam of the cross, where the hands are fixed, the joy of hope is set forth; for by the hands we understand good works, by its expansion the joy of him who does them, because sadness puts us in straits. By the height to which the head is joined, we understand the expectation of reward from the lofty righteousness of God; by the length, over which the whole body is stretched, patience, wherefore patient men are called long-suffering; by the depth, which is fixed in the ground, the hidden Sacrament itself. As long therefore as our bodies work here to the destruction of the body of sin, it is the time of the cross for us. THEOPHYLACT. But their casting lots for His garments was also meant as an insult, as though they were dividing the clothes of a king; for they were coarse and of no great value. And John’s Gospel shews this more clearly, for the soldiers, though they divided every thing else into four parts, according to their number, cast lots for the coat, which was without seam, woven from the top throughout. (John 19:23)
From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)
But the devil is not content with these old devices. Even in our own days he has stirred up some men to declaim against the vow of obedience and all other vows, and to preach that good works are more meritorious when performed without obedience or vow, than when executed under such obligations. Others, again, say that a vow made to enter religion may, without danger to salvation, be broken, and they strive to confirm their opinion by frivolous and empty arguments. For they contend that an act is meritorious in proportion as it is voluntary, and that, if such an act be less voluntary in proportion as it is more necessary, good works done at a man’s pleasure, without the constraint of obedience or vow of any kind, are worth more than such as are performed under the obligation of a vow, either of obedience or of some other nature. They quote in support of their teaching the words of Prosper (Book II. De vita contemplativa), “We ought to fast and abstain, not as though forced by necessity, lest by acting reluctantly we should be called unwilling rather than devout,” They might also bring forward the words of St. Paul (2 Cor. 9:7), “Every one as he hath determined in his heart, not with sadness or of necessity; for God loveth a cheerful giver.” We must now show the fallacy of these arguments, and confute this foolish reasoning. First, in order to manifest the error of these arguments we will quote the Gloss on the verse of Ps. 75:12, “Vow ye and pay to the Lord your God.” “We must observe,” says the Gloss, “that some vows made to God are common to all men, and are necessary to salvation: such are our Baptismal promises and the like, which we should be bound to keep, even if we had not made them. The verse, ‘Vow ye and pay,’ alludes to such vows as these, and is addressed to all men. There are also other vows made by individuals, such as chastity, virginity, and the like. The Psalmist invites us, but does not command us, to make such vows as these, and to pay them when we have made them. For the emission of a vow is a decision of the will; but the payment of such a vow is a decided necessity.”
From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)
And thus it has been stated what nature is, and what it is that has nature, and what is ‘ according to nature ’ . 148. Next where he says, ‘ That nature exists... ’ (193 a 2), he denies the presumptuous position of those who wish to demonstrate that nature exists. He says that it is ridiculous for anyone to attempt to demonstrate that nature exists. For it is manifest to the senses that many things are from nature, which have in themselves the principle of their own motion. To wish, moreover, to demonstrate the obvious by what is not obvious is the mark of a man who cannot judge what is known in itself and what is not known in itself. For when he wishes to demonstrate that which is known in itself, he uses that which is known in itself as if it were not known in itself. And it is clear that some people do this. A man who is born blind may sometimes reason about colours. But that which he uses as a principle is not known to him per se, because he has no understanding of the thing. Rather he only uses names. For our knowledge has its origin from the senses, and he who lacks one sense, lacks one science. Hence those who are born blind, and who never sense colour, cannot understand any thing about colour. And so they use the unknown as if it were known. And the converse applies to those who wish to demonstrate that nature exists. For they use the known as if it were not known. The existence of nature is known per se, insofar as natural things are manifest to the senses. But what the nature of each thing is, or what the principle of its motion is, is not manifest. Hence it is clear from this that Avicenna, who wished that it were possible to prove the existence of nature, unreasonably attempted to disprove what Aristotle has said. However Avicenna did not wish to prove this from natural things, for no science proves its own principles. But ignorance of moving principles does not mean that the existence of nature is not known per se, as was said. LECTURE 2 (193.A 9-B 21) NATURE IS BOTH MATTER AND FORM, BUT PRIMARILY FORM149. Having shown what nature is, the Philosopher here points out the number of ways in which the name ‘ nature ’ is used. He shows first that nature is predicated of matter, secondly that it is predicated of form, where he says, ‘ Another account ... ’ (193 a 30 151).
From Heptaméron (1559)
his wife, that the king might take it from her. He quickly got what he sought, infected his wife, and she the king, who gave it to several other women with whom he conversed ; and he never could be thoroughly cured, for all the rest of his life he was unhealthy, sad, peevish, and inaccessible." {Diverses Leqons de Louis Guyon, neur de la Nauche. Lyon, 1610, t. il, p. 109.) Brantome also speaks of the malady contracted by the king through his gallantries, and says that it shortened his life ; but he does not mention any woman in particular, or allude to the story of the advocate's wife. " Many have thought that she was no other than ' La belle Feronniere,' so called because she was married to an advocate of the Le F^ron family, many members of which were distinguished in the bar of Paris." "We must then," say the Bibliophiles Francais, "number among apocryphal anecdotes the last and vilest part of the adven- ture of the advocate of Paris. What is true, Margaret has made known to us ; modern historians, even those who have shown them- selves most unfavourable to Francis I., have not reproduced the fact stated by Louis Guyon. M. Genin, editor of Margaret's letters, has even published the postscript of a letter of Cardinal d'Armagnac, which proves that at least a year before his death the king was in perfect health. [?y&Q Lettres de Marguerite d'Angoii- leme, &c., 1841, 8vo., p. 473.) Thus is annihilated the ignoble accusation of a shameful disease which should have hastened the death of Francis L" In Grammont's Memoirs it is related that the Duke of York, afterwards James II., was the victim of the same sort of revenge on the part of a jealous husband as that attributed to the advocate of Paris. 254 THE HEPTAMERON- OF HIE [.Voz'f/ 2^ few great lords who give themselves any concern either about the honour of women or public scandal, provided they have their pleasure. Frequently, even, they act in such a manner as to make people believe more than the truth." " It would be well," said Oisille, " if all yOung lords followed this example, for often the scandal is worse than the sin." "You may well believe," said Noraerfide, "that the prayers he offered up in church were very sincere and very acceptable to God." " That is not a question for you to decide," said Par- lamente, "for, perhaps, his repentance was such on his return from his assignation that his sin was forgiven." " It is very difficult," said Hircan, " to repent of a thing that gives such pleasure. For my part, I have often confessed, but hardly repented it." " If one does not repent, it were better not to con- fess," observed Oisille. "Sin displeases me, madam," rejoined Hircan. "I am vexed at offending God ; but pleasure pleases me."
From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)
REMIGIUS. John explains what their envy was, when he says, Behold, the world is gone after him; (John 12:19.) and, If we let him thus alone, all men will believe on him. (John 11:48.) Observe also that in place of what Matthew says, Jesus, who is called Christ, Mark says, Will ye that I release unto you the King of the Jews? (Mark 15:9.) For the kings of the Jews alone were anointed, and from that anointing were called Christs. CHRYSOSTOM. Then is added something else which alone was enough to deter all from putting Him to death; When we he as set on the judgment seat, his wife sent unto him, saying, Have thou nothing to do with that just man. For joined with the proof afforded by the events themselves, a dream was no light confirmation. RABANUS. It is to be noted, that the bench (tribunal) is the seat of the judge, the throne (solium) of the king, the chair (cathedra) of the master. In visions and dreams the wife of a Gentile understood what the Jews when awake would neither believe nor understand. JEROME. Observe also that visions are often vouchsafed by God to the Gentiles, and that the confession of Pilate and his wife that the Lord was innocent is a testimony of the Gentile people. CHRYSOSTOM. But why did Pilate himself not see this vision? Because his wife was more worthy; or because if Pilate had seen it, he would not have had equal credit, or perhaps would not have told it; wherefore it is provided by God that his wife should see it, and thus it be made manifest to all. And she not merely sees it, but suffers many things because of him, so that sympathy with his wife would make the husband more slack to put Him to death. And the time agreed well, for it was the same night that she saw it. CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. iii. in Cæn. Dom.) Thus then the judge is terrified through his wife, and that he might not consent in the judgment to the accusation of the Jews, himself endured judgment in the affliction of his wife; the judge is judged, and tortured before he tortures. RABANUS. Or otherwise; The devil now at last understanding that he should lose his trophies through Christ, as he had at the first brought in death by a woman, so by a woman he would deliver Christ out of the hands of His enemies, lest through His death he should lose the sovereignty of death. CHRYSOSTOM. But none of the foregoing things moved Christ’s enemies, because envy had altogether blinded them, and of their own wickedness they corrupt the people, for they persuaded the people that they should ask Barabbas, and destroy Jesus. ORIGEN. Thus it is plainly seen how the Jewish people is moved by its elders and the doctors of the Jewish system, and stirred up against Jesus to destroy Him.
From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)
3. The words quoted from St. Mark vi and Luke x. plainly allude to men whose inordinate desires induce them to run from house to house in hopes of being supplied more abundantly with food by one family than by another. 4. The text of Isaiah (xxx.) warns us against that inconstancy of mind, which tempts the man whose soul does not rest in God, to flit from one object to another, finding rest in none. The words, in their literal sense, refer to the Jews who, not satisfied with the Divine assistance accorded to them, desired to go down into Egypt to seek protection from the Egyptians. The words quoted from Jeremias are likewise a warning against that love of wandering about which arises from lightness of mind. This appears by the context, “These people have loved to move their feet.” For, they who move easily, delight in motion. And the Gloss, on this passage, explains the movement of the feet to mean movement of the affections. CHAPTER 4 Attacks Made on Religious Because They StudyWE now proceed to consider the objections brought against the studious life led by religious. 1. We find (2 Tim. iii. 7) certain persons, who were a danger to the Church, accused of “ever learning and never attaining to the knowledge of the truth.” For this reason, it is considered a suspicious circumstance when religious are fond of study. 2. St. Gregory makes the following remarks on the words of Job xvi., “My enemy has looked at me with terrible eyes”: “The Incarnate Truth,” he writes (XIII Moral.), “chose for His preachers such as were poor, simple, and unlearned. But, on the other hand, the astute and double-tongued man, filled with the knowledge of this world, whom at the end of time the Apostate Angel will elect to propagate his falsehood, will be damned.” Hence religious, because they exercise the office of preaching in a learned manner, are regarded as the forerunners of Antichrist. 3. “I saw another beast coming up out of the earth, and he had two horns like a lamb” (Rev. xiii. 11). On these words of the Apocalypse the Gloss remarks: “The description of the tribulation which will be caused by Antichrist and his princes is followed by a narrative of the evils which will befall the Church, by means of the apostles of Antichrist, who will travel throughout the entire world.” Again, “coming up out of the earth” signifies “ going forth to preach” (Gloss). On the words “it had two horns” the Gloss remarks: “These preachers are said to have two horns, because they will profess to imitate the innocent and spotless life of our Lord, to work miracles resembling His, and to preach His doctrine; or else because they will usurp to themselves the two Testaments.” Hence it would appear that they who go forth to preach, with the knowledge of the two Testaments, and with an appearance of sanctity, are the apostles of Antichrist.
From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)
But Axistotle shows the contrary. He says that one who speaks in this manner, i.e., one who says that nature does not act for the sake of something, destroys nature and the things which are according to nature. For those things are said to be according to nature which are moved continuously by some intrinsic principle until they arrive at some end—not to some contingent end, and not from any principle to any end, but from a determinate principle to a determinate end. For progress is always made from the same principle to the same end, unless something impedes it. However, that for the sake of which something is done sometimes happens to occur by fortune, when [that which is done] is not done for the sake of this. For example, if some stranger should come and leave after he has bathed, we say this was by fortune. For he did not bathe himself as if he had come for this purpose, since he did not come for this. Hence his bathing is accidental (for fortune is a per accidens cause, as was said above; L8 214). But if this should happen always or in most instances to him who comes, it would not be said to be by fortune. But in natural things events occur not per accidens but always, unless something should impede. Hence, it is clear that the determinate end which follows in nature does not follow by chance, but from the intention of nature. And from this it is clear that it is contrary to the meaning [ratio] of nature to say that nature does not act for the sake of something. 268. Next where he says, ‘ It is absurd... ’ (199 b 26), he destroys the third point by which some hold the opinion that nature does not act for the sake of something. For it seems to some that nature does not act for the sake of something because nature does not deliberate.
From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)
Reply to Objection 3: Properly speaking, the sin of blasphemy is not in this way divided into three species: since to affirm unfitting things, or to deny fitting things of God, differ merely as affirmation and negation. For this diversity does not cause distinct species of habits, since the falsehood of affirmations and negations is made known by the same knowledge, and it is the same ignorance which errs in either way, since negatives are proved by affirmatives, according to Poster. i, 25. Again to ascribe to creatures things that are proper to God, seems to amount to the same as affirming something unfitting of Him, since whatever is proper to God is God Himself: and to ascribe to a creature, that which is proper to God, is to assert that God is the same as a creature. Whether blasphemy is always a mortal sin?Objection 1: It would seem that blasphemy is not always a mortal sin. Because a gloss on the words, “Now lay you also all away,” etc. (Col. 3:8) says: “After prohibiting greater crimes he forbids lesser sins”: and yet among the latter he includes blasphemy. Therefore blasphemy is comprised among the lesser, i.e. venial, sins. Objection 2: Further, every mortal sin is opposed to one of the precepts of the decalogue. But, seemingly, blasphemy is not contrary to any of them. Therefore blasphemy is not a mortal sin. Objection 3: Further, sins committed without deliberation, are not mortal: hence first movements are not mortal sins, because they precede the deliberation of the reason, as was shown above ([2410]FS, Q[74], AA[3],10). Now blasphemy sometimes occurs without deliberation of the reason. Therefore it is not always a mortal sin. On the contrary, It is written (Lev. 24:16): “He that blasphemeth the name of the Lord, dying let him die.” Now the death punishment is not inflicted except for a mortal sin. Therefore blasphemy is a mortal sin. I answer that, As stated above ([2411]FS, Q[72], A[5]), a mortal sin is one whereby a man is severed from the first principle of spiritual life, which principle is the charity of God. Therefore whatever things are contrary to charity, are mortal sins in respect of their genus. Now blasphemy, as to its genus, is opposed to Divine charity, because, as stated above [2412](A[1]), it disparages the Divine goodness, which is the object of charity. Consequently blasphemy is a mortal sin, by reason of its genus. Reply to Objection 1: This gloss is not to be understood as meaning that all the sins which follow, are mortal, but that whereas all those mentioned previously are more grievous sins, some of those mentioned afterwards are less grievous; and yet among the latter some more grievous sins are included.
From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)
Reply to Objection 2: It is one thing to judge of things and another to judge of men. For when we judge of things, there is no question of the good or evil of the thing about which we are judging, since it will take no harm no matter what kind of judgment we form about it; but there is question of the good of the person who judges, if he judge truly, and of his evil if he judge falsely because “the true is the good of the intellect, and the false is its evil,” as stated in Ethic. vi, 2, wherefore everyone should strive to make his judgment accord with things as they are. On the other hand when we judge of men, the good and evil in our judgment is considered chiefly on the part of the person about whom judgment is being formed; for he is deemed worthy of honor from the very fact that he is judged to be good, and deserving of contempt if he is judged to be evil. For this reason we ought, in this kind of judgment, to aim at judging a man good, unless there is evident proof of the contrary. And though we may judge falsely, our judgment in thinking well of another pertains to our good feeling and not to the evil of the intellect, even as neither does it pertain to the intellect’s perfection to know the truth of contingent singulars in themselves. Reply to Objection 3: One may interpret something for the worst or for the best in two ways. First, by a kind of supposition; and thus, when we have to apply a remedy to some evil, whether our own or another’s, in order for the remedy to be applied with greater certainty of a cure, it is expedient to take the worst for granted, since if a remedy be efficacious against a worse evil, much more is it efficacious against a lesser evil. Secondly we may interpret something for the best or for the worst, by deciding or determining, and in this case when judging of things we should try to interpret each thing according as it is, and when judging of persons, to interpret things for the best as stated above. Whether we should always judge according to the written law?Objection 1: It would seem that we ought not always to judge according to the written law. For we ought always to avoid judging unjustly. But written laws sometimes contain injustice, according to Is. 10:1, “Woe to them that make wicked laws, and when they write, write injustice.” Therefore we ought not always to judge according to the written law. Objection 2: Further, judgment has to be formed about individual happenings. But no written law can cover each and every individual happening, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 10). Therefore it seems that we are not always bound to judge according to the written law.
From Deceptions and Myths of the Bible (1975)
The Apollos thereof was, perhaps, Apollonius of Tyana, whose “miracles” so mystified Justin Martyr that he exclaimed: “How is it that the talismans of Apollonius have power in certain members of creation, for they prevent, as we see, the fury of the waves, and the violence of the winds, and the attack of wild beasts; and whilst our Lord’s miracles are preserved by tradition alone, those of Apollonius are most numerous and actually manifest in present facts.” Of this man the American Encyclopedia says: “A Pythagorean philosopher born at Tyana, about the beginning of the Christian era. He professed miraculous powers, was venerated for his wisdom and considered by some a rival of Christ.” Here was a man who had some useful human power while the Church’s miracle worker was only “preserved by tradition,” and founded on mythology. Little wonder then his talismans didn’t work while Apollonius’s did. According to some, we are indebted to this man for the entire story of Christ. The argument runs thus: There was in ancient India a very great sage called Deva Bodhisatoua. Among other things he wrote a mythological account of Krishna, sometimes spelled Chrishna. About 38 or 40 A.D., Apollonius while traveling in the East found this story in Singapore. He considered it so important he translated it into his own language, namely, Samarian. In this he made several changes according to his own understanding and philosophy. On his return he brought it to Antioch, and there he died. Some thirty years later another Samaritan, Marcion, found it. He too made a copy with still more changes. This he brought to Rome about 130 A.D., where he translated it into Greek and Latin. This was seized upon by a hungry and disinherited priesthood and developed into the New Testament. Apollonius became Apollo, Marcion, Mark, and Chrishna, Christ. True or not, many of the things attributed to Christ are also in the Chrishna story. His raising of Jairus’s daughter, for instance, is too similar to that of Chrishna’s raising of Angashuna’s daughter to be anything other than a copy. The coming of the Magi, the herald angels also figure in the Hindu account. For the raising of Angashuna’s daughter see page 339. Had there actually lived a man who could raise the dead, heal the sick and walk on the water, history would have recorded it. Why then did it not? For lack of historians? Had this been the case, the believers would have at least a negative proof, but oddly enough the period was peculiarly distinguished in this respect. There were many historians just then and some of them the most illustrious of all time—Tacitus, Plutarch, Livy, the two Plinys, Philo and Josephus, among others; and besides these, many men of literary note such as Seneca, Martial, Juvenal, Epictetus, Plotinus and Porphyry.
From Deceptions and Myths of the Bible (1975)
Such is the vision Ezekiel claimed to have had—and it was no vision. These four creatures, man and ox, lion and eagle are but Aquarius, Taurus, Leo and Scorpio, the four cardinal points of the stellar zodiac, and hence of the creative process. All antiquity knew about them, and every race made use of them in its art and mythology. Why then should they be a revelation to Ezekiel? Among the Orphics they were designated Dragon, Bull, Lion, and Eagle. The Chaldeo-Babylonians called them Oustour, the Man; Kirub, the Bull; Nirgal, the Lion; and Nathga, the Eagle. In the Hindu pantheon they are the cosmic Maharajas, otherwise known as the Asuras, Kinnaras and Nagas; also the Avengers, the Winged Wheels, the Locapalas or supporters of the world. As the latter they were respectively Indra, the East; Yama, the South; Varuna, the West; and Kuvara, the North. There is a drawing by Levi of these four animals enclosed in a six-pointed star, with the Hebrew name Adoniowtv it. In India there is a similar picture with the word Adonari over it, hence the Adoni of the scriptures. Their word cherub comes from the Babylonian Kirub, the Bull, and means only a creative force. The ox, an emasculated bull, is one with the emasculated Uranus, and both are third-plane symbolism. The complexity, a “wheel within a wheel” and many other wheels, is but the zodiac itself, with its cosmogonical, precessional, annual and diurnal cycles within it. The “whirlwind” is its ceaseless motion. The ancient symbol of this was the swastika, turning thustfi. The Ancients called it “The Wheel of Fire.” The “eyes” of the wheel are symbols of the creative intelligence within this complexity. The four beasts “had the likeness of a man”; in plain words, they are Man, Aquarius, the evolving Life Principle. This is the one and only factor in Creation, the God of religion being but a priestly necessity. In this alleged vision of God there is nothing new or personal. Buddha was called “the Wheel king”; Shamash, the Babylonian god, is shown seated upon a throne with a wheel behind him, and the spokes of the wheel are made of stars instead of eyes. The Assyrians pictured their god Asshur within a wheel, and they said, “The life of God is within the wheel.” “It is highly probable therefore that when he described the four living creatures and the wheel, Ezekiel was simply making use of Assyrian symbology which he had seen again and again when the Jews were in captivity.” E. E. Goldsmith.1 And again, “The Hebrews merely used for their poetic imagery the characteristic beliefs of the people to whom they made direct reference.” And Madame Blavatsky asserts: “The religion of the Masters—the Babylonians and Assyrians—was transferred almost bodily into the revealed Scriptures of the Captives and from there into Christianity.” And now its four beasts are the four angels of the Catholic Church—Michael, Gabriel, Raphael, and Uriel, and when humanized, Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John.
From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)
Objection 2: Further, it belongs to magnanimity that one should deem oneself worthy of great things. But a man is said to be presumptuous even if he deem himself worthy of small things, if they surpass his ability. Therefore presumption is not directly opposed to magnanimity. Objection 3: Further, the magnanimous man looks upon external goods as little things. Now according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3), “on account of external fortune the presumptuous disdain and wrong others, because they deem external goods as something great.” Therefore presumption is opposed to magnanimity, not by excess, but only by deficiency. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 3) that the “vain man,” i.e. a vaporer or a wind-bag, which with us denotes a presumptuous man, “is opposed to the magnanimous man by excess.” I answer that, As stated above ([3360]Q[129], A[3], ad 1), magnanimity observes the means, not as regards the quantity of that to which it tends, but in proportion to our own ability: for it does not tend to anything greater than is becoming to us. Now the presumptuous man, as regards that to which he tends, does not exceed the magnanimous, but sometimes falls far short of him: but he does exceed in proportion to his own ability, whereas the magnanimous man does not exceed his. It is in this way that presumption is opposed to magnanimity by excess. Reply to Objection 1: It is not every presumption that is accounted a sin against the Holy Ghost, but that by which one contemns the Divine justice through inordinate confidence in the Divine mercy. The latter kind of presumption, by reason of its matter, inasmuch, to wit, as it implies contempt of something Divine, is opposed to charity, or rather to the gift of fear, whereby we revere God. Nevertheless, in so far as this contempt exceeds the proportion to one’s own ability, it can be opposed to magnanimity. Reply to Objection 2: Presumption, like magnanimity, seems to tend to something great. For we are not, as a rule, wont to call a man presumptuous for going beyond his powers in something small. If, however, such a man be called presumptuous, this kind of presumption is not opposed to magnanimity, but to that virtue which is about ordinary honor, as stated above ([3361]Q[129], A[2]).
From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)
BEDE. (ubi sup.) But this superscription on the cross shews, that they could not even in killing Him take away the kingdom over them from Him who was about to render unto them according to their works. There follows: And with him they crucify two thieves, the one on his right hand, the other on his left. THEOPHYLACT. They did this that men might have a bad opinion of Him, as though He also were a robber and a malefactor. But it was done by Providence to fulfil the Scriptures. There follows: And the Scripture was fulfilled which saith, And he was numbered with the transgressors. PSEUDO-JEROME. Truth was numbered with the wicked; He left one on His left hand, the other He takes on the right, as He will do at the last day. With a similar crime they are allotted different paths; one precedes Peter into Paradise, the other Judas into hell. A short confession won for him a long life, and a blasphemy which soon ended is punished with endless pain. BEDE. (ubi sup.) Mystically, however, the thieves crucified with Christ signify those, who by their faith and confession of Christ undergo either the struggle of martyrdom, or some rules of a stricter discipline. But those who do these deeds for the sake of endless glory, are signified by the faith of the right hand robber; those again who do them for worldly praise copy the mind and the acts of the left hand robber. THEOPHYLACT. Or else; the two robbers were meant to point out the two people, that is, the Jews and the Gentiles, for both were evil, the Gentile as transgressing natural law, but the Jew by breaking the written law, which the Lord had delivered to them; but the Gentile was penitent, the Jew a blasphemer unto the end. Between whom our Lord is crucified, for He is the corner stone, which binds us together. 15:29–3229. And they that passed by railed on him, wagging their heads, and saying, Ah, thou that destroyest the temple, and buildest it in three days, 30. Save thyself, and come down from the cross. 31. Likewise also the Chief Priests mocking said among themselves with the Scribes, He saved others; himself he cannot save. 32. Let Christ the King of Israel descend now from the cross, that we may see and believe. And they that were crucified with him reviled him. PSEUDO-JEROME. The foal of Judah (Gen. 49:11.) has been tied to the vine, and his clothes dyed in the blood of the grape, and the kids tear the vine, blaspheming Christ, and wagging their heads. Wherefore it is said: And they that passed by railed on him, wagging their heads, and saying, Ah, thou that destroyest the temple.
From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)
Objection 3: Further, according to some, there are three kinds of blasphemy. The first of these is when something unfitting is affirmed of God; the second is when something fitting is denied of Him; and the third, when something proper to God is ascribed to a creature, so that, seemingly, blasphemy is not only about God, but also about His creatures. Now the object of faith is God. Therefore blasphemy is not opposed to confession of faith. On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:12,13): “I . . . before was a blasphemer and a persecutor,” and afterwards, “I did it ignorantly in” my “unbelief.” Hence it seems that blasphemy pertains to unbelief. I answer that, The word blasphemy seems to denote the disparagement of some surpassing goodness, especially that of God. Now God, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i), is the very essence of true goodness. Hence whatever befits God, pertains to His goodness, and whatever does not befit Him, is far removed from the perfection of goodness which is His Essence. Consequently whoever either denies anything befitting God, or affirms anything unbefitting Him, disparages the Divine goodness. Now this may happen in two ways. In the first way it may happen merely in respect of the opinion in the intellect; in the second way this opinion is united to a certain detestation in the affections, even as, on the other hand, faith in God is perfected by love of Him. Accordingly this disparagement of the Divine goodness is either in the intellect alone, or in the affections also. If it is in thought only, it is blasphemy of the heart, whereas if it betrays itself outwardly in speech it is blasphemy is opposed to confession of faith. Reply to Objection 1: He that speaks against God, with the intention of reviling Him, disparages the Divine goodness, not only in respect of the falsehood in his intellect, but also by reason of the wickedness of his will, whereby he detests and strives to hinder the honor due to God, and this is perfect blasphemy. Reply to Objection 2: Even as God is praised in His saints, in so far as praise is given to the works which God does in His saints, so does blasphemy against the saints, redound, as a consequence, against God.
From Saint Thomas Aquinas Collection (22 Books) (2016)
Some enemies of religion, however, failing in their attempt to completely prevent religious from teaching, try to prove, that no religious community ought to have many teachers. In support of this theory they quote the words of St. James (iii. 1), “Let not many of you become teachers, my brethren.” These words the Gloss explains to mean, “Do not desire to have many teachers in the Church.” Now one community of religious is one Church. Hence there ought not to be many masters in a religious community. St. Jerome writes thus to Rusticus—and the words are quoted in VII. quaest. 1.—”Bees have one queen. Cranes follow one leader. There is one captain to a vessel. And one lord in a house.” Hence in one community of religious, it is argued, there ought to be only one master. Furthermore, it must be remembered that there are many religious communities. If each college has more than one teacher, there will be so many religions teachers, that secular masters will, from dearth of pupils, be altogether shut out from the profession. There ought, also, to be a definite number of teachers for every branch of learning; but this great multiplicity of religious professors will cause sacred science to be held in low esteem. These advocates of half measures, commit, in reality, as great an error, as those who desire to see religious totally excluded from the office of teaching. For, all who go astray and cannot keep on the beaten track of truth, fall, in their efforts to avoid one mistake, into the opposite error. Thus, Sabellius, as St. Augustine remarks, striving to keep clear of the Arian heresy of the division of the Divine Essence, fell into the error of confusing the Divine Persons. Boethius also observes that Eutyches, although avoiding the Nestorian heresy of dividing the Person of Christ, fell into the error of teaching that in Him there is unity of nature. The same observation applies to Pelagius, to Manichaeus and to other heretics. On this account St. Paul speaks (2 Tim iii. 8) of “men corrupted in mind, reprobate concerning the faith.” On which text the Gloss enlarges, by saying, that such men “do not stay in the faith, but walk round about it, never remaining on the mean line.”